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ABSTRACT 
The main purpose of this study is to analyse how 
the portuguese regime which ruled Portugal from 1926 to 
1974 (the so called "New State") formulated and implemented 
its educational policy in reference to its broad aims of 
education of portuguese people. The main hypothesis is 
that the main aim of the regime, in regard to education 
of portuguese people, was conformity and passivity. 
This passivity was pursued through the setting 
up of mechanlsms of non participation in public life and 
through several strategies of demobilization; both at the 
political level and the educational level. It will be 
analysed the expressive strategies of mentality inculcation 
through the school curriculum, the organizational strategies 
of compartmentalization of different social strata in 
di f f erent se If -contained status positions through unequal 
access to education and access to unequal education, the 
administrative strategy of centralization which removes 
effective power from teachers and parents in school 
decision-making,the repressive strategies. 
The role of the state in regard to civil society 
will be analysed, since, following the hypothesis, the 
"New State" wanteci a demobilized and depoliticized civil 
society. The two official discourses formulated about 
this role (the corporative and the strong state discourses) 
will be compared. It will be studied how the strong state 
discourse prevailed in policy implementation. 
The implementation of the strong state discourse 
in education will be studied in reference to the non 
corporati ve practice, to the evolution of the portuguese 
youth organization ("Mocidade Portuguesa"), to the state 
control over private education, and to the setting up of 
an administrative state in education through centralization. 
This thesis may also contribute to a better 
understanding about the nature of authoritarian political 
regimes and about corporatist theory and practice in such 
regimes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
GOULDNER concluded that a dis functional aspect 
of bureaucracy comes from the fact that a detailed 
definition of non acceptable organizational behaviours 
increases the knowledge about the minimum acceptable 
behaviour standards (GOULDNER 1954). Once the Ph.D. becomes 
a compulsory certification for the university career, 
the organizational behaviour congruent with the strategy 
to obtain it can be subject to GOULDNER's analysis. 
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In fact to make a Ph.D. thesis, in Portugal, 
implies, even if only implicit/y, to hold a certain X 
conception about what such a degree should be. If one choses 
a minimum behaviour one should avoid problematic areas 
or subjects not yet studied, controversial issues, 
ideological matters, areas were access to sources is 
difficult and the like. 
A different strategy implies risks, especially 
that the amount of work will not be noticed, or of the 
amount of time and effort involved being judged by the 
minimum pattern. Besides that there is less control over 
the amount of time and effort involved in the investigation 
of a real perplexing problem than in a more known research 
path. 
But obviously there are reasons to follow the 
less easy track in spite of all this. Those reasons are 
in certain way the story of this research. 
1. TBB PROBLEM 
This research began with the main purpose of 
analysing the effectiveness of the unification of Portuguese 
post-primary education under the hypothesis that its 
inadequacies arose from the fact that the change of 
objectives had not been followed by the congruent change 
in processes (pedagogical structures and government 
structures). 
Interviewing committed teachers - supposedly more 
open to innovation to obtain information about their 
attitudes towards the problem and the hypothesis a vague 
perplexity arose in face of the attitudes exhibited. 
The attitudes which struck the researcher were 
the following: 
a) Passive acceptance of the continuation of 
central control over educational decision-making, even 
after the setting up of a teacher elected government 
committee in 1974, following the revolutionary situation 
created by the military "coup d'etat" of 25th April 1974 
which overthrew the regime which ruled Portugal since 1926; 
b) Conformist and conservative attitudes towards 
school based educational innovation ref lected in an 
inability to use the room for manoeuver existent in the 
system, which was restricted but present; 
c) Pedagogical individualism indicated by non 
willingness for group work: 
d) A tendency to conceive the role of the elected 
teacher composed government committee as a minimum role 
of bureaucratic manager, accepting and encouraging a 
"laissezfaire" leadership: 
e) A tendency to reject any formal distinction 
at the pedagogical authority level, between qualified and 
non qualified teachers (NOTE 1): 
f) Explicit avoidance of any formal form of close 
control or accountability. 
"Prima facie" some of those attitudes seemed 
contradictory with the educational philosophy which seemed 
to support the new system of school government set up in 
1974 - it is the case of attitudes a), b), c) and d) (NOTE 
2). Other attitudes seemed contradictory with the committed 
or innovatory position of the interviewed teachers it 
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is the case of attitudes a), b), d) and f). All those 
attitudes seemed contradictory with professional values 
(NOTE 3). 
However well founded such considerations may be, 
they led the researcher to think that those attitudes could 
not be explained solely within the study of the problems 
of unification of post-primary education. The possible 
non congruence of those teachers at ti tudes to the changes 
in processes ne.cessary to achieve the new aims could not 
be explained just by studying the issues, policy formulation 
statements or implemented policies generated in the process 
through which post-primary schools became comprehensive. 
It was hypothesized that the answer to such 
teachers attitudes could not be found by isolating the 
professional from' the citizen, separating professional 
values from national cultural values, disconnecting job 
socialization from teacher's own formal primary, secondary 
and university education. This meant that those listed 
attitudes should be firstly analyzed as cultural 'ones, 
which implie'd a study of both the political and educational 
environment into which those teachers lived and were reared. 
The main problem of the thesis became the 
permanence of conformist and passive attitudes in teachers 
even after the revolutionary change in society and 
specifically in the educational system. Conformism and 
passivity can be seen, in a cultural sense, as resistance 
to change, to innovation. The importance of the problem 
is indicated by the fact that only committed teachers were 
interviewed, many of whom of assumed leftist ideology and 
all were supposedly open to innovation. The problem seemed 
more interesting for the researcher because all interviewed 
teachers rejected being labelled as conformist and actually 
blamed the Ministry of Education (the central 
administration) for this passivity. 
The study of the (new) problem implied two main 
dimensions the study of the political administrative 
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and educational system in which the present teachers were 
educated (the historical dimension) and, secondly, the 
study of the present situation with regard to the cultural 
socialization of the teacher as a citizen, as a civil 
servant and as an educational professional. 
The study of the historical dimension led us to 
the study of the political, administrative, cultural and 
educational system of the New State. In fact, the 
overwhelming majority of the present teachers had been 
educated during the New State, that is, during the regime 
under which Portugal was ruled from 1926 to 1974, led by 
Salazar (1932-1968) and Caetano (1968-1974), overthrown 
by the military "coup d"tat" of 25th April of 1974. 
That is the path which led the investigator to 
the study of the New State in its political and educational 
dimensions. Such a study had revealed itself so complex 
and arduous and, at the same time, so absorbing and so 
revealing that it became the only theme of this research. 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF THE -HEW STATE- POLITICAL 
AND EDUCATIONAL REGIME 
A first reason which makes this study important 
had already been stated. It was during the New State that 
the basic socialization of the overwelming majority of 
the present teachers was done as pupils, as non qualified 
teachers and trainee teachers and, for the majority, even 
as tenured teachers. The same applies to the high civil 
servants of the Ministry of Education who rule the 
educational system (NOTE 4). 
One has "not a depoliticized people, but a people 
poli ticized in a certain way, 
We are also like that. One 
educa ted in a certain way. 
must know that even the 
resistance to this certain way will bear the mark of it, 
at least in the beginning" (BIVAR 1975, 27). This certain 
way was the "vocation to serve submissively, which was 
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inculcated in each of our children, in each of us" (ibidem, 
26). As SALGADO ZENHA conunented even those who did fight 
the regime suffered its influence, although reactively 
(in LOURENCO 1976, 229). "What the Salazarism was, it 
was in great part within us and with us" (JOAQUIM 1979). 
A second important reason is that the New State 
is the political, administrative and cultural context in 
which the system of centralized management of the country 
was rebuilt to match the needs of a twentieth century state. 
Such a system was the framework of educational management. 
Such a system remains relatively unaltered and 
is still today the government mould of education. As will 
be shown, this administrative continuity extends to the 
most part of the sectors of public administration. 
When one thinks that the passive and conformist 
attitude inculcated by the New State is the attitude 
necessary for the continuation of the central bureaucratic 
control of education (see FORMOSINHO 1986) and it is 
congruent with attitudes a), b) and d) observed in the 
interviewed teachers the importance of the study of the 
New State becomes clearer (NOTE 5). 
Is the logic of this centralized system entirely 
independent from the logic of the regime which rebuilt 
it? That is, what is the relationship between this 
political regime and this administrative system? What are 
the relationships between the centralized control and the 
inculcation of passive and submissive attitudes in the 
controlled civil servants? The answer to such questions 
is obviously important in face of what can be hypothesized 
as an attitude continuity congruent with an administrative 
continuity. 
A third reason for the importance of the study 
of the New State regime is the fact that it was this New 
State regime, under the rule of Caetano (1968-1974) and 
under the educational leadership of Veiga Simao (1970-1974), 
which was the promotor of the great reform of the 
educational system which democratized access to education 
and started mass schooling (see chapter one, section 3.5.). 
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Such reform is still the basis of the present educational 
system - the reform law of 1973 (Law 5/73, 25-7-1973) was 
only substituted in October 1986 (Law 46/86, 14-10-1986). 
Most of the ideas which were developed after the overthrown 
of New State regime, in the 25th April of 1974, were 
developments of previously formulated policies. In some 
cases they were only formulated, in many formulated and 
formally adopted in the Law 5/73, in many other cases the 
formulation and adoption was followed by the first steps 
of its implementation. Examples of the last include co-
education in schools, the design of new curricula for 
secondary schools, the unification of secondary schooling, 
the creation of new teacher education colleges, the creation 
of poly technical education, the reform of universities 
and the creation of new universities (NOTE 6). 
3. THE MAIN CONCEPTS USED - EDUCATION, PASSIVITY, 
DEMOBILIZATION 
It is useful at this point to define the precise 
meaning of the main concepts which will be used - education, 
passivity, demobilization. 
When it is said that the New State educated for 
passivity we mean that it educated for an attitude and 
practice of no civic participation (neither in political 
discussion nor in political meetings, associations or 
campaigns). Further, education is for an attitude and 
practice of no participation in the life of institutions 
or organizations through any active involvement. Passivity 
means also conformism, that is, submissive acceptance of 
traditions and customs, of the existing social order, of 
all authorities. 
Passivity was achieved through several means of 
demobilization, that is, through deliberate strategies 
to avoid the creation of mass dynamics (through mass meeting 
or mass organizations) or groups dynamics (through 
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membership of civil or political groups) or formal 
participation in public life. So passi vi ty is the aim and 
demobilization refers to the means used to achieve this 
aim. 
This thesis studies the processes by which the 
New State inculcated passive and conformist attitudes in 
Portuguese people, children and adults. Education is seen 
as a comprehensive process and takes a broad sense of 
transmission of knowledge, beliefs, values, norms, habits, 
atti tudes, through formal instruction in schools, through 
family rearing practices, through mass media, through public 
institutions and social organizations. 
Starting from this broad definition of education 
the thesis then studies specifically how passivity was 
inculcated through school education. 
4. THE HYPOTHESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENT - THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE THESIS 
4.1. The hypothesis 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the 
main objective of the New State in regard to the education 
of Portuguese people was to inculcate passivity in attitudes 
and conformism in behaviour through demobilization and 
depoliticization. 
There is at this stage good ground to formulate 
such hypothesis it will explain the teacher attitudes 
which bewildered the researcher (see NOTE 5), it will fit 
wi th the impressionistic evidence gathered from the 
researcher I s formal educational experience (obtained from 
1954-1970) and is confirmed by several references see 
BIVAR 1975, 25-27, NUNES 1981. The hypothesis is also very 
plausible at another level it fits well with the 
authoritarian nature of the former regime. 
At the time of its formulation this hypothesis 
contradicted the common teacher I s opinion and the opinion 
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of the great majority of those who wrote on the subject 
about the New State political and educational system. They 
emphasized the mobilizing period of the regime and its 
initial fascist resemblance. Since then the scientific 
studies about the New State successively emphasize its 
authoritarian nature - see CRUZ studies, LUCENA's papers, 
LOUREN~O'S books. 
4.2. The development of the hypothesis 
The explanation of how it is intended to confirm 
the hypothesis is outlined in the structure of this thesis. 
The first chapter deals with the problem of the 
non definition of the New State as a totalitarian regime 
and its characterization as an authoritarian state. That 
is, a state without political mobilization and without 
elaborate guiding ideology. The chapter includes a brief 
reference to its historical development from 1926 to 1974. 
It thus presents a division of New State regime evolution 
into periods. 
The second chapter presents the theoretical basis 
for the New State objective - the New State elitist non 
participatory theory of government - and its practice at 
the level of the formal political mechanisms - the practice 
of non participation. Demobilization at this level was 
pursued through addressing political communications mainly 
to elites (rarely to masses), through autocratic practices 
and through the building of formal mechanisms of non 
participation in public life. 
The third chapter presents the four types of 
strategies used to demobilize the people at social, 
organizational, cultural and psychological levels 
expressive, organizational, administrative and repressive 
strategies. This chapter deals just with the expressive 
strategies at the political and educational levels. At 
the political level the main concern is to prove that no 
generalized political education of the people (so 
characteristic of totalitarian regimes) was intended, using 
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the distinction between ideological indoctrination versus 
mentality inculcation. At the educational level it is 
analyzed how the passive and conformist mentality was 
inculcated through the school curriculum. 
Chapter four develops this theme analysing the 
concrete content of the mentality inculcated through the 
curriculum in the primary school (the only compulsory 
schooling until 1964). This analysis is done following 
New State main values condensed in Salazar I s motto "God, 
Fatherland, Family and Authority". 
Chapter five analyses the organizational strategies 
of the New State - in the first part it studies, at the 
poli tical and social level, the strategies used to 
demobilize the most important social organizations the 
Army, the Church, the University. In the second part it 
analyses in detail how the organizational strategy of 
compartmentalization was applied in the educational system 
to confine different social strata in' different status 
positions through an equal access to education and through 
access to unequal education. 
By reproducing social stratification in a rigid 
way, the compartmentalization reduced mobilization for 
social promotion thus reinforcing conformism. 
Chapter six studies the repressive' strategies 
used to impose by force a "conformed" behaviour, paying 
special attention to the expressive consequences of the 
use (or the threat of use) of repression - creation of 
conformism attitudes. It describes how repression was the 
main answer of the regime to the university student 
mobilization in the 1960 IS. The ch~"i,pter includes a final 
section which serve as conclusion for what had been said 
in chapter three, 
all the different 
four, five and six - it emphasizes that 
strategies try to inculcate a passive 
mentality and a conformist behaviour in a direct or in 
an indirect way. That is to say all those strategies can 
be seen as revolving around an expressive core of passivity 
and conformism. 
This ends the first part of the thesis where the 
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relationship between the political system and the individual 
ci tizen is the main bulk of the analysis (the exception 
being the study of the strategies towards social 
organizations). The emphasis was on the pursuit of passive 
attitudes as a means to promote conformist behaviours. 
The second part is more concerned with the relationship 
between the State and civil society under the guidance 
of the same leading hypothesis. The achievment of passivity 
implied a demobilized and depoliticized civil society, 
which should be achieved by concentrating in a strong state 
(or under its control) all the effective decision-making 
mechanisms and agents. 
Chapter seven studies the theory of the role of 
the State in New State regime. There are two official 
discourses about this role the corporative discourse 
and the strong state one. The strong state discourse is 
congruent with our leading hypothesis, as will be seen 
comparing the two discourses. The same two discourses are 
present in the theory about the role of the state in 
education. To confirm our hypothesis the strong state 
principles should be the implemented ones as shown in the 
next chapter. 
Indeed chapter eight analyses the implementation 
of the theory about the role of the state and shows how 
the practice followed the demobilizing discourse the 
strong state one which gives to the state almost a 
monopolist role in decision-making and minimized the part 
of civil society. Corporatism was only implemented in the 
form of state corporatism. The strong state was not 
implemented (nor formulated) in the mould of a totalitarian 
state (which would be a mobilizing state) but in the shape 
of an Administrative State, that is, a state where decision-
-making is centralized and concentrated in Public 
Administration departments and is done prevailingly 
following bureaucratic criteria. Centralization is an 
administrative strategy which enhances non participation 
of citizens in decisions, thus effectively achieving 
passivity. 
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Chapter nine applies the same analysis to education 
showing that there was no corporative implementation in 
the educational system and that there was not an educational 
totalitarian state. This is shown through the study of 
"Mocidade Portuguesa", the supposedly mobilising Portuguese 
Youth organization. The implementation of an Administrative 
State is analyzed through the practical stand of the state 
towards private education. 
Chapter ten studies the Administrative State in 
education to give evidence of the use of centralization 
as a demobilizing strategy to achieve passivity. This 
chapter proves it through a detailed analysis of the degree 
of control of central administration over the several areas 
of decision-making in preparatory and secondary schools 
in an historical perspective. 
Chapter eleven presents the conclusions of this 
thesis. 
The outline of the thesis shows how the hypothesis 
is being tested through the analysis of several different 
aspects of Portuguese reality. In regard to the educational 
system the thesis confirms the hypothesis through the 
analysis of the school curriculum, mainly the compulsory 
school one (chapters three and four), through the analysis 
of the structure of school which favours unequal access 
to education and access to unequal education (chapter five), 
through the study of university student mobilization 
(chapter six), through the study of Portuguese Youth 
movement - "Mocidade Portuguesa It and the study of the 
position of private education (chapter nine), through the 
analysis of centralization in educational decision-making 
(chapter ten). 
s. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE ANALYSIS 
The previous section outlined how the confirmation 
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of the hypothesis is developed through the thesis. But 
how will this confirmation be made? What methodological 
options will be taken? Which indicators will be used? 
This section will answer these questions. 
5.1. Discipline perspectives 
This thesis does not pretend to relate political 
or educational evolution with economic evolution, nor to 
analyse which type of social group prevailed in decision-
-making areas, or which social alliances existed, that 
is, it does not pretend to develop its arguments in a 
(strict) sociological perspective. 
This study works much more with Political Science 
concepts, as will become clear. As it was already said, 
the problem which was the starting point for this study 
was the perplexity of the researcher in face of what he 
considered conformist and passive attitudes of Portuguese 
preparatory and secondary school teachers in the 
post-revolutionary and new democratic situation of 
Portuguese Education. This perplexity had an answer from 
studying the educational contexts (in a broad sense) in 
which the teachers were reared and instructed and work 
professionally. This implied the study of political regimes 
and its educational policies. Thus the search for Political 
Science concepts is natural. 
But this use of a Political Science framework 
de~nds further clarification. This thesis does not pretend 
to explain the appearance of the "New State" or its long 
survival (although it provides clues to the latter 
question), it does not try to relate the regime developement 
with international political evolution. 
This thesis does not try either to specifically 
elucidate whether the New State can be labelled as a fascist 
regime, since this question seems to depend, in the 
literature, much more on what is intended by fascism than 
on divergence about New State features, as will. be seen 
in chapter one. Thus the discussion of this point would 
divert us from the main purpose of this thesis. 
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The question is put in another way - whether the 
New State was an authoritarian or a totalitarian regime. 
The answer to this question is clear it was an 
authoritarian regime. It is 
framework of the authoritarian 
in the Political Science 
regime that this study is 
developed, 
political 
ideology. 
that is, in the framework of a regime without 
mobilization and without elaborate guiding 
This thesis tries to relate the internal political 
logic of the regime with its educational policy formulation, 
adoption and implementation. As such this study does not 
address questions like the role of the Opposition, the 
influence of the Communist Party, just as it does not 
analyse the role of the Armed Forces wi thin the regime 
or the colonial problem. This does not mean that they are 
minor subjects in the study and understanding of the New 
State, it just serves to state the purposes and limits 
of the present analysis. 
5.2. The educational system as dependent variable a 
methodological strategy 
The educational system appears, in this study, 
as a dependent variable and political system as independent 
variable. This is a methodology strategy which derives 
from the main purposes of the analysis. It is not, in the 
least, assumed as any theoretical explanatory position. 
If one had studied the "resistances" within the educational 
system resistances 
associations, etc. 
be another. 
from teachers, pupils, parents, 
the methodological position would 
It is clear throughout the analysis that no 
mechanistic reproductive explanatory' model is held - see, 
for instance, the analysis of university student 
mobilization, the analysis of "Portuguese Youth" or of 
private education. 
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5.3. The significant use of primary sources 
The thesis uses very much the analysis of primary 
sources to describe and to understand New State theory. 
The study of most of the subjects begins by this analysis 
of primary sources (all translations from portuguese primary 
sources were done by the author unless otherwise stated). 
The primary sources most used are the speeches, 
writings and interviews of SALAZAR and CAETANO. Salazar 
was prime-minister of the New State from 1932 to 1968 and 
was a member of government for forty consecutive years 
(from 1928 to 1968). But he was also the non discussed 
leader of the regime and its main theoretician. CAETANO 
was, for many years, Salazar's presumed sucessor and 
political heir, the second figure of the regime - he was 
President of the National Union (the sole party), President 
of the Corporative Chamber, minister of Presidency (a sort 
vice-prime minister) and Prime Minister (after Salazar's 
illness and retirement from political life) from 1968 to 
1974. He was also an important corporatist theoretIcian 
and a Public Administration expert. So both Salazar and 
Caetano are the most important figures of the regime, both 
as theoreticians and as practioners. (Salazar's speeches 
are generally quoted as it is usual in Portugal with a 
roman numerical symbol indicating the number of the volume, 
and an arabic figure indicating the number of the page) 
(NOTE 7). 
The prevalence of Salazar and Caetano writings 
as sources does not mean the ignorance of other primary 
sources, for instance, writings of other personalities 
of the regime, documents produced by the "Comissao do Livro 
Negro sobre 0 Regime Fascista" ("COmfSsion for a Black 
Book about the Fascist Regime") (NOTE 8). 
As regards to education the main primary sources 
used for the study of policy formulation are the speeches 
and the writings of the Ministers of Education. The main 
primary sources used for the study of policy implementation 
are legislation and other official documents. 
y 
Beyond the obvious reason that primary sources 
give direct access to official formulation of doctrines 
and policies, there are other powerful reasons for this 
methodological option of giving much importance to the 
analysis of primary sources. 
Salazar said once "I know very well what I want 
and where I go" (SALAZAR I, 6). Indeed it seems he did. 
As LUCENA acknowledges "The elite of the ancient regime 
had a very clear notion of what the New State effectively 
was It (LUCENA 1984). This same lucidity appears sometimes 
in education. Salazar plainly stated, in 1948, that there 
were privileges in favour of the richer classes which come 
from the way education in organized (SALAZAR 1948) - it 
is what SAMPAIO calls "the great sense of realities" of 
Salazar (SAMPAIO 1976, 75). GALVAO TELLES, Minister of 
Education, when expanded compulsory schooling from four 
to six years in a social compartmentalized scheme carefully 
avoided the expression "democratization of education" to 
label this policy measure (indeed it was not that), but 
used just the expression "generalization of education" 
(GALVAO-TELLES 1966c, 16-17). 
This lucidity had been being recognized by those 
who have studied New State regime. LUCENA says that lately 
the definitions of New State leaders about the regime are 
very much used by the researchers who search for a political 
definition for the New State (LUCENA 1984). 
JOAQUIM said that New State leaders put adequate 
questions, but gave bad answers (NOTE 9). 
This extensive use of primary sources in the thesis 
was time consuming, but it provided important information 
about the exact doctrinaire formulations and the hesitations 
and contradictions of New State leaders. 
5.4. The comparison of theory and practice through the 
confrontation 
implementation 
of policy formulation and policy 
The discrepancy between theoretical formulation 
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and practical realities is normal in politics, but its 
exagerated proportions is something typical of Portuguese 
politics (see CAETANO 1950, 6-11, 1977, 226 and WIARDA 
1975) and of Portuguese education (SERRAO 1981). "Admittedly 
a gap between rhetorical and practical exertions is not 
the prerogative of the Portuguese, but it is doubtful if 
any other nation would have much to teach them in this 
regard" (BURRIS 1980). In fact in Portugal even legislation 
can be rhetoric it is the tendency for "decrees to 
prefigure the facts" (LUCENA 1976a, 22), the tendency to 
produce "ideological-legal treatises" (SCHMITTER 1975, 
26). 
So MONICA says that "although a useful indicator 
of official ideology, legislation must not be confused 
wi th a description of what actually happens" (MONICA 1978, 
169) • This means that one has to follow a methodology 
of analysis where a permanent confrontation between theory 
and practice, between policy formulation and policy 
implementation is built in. 
The interest of the analysis of primary sources 
to understand New State doctrine is not harmed by this 
probable discrepancy between theory and practice. In fact, 
the acknowledgement and explanation of this discrepancy 
is essential for the understanding of New State purposes. 
The need for an explanation is even more necessary 
since there are areas where this discrepancy does exist 
along with areas where the practice followed closely the 
theory. For instance, between New State theory and New 
State practice about the role of the State there appears 
a divergence which does not occur between the elitist non 
participatory theory of government or the theory about 
the expressive strategies and their practice. 
s.s. The use of quantitative indicators for the confirmation 
of the hypothesis through content analysis 
In the analysis of policy implementation 
quantitative indicators are often used to confirm the 
hypothesis. The use of quantitative indicators has several 
advantages. It gives precise information about some aspects 
of policy implementation not in terms of yes/no, but in 
terms of how much was implemented. It sets up more sensible 
indicators of policy application variations across periods 
(inclusively it helps to confirm the adequacy of the 
division into periods). 
On the other hand, the use of quantitative 
indicators demands a greater accuracy in the previous 
formulation of hypotheses, whose confirmation is more 
independent of subjective judgements about the content 
analysed. 
Quantitative indicators are used generally in 
the research framework of content analysis. Content analysis 
can be seen as a kind of coding (MOSER and KALTON 1979, 
414) whose basis goal is to transform verbal, non 
quantitative documents into quantitative data (BAILEY 1978). 
For most of the policy implementation studies of primary 
sources documents speeches, legislation, textbooks - it 
is adequate to use such method. However content analysis 
is very time consuming it may need days of content 
categorization to build a simple table - and it is sometimes 
difficult to use. It demands the building of a 
categorization scale, the sampling of primary sources, 
the actual collection of data through coding and counting 
of content analysis units, its statistical treatment and 
the preparation of tables for presentation. 
The first use of quantitative content analysis 
in the thesis is to confirm if the elitist non participatory 
theory of government was followed in practice. The type 
of receiver of Salazar's Communications - elites or masses 
- is used as one indicator of this practice (NOTE 10). 
This same content analysis allows us, in the third 
chapter, to study the evolution of the percentage of 
communication to elites across periods which is used as 
an indicator of demobilization. That is, it is expected 
that in the normal pattern of communication it prevails 
communications to elites rather than to masses. 
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The confirmation of the inculcation of a passive 
and conformist mentality through the school curriculum 
is mainly done through content analysis of reading textbooks 
of compulsory schooling (NOTE 11) involving the 
categorization of 1632 texts of fifteen textbooks. A more 
detailed analysis, done in chapter four, shows us the 
content of the mentality thus inculcated. 
In chapter nine a content analysis of "Portuguese 
Youth" (the nationalist youth movement) regulations allows 
us to draw some conclusions about its loss of mobilizing 
purpose. 
The most time consuming and difficult content 
analysis is the one presented in chapter ten to confirm 
the use of centralization as a demobilizing strategy to 
achieve conformism in schools. It uses as indicators the 
degree of control of central administration over sampled 
areas of educational decision-making. 
6. THE ROLE OP BUREAUCRACY 
Bureaucracy is presented, in this study, as the 
organizational link between the political structure and 
the daily school life, in order to inculcate passivity 
and conformism. 
From the theory about the role of the State it 
follows the practice of an Administrative State which 
-directly comands centralization of decision-making of what 
is done in schools. On the other hand, the omnipresence 
and omnipotence of the Administrative State creates in 
individual citizens an attitude of dependence and 
powerlessness, which is present also in teachers in regard 
to educational central administration, and is the necessary 
psychological legitimising support of centralization. 
Thus bureaucracy is presented as the mediator 
of State-Citizen (teacher) relationships which directly 
and indirectly inculcates passive attitudes and conformist 
behaviours. 
7. THE TIME LIMITS OF THIS STUDY - 1926-1968 
The study of New State political regime, and 
principally the study of its educational system, ends in 
1968, that is, it finishes with the termination of Salazar's 
rule. The main reason for this decision is the fact that 
the educational reform formulated, adopted and partially 
implemented in the early 1970's (1970-1974) have little 
to do with previous policies. This educational reform can 
only be adequately studied in conjunction with revolutionary 
and democratic developments after the overthrow of the 
regime in 1974, as STOER (1986) did. This thesis did not 
have adequate space to explain this rupture in educational 
policy within New State regime. This does not mean that 
some conclusions, both at the political and educational 
levels, can not apply to this period, as will be referred 
in due course of this study. This does not also mean that 
sometimes aspects of this period are specifically included 
in the analysis to prove continuity or show contrasts. 
In sum, this is a study of New State political 
regime and educational policy with specific attention to 
the period 1926-1968. 
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:~A?TE 1\ I 
~~E :~A~~CTEkIZATION OF THE J EW S ~~~E 
1. TOWARDS A CHARACTERI ZATION OF THE "NEW STATE" (1926-1974) 
1.1. Why i t is necess ary t o characterize th e " New State " 
The ~~:~ c~scrip:ion Or the main feature~ ~f :te New 
State is ~:: en:_gt :0 clarify the influe~ce c~ t~e 
political :~;~ffi~ on :he educationa l syste~, O~ _ 5 
manag emen: ~~: G~;0r= that on the atti ude~ s : : ~ac~ers in 
port:.;gu e~,,; :. _: :_:'"C: :::' !:Ll:Z: (see Introch:c::cr . . 2~ C,ie mus:: 
t ha t is , " :.:"': :. ::-. :: ::. ...: c -= :: ...:, -;-, t:' c >: p 1 ana tor y : ~ a :: _:' -:::= . 
Such ~ ~:a~~~G;~ ~~:: be ~aturally bcrrc~~: ~:::~ 
Pol: t . cal :.: :... ? !'l C -= , s :. ~, C to t :. iss c i en t i f icc i s c :. ::: ::. i r. E (; a s as 
its bj~ct :~ara::er:z:ng , comparing and Ex~la~~i~; 
political ~-::;:...mcs . 
What ~:...:: ~e askec rom such a character::~tic~ will be 
the theory :~ gcv=r~~~nt of the New State . the ~a:n features 
of t he reg:~E , the role of State and its relat:cnsh:ps with 
Civ i l ian Sc::e: .' , tne role of Public Administra:ion and what 
is expecte: ~r o~ _ ... - -: 7 C,"', C _ _ ""-. _ _ , • ..,,J . ~~is will enable ~~ : : :: ~~ f or 
1 .2. Was t he "N ew Sta te " a fasci s t regime ? 
This :...::: a p;):!.eJ .:c question , but also on '.:::a\'2:dable o~e , 
i f the ct~racterizat: on of the New State reg:~E is pursued . 
It is ~ot only a polemic que s ti on , but also a very 
diff i c ult :::e c answer . 
1 . 2 . 1 . DO; :~.; cuI ties of characterization 
lirs: . there ' s a gr at emotiona l conte ~ : embedded in 
trJe word ":c.scis;n" nowadays it is almost ah:cys used as a 
pej ora t ive ~ualification or as a pol i ti ca l i~sJlt . 
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Second, because th~re are several defini -::":::ms of what is 
fascism. In com~on political use fascism is ap~lied to any 
conservative, right wing dictatorship (or eve~ to any 
dictatorship as is the case of maoist groups w~:ch qua lify 
communist regimes as "social fascism "). Natura::.::.y enough one 
is not going to use common and loose defini tio!:s as such . But 
the difficul ty remains since there are differ-=nt defini tions 
of fascism among political scientists whic h ar-= not entirely 
value free. 
Thirdly, he adoption of a definition anc the 
characteriza ion of a regime as fascist is not ~ccessarilyseen 
as neutral scientific judgement , but also a -:alue judgement 
about a reg:'me (see about this the very rF:s~l:ng words of 
CABRAL 1982) ( NOTE 1 ) . 
It :"5 ~o: by cnatce that portugues~ aut~~~s 
generally prefer to label the New State as fas~:st 
(FIGUEIRS-O 1976 , MARTINS 1970, SANTOS 1982, 5~RAIVA 1974 
among many others) or as a "qualified fa scism " (CABRAL 1982 , 
LUCENA 1976a SARAIVA and SILVA 1976) or as a "::..ittle 
fascism" (RODRIGUES 1982 , SARAIVA and SILVA 1976) (NOTE 2) . 
Many n~n portuguese authors do not consider the Salazar and 
Caetano's regime a fascis t one-see GRAHAM 19 75 , LINZ , MAKLER 
1979, PAYNE 1979a RIEGELHAUPT 1979a , ROBI~SOK -980, SETON 
WATSON 1972, SCH~ITTER 1975a . ~IARDA 1977 . T~e~E are 
c e r t a i n 1 y ex c e j) t i 0 t s (~ e C K ' . Z 1 98 2 c, 1'10 N ::. C A - ~ - e . :3 0 C A 
1970 , GI 'EI'( 19 2), but the main trena may ind:"c~te that the 
characteriza lon of the Ne w State is not independent from 
the intentions and cultural roots of the autho~s. 
1.2.2. Diffe r ences and similitudes between Salazar 'S Portugal 
and Mus solini's Italy 
All author s who addressed this question - how to 
character i ze th i s portuguese regime - record many di fferences 
between Salazar's Portugal and Mussolini' s Italy. There was 
not in Portugal a mobilization intention (LUCE A 1979 a , 
SARAIVA 1974, 60-61, SCHMITTER 1975 b) nor a mobiliz ing 
party (CABRAL 1982, LUCE NA 1979a, MONICA 1978,95 ) nor a 
mobilizing leader (LUCENA 1979 a); the portuguese regime did not produce 
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an artic~:3te ideology (LUCENA 1979 a) a~~ rs=ruited its 
l eaders i~ a completely different way fr~~ Mussolini ' s one 
(LUCENA 1979 a , MONICA 1978 , 95) ; foreign ~olici~s were 
compl etely different (LUCENA 1979 a, MOJi::h 1978,96 , SCHMITTE R 
1975 b ) ; ~r.e role assigned to the Church ',:as ·.;sry different 
(LUCENA 1979 a) ; the main objective wa s 21s0 differen t since 
the main goal of Salazar ' s regime was. a: l~as t in the first 
decades, to preserve a traditional, hiera~ch:c, rural society 
(LUCENA 1979 a , MONICA 1978, 49. RODRIGUE~ 1982 , SARAI VA 
1974 , 59,63 ) . 
Ther~ are also similitudes - they ar~:vcc to power at the 
same timE a. d in the same international c~~tsY.: ; they assigned 
the same r:: e to the HEad o f he S ate . ~~: :~: ?irliamentary 
Chambers io.·:th reduced powers , cn al mo s t c~::. ::';:;:::-=:--. : Goverr;mE:-nt; 
both had c. :orporativE organization bas£:-: ~:-. c. ;';!"'iLciple cf 
class coc~eration and had a centralizec ~:!~=:~rE; both were 
anti-liberal , anti -comunist and nationalistic;both had 
youth organizations and paramilitary orga~izations (s se about 
this LUCE;A 1979a, MONICA 1978 ,95,SARAIVA 1974,58 (NOTE 3). 
Are those similitudes enou gh to subs~~e both regimes 
under the heading of fascism? Are the differences essential or 
accidental in their nature? ror some aut~~rs Lhey are 
accidental and so the New State is a quc:::'fiec fascism. a 
fasc ism v,' :':h scme diffe~' 2:Jces (CI-.BR;'.L - ~ :::: . :;:I\EF, 1982 . 
LUCENA 19-6a . RODRIG UE: 1 S! c~ . .. - - , I ; ' -
It is, of course , always possible ce:ine fascism 1n 
a wide manner as to encompass various scrts of regimes 
(NOTE 4). 
1.2.3. The relevance of characterization 
This later consideration could leac to the conclusion 
that it is irrelevant t o label the New S:ate provided one 
presents an adequate description and explanation of its 
features (LOUREN~O 1976, 239). 
However there are important reasons - to be added 
to those advocated in section 1.1 - which impose a definite 
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labelling :':-. :~. 1 3 cas '.: . ;0 ch~ract e rizE: 2.00 tG s:a_E. that the 
character:z ", d regime is similar to certain G:~.er regimes and 
different from certain another ones . This judge~ent of 
comparisor. and simili ude. is inherent to characterization 
so an inadequa e characterization can be misleading in so far 
as it pinpoir.ts some features which may not be essential and 
overlooks o:hers whi ch may represent the true nature of the 
regime . To be cnnrrete, if one labels the New Etate as fascist 
associatio~ with Mussolini ' s Italy is inevitable and this 
makes one :n:nk of a mobilizing leader leading a mobilizing 
party to t0bili7..e society . 
What - .... hypothesized in this thesis is that the essence 
of the Nev: S ate was the demobilization of society , the 
passivity G~ ci izens . This difference is con5~dered 
essentiF.1l ' see in the same sense MONICA 1978,97, · 
Fro/T, :~.is di fe. E L intei.:iori should res...:lt different 
educationa: ~olicies . ~or the mcment it is a1: :~at can be 
said . It is expected that in :he end of this :~esis the 
hypothesis ~ill be pro 'ed and this judgement ccnsidered 
adequate. 
The ~cn characteriza ion of the regime as fascism will 
permit us to avoid temptations found in so many works - to 
consider the New State as something of a foreign model 
imposed on ~ortugal which inhibits identification of its 
specific po~:uguese characteristics ; and to overemphasize 
the initia: period of :nE re£::'~e (1932 - 1945) ic~getting 
to explair: :':s "surv' val" tor 2:.LTlost thir\:)' ye2:.::-'s IT,ore ; and 
to fall in::. t e trap ·t being more concerr:eG '",': th fascism 
than with :~e Ne Stat~ itself (NOTE 5) . 
1.3 Was the New State a totalitarian regime? 
1.3.1. New State leader statements that the New State was 
not totalitarian 
This was the self-assumed stand of the portuguese regime. 
The leaders of the New State very explicitly put up their 
distances towards contemporary fascism and nazism and rejected 
t otalitarianism, even when in ernal and external pressures 
pointed in that direction (NOTE 6) 
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Salazar said in 1934: "it i~ nece~~a~v to ~emove t~om u~ 
the impu~~e towa~d~ the to~mation ot what cou~d be ca~~ed a 
totaLiA.a~ian State. A State ~ubduinf} a~~, without exception, 
to an idea~ ot nation o~ ~ace ~ep~e~ented by it [ ••• ] cou~d 
lead to an ab~o~uti~m wo~~e than that which exi~ted beto~e the 
~ibe~a~ ell..a" (SALAZAR I, 340-341). In 1932, in his interviews 
to FERRO, he said "The ta~ci~t dictato~~hip tend~ to a paf}an 
Cae~a~i~m, to a new ~tate which doe~ not ~ecof}niJe ~ef}a~ o~ 
mo~al ~imitation~ [. •• J On the contll..a~v, the New State cannot 
~un awav, and doe~ not think in lI..unninf} awav, tll..om ce~tain 
Li..mitation~ ot mOll..al natulI..e [ ••• J" (SALAZAR ip FERRO 1982, 
113-114). "None ot u~ wou~d attill..m in 'PolI..tuf}al the om!7..{.po~ence 
o~ the State [ ••• ]; none ot u~ wou~d conceive ~he.State a~ the 
~ou~ce ot a~~ mOll..a~itv and ju~tice G .. ] without any ~e~pect 
tOll.. individua~ con~cience, to~ the ~ef}itimate t~eedom ot 
(SALAZAR I, 
289). Consequently SALAZAR is against a state based in 
violence - he is "tOIl.. a lI..epime ot ~tll..onf} ~epa~ity apain~t a 
lI..ef}ime ot vio~ence" (SALAZAR II, 70-71) - see also his 
interview to FERRO 1982 (115-117) (NOTE 7). 
According to New State official statements the State· 
should have limits to its power; this was" leitmotiv"in 
of Sal azar' s speeches (see SALAZAR I 80, I I 70-71 , 
237-239, IV 366, VI 41). Those limits were explicitly 
asserted in the 1933 Constitution (article 4) '- they were 
and Morals. 
many 
III 
Law 
Those proclaimed limitatiDns are very important to 
separate the New State from tctalitarianism (CRUZ 1982 C). The 
moral limitation was very important ~ince it was clear that 
it referred to the traditional roman catholic moral as defined 
by the Church (see LUCENA 1976 a, 129-133). 
We will retu"rn to this point in chapter seven, section 1.5 . 
1.3.2. Non totalitarian indicators 
There is consensus among political scientists and 
historians who wri te about the New State (NOTE 8) to reject 
the totali tarian characterization applied to the regime and 
thus to accept its claims. 
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There are several features of the New Stat~ which can be 
used as indicators - the absence of mobilization and of a 
mobilizing party ( Hthe aim ot the ~e~ime wa~ depo~itici~ation 
~athe~ than ma~~ mobi~i~ation" ROBINSON 1979, 52), the lack 
of an articulate ideology to regulate all aspects of life. 
Indeed the last aspect is a touchstone of the distinction 
between totali tarian and authori tarian states (see LINZ 1975 
- puting some questions to the distinction see V~.RTINS 1969). 
Adriano MOREIRA makes the distinction in those terms - the 
State will be II au.tho~ita~ian o~ tota~ita~ian a~ ta~ a", it 
on~~ p~opo",e", O~ a~""o impo""e", an ideo~o~~ to the civi~ 
~ocietv- H (MOREIRA 1979,143). 
The New State did not have such ideology (:'::::EI~A 1979 a) 
or at least did not try to impose it (CRUZ 1982 -:). The regime 
was ideologically ecletic, as ~ill be seen below, and did not 
attempt to create a new revolutionary man (LUCEI:A 1979 a); it 
did not interphere wi th the life of civil society everywhere 
(GINER 1982). 
This non 
perverted by a 
seen through:)ut 
totalitarian philosophy was not, as a rule, 
totalitarian pratice (CRUZ 1982c), as will be 
the thesis (NOTE 9). This does not mean 
that there were no totalitarian elements within the regime, 
mainly in its early years (see NOGUEIRA 1977b, 162), nor 
that profascist totalitarian tendencies were nc: ;resent 
mainly since 'the 1930's, until the end of the Second World 
War, but they were episodic or exceptional, they were never 
the core of the regime (NOTE 10) - see section 2.1.1 . 
1.3.3. Explanation of the non totalitarian nature 
There are several reasons for the non totalitarian nature 
of the regime - both internal and external reasons. As reasons 
internal to the regime one can point the catholic belief of 
the leaders of the regime (CRUZ 1980,376); their juridical 
formation which made them inclined to build an "Etat de 
Droi til (CRUZ 1982 c, LUCENA 1976 a); a theory of eli tes based 
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on passivi ty and not on mobilization as characteristic of a 
totalitarian regime; the leader's theory about portuguese 
temperament and the essence of portuguese Nation; the rural 
project for portuguese society; and probably the temperament 
and style of Salazar himself (NOTE 11). 
As reasons external to the regime one can point to the 
strength of the catholic Church in Portugal (see as an indicator 
the episode of the foundation of "Mocidade Portuguesa" 
- Portuguese youth - NOTE 12), the important role of the Army 
which was one of the pillars of the regime, the passive 
resistance of the middle classes or significant part of them 
(CABRAL 1983), the resistance of a gTBat part of the intellectuals 
(ROBINSON 1979,81 ), the stage of development of the portuguese 
economy and society. 
1.4. The New State as an authoritarian regime 
Almost all american scholars who write about Portugal 
characterize the New State as an authori tarian regime - see 
among them BLUME, BRUNEAU, GRAHAM, MAKLER, PAYNE, RIEGELHAUPT, 
SCHIMITTER, WIARDA. 
It has already been saidthat portuguese authors prefer 
generally the characterization of fascism. But recent studies 
call atention to features of the New State which are those of 
an authoritarian regime, mainly demobilisation - see LOURENt;O 
1976, MONICA 1978. The most recent studYby CRUZ(1982 c) 
points to an authoritarian framework. LUCENA last studies also 
seem to point in that direction (NOTE 13). 
1.4.1. Characterization of authoritarian regimes 
LINZ tried, in an article in 1964, to define a variety of 
regimes, which were neither d~mocratic nor totalitarian 
poli tical systems, as authori tarian regimes. Later articles 
elaborated on that (1970,' 973) and a general theory appeared 
in 1975. 
According to LINZ authoritarian regimes are political 
systems with limi ted. non responsible. political pluralism; 
wi thout elaborate and guiding ideology but with distinctive 
mentalities; without intensive nor extensive political 
mobilization (except at some points in their development)i and 
in which a leader (or ocasionally a small group) exercises 
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power wi thin formally ill-defined limits, but actually qui te 
predictable ones (LINZ 1970,1975) (NOTE 14). 
According to LINZ limited pluralism means 'the legal or 
de facto restrictions put to the creation or activity of 
political groups, interest group or institutions; as long as 
there remains groups not created by or dependent on the state 
which influence the political process there is limited 
pluralism. This pluralism is limited, because the rulers 
ul timately define which groups they will allow to exist and 
under what conditions. 
In contrast with the accountability of a democratic 
regime, this pluralism is not responsible (to people) since 
political power is not legally or de facto accountable 
through such groups to the citizens, even when it might be 
quite responsive to them. The men who come to power 
reflecting the views of various groups and institutions 
deri ve their posi tion not from the support of those groups alone, but 
from the trust placed in them by the leader or ruling groups 
- so there is a constant process of co-optation of members for 
the ruling groups which accounts for the heterogeneous and non 
politically professional character of the elite (LINZ 1975, 
265-266). 
LINZ considers both ideologies and mentali ties as part 
of a broader phenomenon of ideas leading to action- oriented 
ideals, but makes a distinction. Mentalities are ways of 
thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational, that 
provide non codified ways of reacting to different situations' 
On the contrary, Ideologies are belief systems based on fixed 
elements and characterized by strong affect and closed 
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cognitive structure, with considerable constraining power 
important for mass mobilization. Ideo19gies are characterist~c of 
totalitarian regimes. mentalities are typical of authoritarian 
regimes. Mentality is psychic predisposition, ideology is 
reflection, self-interpretation; mentality is previous. 
ideology later; mentality is formless. fluctuating, ideology 
is firmly formed; mentalities are closer to the present or the 
past, ideologies have a strong utopian element (LINZ 1975. 
266-269). 
Another characteristic of authoritarian regimes is the 
lack of political mobilization and political participation of 
citizens and even of many of their supporters. Several reasons 
contribute to this - effective mobilization, particularly 
through a single party and its mass organizations, would be 
perceived as a threat by the other components of the limited 
pluralism, typically the army, the church, the bureaucracy and 
interest groups (to break those constraints would mean to move 
ei ther in a totali tarian direction or in a democratic one); 
Further the absence of an ideology is a serious obstacle to 
mobilization and alienates the young, the students and the 
intellectuals from the regime;the heterogeneous character 
of the elite does not facilitate mobilization. Beyond those 
reasons, inherent to the nature of authoritarian"regimes, 
there is generally the underdeveloped character of the 
population, mainly of rural population (which consti t:.aes a 
large portion of the total population) which has no 
participatory political culture; also many authoritarian 
regimes came to power after periods of competitive democratic 
participation that created conflicts in society - so many 
ci tizens fel t the depoli ticization brought about by the new 
regime as a relief. 
Demobilisation is also actively sought by the rulers 
since it fi ts wi th their mentalities and reflects the 'w'i shes 
of the insti tutions and groups which are part of the limi ted 
pluralism which supports them. ~s a consequence the regi~e 
tends to reduce politics to mere administration of public 
interest and to de facto expression of particular interests. 
So authoritarian regimes are based on demobilisation, 
depoliticization and non participation. This means that no 
mass organizations or mass meetings are encouraged, there are 
no regular voluntary campaigns or face-to-face propaganda 
acti vi ties, no encouragement to ci tizens participation in the 
life of institutions, no encouragement or appeal to political 
participation through the vote, no importance given to 
electoral mechanisms in chosing the country's leaders or 
organizational leaders. 
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1.4.2. Demobilization and passivity as the essence of the 
regime - the hypothesis 
It is our hypothesis that passivi ty 'Was the main goal of 
the regime, that the New State 'Wanted a demobilised and 
depoliticized civil society. This passivity and 
depoli ticization demanded a theory and practice of government 
based on demobilisation, demanding conformism from individual 
citizens, organizations and social institutions. By passivity 
is meant an atti tude and practice of no participation ei ther 
in political discussions meetings or campaigns, no 
participation in the life of institutions through active 
involvement, no discussion of public issues, in general terms 
. 
no involvement in political life at any level; it means also 
submissive acceptance of traditions and customs, of the 
existing social order, of all authorities. 
As a matter of fact 'Words like demobilization, 
depoliticization, non participation, obedient compliance, 
conformism, passivity, apathy has been used by several authors 
to characterize the New State intentions - see DALE and STOER, 
GRAHAM, LOURENCO, LUCENA, MAKLER, MARTINS, RIEGELHAUPT, 
ROBINSON, SCHMITTER, WIARDA among others. 
'Salazar's leadership was never a dynamic one, and even lacked 
a strong charisma (CRUZ 1982 c). Salazar's rule can be 
adequately described as monotonous, grey and melancholic 
(LUCENA 1979 a), based on routine not on exceptional events, 
on daily governmental acts not on enthusiastic speeches (NOTE 
15),a marked contrast with previous political behaviour in 
Portugal. 
Salazar carried so far this wish to "deal with a sleeping 
country" (LUCENA 1979 a) that he was often accused of 
immobility(- see his acknowledgment of this accusation and his' 
deffense as reflected in SALAZAR IV 188-189, VI 437,442-443 ). 
This essentially passive nature of the regime fi is 
adequately with LINZ's characterization of authoritarian 
regimes. One is not using the New State to exemplify LINZ' s 
theory or to search for an adequation of portuguese regime to 
LINZ's subtypes (see LINZ 1975). Rather LINZ's elaboration 
-- - .. -. 
will be used as a general framework for the analysis of 
the primary sources of the New State. 
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To aid the characterization of the New State regime in 
the authoritarian framework a reference to its limited 
pluralism is necessary. 
2. LIMITED NON RESPONSIBLE PLURALISM 
Evidence for the existence of a limited pluralism wi thin 
the regime will come first through the analysis of its 
ideological sources, second through the existence of 
compromises in the main constitutional document of the regime 
(the Consti tution of 1933) and third through the analysis of 
the different groups inside the regime. 
It is also our concern here to carry eviCience for the 
hypothesis of demobilisation and passi vi ty as the main aim of 
the regime. In this way it is argued that the main ideological 
source of the regime was not fascism, that fascist 
constitutional ideas did not prevail nor any fascist group was 
lastingly important within the regime. 
2.1. Ideological ecletism of the regime 
We will begin showing how the more fascist like periods 
of the regime carne from reasons which were external to its 
natural development. 
2.1.1. The fascist source 
a) Tactical fascistization - fascistization from within 
One of the groups which initially supported the new 
regime was that responsible for the first appearance of fascist 
ideas and ri tuals wi thin New State supporters it was 
"integralismo 1 usi tano" movement. This was an intelectual 
movement, born in Portugal after 1914, with right wing 
ideology, repudiating liberalism and individualism,defending 
organic representation and corporatism of association, 
decentralization and the restoration of numicipalist 
tradi tion, pre-consti tutiona1 monarchy. It attracted the pa!t 
of the new generation which was very nationalistic and very 
traditional (CRUZ 1982a, and b, MARTINS 1970, i 
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MA R 0 U E S 1 97 6 , 1 7 a -1 7 9 , WIARDA 1577, 75-79. The Ne"w ; 
State took from it only some aspects - its traditionalism and 
nationalism and some aspects of its corporative ideology, but 
the regime never restored monarchy, never decentralized 
following municipalist theories, never accepted fully organic 
representation and substi tuted corporatism of association by 
state corporatism (NOTE 16), since this conflicted with 
limited pluralism, that is, would upset those compromises 
which make possible the adherence of several groups to the New 
State. 
In 1932 a group emerged from this movement to form an 
autonomous political movement which adopted fascist ideology, 
symbols and rituals - they were the National-Synaicalism 
movement. They tried to build a kind of party state with 
militia type organizations (see NOTE 9). As this new movement 
grew and its leader (Rolao Preto) began to be charismatic, 
Salazar and the mainstream of New State supporters fel t the 
need to neutralize it. This was done through c~ptation of the 
most part of its followers despite the resistance of their leaders. 
This process of co-optation provoked what one can call a 
"tactical fasci sti zation" of the regime. Co-optation means 
choice by the present members of the elites of the new members 
that is, recruitment for the ruling group by the ruling group 
and from that a slow process of. assimilating the new member 
to the values and norms of the group. 
This tactical fascistization was translated into some 
political activities. First, the creation in the end of 1933 
of a youth movement which took a radical tone 
(PINTO and RIBEIRO 1982). This movement which was the 
predecessor of "Mocidade Portuguesa" (Portuguese youth), was 
called "Acc;ao Escolar Vanguarda" (Vanguard School Action) 
(NOTE 17). 
A second poli tical acti vi ty which can be encompassed in 
this tactical expedient is the promotiori of the first congress 
of "Uniao Nacional" (National Union), the regime's sole party, 
in May 1934 (see PARREIRA et alia 1982). 
This fascistization process of this New State 
organization had the double purpose of emptying the 
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threatening movement (by recrui ting members '.. the same area 
and by transfering militants) and of controll:~g the 
enthusiasm of new recruits (which implied to g~ partially 
along with them, but to keep firmly the contr~l of the 
situation). 
One can conclude that to maintain passiv::y it is at 
times necessary to go along with enthusiasm. 
b) Defensive fascistization - fascistiz~tion from 
without 
Those internal pressures which culmir.ate~ in the tactical 
fascistization of 1933-1934 were followed by Exter~al 
pressures derived from the Spanish Civil v;=.:- :r.i tiated in 
1936. It is what MARTINS (1970) calls a "fas::'st:'zation from 
wi thout". a def ensi ve fasci s ti za tion (see a:'::ut thi s period 
MARTINS 1970, ~~RQUES 1976,183-186, ROBINSON 1?79,58-60, 
SCHMITTER 1979). The civil war in Spain was co~sidered a 
matter of life or death for the regime (NOTE 1 E) and thus the 
year 1936 saw the creation of many potentially ~obilizing 
organizations - the "Mocidade Portuguesa" (Portuguese Youth), 
"Legiao Portuguesa" (Portuguese Legion) alongside with the 
"Obra das Maes pela Educac;ao Nacional" (Association of Mothers 
for National Education) (NOTE 19). 
"Legiao Portuguesa" was a paramili tary :rga~ization (a 
militia), headed by the Army, entrusted with :he crganization 
of civil defence and acting as a reserve force of the regime. 
"Mocidade Portuguesa" combined scout principles with political 
and religious formation. Both movements had 
fascist-like rituals but both declined after the Second World 
War (MARTINS 1970). MARQUES says that "Mocidade Portuguesa" 
"rapidly declined and became a subject of contempt or ironical 
comment for most adolescents "(MARQUES 1976,186). Both 
movements lasted until 1974, what needs explanation (which 
will be given in regard to "Mocidade Portuguesa" in chapter 
nine, section 2). 
One can conclude that fascist tendencies carne to the 
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regime not by natural development of inner tendencies of the 
mainstream of the regime supporters. They came first to meet tactical 
needs, then defensive needs and not independently from the 
prevailing international context. Over both ta:tical needs 
and the international context had changed, it was logical 
that there was no longer any need for expression of those 
marginal tendencies. That was indeed tha cas~ in the post-
-war period - by the early 1950s the regime's concerns were 
completely different and fascist rituals useless (NOTE 20). 
2.1.2. The catholic doctrinaire source 
The main ideological source of New State was catholicism 
as translated into political philosophy (christian democracy) 
and as translated into social philosophy (Church's social 
doctrine) . 
"The ~e~a~ion~ ot ca~ho~ici~m ~o ~a~aJa~i~m ~~ no~ a 
pu~e~v ex~~in~ic ~e~a~ion~hip~, bu~ ~ome~hln~ ot ideo~o~lca~~~ 
int~in~ic to the ~e~ime. 5a~aJa~ wa~ [ ••• 1 in hl~ own waV and 
hi~ own time a ch~i~tian democ~at"; "Jndeed catho~ic 
inte~ec~ua~~ end up bein~ the a~mo~t exc~u~ive doct~inai~e~ 
ot ~he New 5~a~e" (CRUZ 1980,17 and 377 - see also pages 16-
-19) . 
But obviously the New State was far from a pure version 
of christian democracy; CRUZ calls it a uta~ci~~iJin~ ve~~ion 
ot ch~i~~.i..an democ~acv": (CRUZ 1 980,18 and 375) (NOTE 21 ). 
This catholic source can be seen in almost: -oall areas of 
poli tical life - it can be seen in the founding elite and in 
groups wi thin the regime (see section 2.3) in the 
33 
expressi ve strategies used by the regime {see chapters th..1"€€ and four)in 
the relationships between Church and State (see chapter five) 
in the ethical limi ts to the role of the ~tate (see chapter seven, 
section 1.5), in the mentality inculcated through family and 
schoolS (see chapter four). 
It was also the main ideological source of corporatism 
which was the basis of New State political and social 
structure (at least in theory) t as· shall be seen in chapter 
four. 
2.1.3. Other ideological sources 
There are other ideOlogical sources in the New State. The 
monarchic tradition in its absolutist form and patrimonialist 
doctrines were also an inspiration for some sectors of the New 
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State, although monarchy was never restored (CRUZ 1985). 
Related with that is the state patrimonialism and 
centralization traditions which very much influenced the doctrine 
and the practice about the role of the state towards civilian society 
and the structure of public administration - see about those 
traditions VALENTE 1983, WIARDA 1977. 
One cannot call liberalism a source of inspiration of the 
regime's ideology, although CAETANO proclaims in 1941 "We will 
keep everything truly good and human which liberalism defended" ( Cl£fAAO 
1941,124,1950,23). But liberalism was certainly a limitation 
to the full application both of absolutist patrimonialist 
ideas and of corporative solutions, as we will be seen in the 
next pages. 
2.1.4. The most important source for mentality inCUlcation 
through education was the catholic doctrine 
The catholic doctrine was by far the most important source 
for the educational system both in its broad meaning including all 
type of social mentali ty inculcation or in 
a more restrict sense of family and school education or even 
in the narrowest meaning - (state school education ),as will be 
best seen in chapters three, four and nine. 
2.2. Compromise in the New State Constitution - 1933 
Unanimously authors consider the Consti tution of the New. 
State (1933) as a compromise consti tution - see CABRAL 1976, 
CAMPINOS 1975, CRUZ 1982 c, LUCENA 1976 a,122-126,1978 a,89-
-93, MARQUES 1976,190,MARTINS 1970. 
The'main compromise is between demo-liberal principles 
of individual representation and corporatist principles of 
organic representation which demand that the Nation be 
represented in pOli tical bodies by its structural elements 
( the "living bodies") - families, municipali ties , corporative 
bodies. Those were all represented in the "Camara Corporativa" 
(Corporative Chamber), but this body had only consultative 
character. In contrast, both the President of Republique 
and the Parliament were elected by individual citizens. This 
represented the primacy of individual representation over' 
corporative representation. 
The Consti tution 'Was based on t'Wo concepts of Nation -
- firstly, nation as the 'Whole of portuguese ci tizens, that 
is, nation as the portuguese people, and, secondly, nation as 
the network of its "structural elements" or "living bodies", 
the "trans personal cuI tural community" (CAETANO 1 972 a, 509), 
the historical heritage to be continued today 
(LUCENA 1976 a,123-124, LUCENA 1978 a,89-93, CAMPINOS 1975,20-
-24 and CAETANO 1972 a, 508-509). The firs t concept is used in 
the main elements of the poli tical structure; the second one 
is the theoretical doctrinaire support of the Ne'W State, the 
basis of corporatism and corporative political philosophy. The 
second concept of Nation is also the bedrock of natior.alism 
and of portuguese naticnal destiny and mission and the 
legi timacy basis of Salazar's leadership (see CAMPINOS 1975, 
25-31 and 45-47) 
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The compromise which charactrised the Constitution is congruent ~·ith the 
ideological heterogeneity of the regime. SALAZAR himself 
praised ecleticism in political practice (NOTE 22). 
2.3. Groups inside the regime - the practice of limited 
pluralism 
The regime was never monoli thic nor free of conflicts. 
There were different groups competing for influence - they 
changed at times. Conflicts were always in soft tone and 
behind the scenes. CAETANO even said that there had been in 
the Government persons that, under a party system, would have 
been in different parties (see SALAZAR's agreement to this in 
SALAZAR V,398,406-407. VI~3561 . 
In the beginning pluralism 'Was more intense, but with 
time it turned "more and more respectful" (LUCENA 1979 a) and 
thus more limited. This was a natural consequence of the 
reinforcement of Salazar's authority. (In Caetano's rule 
(1968-1974) pluralism became more intense again - see GRAHAM 
1975,40-48 ). 
This pluralism came from different groups inside the 
regime. Although the catholic source was dominant it does not 
make much sense to speak of a catholic group since·. all groups 
were composed of catholics. 
Indeed cathol:c groups which were active during the 
previous republica~ regime (1910-1926) were at the very center 
of the New State foundation. 
In 1910 the ~~narchy was abolished and a Republican 
Regime began. The republican ideology and practice was 
strongly anti-cler:cal, anti-catholic and anti-religious. In 
the words of its most proeminent leader (Afonso Costa) it was 
the Republic's intention to extinguish religion in Portugal 
in two generations. Even accepting this as a boast it 
certainly was the intention of the leaders to put an end to 
the existing Cathclic Church. They formulated and 
policies towards t~:s objective (see MARQUES 1976, 
ROBINSON 1977). 
implemented 
and 
It is not sur;: ri sing that such policies pushed the 
catholic leaders tc accept, or even to desire, an 
authoritarian regi~e in which the Church could be protected. 
Earlier there had been a catholic revival at the turn of 
the 19th century (ROBINSON 1977, MARQUES 1976, 130) and some 
new religious organizations were introduced. One of them - the 
~ (Centro Academico de Democracia Crista) - was to provide 
the great part of the founding elite of the New State 
(ROBINSON 1977, BRrNEAU 1976, CERQUEIRA 1973, FIGUEIREDO 1976, 
29-30). The CADC ~as a small catholic students society in 
Coimbra of which Salazar, Cardinal Cerejeira (patriarch of 
Lisbon and virtual leader of the Portuguese Church from 1929 
to 1971), the President of the Parliament and many others were 
members. So the New State was born linked with catholic 
leaders and the University of Coimbra at the same time. 
Another catholic group became influential, beyond the one 
linked to the founding elite - "Acc;ao Catolica" movement 
("Catholic Action") was influential at a certain time. 
An important permanent group was the monarchic one 
36 
(Salazar himself yas believed to be monarchic in his heart by 
no other than CAETANO - CAETANO 1977,368). The main aim of 
this group was to lead Salazar to restore monarchy. They tried 
it more than once, but with no sucess (see CAETANO 1977, CRUZ 1985). 
There was also a group of corporatist theoreticians who 
fought for an integral and pure version of corporatism. They 
were a small group of intellectuals wi th limited influence 
(WIARDA 1977). CAETANO can be considered, at times, part of 
this group. 
At the beginning of the regime the military group was 
also very influential. The early thirties saw the appearance 
of the national-syndicalists which were briefly also an 
important group on the fringe of the regime {MEDINA 1977,1979}. 
Limi ted pluralism led sometimes to conflicts wi thin the 
regime like the one between monarchists and republicans (see 
CAETANO 1977, passim.), the corporati s t theoreticians intense 
critique of the corporative practice,{see chapter eight. section 2.2.3},the 
conflicts between "hawks" and "doves" in the 1950s which 
culminated wi th the dismissal of the leaders of both factions 
(see CAETANO 1977,520-521, 580-583 , MARQUES 1976, 221 ), the 
conflicts wi thin CAETANO's rule between liberals and extreme 
conservatives ("ultras") - see GRAHAM 1975 (NOTE 23). 
But pI urali sm could not go so far as to transform groups 
into crystallized tendencies wi thin the regime or in pressure 
groups. Pluralism did not also go so far as to be transformed 
into open and achnowledged divergences of opinion (NOTE24). 
There was another source of pluralism. Beyond limited 
pluralism of ideological nature, there was also interest 
pI uralism derived from the fact that different eli te members 
represented the expectations of different potential 
consti tuencies, like economic or professional groups, 
or of different organizations like Army, Church, University. 
2.4. Non responsible pluralism 
There are two important features which distinguish 
pluralism in authoritarian regimes from pluralism in 
democratic regimes. Pluralism in authoritarian regimes is 
limi ted and non responsible (LINZ 1970,1975). That is, it is 
not subject to any form of electoral accountability. Different 
groups in the elite reflect the views of different ideological 
groups and of different organizations, but do not represent 
them oficially. 
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In a df:T:1ocracy elected representatives represent their 
electorate: and are commi t ted, to a certain extent, to certain 
policies - they are accountable to the electorate. The 
accountability in an authoritarian regime is to the leader who 
co-opted the members of the elite. This is not to say that 
there cannot exist an informal and diffuse accountability from 
groups of the elite towards the groups whose views they 
reflect, but there are no formal mechanisms of substitution; 
on the othe:r hand, lost of confidence does not imply any 
change if the leader's confidence remains. 
2.5. Conclusion - limited pluralism and demobilization 
In section 2. ~~ have sho~n that as generally happen in authoritarian 
regiTTlE5 the elite of Ne'w State was hetercgeneous in its background (LINZ 
1975). This is congruent with the lack of an articulate ideology, which 
is also cr.aracteristic of authoritarian regimes. 
This heterogeneity is intimately related with the non 
mobilizational essence of authoritarian regimes which can 
retain the loyal ty of disparate members. but generally 
alienate the support of intelectuals, students and youth (LINZ 
1975 ). 
Recruitment for the elite comes from a "syncretic 
ideological substractum [ •.. J from which the dictator and the 
government freely chose at every poli tical juncture" (GINER 
1982). The process by which members are recruited for the elite 
reflects also non mobilization - co-optation by the leader· or 
the government substitutes the active element of choice by 
poli tical consti tuency for a passive element of fidelity to 
the leader. Due to the heterogeneity of recruitment areas 
there were few professional poli ticians in the eli te, which 
also helped to avoid the creation of mobilizational political 
dynamics. 
So it is clear that there is a link be~n limited pluralism and non 
mobilization; that is, ideological ecletism, heterogeneous 
basis for recruitment, the existence of different group 
derives and leads to lack of an articulate ideology which ~U1d be 
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instrumental to any mobilization. 
This lack of an a ideology prevented the school curriculum from being 
filled with strict ideological indoctrination, schooling being 
the vehicle for inculcating a passive mentality (that 
is, values, attitudes and habits rather than ideas, 
concepts and intellectual schemes). The New State theory 
about the education of children must be seen as part of its 
broader theory about the way portuguese should be governed 
- how they should be ruled. 
The next chapter will deal with this theory of government. 
It will be presented New State elitist non participatory 
theory of government and its practice of non participation of 
. 
citizens in public life. 
3. PERIODS IN EVOLUTION OF THE NEW STATE REGIME 
It is necessary for the presentation of the political and 
educational evolution of the regime, and for the demonstration 
of its relationship, to present a division of New State regime 
evolution into periods. 
A difficulty arises from the fact that there is not 
yet, at this stage of thesis data and analysis which 
can justify all the proposed divisions. We will present 
now the proposed periods, with a brief pOlitical and 
educational description of each one. 
The ~se of those perioos to describe and explain educat~ona1 policy 
evolution will provide this data. 
The division of an historical si tuation into periods can 
be sometimes difficult when there are no decisive events or 
abrupt changes - but it is probably in those' cases that the 
presentation of periods is more necessary to represent 
formally the continuous process· of change. 
The presented division uses, in the first instance,' the dates 
of historical events which directly changed the political 
si tuation - the mili tary "coup d' etat" which set up the new 
regime in the 28 th May of , 926. the end of the Second World 
War ( ·al though in this case the influence is an indirect one), 
the physical incapacity of Salazar and his substitution in 
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1968, the military "coup d'etat" which put as end to the 
regime in the 25 th April of 1974. 
In the secood instance thi s di vi sion uses poli tiaal landmarks 
internal to the evolution of the regime - the publication of 
the regime Constitution in 1933, the presidential election of 
1958 and the poli tical and consti tutional changes it had in 
the regime. 
There is naturally a· delay between general 
political change and specific policy formulation (and 
between policy formulation and adoption and 
policy implementation - see CORTESAO 1982,164-167). The 
educational policy formulation landmarks chosen to date 
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educational periods have generally some brief delay in relation to 
political change - the first pair of dates shown in the titles 
of the follcr~ing sections refer to political evolution and the second 
to educational evolution, thus showing this delay. 
One can divide the New State regime eVOlution in five 
periods 1926-1933/1933-1945/1945-1958/1958-1968/1968-1974. 
{See similar division in LEEDS 1983 - see also FRANCO 1982, 
NOGUEIRA, STOER 1986 (NOTE 25).) 
3.1. The formative period (1926-1933/1927-1936) 
In the 28 th May of 1926 the republican regime was 
overthrown by a military "coup d'etat" which gave rise to a 
regime which later called itself the New State. In 1928, 
Salazar entered into the Government as Minister of Finances and 
in 1932,.,as appointed Prime-Minister, the office he held for 36. 
years, until September 1968. In this period he chose Marcello 
Caetano to be his cooperator (CAETANO 1977,24-25) •. 
1926-1933 was a transitional period - a self-called 
"administrative dictatorship" which developed . a poli tical 
philosophy. The most important step of this development can 
be seen in Salazar speeches - "Administrative dictatorship and 
pOli tical revolution" (28-5-1930), "Fundamental principles of 
the poli tical revolution" (30-7-1930), "The national interest 
in the Dictatorship pOlicy" (17-5-1931), "Economic concepts 
of the neVI Constitution" (16-3-1933) (all in the first volume 
of Salazar's speeches). 
The relationship of the State wi th the Church improved 
greatly, but was not defini tively settled. The main 
financial concern was budgetary balance. 
In the educational sector this period is alSO a 
transi tional one, in the sense that the implemented pOlicies were 
more anti-republican policies, destroying what the republicans 
had done, than the implementation of an articulate educational 
thought. 
o. (MONICA di vices this period into two 
sub-periods - 1926-1928, a purely transi ti onal period and 
1928-1936 a period where there was a gradual implementation 
of the new ideas under the rrotto "Ii ttle and well" - see MONICA 
1978,281-282 J. 
The implemented policies intended reductions in 
compulsory schooling, primary school curricula, primary 
school teachers education • It vas a reaction against ~as 
seen as the republican trial of ;romoting mass education 
and encyclopedic curricular conceptions. 
The most important Ministers of Education of that 
period were CORDEIRO-RAMOS (1930-1933), rI'AMAGNINI (1934-1936). 
3.2. The mobilizing period (1933-1945/1936-1947) 
The landmark which sets the beginning of this period is 
the publication, in March 1933. of the Constitution of the New 
State regime, which through several revisions lasted until 
1974. This marks the formal end of 0 the military dictatorship. 
For the reasons explained in this chapter, a sector of 
New State eli te adopted a mobilizing and radical style. The 
influence of nazi and fascist regimes became visible. First 
it developed a tactical fascistization. a fascistization from 
within. Then, the civil war in Spain provoked the 
fascistization from wi thout - reflected in creation of the "Portuguese 
Legion" (paramilitary organization) and the "Portuguese Youth" 
(Youth organization). 
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Repressive strategies began in 1933 ... i th creation of 
the political police. special tribunals for political crimes, 
the introduction of censorship and political control 
of civil servants (including teachers).' 
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The corporative principles of the regime in relation to 
the economy were set up since 1933 with publication in that year 
of the !'National Work Statute". The relationship wi th the 
Church was defini ti vely settled through an agreement in 
1940 ("Concordata"). 
The most important speeches of Salazar which represent 
this mobilizing evolution are - "National Propaganda" 
(26-10-1933). "Physical Education and Sports" (3-12-1933), 
"The school, the life and the Nation" (28-1-1934) (which 
reflect the tactical fascistization) and "Political education, 
guarantee of revolutionnary continuity" (22-3-1938), "Aims and 
need of political propaganda" (26-2-1940), and some minor 
speeches addressed to "Portuguese Legion" and "Portuguese 
Youth" (which reflect the fascistization from without). 
But alongside those mobilizing-like speeches there were 
others clearly and strictly confined to the authoritarian 
framework - "The portuguese New State in the european 
political evolution" (26-5-1934). "The great certitudes of 
National Revolution" (26-5-1936) (in the tenth anniversary of 
, 
the "coup d' etat" - it became the regime educational Gospel» 
"The political moment - great and small questions of 
portuguese politics" (20-9-1935). So, in this period, the 
mobilizing discourse co-exists, even in the same persons, with 
the tradi tional demobilizing authori tarian discourse of the 
regime. 
In education the CARNEIRcrPACHECO reforms represent 
the full implementation of the mobilizing spiri t. CARNEIRO -
- PACHECO was minister of Education from 1936 to .1940 - he 
reformed the educational system (Law 1941. 11-4-1936). he 
changed the name of the Ministry of Public Instruction to 
Ministry of National Education, he created the "Portuguese 
Youth", in 1936, "The Work of the Mothers for National 
Education". also in 1936. He reformed primary and grammar 
'school education, he set up the doctrinaire sole textbook for 
the more normative subjects, and closed Primary School 
Teacher Education Colleges. All these reforms had a doctrinain? 
leitmotiv and a mobilizing purpose. 
3.3. The stabilization period (1945-1958/1947-1964) 
Due to the triumph of democratic regimes in the second 
World War the regime had to adjust its language and its style 
to the new times - the mobilizing discourse d.isappeared and 
the mobilizing symbols were substi tuted. Salazar even spoke 
of "organic democracy" trying to verbally adjust the regime 
to the si tuation which the second world war brought about. 
Portugal joined the NATO alliance in 1949. The Corporative 
structure and spirit were renewed. 
The end of the War created hopes of a slight 
democratization of the regime. as Salazar vaguely hinted; an 
oppositionist movement was created (M.U.D.). Repression 
followed and several uni versi ty professors were expelled for 
political reasons in 1947. 
In the 1950's the regime began a slow process of 
industrial development of the country. It launched the 
"PIanos de Fomento". which were five years plans - the first 
was a plan for the quinquennium 1953-1958 .. 
In the educational sector the stabilization period went 
on implementing the primary school reform of CARNEIRO-
-PACHECO and regulating in detail the (centralized) management 
of secondary schools (Statutes of 1947 and 1948). 
But the slow process of industrialization demanded a 
different educational pOlicy for the mass. In 1952 the GoverI11l'ent 
proposed a campaign to nobilize Adult Education to end 
illi teracy (NOTE 26). In 1955 LEITE-PINTO became Minister of 
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Education (1955-1961 ) - he thought that "wi thout ins truction 
there is no technical improvement which can be efficaciously 
absorbed 3nd applied" (in SAMPAIO 1977,11 ) i he recognized: the 
impossibility of industrializing the country without a 
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generalized and enlarged mass education. This position had the 
opposi tion of the traditional sector of the eli te. In the ensuing 
confrontation the traditionalist sector wan and instead of extending compulsory 
schooling by the the three years more wished by LEITE 
PINTO it was reduced to a one year extension (i.e. fran three to four 
years). Meanwhile more technical schools were being buil t to 
serve the industrialization needs. 
In 1962, GALVAO-TELLES substituted LEITE-PINTO as 
. 
minister of Education (1962-1968) reflecting the return 
of the control over the educational system to a more 
traditionalist member of the ruling elite. 
In 1956 there was a serious university student unrest 
situation and from them on there was a permanent tension 
between university students and the regime. 
3.4. The stagnation and decline period (1958-1968/1964-1970) 
In 1958 the election of the Presidency of Republique 
became unuswUly disputed because the candidate of the 
opposition (Humberto Delgado) COUld, for the first time, 
really mobilize great masses against the regime. As usual the 
official candidate won, but through repression and fraud - the 
regime was very shaken and immediately substituted the system 
of direct election for an indirect election for the Presidency 
of Republique. 
A group of catholics began to question the "moral union" 
between the Catholic Church and the New State. The bishop of 
Oporto wrote a letter critiCizing Salazar and was consequently 
expelled from the country. From then on there was a clear 
catholic minority group, later kno"m as "progressist 
catholics", actively opposed to the regime. 
In February 1961 the colonial war started in Angola. 
In December 1961 India invaded'and occupied the Fort~se 
territories in the indian peninsula, this was seen by the 
regime t s eli te as a national tragedy. In 1959, 1961 and 1962 
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there were aborted conspiracies or aborted "coup d~etats".In March 
1962 . began the most serious movement of university student 
unrest until then leading to the resignation of Marcello 
Caetano from Rector of the Uni versi ty of Lisbon indicating 
severe splits wi thin the eli te. In 1963 the guerrilla war broke in 
Portuguese Qlinea and, in 1 964, in M:>zambique. 
In 1967 an ariied oprosi tionist. grcup appeared 
in a spe:tacular fashion as saul tiilg the Bank 
of Portugal, in a small town, taking away for political 
purposes around one million dollars. 
In sum, all of a sudden, things became very difficult, in 
the, internal and external political front, for tpe regime. The 
strategical answer to those attacks was internal repression. 
The colonial war begin to monopolize all the ~ime's attention 
and even provoked a remobilization of a hard core of the 
regime elite. It led to the need for counteracting the process 
of growing international isolation. Salazar's speeches of that 
period clearly reflect all those concerns and have a 
defensive tone. 
In the econany industrialization goes on with foreign 
capital in spite of the war; tourism progresses greatly; 
massive emigration for France and Germany is the answer of the 
rural class to the crisis in agriculture. 
In education this period could begin with the appointment 
of Galvao Telles in 1962, but the date of 1964 had been 
chosen because it is a landmark of educational policy 
formulation - the extension of compul sory schooling to six 
years. GALVAO TELLES tried to make compatible the inevi table 
expansion of compulsory schooling with the continuation of the 
strong social reproduction and eli te preparation as priority 
function of the educational system. He achieved this through 
the creation of a threefold track in the new canpulsory fifth 
and sixth years of schooling. The first track is the urban track for those 
who wanted to follow up studies (preparatory school), the 
second track was the rural track for those who also wished 
to follow up studying "Telescola", (that is, Television 
School), the third track was the rural track for those 
who did not go on. 
3.5. The "renewal within continuity" period (1968-1974/ 
/1970-1974 ) 
The event which started this period was the substitution 
of Salazar by Caetano in the leadership of the regime, in 
September 1 968, due to the physical incapaci ty of Salazar. Caetano 
proclaimed that his rule would be one of "renewal within 
continui ty". He changed the leadership style riskin~ mass 
situations and creating a sort of" fireside chats" ( "conversas 
em familia"). He substi tuted the New State with the promise of 
the Social State. 
There was a liberalization - repression was decreased, 
censorship slowed down, the bishop of Oporto could return. It 
A "liberal wing" appeared in Parliament, which sometimes acted 
as a semi-opposition group •. This liberalizations was ended in 
1971. ·There was a revision of the Constitution in 1972 which 
did not change anything fundamental - continuity prevailed 
over renewal. 
The relationship wi th the catholic opposi tionist group 
worsened and the same happened with the official relations 
wi th the Holy See because of what the regime Sa\\' as the Pope 
support to the colonial liberation movements. University 
students unrest reached a new peak in 1969 and was high for 
all this period. The reaction to this mobilization divided 
the regime elite - some were for blunt repression, others for a 
nationalistic remobilization of the Youth, a minority for. a 
more permissive attitude. 
Foreign capital participation in portuguese economy 
increased and the portuguese economy went on developing in 
spite of the colonial war. 
The colonial war issue dominated all this period and it 
compelled the regime to facilitate the recrui tment for the 
Armed Forces. This provoked dissatisfaction among professional 
army officers thus beginning a mili tary underground movement 
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which soon began discussion not only of professional issu-:-s but also of 
political ones - the regime was overthrown in tt.~ dawn of the 
25 th April of 1974. 
In reference to the educational system this period 
begins in 1970 with the appointment of Veiga Sima~ as 
minister of education (1970-1974). He initiated a~ educational 
reform under the motto of "democratization of e:':Jcation". He 
gave to the " battle of education" (as he called i:) a 
mobilising style which had never been seen befor~ in the 
regime. In 1971 Veiga Simao proposed a complete r~form of the 
educational system, from top to bottcm, in a d~=ument which 
was put to public discussion. This public debate mobilised 
many sectors of public opinion and of political opinion, from 
the conservative wing of the regime(who opposed the reform )to 
the several oppositions ( whose position goes from critical 
half support to a "wait and see" position to a blunt 
condemnation under the accusation of demagogic propaganda). 
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The educational field was the only one where liberalization 
survived. For the reasons exposed in the Introduction (section 7 )this 
period will not be analyzed ( see about the meaning c: Veiga Simao 
reform STOER 1983, 1986 ). 
The proposed reform increased compulsory schooling for 
eight years, it extended preparatory education from two to 
four years, it created an unified comprehensive secondary 
school, it changed teacher education, it created the 
polytechniCal higher education, . it compelled uni versi ties to 
reform. It also created four new universities, ten 
poly technical institutes and nine preparatory teachers 
education colleges (alongside the expansion of the existing 
primary school teacher education colleges). 
The reform \Vas approved after the public debate and the 
P¥lI'liana1tary discussion - it is contained in the Law 5/73, 
25-7-1973. Many partial reforms had been made between 1970 and 
1973. This reform became the basi s of the development of the 
educational system from then on - it is still the basis of 
the present system, al though with many changes (the Law 5/73 
was in force until OCtober 1986). 
3 .6. nnclusion 
This presentation of the political and educational 
evolution of the regime (which serves also as description of 
the main events during the New State regime) does not mean 
that the analysis of the New State will be mainly done by 
periods. What is generally pursued in this work is the 
analysis of the essential and permanent political and 
educational features of the New State under Sala~ar rule. But 
it is often necessary to analyse the historical evolution to 
demonstrate the demobilising hypothesis and to characterize 
more accurately those permanent features. 
ARCHER in her monumental analysis of patterns of 
interaction and change in decentralized and centralized 
. educational systeJT5 ("Social Origins of Educational Systems"), 
concludes that "Patterns of·change [in centralized systems] 
follow a jerky sequence in which long periods of stability 
(i.e. changelessness) are intermittently interrupted by polity 
-directed measures. This had been termed the 'Stop-Go pattern" 
(ARCHER 1979,617). There are two clear Go educational periods 
in the New State - the second period wi th CARNEIRO-PACHECO 
reform and the fifth period with the VEIGA SIMAO reform. 
Al though representing opposed ideological options they have 
in common the mobilising style and the comprehensiveness of the cr.ange. 
It is natural that research attention falls more on the 
Go periods, where change occurs (as it is indeed the case 
of many studies about the New State educational system), but 
the Stop periods last much longer and can neutralize and 
modify the changes of Go periods. Indeed CARNEIRO-PACHECO 
reform was in most of the aspects transformed 
by the stop period which followed - the primary school 
curriculum inculcated passi vi ty not mobilization (as will be 
seen in chapters three and four), the grarnnar school reform lasted only 
until 1947, Portuguese Youth entered in decline (as will be 
analyzed in chapter nine). So Stop periods deserve as much 
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attention as Go periods. This thesis will try to give 
equivalent attention to both. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NON PARTICIPATION 
IN THE NEW STATE 
I-THE NEW STATE ELITIST NON PARTICIPATORY THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 
1. SALAZAR's THEORY ABOUT THE PORTUGUESE MAN AND THE WAY HE 
SHOULD BE GOVERNED 
Salazar and other theoreticians of the New State started 
from an image of the portuguese man, the portuguese essence. 
They held a model of how portuguese think, feed .and behave and 
from that they worked out a theory of how he should be 
educated and governed. 
A simple example will illustrate this relationship -
- Salazar disliked the party system, but conceded it worked 
well with certain peoples, the english for instance. But he 
considered absolutely inapplicable to Portugal any type of 
party system due to portuguese temperament. As he said to 
Ferro "I have no horror to parties on general terms; I abhor 
parti san system in Portugal" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1 982,161 - see 
also SALAZAR V,467-8, RATO 1958,78)(NOTE 1). 
As New State theories of education and government were 
inspired not only on general political ideologies, but started 
also from an image about the portuguese man we will begin by 
presenting this image. 
1.1. Salazar's diagnosis of portuguese people,defects 
According to Salazar portuguese are sentimental, they 
suffer from a "unhealthy sentimentali sm which: we are used to 
see as kindness" (in FERRO 1982,116), from "an unhealthy 
fatalism" (in FERRO 1982,165), nourished by fatalistic. songs 
like "fado", the national song (in GARNIER,. no date,123), thus 
becoming "an eternally nostalgic and. longing people, distant 
from reality" (in FERRO 1 982,165) (NOTE 2) • 
. Congruently portuguese are emotional (SALAZAR VI,47 and 
248) which makes them abhorr violence (SALAZAR II, 70. in 
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FERRO 1982,115-117) and prefer to be a people of "brandos 
costumes" ( mild habits) (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,115). 
Portuguese are also passive and conformist, "4uf..f..e/l.in~" 
"doci.l.e" . and "kind" people (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,295), with 
"a natu/l.a.l. p/l.edi4p04ition to/l. 40cia.l. di4cip.l.ine" (SALAZAR II, 
1 04). 
Portuguese do not have strong wills, they are "voluble" 
and "unstable" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,118,191,296 and in 
GARNIER no date, 135), they lack "a con4tancfl. 4pi/l.it and 
tenacitfl. in action" (in FERRO 1982,295) and thus they are 
inclined "to bui.l.d on epheme/l.a.l. enthu4ia4m4 and to abandon 
j.U4t initiated ta4k~ to be[Jin othe/l. one4" 
(NOTE 3). 
(SALAZAR V, 94 ) 
Portuguese are also highly theoretical, but at the same 
time superficial. "Ou../l. booki4h in4t/l.Uction C ••• r mo vin[J on 
ab~t/l.action~, with .l.itt.l.e contact with tact~, can app.l.fI. ~t~· 
ef..to/l.t in emptfl. (.o/l.mu.l.a~" (SALAZAR 111,393). But "The ve/l.fI. 
ea~ine~~ 0(. hi4 app/l.ehen4ion dec/l.ea~e~ the need to t/l.fI. ha/l.de/l. 
and ./.ead4 him to 4tudfl. ~upe/l.(.icia./../.fI. a./.~ ~ubject4 and to t/l.U4t 
too much on ~pontane.i..tfl. and on the b/l.i./../.iancfl. of.. hi~ 
Lnte./../.igence ••• ")(SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,295). 
So portuguese are naturally inclined to improvise 
instead of planning acti vi ties. There is "a true hostility in 
our spirit to any program of work"; "The discipline of a 
studied plan is painful to endure as if it was a violence done 
to our temperament"; so "all ( ..• J is tendencially left to the 
improvisation made up in the very moment, to sudden fancies" 
(SALAZAR II,72)., 
Portuguese have "sharp critical wit" (SALAZAR VI,247), 
they easily engage in criticism of other's actions. Quick 
intelligence but no tenacity slides down easily into criticism 
as attractive activity of fault-finding. Salazar comments 
ironically - "in OU/l. po./.itica.l. wO/l../.d manfl. 0(. mfl. t/l.iend4 p/l.ove 
thei1 devotion exact.l.fI. bv. beln~ d.i..~~ati~tied" (SALAZAR II1,32) 
Portuguese are ,very individualist (SALAZAR' 11,103, IV, 
454, V,467 , VI 246, in GARNIER, i 35 ), even "wi thout noticing 
it" (in FERRO 1982,295). This leads to a mistrust of authority 
- "It is inevitable a sort of suspicion of authority not 
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because it lacks idoneousness, but because he wants it be less 
attached to what is general and more attached to what is 
particular" (SALAZAR VI,246). This leads also to great 
difficulty in adaptation to groups work (SALAZAR VI,247). 
1.2. How a theory government was build upon this diagnosis 
A simple explanation of Salazar's ideas will make clear 
the basis for his theory of goverment by elites. If portuguese 
are sentimental and emotional they are easy prey to demagogues 
(SALAZAR VI,47,248) - there is the need for someone who remain 
cold headed to decide for them. As they also are fatalistic and 
passi ve they lack ini tiati ve - there is the need for someone 
to take the lead. But they are also voluble and less tenacions 
- so this someone must be stable and constant for them, 
carrying through all the planned action. This is as much 
necessary as they like improvisation and are easily carried 
away by their whims. "The abyss between our intelligence which 
is sharp and quick, typical of southern people, and our feable 
will power ... " (SALAZAR in FERRO 1 982,188) leads to an easy 
finding of solutions, but not to capaci ty to carry them out; 
this naturally leads to a canalization of sharp cri tical wi t 
to fault-finding activities. It is necessary someone to lead 
portuguese out of this impasse. 
According to Salazar's image of portuguese men, they have 
mixed feelings about authority - they accept easily social 
discipline since they are passive and conformist, but they 
abhor intellectual discipline to which they prefer 
improvisation, spontaneity whi~h goes better with their 
individualism and volubility. They distrust authority, but 
they very easily conform. It is necessary that saneone uses 
this tendency to social discipline to persuade them to 
systematic action, to cooperation. 
All this is the role of an eli te. This eli te obviously 
must not suffer from the same defects, it must be distant from 
the "low tide of the race" using FERRO's expression about 
Salazar (FERRO 1982 t 178). As FERRO says this di s tance gives 
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infl uence over the race, gives the necessary strength to lead 
people to the highest aims. "Portuguese people when properly 
led give everything one 't.'ants". Thus the most important and 
urgent condition for a sucessful government is "the 
preparation of eli tes whict[ ... 1lead the Nation" since "the 
great national problems can only be solved by those elites ..• " 
(in FERRO 1982,295-296 - see also SALAZAR 1933). 
This leadership must respect the natural defects of the 
race and try to modify the acquired ones, must "use the 
formidable quali ties of the race and neutralize some of its 
main defects" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,168 and 56) (NOTE 4). 
Salazar exemplifies ~~w natural defects should be 
respected. It is necessary to rule wi thout violence because 
portuguese repudiate viol:~ce on account of their 
sentimentalism (see SALAZhR 11,70-71, FERRO 1982,115-117, 
GARNIER no date 117-118) (NOTE 5). It is necessary to rule 
slowly, calmly, condescending sometimes, because of the same 
sentimentalism (see FERRO 1982,116-117,166, GARNIER no date, 
132-133 ). It is necessary not to capi tali ze on emotionality, 
that is, it is necessary not to appeal to the heroic character 
of the race, wi thout trying beforehand to modify the general 
mentali ty, since this slides later on into unheal thy fatalism 
and nostalgia (in FERRO 1982,165). It is also necessary to 
control public opinion since portuguese people is easy prey of 
demagogy due to its emotionality and sentimentalism (see 
SALAZAR VI,47 and 248). 
Salazar built his theory of elitist non participatory 
government on an image of portuguese people. His diagnosis is 
even today up-to-date in many points. That is, several authors 
say today similar things about portuguese - see for instance ~ 
1985, LOURENr;c> 1976, 1982a, JESUINO 1982, ROBINSON 1979. All this 
can be included in a tradition of pessimistic images of 
portuguese people which 'Was already very common in the 1870 
generation (NOTE 6). 
From that diagnosis Salazar drew out a theory of 
government he considered particularly adequate to portuguese 
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temperament, but the production of this theory was mediated 
by his poli tical ideology and by his ideal image of the new 
portuguese man he wanted to build. 
This means that from similar diagnosis very different 
therapies can be draym out, that is, very different theories 
of government can be produced, according to the ideal image 
of portuguese man wanted. To choose a theory of government is 
implici tly to choose al so an ideal image of man. 
This points up to the need to know the ideal image of 
portuguese man Salazar held (since his political theory is 
object of this chapter). 
. 
1.3. Salazar's ideal image of portuguese - Salazar new man 
Salazar acknowledged he wanted to build a new man (SALAZAR 
1933,1948, in FERRO 1982, 125,156,165,277 and in GARNIER, no 
date,63) 
The ideal man is the controlled man. In Ferro's words 
Salazar wants "to modify the rythm of the nation, to lead it 
to deny its own instincts ... through a painful, but may be 
benefi tial and redeeming suffocation" (FERRO 1982,180). That 
is, the new man must control his instincts even at the risk 
of suffocation. 
The ideal man is an obedient person. "Those who prefer 
their freedom of action to obedience are not with us" (SALAZAR 
I,183-184) since "There is less damage in forbidding 
cri ticisms than in allowing disobedience" (SALAZAR II,133). 
"II hope) that people obey when it comes the time to command" 
(SALAZAR I,6). To be obedient was not a privation, since "If 
you knew how difficult it is to rule you would like to· obey 
all your life" (New State official poli tical· motto). On the 
other hand, "the will to obey is the only school to learn to 
command" (SALAZAR 1,94) (NOTE 7 ~ 
The ideal man, the new man does not discuss God, 
Fatherland, Authority or Family (see SALAZAR 11,130-134). 
The ideal man, being controlled and obedient,"lives 
habi tually" (see FERRO 1982,283, NOGUEIRA 1980, 531). This 
habi tualness is a concept very cherished by Salazar,·· almost 
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identifyi~g routin~, habitual life with hapiness (NOTE 8). 
This habitual ~an is naturally apolitical, does not 
discuss pt.:~lic affairs, let those who know best decide for 
him. fERR: put it very well - "And now ~hat we have hea~d him 
C5a~a~a~1, ~et U~ 90 each one to ou~ own ~ive~ ••• ~iea~e be 
-1iien~ • •• Let him wo~k ••• " (fEr~RO 1982,181 ). 
As Salazar says "All this is very Ii ttle after all, but 
I take care of pull:':;g up from this all the rest" (SALAZAR 
1933). That is, for ~ALAZAR the new man did not need to have 
any pOli tical ideolc;y or any social doctrine, but just some 
basic mentality patterns and attitudes. 
This "r.ew man" S-2E:=T!'lS singularly close tc the old passive 
man we sta~ted w~th. There is not here any revolutionary 
design, a~y mcbilizational appeal, not even any apostolic 
fervour. ':"!':e ne'.A.' rna!'". obeys the 1 eader, but thi s leader does 
not co;ru'Tla;.~ hir.. tc a:t (L.ke in totali tarian regimes J, 
corrunands t:irr. not to act, to be passive, to be apoli tical, to 
live habit:.;ally! 
One must try to enlighten this apparent paradox -the new 
man to be built see~s very close to the old man from which we 
started. C!'1e can hyphothesize that the rural man already fi ts 
the ideal :~age of ;:rtuguesee; the man who m~st become 
passive a:-:: apolitical tr.:-o:..:gh "redeeming suffocation" is the 
urban man (NOTE 9). 
Let us find support for this hyppothesis in 
SALAZAR's ",,·ords. ".'ien who we~e educa~ed and iive exciu~ive~$/­
alwund ~he -1choo.l., th.e admini-1t~a~ive ot.f.ice and ~he caf.e, 
[cof.f.ee-~hopJ - and it i-1 the~e that we have ~ec~uited 9~eat 
pa~t of. ou~ pub~ic men - [ ••• ] have a f.auit$/- to~mati...on [ ••• J 
The di-1tance which ~oe~ t.~om U-1, cate cU-1tome~-1, f.amiiia~ 
wi...~h pub.l.i...c depa~~ment~, c~o~e to mi...ni...-1~~i...e~, -1ha~i...n9 ~he 
omni...po~en ce ot Powe~ C ••• J and ~he ~~ue nati...on i-1 eno~mOU-1" 
(SALAZAR 1 933 ) ~ 
It is to those men, urban men, that "~he ab~oiute 
-1~e~i...ii...t~ ot po.l.i...ti...c~ con~i...de~ed a-1 an end i...n it-1eit ha-1 no~ 
~et been adequate.l.~ demon~t~ated ••• "· (SALAZAR 11,72). It is 
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those men, grouped "arour.d mean interests", vi!'.':) need a 
therapy, an "immobilization [, .. 1 of all frag::-iE:ntary 
poli tical action", (SALAZAR in FERP.O 1982,161 ). 
One can even hypothesize further that it is the Lisbon 
urban man that Salazar had particularly in mind - as he said 
"the countryside C ... 1 is more impartial, less emotional than 
Lisbon" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,138) or, as just seen, "the 
distance which goes from us [ .•. ] close to mi~istries [ .•. ] 
and the true Nation is enormous". 
Summing up, both rural and urban men must be obedient, but one 
is already "docile" and wi th "natural predisposi tion for 
social discipline". the other is still lons;:'ng for the old 
politics, is still too e::-.otional and frenet:'c and should be 
subject to a tberapy of immobilization of ~:li tical action, 
to the "redeeming suffocation". 
(Thi s links clearly wi th the rural ism as characteri s ti c 
of the New State (or of its first decades) - see chapter 
four, section 6. 
The building of a new man depends heavily on the 'Way the 
new generations will be educated. So SALAZAR says "The 
appropriation of the State [ •.• J is not enough for the 
material and moral renewal nor does it guarantee by itself 
stability and the future of the work done. Th:s must be 
grounded on the reform cf education [ .. J [2c] let us control 
the State but guide into a good path the intelligence and the 
will of the portuguese" (SALAZAR 1933 - see also SALAZAR I, 
307,V471). 
So both "/.JchooJ.. and f-ami..J..v. /.JhouJ..d i..mpll.i..nt .in the /.JOU"lA 
i..n f-Oll.m a ti.. on , i..n a nevell.-f-adi..n9 wav., tho/.Je hi9h and nobJ..e 
/.Jenti..ment/.J which chall.actell.ile OUII. civiJ..i~ation and impll.int 
~eep J..ove f-Oll. the Fathell.J..and" (SALAZAR 1,313). "The be/.Jt 
9uall.antee of- the f-utuII.e of- the nation i/.J in a dif-f-ell.ent 
f-oll.mati..on of- POll.tu9ue~e. FII.om thi../.J it come/.J the impolI.tance of-
t;.he pII.obJ..em Lof- education] even in the poJ..iticaJ.. domain" 
(SALAZAR in GARNIER no date,63). 
SALAZAR believed in "t~e pO/.J~ibiJ..itv. of- modif-ication, at 
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lea~t pa~tial moditication, ot nationa~ cha~acte~ th~ou9h 
education" and acknowledged it was a task in which 
"tami~~, ~chool, ~ocia~ envi~onment and even pub~ic attai~~ 
leade~~hip" should cooperate (SALAZAR in GAR~IER no date,63)_ 
see also SALAZAR I.65,1936,in ASSAC 1952.17. 
So t~e building of the ideal new portuguese man through 
educatio~ is not the task of one institution alone, it is 
necessary for this task the cooperation of a group of devoted. 
intelligent and patriotic portuguese (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 
297). That is. both educating and ruling the portuguese is the 
task of a~ elite of men. So it is logical to analyse New State 
theory a~~~t the role of the elite. 
2. THE THEORY OF ELITES 
2.1. The theory of government by elites 
The :;ew State had an eli tist theory of s;overnment. Thus 
it had a r.cn participatory theory of how to rule. Government 
should be exercised by an elite guided and co~~anded by a 
leader. 
"Co~~ectiv.e ~i..te [ ••• ] doe~ not o~de~ i..t~ e~t 
~pontaneou~~v. Jt i4 an i~~u~ion to think that ~ociet~ ~ea~ch~ 
o~ lind~ b~ it~elt it~ own ~uide~ine~ [ ••• ] One o~ a lew 
[pe~~on~], the coll.ecti..ve bei..n~ [ ••• ], detine a 
di..~ection, ~i..ve i..mpu~~e, c~eate po~itic~" (SA:AZAR 111,389). 
"The poli..ti..cal tunction, to whi..ch it be~on~~ ~pi..~itua~ 
~uidance ot the Nation towa~d~ it~ de~tin~, ~hou~d be~on~ to 
~n e~ite ot citi..Jen~ cho~en b~ thei~ ~ac~itice, thei~ ~pi~it 
of.. ~el.f..-denial. and devotion to common ~ood": (CAETANO 1938). 
I 
From this it follows logically that the great priori ty 
of the regime was the recrui tment and education of this eli te 
of citizens. 
"Ou~ 9~eat p~obl.em i4 the p~epa~ation ot el.ite~ which 
educate and l.ead the Nation r ... ] J think it i~ even mo~e 
u~~ent the p~epa~ation ot l.a~ge el.ite~ than to teach the 
peopl.e to ~ead. In lact the 9~eat nationa~ p~obl.em~ cannot be 
~ol.ved b~ the peopl.e, the~ can onl.~ be ~ol.ved b~ tho~e el.ite~ 
actin9 with the ma~4e4" (SALAZAR in FERRO,296 - see also 
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SALAZAR 1933 and GARNIER no date,62, (CAETANO 1941,34). 
But the eli tes should themselves be guided by a 1 eader 
"Due to lack ot equilib~ium in the human 4pi~it, o~de~ i4 
not 4pontaneou4i 4omeone mU4t command to~ the benetit ot all " 
(SALAZAR 11,138); that is, what is needed is that " man~ 
p~epa~e, onl~ one decide4 and 4ee that it i4 implemented with 
en~ugh mean4" (SALAZAR 1,375). 
If t r.e deci sion-making is res tricted to trained eli tes, 
to govern :'s to consul t those eli tes; that is, "governments 
should ne~~r be enslaved to the opinion of masses, bec~use 
this opin:':!1 is always inferior to the public opinion of the 
Nation" (~';LAZAR in FERRO 1982,272). "We a~e a people'4 
~egime, but not a ~ove~nment ot ma4~e4, a ~oveli.nment 
intluenced o~ led b~ ma44e4" (SALAZAR in FERR~ 1982,304) (NOTE 
10) • 
"Jt democ~ac~ con4i4t4 in believin~ that Power. had it4 
or.igin in ma44e4 and that ~over.nment 4hould be led by ma44e4 
and not b~ an elite then J con4ider. democ~ac~ a tiction" 
(SALAZAR VI,41 - see also SALAZAR 1,91). 
(That is not the same as saying that public opinion was 
completely unimportant for the New State. Eve~ before the full 
establish::-.e;.t of the New State, public opinio:. was considered 
important. nDictator.~hi~4 ar.e not con~ide~ed ~oveli.nment~ ot 
opinion, becau~e the~ do not r.eceive tr.om pub~ic opinion thei~ 
4t~enght or. le9itimac~, nor. to the~ evolute in acco~dance with 
chan~e~ in public opinion. But the~ can and the~ mU4t be 
gove~nment4 ot opinion in the 4en4e that the~ can ~~e~_~ 
eublic_£eini£~, the~ can enli~hten and lead it ••• " .• " (SALAZAR 
1,24 - our emphasis); public opinion is indispensable "but 
one never should lose the control of its formation, even out 
of concern for the health of it" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,272). 
The theory of elites does not underestimate the 
importance of public opinion, but instead of making the eli te 
to respond to public opinion, i t gives to the eli te the role 
of shaping public opinion - in fact, as SALAZAR said, "to 
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govern is to protect people from themselves"). 
2.2. Political and educational consequences 
Here it is succintly presented in the leader I s own words 
New State theory of government by an elite. From this 
conception several consequences were derived. As it was just 
said, public opinion should be shaped by the elite - thus 
censorship is inevi table ("newspapers are the spiri tual food 
of people and should be subject to quality control as any 
other food" said SALAZAR to FERRO 1982,95), propaganda is 
needed to direct public opinion and present tr.e ?ficial truth 
(see FERRO 1982,270-2). Politics is mainly the action of 
persuading people of the goodness of Government decisions 
(SALAZAR V, 308) - "poli tics[ .}has as its only useful aim to 
give expression and political value to government actions. To 
govern, leading national conscience, is truly the only serious 
function" (SALAZAR IV,487). As it is explicity said government 
and administration are the only serious business to which the 
elite should give time and effort - thus Government is the 
most important sovereignity body and Public Administration 
is the main instrument of action for the eli te policy-making 
and policy implementation. All those consequer.ces of the 
elitist theory of government will be analyzed in due time. 
The people need not mobilize itself since its 
participation is not necessary in the solution of big or small 
national problems; politics and admini s tration are reserved 
for the elite. CRUZ put this very well - Salazar "did not 
pretend to give to masses or public opinion the status of 
active political subject, but only pretended to make them 
object of inculcation of a passive doctrine" (CRUZ 1982c). 
The educational consequences of this theory of government 
are very clear - the important efforts should be concentrated 
in educating the elites, as Salazar very explicity said above. 
Thus the New State should set up a system of unequal acess to 
education and cccess to different types of educational 
content. The educational system should prepare "those top 
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people which should be light and radiance" as one Minister of 
Education said (NOTE 11). 
(One must distinguish New State political theory of 
elites which is a theory of government, from :ts social theory 
of elites, which is concerned with social rep~oduction. 
As CAETANO said "what is good for society, what is good 
for Nation, is the existence of good eli tes in each [social] 
class, clearly differentiated, although united by the same 
COTTL110n objective" (CAETANO 1928). SALAZAR att!"'ibutes the 
material poverty of Portugal to lack of good social elites -
good farmers, good industry men, good busi!'".~ss men (SALAZAR 
1933). 
An educational consequence of this soci~: theory of 
elites is the rejection of this "dangerous" :::.:;a of 
"compelling all persons to attend an unique s-:hool"; "To form 
an unique eli te - that of intellectuals - wou:.: be a calami ty" 
(CAETANO 1 928 ). So it were set up schools fer the intellectual 
eli tes (grammar schools) and schools for tr.-e eli te of urban 
workman and low stratum of middle classes (tecr.nical schools).) 
In the second part of this chapter 'v:e · ... ·:.11 analyze how 
tha t theory of gcvernmen t was put in to prC.c t:':e , that is, we 
will analyze the practice of non participatic~. 
This practice consti tutes one main process of social and 
political education of portuguese - it shows tow a passive 
mentality was inculcated through the non ava:lability of 
mechanisms of participation. It shows how "public affairs 
leadership " contributed to the "modification of national 
character". 
This practice created the social educational climate in 
which several generations grew, the generations which are now 
in power and govern the present educational system. 
The analysis of this practice will also provide the 
context of government in which educational policies were then 
formulated,adopted,and implemented. 
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II - THE PRACTICE OF NON PARTICIPATION 
3. ANALYSIS OF THE RECEIVERS OF SALAZAR's SPEECHES 
A first step towards the analysis of the implementation 
of this theory of eli tes is the presentation of who were the 
receivers of Salazar's co~~unications. Did Salazar speak 
mainly for the elite or for the masses? If our hypothesis 
about the demobilising nature of the regime is correct he 
spoke mainly for the ellte. 
For this analysis of the receivers of Salazar's 
communications one must first define what is intended for 
"communication" ln the fcllowing presentation. The unit of 
analysis is any wri tten piece included in Salazar six volume 
of speeches. This includes beyond the speeches, also the 
occasional interviews Salazar gave (mainly to foreign press), 
and official government notes written by Salazar. It also 
includes one technical report and technical notes and the 
diplomatic notes (which were categorized aside, as it will 
be explained). 
The categories of analysis were naturally the type of 
destinataries of the communicatlons - elites or masses. Within 
the elite a distinction is made between high elite and low 
elite, to allow analysis of what type of elite Salazar 
addressed. In communication to elites it were included those 
addressed to the National Assembly (the parliament), to the 
National Union (the sole party), to the Government, to the 
Corporative Chamber, to the Army, to the Portuguese Legion, 
(the regime mili tia) and to the Portuguese Youth (the regime 
youth organization) - high elite - and also those communications 
addressed to town mayors, corporative bodies and other group 
belonging to the elite (colonial authorities, high civil. 
servants )-10\1,1 eli te. The category communication to masses 
includes those addressed to demonstration participants, th6se 
addressed to the general public in broadcasts, speeches in 
inaugurations, interviews, official government notes published 
in newspapers (and generally also broadcasted). Speeches to 
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various groups of civiliar; society like employers or sportiv~ 
group leaders were also i~cluded in this category (they 
represent just 8% of Salazar's speeches). As there were 
several speeches (12) which could not be adequately allocated 
to the previous two categcries. another. category of analysis 
was needed - Various Communications, that is, communications 
neither to masses nor to political, social or economic elites. 
This include technical reports, technical official notes, 
diplomatic notes, academic articles, a speech in an "honoris 
causa" doctorate. 
For better understanding of Salazar's implementation of 
the theory of elites we i~cluded for comparison Caetano's 
speeches. The methodology used to categorize Caetano's 
communications followed t~e criteria just described. 
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 provide the result of the 
analysis. 
TABLE 2.1 
ANALYSIS OF THE RECEIVERS OF SALAZAR's and CAETANO SPEECHES 
DESTINATARIES SALAZAR's SPEECHES CAETANO's SPEECHES 
99 42 
Eli tes 
55% 34% 
70 41 
Masses 
39% 34% 
-, 
12 39 
Various 
7% 32% 
TOTAL 181 101% 122 100% 
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TABLE 2.2 
ANALYSIS OF THE RECEIVERS OF SALAZAR's and CAETANO's SPEECHES 
(only those addressed to elites or masses) 
DESTINATARIES SALAZAR's SPEECHES CAETANO's SPEECHES 
99 42 
Eli tes 
59% 51% 
70 41 
Masses 41% 49% . 
TOTAL 169 100% 83 100% 
TABLE 2.3 
ANALYSIS OF THE ELITE RECEIVERS OF SALAZAR's 
and CAETANO's SPEECHES 
DESTINATARIES SALAZAR's SPEECHES CAETANO's SPEECHES 
73 19 
High elite 
74% 45% 
26 23 
Low elite 
26% 55% 
TOTAL 99 100% 42 100% 
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Comm~nting those results it is evident that S3lazar spoke 
preferably for the elite (55% of all speeches and 59% 
excluding various); his speeches to masses represent 39% of 
the total of his speeches, being great part of those given in 
the fascistization period (see above pages12-15). These 
results are even cle~r when compared with CAETANO's 
performance - he adressed much more important speeches to 
various (32%), he spoke as much to masses as to eli tes (49%-
-51%); there is also a great difference in the type of elite 
Salazar and Caetano adress - Salazar adresses only 26% of his 
elite speeches to the low/local elite against 55% of Caetano's. 
Were Salazar's speeches to elites more elaborate and detailed than 
those to masses? Indeed they were which can be· seen through 
the analysis of the themes of the speeches c.!Jd also through 
a very crude indicator - length of the speech as measured by 
number of pages. (This indicator is only relevant because it 
is coincident with the qualitative content analysis). 
Salazar's speeches to high elite had, on average, 14.5 
pages, his speeches to low elites 11.4 pages and his 
speeches to masses jus t 10.8 pages. Thus hi s more longer 
messages were adressed to the high elite (mainly National 
Union, National Assembly and Army). 
To sum up, it seems evident so far that Salazar indeed 
implemented his elitist non participatory theory of government. 
In the next section we will see that he even overdid it, 
through his autocratic practice. 
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4. THE PRACTICE OF AUTOCRACY 
4.1. An autocratic leader 
The practice of the New State did not follow to the letter 
the theory of government presented above. More and more an 
autocratic practice was perverting those ideas. This 
autocratic aspect is refered to by many authcrs - see just as 
examples BRADFORD 1973.88-89. CAMPINOS 1975.35-41. CRUZ 1982c. 
MARQUES 1976.203.215.220. WIARDA 1977.282.291.309 - and also 
by some actors - see CAETANO 1959.177-178 and CAETANO 1977. 
CAETANO said in a famous speech in Coimbra (in 1951) 
"all institutions of the New State ended up gravitating around 
Salazar" and rhetorically asks if the New State is really a 
regime or just a "set of conditions which were adequate to the 
exercise of Power by a man of exceptional governing qualities" 
(NOTE 12). Caetano, in his memoir, tell s several 
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episodes which confirm this autocracy and resents, between the lines, 
the autocratic style (NOTE 13). 
This autocracy had some ridiculous aspects, like the 
fact that Salazar was never told that he was no longer Prime 
Hinister after his substitution in September 1968,due to 
physical and mental incapaci ty after an accident (see THOMAZ 
1983,58-59 and 122-123 and PIRES 1973, WIARDA 1977,395-396). 
This autocracy was given a religious legi timacy through 
the myth of the "providential man" which even Church leaders 
encouraged (chapter five,section 2.2.3). It was given a personal 
legitimacy by Salazar's ascetism,austerity and devotion to the 
job giving rise to the image of the mystic mariage 'of Salazar 
with the Nation; this legitimacy was carefully cultivated by 
Salazar wi th the diffusion of the idea that he did not want 
power( I), power was for him a total sacrifice and he only 
carried his' burden because it was in the interest of all (see 
SALAZAR to FERRO 1982.305-307). 
4.2. Mechanisms of an autocratic leadership 
Salazar's autocratic leadership was not only actively 
sought by distance. loneliness and ascetism and the image of 
constant self denial in the exercise of government. It was 
also sought by the use of several instrumental devices. 
The substi tution of group-decision making methods in 
Council of Ministers by individual meetings with the Ministers 
(NOTE 14). the creation of parallel decision-making bodies, 
like the Private Council (NOTE 15). the setting up of a system 
of personal accountability at top level instead of an 
insti tutional one (see GRAHAM 1975). the preference for"ys-rnen" 
for top jobs and the dismissal of some brilliant but not 
totally compliant men (NOTE 16). the system of recruitment for 
the elite through co-optation, the fragmentary pattern in 
public administration (NOTE 17) are all are devices to create 
and sustain autocratic leadership. 
This autocracy was carefully preserved by the choice of 
submissi ve men for President of Republique. as will be seen 
in this chapter, Americo Thomaz being the most notomus 
example (1958-1974) (NOTE 18). 
4.3. Autocratic leadership and limited pluralism 
Autocratic leadership did not mean absolute power. that 
is, power above law and morals. It did not mean also 
ideological dogmatism or totalitarian indoctrination. but 
rather the monopoly of poli tical initiative in the hands of 
Salazar, loyalty of every elite member and of the different 
groups towards the leader (which included personal 
accountability) and the cult of personality. 
. One must also recognize, that many elite members actively 
pushed Salazar towards this. role. above collegial bodies and 
elite groups • 
. 50 limited pluralism was not incompatible, to a certain 
degree, with Salazar's autocratic style. Probably the 
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heterogenei ty of the 'eli te demanded a mediator above factions 
and groups; this explains why part of it pushed Salazar 
towards autocracy. 
Pluralism of opinion was admissible wi thin the range of 
total loyalty and obedience to the leader (see SALAZAR 1,183-
-4). The counterpart of this agreement is that the leader 
should effectively hang over the different groups and opinions 
carefully avoiding total identification with any of them. 
Two episodes can be presented as evidence of this 
implicit agreement between the leader and the elite which made 
compatible (relative) autocracy with (moderate) limited 
pluralism. 
. 
The relationships of SALAZAR with the monarchic group are 
a clear illustration of the ambigui ty and compromise needed 
both for the leader and for the el i te - see CAETANO I S memoirs 
( 1977) 361-393, 530-536. SALAZAR says explicitly in a letter 
to CAETANO "'t i4 cLea~ we aLL a~~ee that it had not been 
di4cu44ed the p~obLem ot the ~e~ime, [that i4, ~ona~ch~ o~ 
Repl.lb.liql.le] [ ••• 1 but not ' that it doe4 not ex.,i.At in 'Po~tugaL 
. anJl. p~obLem about the ~egime' [ ••• J 't had been p044lbLe to 
.live [with the mona~chlc~ becau4e the que4tlon ot the t~pe 
ot 4egime had been out ot dl4cu44lon. 't i4 not convenlent 
that it wiLL be di4cu44ed, whlch mean that· we mU4t Leave In 
41.14pen4e the mona~chlc 4oLutlon and con4lde~ It, at Lea4t, a4 
a tl.ltu~e, ~emote and not detlned p044lbiLlt~" (SALAZAR in 1957 
in CAETANO 1977, 533). 
The other episode is the growing conflit between a 
conservative, "hawkisbf" faction led by a colonel minister of 
Defense (Santos Costa) and a more open one (called left~t by 
the other) led by CAETANO. Such a conflict could only be 
solved by the simultaneous dismissal of both (see CAETANO 
1977,578-583) • 
To conclude, the'combination of autocratic leadership 
with limited pluralism meant, on one hand, that Salazar should 
carefully avoid the crystallization of the groups into 
political tendencies which could corner him (not allowing even 
a catholic tendency - see FERRO 1982,85-86), on the other 
hand, it meant that Salazar should always seek a minimum 
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degree of equidistance and perform an arbitrational role 
within the elite. 
4.4. Autocratic leadership and non participation within the 
elite 
Autocratic leadership implied that participation and 
mobilization were limited, although not absent, within the 
elite (NOTE 19), since decisions came generally from the top 
without serious discussion of issues within the elite. 
This led with time to political immobilism and 
demobilization within the elite. Pluralism b~came more 
respectful, the regime more grey and apathetic. n.p.e more 
monotonous and habi tual, loyal ty more empty of real content 
beyond personal dedication. (This is notorio~s in the 
decline period of the regime which began after the 
. dismissal of CAETANO and the coming of THOV.AZ to Presidency 
of Republique (1958) - see ~~ROUES 1976,220-221, WIARDA 1977, 
210,307-308). 
This autocratic leadership meant that, in the 
educational system, even the eli te was as much socialized as 
the masses to obey and conform - as MONICA says "In Portugal 
children of the ruling classes had also to learn not to 
question the legitimacy of the regime" (MONICA 1978,286). 
5. ~CH~NISMS OF NON PARTICIPATION ~N PUBLIC LIFE 
The insti tutionalization of an eli tist non participatory 
theory of government inevitably means the minimization or 
control of elections. since elections are the participatory 
mean tI par excellence". 
Elections can become unimportant because the elected 
bodies have no important roles, being the important deci sions 
taken by non elected bodies; because they are so controlled 
that they cannot reflect the true opinion of the electorate; 
or because this is so restrictly defined that does not. truly 
represent the citizens. 
Let us analyse first the role of elected bodies and then 
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how elections were controlled. 
5. 1 . The honorific role of the President of Republique 
The President of Republique was directly elected by the 
Nation - see for this LUCENA 1976 a and CRUZ 1982 c. In 
theory ,he had many powers including that of appointing and 
dismissing the Prime Minister, that is, until 1968, Salazar; 
he was the most important personality of the regime, he 
commands. In practice he was an unimportant figure, not even 
really the second one. This subalternity can not even be 
disguised under the face saving formula of CP.ETANO "bicephalic 
leadership" - see CRUZ 1982c, BLUME 1975; the fact was so 
evident that even the Corporative Chamber acknowledged, in 
1971, that the President of Republique had "lini ted poli tical 
powers" (NOTE 20). 
The reasons for this weakness lay in the way he was 
proposed to be a candidate and the control of elections. The 
candidate was chosen by the "party", that is, by Salazar· (NOTE 
21 ) whom he, once elected, should reappoint or dismiss. 
Salazar never chose men of strong personality or great 
intelligence (NOTE 22). Secondly, since Salazar was the leader 
of the regime the candidate of the regime derived its strenght 
from the fact that it was Salazar who proposed him - in a way 
it is true the political joke that if Salazar had chosen a 
traffic policeman he would be elected in the same way. 
The President of Republique was,at its best,a "ceremonial 
leader of the Republique" (BLUME 1975), a "venerable" figure 
of the regime, at its worst, a puppet on a string and a 
source of damaging political jokes (NOTE 23). 
But if the President (ei ther "venerable" or puppet) was 
always inoffensive the same cannot be said of electoral 
, 
campaigns. The 1949 campaign was worrying and the 1958 
campaign put the elite in complete panic - see about this 
MARQUES 1976, ROBINSON 1979. So in 1959 the New S ta te decided 
it was too risky to play the election game, even holding all 
the trump cards. so it transformed the system into an 
indirect election by an electoral college composed by the 
notables of the regime (NOTE 24). Before 1959 there was no 
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participation, after that there VIas not even the appearance 
of it. 
The President of Republique VIas present in mass media and 
in school - instruments of social and poli tical education of the 
portuguese - as the symbol of national uni ty and as such it 
should be above political or ideological discussions or 
criticisms. 
This role VIas transmitted through school education since 
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primary education. Reading textbooks included a text about the 
President of Republique and a portrai t of him. The text VIas intended to 
inculcate respect and veneration for the "Chief of the great 
Portuguese Family" (NarE 25). 
The mass media usually qualified its reference to the Chief 
of State - it VIas called the "respectable" or the "venerable" 
President of Republique. 
5.2. The ratifying role of "National Assembly" 
5.2.1. The reasons for institutional ecleclicism 
It is ",orth beginning to call attention to the fact that the 
"National Assembly" (Assembleia Nacional) VIas not a parliament 
in the Vlestern european sense. The New State regime was 
strongly anti-parliamentarian. In the purest realization of 
its corporative principles there should not even exist a body 
based on individual votes of citizens, but just a body based 
on organic representation of the "structural elements" of the 
Nation - families, municipali ties, corporations (see LUCENA 
1976a,122-125). Since "the Corporative Chamber is, by its 
origin and composition, much more representative than the 
[National] Assembly" (SALAZAR IV ,435) . the existence of this 
one can be seen as a compromise and an indicator of 
insti tutional eclectidsm (see chapter one, section 2.2) 
There are internal and external reasons for the creation 
of an institution of parliamentary fa9ade aside with a body 
of corporative representation (the subject of corporative 
representation ",ill be developed in chapter 7 ). 
As for internal reasons these rely heavily on mistrust 
of corporative representation. HWhicheve4 ~he ex~en~ion ot 
~n~e4e~~4 o4~aniled in c04po4ation~, the4e wi11 be 1ackin~ 
a1wa~~ ~he 4ep4e4en~ation ot nationa1 inte4e~t4, 4ta~e ~ike 
.i.~te4e4t4 H (SALAZAR I, 388); "it doe4 not 4eem 4i~ht that 
nationa1 inte4e4t4 be con~tituted b~ the me4e combina~.i.on ol 
va4ioU4 mate4ia1 04 m04a1 inte4e~t4 ••• " (SALAZAR IV,435 - see 
also SALAZAR V, 494 and in FERRO 1982,275). As one deputy said 
"The Nation i4 m04ethan j.U4t the a4ithmetic 4um ol 
" 
.i.n4titution4. The4e a4e inte4e~t~ which a~e eve4~bod~'~ 
inte~e~t4, but no ~~oup ••• can inte~p4et" (NOTE 26). The need 
for adequate representation of national interest justifies 
(either as transitional solution or definitive assumed 
eclecticism-see LUCENA 1976a,125-6). this solution. 
But the need for international acceptabili ty . justifies 
also this compromise, al though such reasons are not assumed 
(see ROBINSON 1979,68). It is good for external image to hold 
elections even if they are only "para ingles ver,,'Cliterally 
'for the english to see'). International climate after the 
second world war was not favourable to authoritarian regimes. 
5.2.2. Mechanisms of neutralizing the role and 
representativity of National Assembly 
As it was jus t said, the reasons for providing parliamentary 
representation were exclusively strategic they did not 
come from any belief in the virtues of parliament. In fact, the 
regime was strongly anti-parliamentarian •. so it is not 
surprising that several neutralizing mechanisms were' built-in 
the National Assembly's role and representativity. 
The very first was the obvious control of elections in 
order that only official candidates were elected. 
Secondly. the choice of official candidates to deputies 
was controlled by Salazar himself. Thus elected deputies 
represented, at best. the balance of power within the regime, 
at worst, Salazar himself. 
Thirdly, deputies were in very significative percentage tenns 
mere representatives of the interests of Public Administration. 
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Salazar (IV,427-8) complains that in 1949 el~ctions around 50% 
of the official candidates ~ere civil servants (NOTE 27). 
Fourthly, the ~ork condi tions of the Assembly completely 
~erted any serious parliamentary role - it ~orked only 
three months per year, deputies were part-time representatives, 
it depended financially on the budget of the Prime-
-Minister's officel (see about conditions BLUME 1975). 
Fithly, its powers were very limited - it could not 
promote the resignation of the Government; an the contrary it 
could in fact be dissolved by simple wish of Salazar via the 
President of Republique; it was not the normal legislative 
body (that was the Government) (NOTE 28); it could only approve 
the guidelines of any law and not any detailed ctrticles (NOTE 
29); its powers of supervision of Government and Public 
Admini s tra tion actions were limi ted (NOTE 30); the individual 
ini tiative of deputies ~as limi ted, the main restriction being 
the interdiction of proposing bills which in any way increased 
state's expenses. 
The history of National Assembly is the history of its 
extinguishment to use the words of one dissident deputy in 
1971 (NOTE 31). It must be the only parliament which voted 
against a governmental proposal to increase the Assembly's 
po~erl (see CAETANO 1972a. 593). 
It did not have even a participatory role for the eli te. 
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since great decisions were never made there. v.'hen in the regirrE's 
final agony period ., ( beginnings of 1974) Caetano. then 
Primer-Minister, asked the Assembly to formulate an overseas 
. policy the best the Assembly could produce was that it agreed 
with Governm~nt's policy, that is, it agreed with a policy for 
whose clarification it ~as asked to contributel 
~.2.3. The real role of National Assembly 
What was then the real role of National Assembly? It ~as 
a forum for debate of technical problems and minor poli tical 
problems. It ~as also in LUCENA's expression a "body of. 
political sensibili ty of the regime" (LUCENA 1976a ,152); that 
is,. reflected balance of po~er ~ithin the ruling elite, since 
it ~orked as an instrument of the bargaining of internal 
interests. It performed also a consultative role just as the 
Corporative Chamber. It had also an important "fa~ade" role, 
a window dressing device of the regime, as said before - in 
this role it ratified and legitimized decisions taken 
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elsewhere (GRAHAM 1975,32) that is. it had to rubber stamp 
governmental decisions in order to preserve the trappings of democratic decency. 
Considering the real role it performed some authors do 
not consider National Assembly really a Parliament. even in 
a minimal sense of the word, but just the modern equivalent 
to medieval portuguese "cortes II (NOTE 32 ). 
5.2.4. National Assembly - a discrete body 
Contrarily to ~hat happened with the President of 
Republique no reference was made in primary reading textbooks 
to the National Assembly. It was also not object of public 
attention in mass media. 
This is obviously congruent with the social and political 
education of portuguese which did not encourage participation 
- consequently it did not even give relevance to formally 
participatory bodies. 
(Only for a brief period - 1969-1972 - was the National 
Assembly object of attention of mass media, because of the 
discussions between extreme right wing and liberal members of 
parliament ). 
5.3. Control of electoral process 
We have just seen that elections were unimportant because 
the elected bodies were unimportant. But they were unimportant 
because they were not truly representative due to several 
controls exerted in several stages of the electoral process. 
This non representativeness is not surprising since the 
New State, congruently with its non participatory theory, did 
not believe in elections. nJ do not beLieve in unive44aL 
~utt4age, ~ince individuaL vote doe~ not take into account 
human ditte4entiation t ... J Men [ ••• ] mUdt be equaL in 4e9a4d 
to Law, but J condide4 dange4oud to 9ive to aLL th, dame 
poLiticaL ~i9htdn (SALAZAR VI,41). nNapp~ a4e the nationd which 
do not have/ ~o make choiced in the c4uciaL moment4 ot thei4 Lite" 
(SALAZAR !II, 31 0). 
According to him portuguese people thought the same way. 
"People has aversion to voting" (SALAZAR IV.190). So there 
were few direct elections - only President of Republique. 
(until 1959). National Assembly and the smallest local 
government body were directly elected. 
5.3.1. Mechanisms of control of the electoral process 
As said before. there were various controls in the process -who 
could be an elector. electoral registers. electoral campaigns. 
voting and counting of votes all was under strict control. 
To be an elector was dependent. for men. on being Ii terate 
or on the amount of tax payed by illiterates. and for women.on 
educational qualifications (generally secondary schooling) or 
on being heads of the family or, for those who did not qualify 
by previous cri teria. on being married. Ii terate and payers 
of house tax to the State - for all this see COMISSAO ... 1979. 
8-9 (for the electoral discrimination against women see 
Salazar'S words in FERRO 1982.156-160 - NOTE 33 -; CAETANO 
ended uP. in 1968. with this elec1Dral discrimination - see 
COMISSAO ••• 1979.9). 
But all those who qualify could be prevented from having 
their names in electoral register when they "profess ideas 
contrary to C ... J social discipline" or lack "moral 
idoneousness"; that is, those who openly declare to be 
oppositionists and to be prepared to act according may be 
excluded from being electors! 
In this non favourable climate many of those enti tIed to 
vote did not bother to register (MARQUES 1976.191-2). Just to 
compare the effect of all this on actual electorate it is 
worth to call attention to the fact that electorate was, in 1973, 
around 1800000 and, in 1975, in the first election after the 
overthrow of the regime, the electorate was 6300000 - that is, 
in just two years there was an increase of 350% (see COMISSAO 
••• 1979.9) (NOTE 34). 
But a second layer of controls was the practice of 
fraud on electoral register encouraged and permi tted by the 
fact that no counterfoil or receipts of inscription was given 
and no access to electoral registers was allowed. Thus 
electoral registers were "prepared" - that is the euphemism 
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used in official documents to describe practices such as 
registering death people, not registering people allowed to 
vote, double registering some voters, etc. (for documental 
evidence of those practices see COMISSAO ... 1979). 
A third layer of controls was during the electoral 
campaign. It included governmental support to official 
candidates (see COMISSAO •.• 1979), strict control of mass media 
reporting of the campaign (NOTE 35 ), open propaganda in media 
of official candidates, sometimes prohibition of Opposition 
meetings, persecution of civil servants involved in 
oppositionist campaigns (see COMISSAO ... 1979). 
A fourth layer of controls was implemented in the 
electoral act itself. They included inexistenc~ of adequate 
guarantees for cpposi tionists, supervision of voting, 
deliberate miscounting of votes, "carousel" and other. frauds 
(NOTE 36 ). 
It is very interesting to record that NOGUEIRA, 
ex minister of Salazar and his biographer, acknowledges those 
frauds - he admits that in the presidential election of 1958 
the Opposition candidate (General Humberto Delgado) could have 
had 10% or 20% less votes due to fraud (NOGUEIRA 1980,513 note 
- see page 503). CAETANO, in his memoirs admits, in relation 
to the same election a fraud of 15% of votes (CAETANO 1977, 
577) . 
5.3.2. Electoral practice 
What was the result of all those controls"in actual 
electoral participation? The average participation (percentage 
of actual voters in reference to total population) was from 
1934 to 1945 between 5.3% and 8.6% and from 1953 on it 
stabilized around 11-13% (Source: SCHMITTER 1979): Turn out, 
that is, percentage of actual voters in reference to inscribed 
electorate, was extraordinarily constant - from 1934 to 1942 
it was located between 79% and 86.6%; the 1945 election sho.ved the 
worst turn-out of all New State elections - 57.3%; from 1953 to 
1965 turn out remained between 72.2% and 77.3%; the 1969 and 1973 
election shawed a slight decrease. in turn-out - respectively 
62.5 and 67.2% (Source: SCHMITTER 1979). 
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This constancy is due to preferential registering of 
people in electoral registers and to the high proportion in registers 
of civil servants and other employees dependent on the state or 
governmental appointments (for instance, employees of 
local bodies, Corporative bodies, mixed economy companies, 
etc.) since there was a strict control of actual voting of 
civil servants (it could be registered the name of those who 
did not vote - see COMISSAO ... 1979, GON~ALVES 1981 ). 
5.3.3. Why was it neces sary con trol so heavi ly partici pa tion 
of a passive people? 
This question arises naturally from confrontation of such 
layers of controls with Salazar's theory about the portuguese 
man. Such a question imposes itself even more when one takes 
into consideration the other controls existent in portuguese 
society - there was no freedom of press, speech, meetings, 
there was no Opposi tion in parliament. Why so many controls 
for a naturally passive and apathetic people? 
In relation to elections a partial explanation can be 
given - the regime wanted not only to win, but also to obtain 
a crushing victory, which was to kill two birds with one stone, 
since it avoided the entrance of opposi tionist deputies in 
National Assembly and, at the same time, it contributed to 
internal legitimacy and international acceptability. 
But this is not the whole explanation. One can very 
legitimately suspect that Salazar did. not believe fully in his 
diagnosis of portuguese man. This calls attention to how much 
portuguese passivi ty and conformism was resul t of deliberate 
non participatory policies. 
5.4. The role of the "Uni!o Nacional" - the sole party 
5.4.1. An official civic association 
According to official statements the "Uniao Nacional" 
(National Union) was not a party and so should not cultivate 
partisan spirit (see SALAZAR I,94-95,346-347~ IV,183 and in 
FERRO 1982,87). Consequently. it is not a sole party (SALAZAR 
1,346-347. IV,270)."It is open to cooperation of all men of 
good will provided they accept som~ basic principles of the 
New State (SALAZAR IV.183 - see also IV.469tVt398t406-407. 
VI t 356-357). Membership of the National Union is not necessary to 
be appointed for political posts or public offices - see 
SALAZAR IV.184, VI.169-170.242 (NOTE 37). 
So officially the National Union is a "civic association 
which linked government and people" (CAETANO 1977,289). "an 
association wi thout partisan character and independent from 
the State which aims essentially at gathering the largest 
possible number of citizens. wi thout distinction of poli tical 
colour, in order to support the State and to defend public 
opinion ... " (QUEIRO 1946) (NOTE 38 ). 
5.4.2. National Union ~as not a mobilizing c~ganization 
The National Union was not a mobilizing party (f{ARTINS 1986.PAYNE 1979b. 
SANTOS 1982. SCHMITTER 1975.65. WIARDA 1977. 118-9). There was 
no mass recruitment (SCHMITTER 1975.65 note 27. LUCENA 1979a). 
it had no penetration on the life of the nation (LUCENA 1979a) 
it did not mobilize people for genuine mass demonstrations 
(almost all demonstrations were staged ones - see comment of 
THOMAZ 1983,311 ). it did not have any significant doctrinaire 
production. it was invaded by civil servants (CRUZ 1982c, 
PARREIRA 1982, WIARDA 1977.119) and logically never undermined 
or even challenged the political authority of the bureaucratic 
apparatus (SCHMITTER 1979). 
Even in the beginning the National Union was apathetic, that 
is, not even ini tially it showed any signs of dynami sm. This 
can be clearly seen in the account of its first Congress given 
in PARREIRA 1982 and also in CAETANO's memoirs (CAETANO 1977, 
59-60 ). 
Al though it was intended to be passi\e it overdid it 
sometimes and even Salazar ocasionally complained of its 
inefficiency (SALAZAR VI,376-377). CAETANO. who had very 
important posts in National Union, said in a letter to Salazar 
in 1947 "I thought [ ••. J that Government had the intention of ' 
promoting a true civic mobilization [ •.. J But reali ties became 
entirely against my suppositions. Government[ ... ] goes on 
being the only active political reality supported by the 
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administrati ve apparatus and the polices" (CAETANO 1977,299 
- see also pages 59-60,299-304). 
Indeed National Union was very dependent on the Government 
- it was created by decree-law( !}, was set up initially by the 
Home Office, it depended financially on the latter (see 
COMISSAO ... 1979.71-72 and 81-83). 
The non mobilizational role, acknowledged by authors and 
actors alike, is very congruent with our main hypothesis about 
the essential demobilizational nature of the New State. It is 
.also congruent with limited pluralism and heterogeneous 
recruitment for tr.e elite. As PINTO. an extreme right-wing 
mili tant, commented wi th disillusion the National Union was, 
"like bourgeois parties in pluralist systems, an organization 
of persons and ir.terests, united by affinities and personal 
loyal ty to a leader" (PINTO 1973,87). 
5.4.3. '!he National Union was not influential within the elite 
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In theory the National Union could have been a non rrobilizational party in 
regard to masses and a dynamic and influential party wi thin 
the elite. I t could have been an agency of political education for 
the elite. 
This was also not the case. National Union was never a 
"cadres" party. a policy formulator. a doctrinaire 
organization, or even a think -thank group or planning office. 
As CAETANO acknowledges only government fulfilled those roles 
(see CAETANO 1977.299,293-294 - see also 332-334). 
As indicator of this non influential role for the eli te 
one can point that many deputies were not members of· National 
Union (CAETANO 1977,304). 
Another indicator of this non- influence is the concern 
with which even from the beginning (see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 
86) no internal dynamism was allowed. As a notable of the 
regime said "We do not recognize parties outside Nationa1Union. 
Wi thin it we do not allow groups" (NOTE 39). Since CAETANO, 
when president of National Union, seemed to have other opinio~ 
he came into confli t wi th Salazar and resigned from the post 
(CAETANO 1977.59-60,285-334) (NOTE 40). 
This meant that no ideological groups or political 
tendencies were allowed (monarchists seemed to be an exception 
NOTE 41), only personal affini ties groups or interest 
groups. In those conditions it is not surprising that National 
Union never instilled any dynamism within the elite. 
5.4.4. The actual role of National Union 
What was then the actual role of National Union? If it 
was not a mass party nor a doctrinaire or a cadres party. if 
it was not an agency of poli tical education of the eli te, if 
it did not mobilize nei ther people nor the eli te. if did not 
influence public opinion or government policies what did the 
National Union live for? 
Its first real role was precisely to avoid political 
mobilization, since the official comprehensi vness of National 
Union (symbolized in its name) was used as legi timacy basis 
to prohibi t any poli tical acti vi ty or group outside it, even 
right wing groups (see in chapter one the case of national -
-syndicalists). The conclusions of its first congress already 
emphasized this - see PARRElRA 1982. 
A second role was to control participation within the 
supporters of the regime. Limited pluralism and heterogeneous 
background of the eli te and of its recrui tment patterns could 
be dangerous, since they could degenerate into centrifugal 
forces. The National Union served to "hinder the crystallization 
of tendencies wi thin the regime" (LUCENA 1979a). Pluralism, 
even limited, should be kept under control. 
A third role was to deprive the Army from legitimacy to 
go on assuming any political role (PARREIRA 1982). 
A fourth role was to act as a vast patronage-machine 
which could explore situationism. CAETANO, in his memoirs, 
acknowledged this role, even calling National Union's 
President (himself at the time) "general agent of Countryside 
in Lisbon" for making personal and local demands accepted by 
central bureaucratic services (CAETANO 1977,294,300) - see 
WIARDA 1977,118-119,181,295. 
A fifth role was to act as the instrument of presenting 
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nationalistic candidates for elections. 
A sixth role was to serve as a sort of Honors Chamber of 
the regime (a "collection of notables" - WIARDA 1977,118), 
a "regrouping of prominent people" - LUCENA 1979a). 
5.4.5. Was National Union a party? 
Taking all this into account one can ask if National 
Union was really a party. 
CRUZ adresses this questions - he suggests that what was 
rejected was the liberal democratic conception of party. So 
National Union was not a state or government party, but it was 
a civic party, whose aim was not political parti~ipation, but 
civic cooperation (CRUZ 1980,378-382, CRUZ 1 982c ). But it is 
probably more useful to consider it "more as a bureaucratic 
appendage of the regime than a political party in the Anglo-
-American sense" (WIARDA 1977,294), since its degree of 
authonomy from the state and from government and 
administration was minimum.' 
'" 
To conclude one can say that National Union was not a 
mechanism of participation for the masses or for the 
elite. 
5.5. Conclusion - there were no mechanisms of participation 
in public life 
One can conclude that there was no participation nei ther 
through elections nor through party membership. Participation 
could logically carne yet, in a corporative regime, through 
Corporations, but that was not the case since corporations 
were inextricably mixed up with the adminis trati ve apparatus, 
as shall be seen in chapter eight. Participation could still 
exist at local level, through local government, but that was 
not at all the case as will be discussed. in chapter eight (Those 
two possible channels of participation were not analysed here 
just because they will be"better dealt with iri oth~r chapter ). 
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Participation through elections was also dependent.· for 
men and even more for women. on formal school education. 
Since there was not any attempt of mass education there were 
always many illi terate persons - the rate of illiteracy was 
67.8% in 1930.55% in 1940.45% in 1950. 38.1% in 1960, 30% 
in 1968, which placed Portugal below all other european 
countries (MARQUES 1976.203-204). This means that the legal 
restrictions for voting based on literacy were very 
important. So there was a formal link between education and 
political participation. 
Some authors say that the regime did not need a 
mobilizing party as a agency for the participation of the masses, 
because the Catholic Church did the mobilization the regime 
needed (LOURENC;O 1982b). Others say that it was the Army which 
filled the role of the mass party (CABRAL 1976, GINER 1982, 
JESUINO 1982, MARQUES 1976~ 
Those explanations do not obliterate the point that the New 
State did not need a specific agency for ideological or 
political mobilization (which the Church was not) nor for 
participa tion of citizens in public life (which the Army was 
not) . 
The Catholic Church always had an important mobilizational 
role towards a type of mentali ty and patterns of life which 
were also the most adequate for the regime - hence the 
"moral union" between them. But this only proves that this 
mentality inculcation was enough for New State purposes. 
Indeed the absence of a specific mobilising party c:om=s 
from the fact that mobilisation in public areas was not the 
aim of the regime. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEW STATE 
EXPRESSIVE DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES - THE 
INCULCATION OF PASSIVITY THROUGH THE 
CURRICULUM 
It has already been said that it is this work's contention 
that demobilization was the main goal of the New State. There 
werethree tasks inherent to the achievement of this goal - to 
maintain demobilised the"rural marl' which was considered 
naturally passive(ajudgement which was extended to the less 
educated urban strata); to actively derrobilise (or keep 
mobilisation level under strict control) urban elites, mainly 
in great cities; and to control organizations ~hich were 
potentially mobilising - the Church, the Army, the University. 
The first task was almost completely achieved through the 
referred mechanisms of non participation of citizens in public 
life and through centralization which removed decision from 
local bodies and local arenas. 
The other tasks demanded the seting up of specific 
demobilising strategies. The object of the following four 
chapters is to proceed to the analysis of such strategies. 
Each chapter begins with a general analysis of the 
demobilising strategy and then shows how the educational 
system participated in it. 
1. A TYPIFICATION OF NEW STATE DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES 
It seemed usefUl to present those strategies under a four 
category typology. This may help to clarify the ~'s 
intentions and essence. 
It is suggested that one can consider expressive, 
adminis trati ve, organizational and repressive strategies as 
four main types of political strategies. 
The first type - expressive strategies - comprehends 
those ones where demobilisation is pursued through 
mentality inculcation and attitudes imprinting. The main 
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instrument of this type of strategy are generally the 
educational system, youth organizations and the mass media 
The second type comprises the use of direct control by 
the State of access resources and decision-making to achieve 
conformism. This means control of access to jobs, job security, 
salaries, promotions, allocation of resources, etc. but also 
the monopoly of decision-making in the center of 
administrative state departments. There are two subtypes -
direct control, related with the first aspects, and 
centralization, related wi th the last one. Those administrative 
strategies use the direct power of the State and so they are more 
used towards those who are more directly linked or dependent 
on state departments. 
. 
A third type includes strategies which are aimed towards 
powerful social insti tutions like . the Army, Church, Universities, 
Trade Unions, etc. Those include same subtypes-
compartmentalization (a strategy of isolation), co-optation 
(a strategy of recruitment of members for the elite from 
leaders of those powerful organizations) and organizational 
pre-emptying (occupation of an organizational space mainly to 
avoid the occupation of the some space by others). 
A fourth type is made up by repressive st rategies - they 
can consist in the suppression of freedoms and .of information 
(censorship) and in the direct repression of mobilising 
actions. 
This chapter and the next on~. v..ill analyse expressive strategies, 
chapter five the administrative and organizational 
strategies and chapter six the repressive strategies and 
the new changing strategies in 1960s • 
2. EXPRESSIVE DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES 
2.1. Ideological indoctrination versus mentality inculcation 
First of all one must distinguish between ideological . 
indoctrination and mentality inculcation. The former is a 
poli tical indoctrination in an articulate ideology the latter 
is an inCUlcation of values, norms, habits and attitudes. This 
distinction made by LINZ fOllows the line which separates 
, 
totali tarian and authori tarian regimes. (see above chapter one). 
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Ideological indoctrination is a mobilising strategy, 
necessary to implement new ideas, new theories or new 
world views. that is, it is a strategy to mobilise for change. 
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On the contrary, mentali ty inculcation can be compatible wi th 
demobilisation when just pursuing the imprinti~of traditional 
patterns of life thought to be always present in the national soul. 
In this case inculcation of traditional patterns is a strategy 
for non change, for preservation; thus it reinforces 
conformist attitudes. 
So to carry evidence for the hypothesis of the 
demobilising essence of the regime one must prove that 
mentality inculcation, rather than ideological .indoctrination, 
was the aim of the New State (see MONICA 1978, 355). 
We will try to confir~ our hypothesis 
a) analyzing what New State leaders thought about the 
poli tical education of people ( that is,ideological education of 
masses), aided by the analysis of the speeches of Salazar; 
b) analyzing what New State leaders thought about 
political propaganda; 
Those two analysis will show that political 
education was nei ther really intended (except possibly in the 
period of tactical and defensive fascistization of the regime 
- see chapter one) nor practised,and that political propaganda 
was not ideological indoctrination. 
The confirmation of the hypothesis will continue 
c) analyzing New State theory about the portuguese 
"mentali ty minimum", that is, the basic beliefs, sentiments 
and attitudes portuguese should have to make feasible the 
ruling of New State; 
d) analysing New State means (strategies of the 
expressive type) to achieve this; 
e) describing the basic pattern of life envisaged for 
portuguese people in general. 
The second part of the chapter will analyze how this passive 
pattern of life was inculcated through the school curriculum. A 
detailed analysis of the portuguese "mentality minimum" will be 
done through the messages contained in the reading textbooks 
of primary education in the next chapter. 
2.2. Political education of people 
2.2.1. Appeals for political education of people and its non 
implementation 
The need of political education of people was ocasionally 
emphasized (SALAZAR 111,25,33,37, V, 142-144) mainly of new 
generations (SALAZAR 111,199-203, CAETANO 1952.11). These 
appeals were generally vague, since they never explained what 
political education has to be done, where and how (see, for 
instance, SALAZAR IV, 278, V, 144). 
But those appeals were not implemented as can be 
evidencec by SALAZAR's complaints that the National Union never 
provided political education for masses - in 1938 (SALAZAR III, 
26), in 1947 (SALAZAR IV,76), in 1953 (SALAZAR V,142), in 1965 
(SALAZAR VI, 376) (NOTE 1 ). 
SALAZARS acknowledgment in 1965 that, in Portugal, only 
two organizations cared about the formation of their militants 
- the Church and the Comnunist Party - (SALAZAR VI, 376 -see also V, 142-143) 
evidence that poli tical education was not even provided for 
New State's elite. 
To carry further evidence one can analyze what SALAZAR 
and CAETANO said about corporative education. There are the 
same appeals to the need of corporati ve education of masses 
(SALAZAR 1I1,367, 1V,433), the recognition of the need of 
corporative education of corporative leaders (SALAZAR 1II,367, 
CAETANO 1941,9,31-34) alongside with the acknowledgment that 
it had not been done (CAETANO 1941, 31-32, 80-81, CAETANO 
1950, 12, CARDOSO 1949). 
Further evidence can be found to support the argument 
that political education was not practiced through analysing 
.. --New State leaders statements about the political education of 
youth. CAETANO speaking about this education, through New 
State youth organization ("Mocidade Portuguesa"), is very 
moderate. He just says "Let us make from each portuguese a 
conscious agent [ ... J of the poli tics which sui ts the Nation 
[ .•• ] a devoted servant, in all and above all, of national 
interest" (CAETANO 1952,11 ). Speaking of the "integral 
formation of youth" he defines it just as" that which develops 
in youth all virtualities towards the Good" (CAETANO 1952,35). 
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The appeals are directed towards obedience and christian 
religious and moral formation. This will be analyzed in more 
detail in chapter nine, when describing the project and 
activities of New State youth organization, and acknowledging 
its deliberate sharing of influence over youth wi th the family and 
Catholic Church. Indeed "Mocidade Portuguesa" (Portuguese 
Youth) was not a mobilising agency. 
From all this one can conclude 
- firstly, that poli tical education was never practiced 
which is acknowledged by actors, as seen above, and authors 
alike, as seen in chapter one. 
- secondly, that mobilizing political education of people 
or even of elites, was never truly intended by New State 
regime. 
The fact that political education programs were never 
implemented is a strong indicator that it was never really 
fully intended. This indicator seen in the context of what had 
been said in previous chapters increases its importance. But 
one can carry more specific evidence if one proves that for the nost 
part the statements appealing for the political education of 
the masses were produced in the tactical and defensive 
fascistization period of the regime (1933-1945) - see chapter 
one. Indeed this is the case. 
All the three speeches of SALAZAR specifically devoted 
to poli tical education and propaganda come from this period 
- "National Propaganda", in October 1933, , (SALAZAR 1,261-268) t 
"Political education - guarantee of revolutionary continuity" 
in 1938 (SALAZAR III, 25-38), and "Aims and needs of poli tical' 
propaganda" in 1940 (SALAZAR 111,193-211). The quotations of 
this' part about the political education of people were taken 
mainly from these last two speeches. The same applies to the 
quotation of CAETANO (CAETANO 1952,11) which is part of 
guidelines he produced for Portuguese youth , when he was its 
leader, between 1940 and 1944 • 
.r . 
We will now prQvide evidence that shows that this 
period (1933-1945) was an exception in the regime, thus 
carrying weight to the assertion that political education of 
masses was never implemented. 
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2.2.2 Analysis of the rec~ivers of leader's speeches to 
provide indicators cf the exceptional character of the 
mobilisinG period 
We will use the division into periods presented in Chapter 1 in the 
analysis of evolution in the addresses of Salazar's speeches. This 
diachronic analysiS will present an indicator of the exceptional character 
of the robilising period, which is instrumental to show that the radical 
and dynamic appeal of that period (inherent to the tactical and def ensive 
mobilising strategies) did not repeat itself in later penods. 
(For details of the methodclogy used to build the Tables 3.1 and 
3.2 see chapter !We, section 3). 
In Table 3.1 a~j 3.2 were r~orded ooly those communications 
addressed to elites cr to masses, that is, it were excluded commu~:=ations 
categorized as "various". Caetar:~' s rule period was included here to 
provide a term of car.parison wi th the four periods of Salazar's rule. but 
will not be object of ar,alysis .. 
TABLE .3.1 
ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE RECEIVERS OF NEW ST~~E 
LEA~~R's SFEECEES 
1st. Period 2nd Period 3rd Period 4th Period 5th Period 
1925-1933 1933-1945 1945-1958 1958-1958 1958-1974 
10 48 27 14 42 
Elite 
91% 53% 53% 58% 51% 
1 43 15 10 41 
Masses 
9% 47% 37% 42% 49% 
11 91 43 24 83 
TOTAL 100% 100% 1000-' 100% 100% 
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TABLE 3.2 
ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF COMMUNICATIONS PER PERIODS* 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Period Period Period Period Period TOTAL 
1926-1933 1333-1945 1945-1958 1358-1968 11968-1974 
PERCENTAGE OF /~~ TOTAL COMMUNICA- n 54% 25% 14% 100% TIONS - Periods 
1 - 4 / /1 ~ 
.. './/' 
, I ! PERCENTAGE OF I: I I J I " ,I . 
COMMUNICATIONS 
'. /) 
. , 
TO MASSES - Pe- 1% 61% 23% 14% , " / 99% 
riods ' ! 
I (i? 1 - 4 i / II , , ','./ 
AVERAGE 
COMMUNICATIONS 
PER 2.2** 7.3 3.4 2.3 14.9 YEAR 
*NOTE: The analysis exclude Communications categorized as 
addressed to various, that is, neither addressed to 
masses or to elite. The number of year~ in each period 
was calculated in years, months and days. 
**~: For this calculation the first period began in 27-4-1928, 
the day in which Salazar entered in the Government. 
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It is evident that, among the four periods which are 
studied in this work, the one in which communication to masses 
was a very important strategy was the second period - in this 
mobilizing period 47% of the analyzed communications were 
addressed to masses (average is 41 % as can be seen in Table 
2.2 - Page 62) • But the difference between this period and the 
others is still more clear analyzing Table 3.2 - in fact 54% of 
all communications and 61 % of all those addressed 
to masses in the forty two years which the four periods 
encompass (1926-1968) were produced just in those twelve more 
mobilising years (1933-1945). Average communication per year 
in this period is more than double that of any. other of the 
four periods. 
So it seems demonstrated that: a) The second period was 
a more mobilising period than that one which preceded it and 
the two which followed it; b) This mobilizing pattern of 
communication was not repeated in the next two periods studied 
(the clear difference with Caetano period is not object of 
analysis here). 
2.2.3. Conclusion - absence of political education of masses 
Returning to what it have been said about political 
education of masses, it can be concluded from all that was 
said and analyzed in the two previous sections. that the 
period in which various appeals to political education of 
people were produced was an exceptional one within the regime. 
One can further hypothesise that this mobilizing style. was 
part of the radical tone inherent to the tactical and 
defmsive mobilising-like strategies of the fascistization 
period of the regime. 
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The fact that those appeals were never transformed into 
action is perfectly congruent wi th this interpretation. Thus 
Portugal went on in a process in which the legal revolution 
preceeded the mental one, to use SALAZAR's words (SALAZAR III, 
366 ). 
This absence of political education has been compensated, 
according to SALAZAR, by the basic mentali ty of the people -
the "faith in those principles which consubstatiate the soul, 
traditions and aspirations of portuguese Nation" (SALAZAR III, 
210), the intuition of portuguese people (SALAZAR 111,37) "the 
consistent lusi tanian [portuguese] background, the lessons of 
history and the examples of its men of great werth, the 
heal thy tradi tion of our ances tors 11 (SALAZAR VI. 3·77 ) . 
So it is necessary to analyse in greater detail this 
basic mentali ty of portuguese in which SALAZAR and the elite 
were so confident. But before this it is yet necessary to 
clarifly the meaning the regime gave to political propaganda. 
2.3. Political propaganda 
Sometimes SALAZAR uses the c0ncept of political 
propaganda in a very comprehensive meaning encompassing 
governmental propaganda and political education, that is, 
encompassing both political information and POlitical 
formation (SALAZAR 111,195). At other times he uses the concept in 
the limited meaning of propaganda - publici ty of realizations, 
advertisement of rulers (see SALAZAR 1,262-264). We will 
consider now this restricted meaning, since we have just analy~d 
political education. 
For SALAZAR political propaganda is justified for two 
related reasons. Firstly, because "poli tically it only exists 
which is known to exist" (SALAZAR 111,196). If the government 
builds roads or schools, but only those who live nearQY know 
it,:itis, as for as politics is concerned, as if it had done nothing. 
So it is necessary to advertise publicly those achievements 
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(see SALAZAR 1,263-264, 111,196 - see also SALAZAR in FERRO 
1982,120). In this way propaganda has the role of giving to 
the common citizen the national dimension about government 
policies and realizations, sinc::e "it is very difficul t to see 
the world from the window of our room" (SALAZAR 1,263) and it 
is dangerous to form opinions about national reali ties just 
by playing the philosopher in the theshold of one's door 
.. (SALAZAR 1,264) (NOTE 2 ). 
The second reason for the need of national propaganda is 
that "in\ politics, what seems to be, is". This motto was much 
invoked by SALAZAR ( SALAZAR 1,263, I 11,27,196,198 ) ( NOTE 
3 ) and opposes what seems to be (for public opir;ion) to what 
really is. Propaganda has the role of presenting things as 
they really are (that is, as they officially are, we add). 
For those two purposes it was created in October 1933 a 
"Secretariate for National Propaganda". 
Jh contrast to what happened wi th poli tical education 
intentions, political propaganda was effectively practiced. 
A secretariate was created to promote and 
coordinate it (later on called National Secretariate for 
Information), which had also, had, until 1950s , a certain role in the· 
promotion of. cuI ture and arts (MARQUES 1976,207-208). The mass 
. media and the school were also very important agents of 
governmental propaganda. As SALAZAR predicted in 1933 it could 
not avoid "all personal flattering references nor all 
tributes paid to those who assert themselves by their work, 
their dedication, the unselfishness in serving public cause" 
(SALAZAR 1,262). Indeed it was not avoided. 
Propaganda was an expressive strategy used by the regime 
in order to create in citizens an atti tude favourable to the 
New State and its rulers and to increase the legitimacy of 
their rule (NOTE 4). It was nota strategy of ideological 
formation. but rather of factual· information (or misinformation); 
it was not a strategy of 'mobilization neither. through 
ideological indoctrination nor through participation.lt appealed 
rather to compliance and conformism, to· obedience and quiet 
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acceptance of things as they were - it did nc: appeal to any 
kind of revolution. but to mere situationism UWTE 5). So the 
existence of political propaganda does not prejudices our main 
hypothesis about the passive and demobilisir:; nature of the 
regime. 
Political propaganda was not even a pure expressive 
strategy. since it can only be efficient in a repressive 
. context of suppreEion of freedom where contrel of mass media 
and censorship is indispensable. 
Having Evidenced that poli tical educatic:: of people was 
not really intended and that poli tical propa;=.nda. which was 
implemented. was not a mobilizing strategy. '",'e will analyze 
the process of mentality inculcation which was intended and 
implemented. as part of the expressive confor~ist strategies. 
2.4. The inculcation of a passive mentality 
2.4.1. The "basic sentiments of portuguese mo!'"al structure" 
In the preface SALAZAR wrote for his interviews given to 
A. FERRO he says that he just wants to have healthy man 
(nei ther sick nor athletic.). patient. calm a~.:: tenacious· 
(nei tr.er abulic nor agi tated) - "all thi~ is very Ii ttle 
but I will manage to draw the rest" (SALAZA? 1 933). He goes 
on to say "The f-oll.mat.ion of. a 4oJ..id coJ..J..ect.ive con4cience did 
not. ~UPP0II.t. noll. demand t.hat. we wouJ..d ~o be~ond t.he ba4ic 
a~pilLat.ion~ and ~ent..i..ment.~ which con~t.it.ut.e t..!le m~.nt.aJ.. and 
mOll.aJ.. ~t.lI.uct.ulLe of- t.he pOIl.t.u~ue~e"; 
.' __ ' ._...0...--. __ ' .-'._-_.- -_ 
(SALAZAR IV.467~ see similar ideas in SALAZAR I. 94.11.27.111 • 
210.IV,510-511, V 515.1936 and in ASSAC 1952.17. 
It is clear from those texts that SALAZAR appealed just 
to general values and atti tudes already prese!'lt in portuguese 
life. that is.he appealed to traditional patterns of life. 
This is congruent with what was said above about Salazar'S new 
man (Chapter 2). Consequently Salazar did nei ther preach nor 
practice any frenetic style of government. 
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2.4.2. The "mild but constant pressure" 
"A leader cannot be considered inferior or dishonest for 
conducting men without them noticing it" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982). 
FERRO said to Salazar "[I thinQ your aspiration, your 
obstinate dream is to modify, little by little, patiently, 
our mentali ty". SALAZAR liked the idea and improved it - he 
preferred to use the image of "a ~CA.eJ1) whi..ch bOlle~ ~-low-lV-
wi..thout·hullii..n9 the wood,' whi..ch doe~ a mi..-ld but con~tant 
plle~~ulle, penetllati..n9 -li..tt-le blJ litt-le wi..tfl.Out evVL pllovoki..ng. 
a -li..ve-lv. Ileacti..on ot. the mattell." (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,168-
-169). 
So SALAZAR says that one must govern "slowly, little by 
little" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,166), "without trepidations nor 
hesitations nor backward movements" (SALAZAR VI ,443), calmly, 
generous1y,with a touch of indulgence (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982 
116-117'- see also pages 190-191,260). 
The "mild but constant pressure" is the explicit mean 
SALAZAR uses to maintain those "basic sentiments of portuguese 
moral structure" and to build a passive man, without him 
noticing it. 
So violence is not necessary - one must govern wi thout 
violence, even for the reason that the portuguese are people of mild 
customs (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,11.5-117 , SALAZAR II,70-71). 
In fact SALAZAR could not dispense with all violence, 
mainly because not all men accepted to be so passive and 
conformist as he wanted, but physical violence 'A'as never the main 
strategy of New State. 
This invisible pressure is a means to inculcate a basic 
mentali ty in the portuguese. Which was this basic mentali ty? 
2.4.3. The basic mentality - ~d, Fatherland,Family and 
Authority 
The basic mentali ty the New State tried to inculcate 
very clearly defined by SALAZAR in 1936, ten years after 
"coup d I etat" which brought about the regime "U'e take t.OIl 
~od and vi..ll.tue: we take t.OIl ~Ilanted Fathell-land and i..t~ 
we take tOil ~Ilanted autholli..tlJ and i..t~ plle~ti..gej we 
I 
~ 
I 
was 
the 
91lanted 
IIi..~tollv. ; 
take to~ ~~anted tamil~ and it~ mo~al; we take to~ ~~anted the 
9lo~y ot wo~k and it~ dut~" (see SALAZAR II,127-'~1 _ see also, 
SALAZAR V,86) 
This gave rise to a very well kno~n slo~a~ - God, 
Fatherland, Family and Authority - which is a synthesis of 
traditional mentality. 
This mentality will be the basis for tt~ analysis of 
school curricula. 
2.4.4. Tt~ basic pattern of life - an apolit:=~l life 
If t~.e collective conscience just needs: to believe in 
God, Fath~rland, Family, Authori ty and vlork :hen the ccrmnon 
citizen sh:;uld just go to church, be a patrie:. lead a family 
life, be always obedient to authorities and C~ embedded in hjs 
work. That is, politics should never impinge u;:>:n his habitual 
routine. That is, he should have only pri va:~ acti vi ties and 
private strategies to solve his problems,neve~ he should think 
of public strategies. 
For pcli tics ~'as considered evil. The partisar. ;:,:::li tics, the 
politics cf the othersJwas inherently evil (~s~ LOUREN~O 1976, 
23). Even the regime's political activity, al thou;:-. necessary, had 
just a secondary role - "C ... J to~ u~ thi..~ [polLtical] 
acti..vi..t~ ha~ a~ onl~ u~etul ~oa~ to ~ive exp~e~~ion and 
poli..ti..cal value to ~ove~nment act~. To 90ve~n,leadi..n~ nati..onal 
con~ci..ence, i..~ the onl~ t~ul~ con~i..~tent and ~e~iou~ ~oleH 
(SALAZAR 1V,487 - see also 11,72-74) (NOTE 6). 
FERRO already set up this tone of apolit:cism in 1933 
when he said "let us patiently wai t that he [~alazarJ fulfills 
his promises" (FERRO 1982,181). A very popular comic actor 
synthesised in the 19605 thi s atti tude in the motto "My only 
poli tics is my work and 1 always got on well wi th it" (NOTE 
7 ) . 
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It is as if the New State proposed an impI:~it pact 
between the regime and the Nation: rUling and government was 
up to the New State elite - common citizens sf.ould nOot care 
about it, in turn the State will not interfer~, u~like 
totalitarian regimes, ~ith private life of people. The pact 
was generally kept by both sides. 
How far did this apolitical attitude pene:rate portuguese 
mentali ty? SCHHITTER in his simulated pattern of support for 
the regime divides the population into five categories -
active enthusiasts, passive supporters, semi-opponents, active 
opponents and excluded apathetics. The last grc~p is estimated 
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as the predominant one and the first as the least important 
(never exceeding 10%) - see SCHMITTER 1975 b. From the 1960s on -
wards there was an increase in the mobilization of university 
students and trade' unions. But the apoli tical at ti tude penetrated 
well enough to make pcssible the 'very long surv:val of the 
regime, since "this f:rm of political domina::'cn C ... J does 
not depend on enthusiasm. It cuI tivates and surv:'ves because 
of passive opportunis~ and passivity" (SCP.MITT~R 1975 b). 
2.5. Inculcating a passive mentality 
2.5.1. Inculcating a passive mentality through mass media 
The regime did not directly control newspapers, cinema 
or theatres', did not have the monopoly of radio; there were 
two private powerful radio stations and other less important 
besides the official one. The only means of communication 
which was monopolized by the State was television (television 
~ 
only began to be influential in the 1960~). 
The rejection of monopoly of mass media is an indication 
of absence of mobilization intention (see HONICA 1978,355). 
Addi tional evidence for the non mobil isaticnal role of mass 
media comes from the fact that no large scale programs of 
ideological indoctrination through mass media were im~emented, 
there was no diffusion in large scale of doctrinaire books, 
magazines or leaflets. 
The closest thing to a mobilising message was the 
constant manichaen presentation of facts, through the medium of 
fairy-tale stories, dividing the nation and the world between 
the good and the evil ones, the nation and the anti-nation, 
the deffensors of christian western civiliz2~iori and its 
attackers, us and them. The role of the bad guy was 
in terna tionally pI ayed by the cormnuni s t na ~ions, mainly the 
Soviet Union, and internally by the clandest:ne communist party 
(NOTE 8). 
The mass media was used for permanent governmental 
propaganda through manipulation of information which any 
sample of editorials, television news or ne'w·sreel can show. 
As said this had no intention of mobilizing the common man, 
but to enhance its passive acceptance of things as were 
presented to him. 
But poli tical propaganda was not the o:lly expressive use 
of the mass media. The less visible effects of s:..:ppression of 
information (through censorship) were probably much more 
important than the visible and explicit propaganda. In so far 
as it ~sed the transmission to masses of a non problematic, 
consensual, highy moralistic and almost rosy vision of 
portuguese society,censorship had powerful expressive 
consequences. But as censorship is essentially a repressive 
strategy, even when it has important expressive consequences, 
this subject will be dealt later on in this chapter, when' 
speaking about repressive strategies. 
All this fits well with the "mild but constant pressure" 
used towards the inculcation of respect for God, Fatherland, 
Family and Authority, the "basic sentiments of portuguese 
moral structure". 
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In sum, the mass media VIas . used for government's propaganda 
and for the inculcation of a passive mentality and not for 
political education of citizens or other mobilising strategy. 
2.6. Inculcating a passive mentality through the educational 
system 
Educational systems are ideal vehicles for the diffusion 
of social or political projects in so far as all new 
generations can be influenced. 
2.6.1. The school as an explicit agent of mentality inculcation 
Salazar acknowledged this fact "UJ~ cannot un.dell.4tand, 
ne.i...thell. cou.ld we pell.m.i...t that the 'Poll.tu~ue4e 4choo.l4 4hou.ld 
Il.ema.i...n neutll.a.l .i...n th..i...4 4tll.u99.le [a9a..i...n4,t commun..i...4iJ [ ••• J 
We all.e compe.l.led to. ~tate that we do not :l.ec09n..i...Je .l.i...bell.ty. 
a4 a9a..i...n4t the nat..i...on, the common ~ood, the lam..i....ly. and 
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mOll.a.l..i...ty.. On the contll.all.y., we w..i...4h the tam..i....ly. and the 4choo.l4 
..i...nde.l..i...b.ly. to ..i...mpll...i...nt on the ~Il.ow..i...n~ m..i...nd tho4e h.i...~h ..i...dea.l4 wh..i...ch 
chall.actell...i...Je OUIl. c..i...v..i....l..i...Jat.i...on, to~ethell. w..i...th the deep .love 
of- coun,tll.y. ak.i...n to t.he .love 01 .~.ho~e .. wh.o h~~e. cll..eated and 
extended OUIl. hell.it.q~e ..i...n the.pa~t"( S~ I, 313-314), 
translation of SALAZAR 1939,209). The schools could not be 
divorced from the nation (SALAZAR I, 307). The school should 
be the "sacred workshop of souls" (SALAZAR I, 306). 
CAETANO follows the same line of thought "The school 
is mobilized for the strugle. 
of the Fatherland through the 
CAETANO 1937, in 1941,148). 
It has an ideal the greatness 
noblemindedness of his children" 
This same function is assigned to the University, "the 
portuguese spiri tual factory" (SALAZAR I, 306). "We wou.ld not 
undell..~tand that the Univell.4ity. undell.m..i...ned the idea1.4 of- the 
c..i...vi1.ilation of- which it i~ the exponent [ ••• J Jt wou1.d not be 
undell.4tandab1.e that. the Univell.~ity. ll..ebe1.1.ed a~ain4t ~od, 
denied Chll.i4tian Il.edemption, put ..i...n doubt the mOll.a1. and ~ocia1. 
nece44ity. of- the independence of- the Fathell.1.and, Oil. pUll.p04ed 
to exp1.ain the WOIl.1.d undell. the l.i~ht of- a matell.ia1.i4t 
concept.ion",said CAETANO in 1942 (in CAETANO 1959,342). 
The action of the school is essential fer the building 
of the new man, as said above (pages 28-29). liThe primary 
school is the nursey that society has to cuI ti va te the ethic 
and professional values which it needs and experiment the 
man which suits it" ("Escola Portuguesa" 1934, official 
educational bulletin, in MONICA 1978,132). 
The sucessive ministers of Education, in the different 
analyzed periods, share those ideas, although with different 
emphasis and styles. 
CORDEI RO-RAMOS (1930-1933) defends the vie'~' that the school 
transmits a favourable version of portuguese Discoveries 
(CORDEIRO-RAMOS 1933a). TAMAGNINI (1934-1 93E) says that the 
first function of the portuguese school is tc serve the 
national interests (TAMAGNINI 1936,59). 
CARNEIRO-PACHECO (1936-1940) gives a mcbilising appeal 
to those ideas, in the mobilising period. He cri ticizes the 
decadence of the race (1936a) and is confident that 
"pontugue4e ~outh, tnee tnom the monbidit~ ot the 'lado' 
(nationa.l lata.li4tic 4on91 c. .. J wi.l.l ~in9 lnom ~ide to 
4ide, in a vini.le chonu4 ot pUll.e voice~ C ... J the 
impell.i~hab.le taith in the de4tinie~ ot Fathen.land"i (1936a). 
He presents Salazar as the leader, that is "the spiritual 
guide of the People for the definitive victories of its 
destiny" (1935b) and as the "g'neat educaton of- oun time" 
( 1935b) (NOTE 9). The teacher should be a :7.:>ulder of soul s 
and of portuguese (1936b). The teachers who will not accept 
this role should give up, '"4ince the houll. i~ not loll. 
objection~, but ton action; and one i4 not pOll.tugue~e on.l~ 
becau4e one wa4 bOll.n in 'oll.tuga.l" (1936a, 1936b). CARNEIRO-
-PACHECO does not think that school is enough to guarantee the 
moral aims of the New State and creates the "Portuguese Youth" 
in military moulds (1936a, 1936c, 1938a). 
The following Minister Mario FIGUEIREDO (1940-1944) 
speaks of impregnating "the soul of the youth of the values 
of the New S ta te thought" (in SAMPAIO 1976,61 ). 
After the second period these type of statements lost their 
mobilising tone. LEITE-PINTO (1955-1961) emphasises overall 
the nationalist role of the school in several speeches. GALVAO-
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-TELLES (1962-1968) puts side by side nationalism and 
catholicism as guides for school action - see GALVAO-TELLES 1966a 
Summing up, it is clear that the political and 
educational leaders of the New State saw the school as an 
explicit agent of mentality inculcation. 
2.6.2. God, Fatherland, Family and Authority - the mentality 
inculcated by the school 
As has already been said, Salazar defined, in the tenth 
anniversary of the setting up of the regime, the "basic 
sentiments of portuguese moral structure" - God, Fatherland, 
Family and Authority. 
This was considered henceforth the gospe~ of the New 
State (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1938b). This motto was glossed in 
several occasions - see, for instance, CAETANO 1952,45, CARNEIRO 
PACHECO, 1938b, GALVAO-TELLES 1964c, 1966a, 55. 
The ministers of Education saw also the function of 
school as inculcating respect for God, love and sacrifice for 
the Fatherland, dedication to Family and obedience to 
Authority. 
CORDEIRO-RAMOS (1930-1933) speaks against materialism 
(1932), against the presentation by the republicans of a 
materialist interpretation of the portuguese ~iscoveries. He 
proposes that the regime must present a glorious and religious 
presentation of Discoveries, he defends the important role 
of history in the formation of youth, since Portugal is a 
stronghold of christian western civilization (1933a). 
TAMAGNINI (1934-1936) speaks of "reintegrating all that 
belongs to the national soul, all that is moral [ ... ] all that 
is --€ssentially human - the cuI tural aspect and the religious 
aspect, the thirst for kno~ledge and the respect for God 
( 1936,4 - see also pages 86-87). He q~fends the view that all that 
does not possess a nationalist meaning in the structure of 
secondary school should be eliminated (1936.59) and assigns 
as the main role cf grammar school education "the nationalist 
formation of the youth which will be the Nation leading 
elite" (1936,65). 
In the second period mentali ty inculcation slid tNards 
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ideologica: indoctrination. CARNEIRO-PACHECO, more than any 
other, ass<;:rted in his mobilizing style the dominance of 
education (meaning socialization) over instruction as a function 
of the educational system. He probably shared ALFREDO PIMENTA's 
thought tba':: the portuguese people had too much instruction for 
the educa ti on it had (PIMENTA 1927, in CORTESAO 1982,221). He 
tried to i:::~lement in an integrated whole the prevalence of 
education over instruction, as will be seen in a next section. 
He emphasized constantly the inextriccble union between 
Fatherland and God in the education of youth.an union aimed at 
a mass mobilization for the "portuguese renaissance". This 
union is s::r.-tbolized by the presence of the national flag and 
. 
the crucifix,side by sidetin the school and public cerimonies. 
The union is necessary for the identity of Portugal (Portugal 
will be no more Portugal if it ceased to be catholic),the 
union is necessary for the defense of Christiarl "lliestern 
civilization (see CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1935b, 1936a, 1936b, 1936c, 
1938b,193Ec). 
He puts Authority as an indispensable value in education 
to achieve the renewal of the Nation. He tried to promote the 
cult of the leader (1935b), the "sole command" (1933), the 
image of Salazar as the great educator (1935b) - the Authority 
was thus personified in Salazar as the leader and the Youth 
and the Nation should fOllow the leader. 
CARNE:RO-PACHECO does not value equally respect for the 
Family "The State cannot i.~no'l.e [ ••• J that the /..amLJ..y. even 
when mO'l.aJ..~y and civica~~y ~ood. ha~ no condi.tion~ to pe'l./..o'l.m 
we~l it4· educational mi44i.on" (1936a). He says that nowadays 
parents still Hha./..t awake to the evi~ pa44i.on4 and tata./.. 
e'l.'l.0'l.4 can onJ..y 4ee c./..ea'l.J..y th'l.ou~h the eye4 O/.. thei'l. child'l.en 
[membe'l.4 at tpo'l.tu~ue4e Youth]" (1938a). He says to the very 
young members of Portuguese Youth (7 to 10 Years-Lusitos): 
HLu4ito! Next 4unday awake yOU'l. tathe'l. and it you 4ee him 
he~itatin9 [in 90in~ to vote] take hi4 hand b'l.in~ him to 
vote [in palt./..i.amenta'l.Y e~ec.tion~J ••• it i4 /..Olt yOU'l. /..utu'l.e H 
(1938c). It is clear that.CARNEIRO-PACHECO saw "portuguese 
Youth" as a vanguard "against all ant i-F a therland person C ••• J 
at the service of portuguese Fatherlanl" (1936c), who would 
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teach to th~ir parents the new nationalistic fai tho The same 
aims are extended to girls- he cri ticizes mothers who prefer 
an education in the old fashion for girls (1939) (~OTE 10). 
A mobilization intention, with a fascist touch, is 
present h~re (see 1938a), but it lasted only in the second 
period. (It is curious to notice that, accordi~g to CAETANO's 
memoirs, Salazar did not like the frenetic n~rvous style of 
CARNEIRO-PACHECO and ceased to receive him and to give 
normal support to his projects - CAETANO 1977,165). 
In the third period LEITE-PINTO (1955-1961 ) emphasizes the 
role of the school in promoting a healthy nationalism, not a 
mili tary like mobilizing nationalism (as CARj~EIRO-PACHECO. in 
the second period, intended), but the patriotic ",.'ish to serv~ 
the Nation. As he puts it "To achieve the pe~~ona~ 
development at each individual, but to t~v that, once he i~ 
inte9~ated in ~ociet~, each one aim~ natu~all~ to make him~e~t 
known at the ~e~vice ot the Fathe~iand" (LEITE-PINTO 1966a) - S~~ 
also 1960, 1963). 
GALVAO-TELLES (1962-1968), already in the fourth peri od, 
empha9zesequally nationalism and catholicism, not on the 
mobilizing style of the second period, but in the defensive 
style of one who thinks that those values are the only bastion 
in a changing and dangerous new world. He returns to a more 
orthodox view of the role of education, than hi s predecessor 
(see chapter one, section 3.3, chapter five. section 3.5). He says 
that education "~houid empha~i3e each time mo~e the 
~pi~ituali~t ~tamp which come~ t~om the iuminou~ Ch~i~tian 
t~adition~ (1963b) "the ~oun~ one~ ~hould be educated in the 
ii~ht ot the p~inciple~ ot ch~i4tian we~te~n civiliJation 
G .. ] we do not want mo~e than to detend a civiii~ation who~e 
e~~ence i4 blended with the ve~~ tempe~ament ot ou~ peopie" 
(1964c). We want "the to~mation ot 'o~tu~ue~e who tan be good 
Ch~i~tian4 and the to~mation ot Ch~i4tian~ who can be good 
rpo~tu~ue~e" (1 964c) .GALVAO-TELLES wants "a ~enewed ~v~tem ot 
educationai action taithtui to the ~~eat con~tant~ ot 
ch~i4tiani~m and LU4itanit~ [po~tu~ue4e e~~enceJ" (1964a). 
He clearly expresses his fideli ty to the New State 
educational gospel "tile put ~od abo ve anJ; cont~o ve~~J; [ .•. 1 we 
con~ide~ ihe rathe~iand a~ iniangibie, a~ a timeie~~ and 
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un.U.all.!/- expll.e-J-J.i..on 01. ..the na..t.i..ona..!. who..!.e [ ••• J We I..i..ffh..t tOll. 
t.he pUIl..i....t!/- 01. Fam.i.."!'!/- .i..n who-Je .i..nt..i..mac!/-, and on..!.!/- ..thell.e, can 
t.he human be.i..n~ I..i..nd t.he t.ll.ue happine-J-J and t.he be-Jt. -Jchoo..!. 01. 
vill.tue-J. We Il.e-Jpect. ..!.egit..i..mate Aut.holl.it.y and ~ant. t.hat. it. 
-Jhou..!.d be a~wa~~ dignil-ied, in ba..!.anced conci..!.iat..i..on w.i..th 
t.he nece-J-Jall.!/- Fll.eedom c. .. J. We ..!.on~ tOll. a bet.t.ell. and bet.t.ell. 
Soc.i..a..!. 7u-Jt..i..ce" (1964c). This is an adj~sted version of 
Salazar's motto. 
Congruently he conceived the role of "Portuguese Youth" 
not as an independent mobilising organization, but as a 
cooperator of school action and under its control (see GALVXO-
-TELLES 1963e, 1964c). 
All those transcriptions demons trc. te tha: GALVXO-TELLES 
was a much more orthodox and traditional me~ber of the 
regime's elite than his predecessor, what mec.nt that the 
regime remained faithful to its educational gospel - to 
inculcate in children God, Fatherland, Family and 
Authority. 
The'third part of this chapter will analise the 
inculcation of those values through the curriculum. Before 
that analysis can be made,it is necessary to clarify the 
very notion of "curriculum". 
2.6.3. Mentality inculcation through the curriculum - several 
concepts of curriculum 
The "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" were 
to be inculcated in the children through the school 
curriculum. So the third part of this chapter and the next chapter 'Will be 
dedicated to the study of school curriculum. But it is 
necessary that, before that analysis we define clearly what 
curriculum means here. 
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Tradi tional defini tions curriculum centered around the 
academic teaching activities (around the notion of "purposive 
organized activity" referred by EGGLESTON 1980,16). When 
sociologists began to take an interest in what was happening 
inside the schools (see EG:;LESTON 1980,4-6, MUSGRAVE 1979,193) 
they were concerned to make explici t the "reali ties of social 
behaviour" (EGGLESTON 1980,16) - so they centered their 
attention 00 what was really being learned in schools. They 
became even more interest in the "hidden curriculum" (JACKSON 
1968) (that is, in "the material, academic or moral, that is 
taught to pupils wi thout this being intended by those 
running the schoOl concerned" - MUSGRAVE 1979,195), than in 
the manifest curriculum (NOTE 11 ). 
One can have several defini tions of curriculum from the 
most embracing to the narrowest (NOTE 12). In a first 
defini tion curriculum is all that is learned in school' - .' it 
is the most comprehensive definition and includes all the 
hidden curricula,( all that was learned even if not explici ty 
taught). This defini tion <·includes all three of BERNSTEIN 's 
message systems which reali§e formal educational Knowledge -
- curriculum (that is, what counts as valid knowledge), 
pedagogy (what counts as valid transmission of knowledge) and 
evaluation (what counts as valid realization of this knowledge 
on the part of the taught) (BERNSTEIN 1977,85). This 
defini tion has in its comprehensi vness its greatest advantage 
and its biggest drawback - it demands a lot of research within 
the schools, including participant research, to describe a 
concrete curriculum, under this definition. 
A second definition of curriculum excludes the hidden 
curriculum, but it is comprehensive in regard to the manifest 
one - it includes aims of education, pedagogical objectives, 
content of education (syllabus, textbooks I etc.), all planned 
activities (inside and outside the classroom) and the 
practised methods of teaching and of evaluation. 
A third definition includes the aims, objectives and 
content of all planed school activities. It is a more 
operational definition than the previous ones, but it. still 
demands a specific analysis of each school since, even in a 
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centralized educational system (as the portuguese) outside 
classroom activities can (limitedly) vary from school to 
school. 
A fourth definition sees curriculum as a programme of 
subjects offered to a group of students (see WESTON 1980 
thus concentrating the analysis on the list of subjects and 
ignoring outside classroom activities. 
The most easy to operate definition is the last one. 
since it does not demand a concrete analysis of each 
individual school activity. We will use it as the basis of our 
analysis of secondary school curriculum, whose evolution will 
be given through the percentage of teaching time allocated 
to the different types of subjects. But we will include in the 
subjects analysed the outside classroom activities of the 
"Portuguese Youth" since they were compulsory for all schools. The 
second definition will be used in analyzing primary school 
curriculum. Greater attention will be given to the content of 
education here, investigating what mentality was being 
inculcated. This research will be done through the analysis 
of the content of primary education reading textbooks. It will 
be ·considered as planned school activities the compulsory 
activities of "Portuguese Youth". 
2.6.4. Mentality inculcation through the curriculum - the 
different components of the curriculum 
The distinction between the academic curriculum and the 
moral curriculum (MUSGRAVE 1978,1979), between cognitive 
learning attainments and moral learning attainments is very 
well known within sociology of education (SUGARMAN 1976). 
Although the different types of learning outcomes are "in 
every concre~ social situation [ ... ] inextricably bound up 
together" (SUGARMAN 1976), the distinction is conceptually 
clear. But much more important than that clari ty is the fact 
that this distinction is vi tal for the analysis of mentali ty 
inculcation. 
An elaboration of the above typology will be used in our 
analysis - it will be considered basically an instructional 
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component and a moral component of the curricul~~. The 
instructional component refers to the provision of information 
that is, to the transmission of knowledge and skills. The 
moral component refers to the influence of values orientation 
and norms and to the shaping of habits and attitudes. 
The ins tructional component can be subdivided according 
to the type of information provided - it includes an academic 
component, a technical component, and an artistic and physical 
component (FORMOSINHO,1985e). The academic component is 
characterized by the transmission of a formal, abstract and 
theorical knowledge, often in a deductive and subject 
compartimentalized framework (FORMOSINHO, 1983a). The 
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technical component consists in the training of specific 
techniques which are part of the occupational skills. The artistic 
and physical canponmt refers to the transmission of knowledge and 
techniques related to the Arts and to Physical Education. This 
typology of the instructional component will be useful for the 
analysis of secondary school curriculum. 
The distinction between the instructional curriculum and the 
moral curriculum holds valid for all the definitions of 
curriculum, but it has different importance according to whether the 
definition is based on the teaching perspective or on the 
learning perspective of the pedagogical relationship. Only 
the first definition of the currlculum presented in the 
previous section is based on learning-, the others are based on 
the acti vi ties planned by the teachers (or the school), that 
is, on teaching. 
Since the first definition is based on the ends, the 
outcomes, the learning outputs and the other defini tions are 
based on the means, the teaching inputs, it is perfectly 
natural that from an activity perceived by the teachers as 
predominantly instructional many moral outcomes can result for 
the students. 
The discrepancy between formal categorization of teaching 
activities and real learning outcomes is maximum when one 
compares the fourth definition of the curriculum (as programme 
of subjects) with the first definition. 
This means that to use the distinction moral/ 
/instructional curriculum one must define at what curricular 
conceptual level one is operating. In the most formal level 
(the fourth definition) History or National Language should 
be categorized only in the academic instructional curriculum. 
But an analysis at the third definition conceptual level 
(which incl udes analysi s of the aims, obj ecti ves and con ten t 
of the curriculum ) will clearly show many moral elements in 
those subjects. So in our research we will clarify at what 
conceptual level we are operating in each analysis. 
We will now analyse the curriculum of primary sc~ccl, i~ 
the next section of this chapter, and the curriculum :f 
secondary school, specially of grammar school, in the last 
section. In the next chapter it will be done a detailed 
analysis of the content of the mentality inculcated in the 
primary school curriculum. 
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3. THE INCULCATION OF A PASSIVE MENTALITY THROUGH THE PRIMARY 
SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
3.1. The hypotheses 
Based on what had been said in this work until now one 
can draw several hypotheses which will guide our analysis of 
the curriculum. They will be enunciated now putting within 
brackets the section of the thesis in which its justification 
can be found. 
a) There is a high degree of mentalitv inculcation in the 
primary school curriculum (chapter two t section 2.2, chapter 
three, sections 2.4, 2.6.1); 
b) There is not poli tical education in the curriculum in 
a meaningful way, but just instillation of a conservative, 
conformist, passive mentality (chapter three, section 2.2); 
c) The importance of men tali ty inculcation incr"eases in 
the educational mobilizing period and decreases afterwards 
(chapter one, section 3, mainly 3.2, chapter three, sections 
2.2.2.,2.6.1.); 
d) The content of mentali ty inculcation is mainly based 
on Salazar's motto - God, Fatherland, Family and Authority 
(chapter three, sections 2.4, 2.6.2); 
Those are the hypothesis which will guide our analysis. 
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3.2. Methodology of the analysis of the primary school 
curriculum 
More ~rtance will be attached to the analysis of 
primary school curriculum since it is the only compulsory 
schooling until the end of the period considered. The six 
year compulsory schooling, although decreed in 1964, was only 
implemented since the school year of 1968-1969. 
3.2.1. The adopted concept of curriculum 
The defini tion of curriculum which will be used in this 
analysis will be the second one, which is comprehensive in 
regard to the manifest curriculum, including aims of education, 
pedagogical objectives, content of education, all planned· 
activities and the practised methods of teaching and 
evaluation. The main emphasis will be on the content of. 
education. 
The analysis of this content will be done using as an 
indicator the content of school textbooks, mainly reading 
textbooks (but also history textbooks). The choice of those 
type of textbooks is obvious since the teaching of Mother 
Tongue and of History is naturally the most prone to become 
vehiclES of mentali ty inculcation. This was also the explici t 
option of the New State regime as will be seen. 
3.2.2. The use of content analysis 
The research method used will be content analysis. This 
method will be applied intensively to the' analysis of reading 
textbooks. The methodology of this content analysis will be 
presented now. 
Content analysis can be seen as a kind of coding (MOSER 
and I<ALTON, 1979, 414), the basic goal of which is to take 
a verbal, non-quantitative document and transform it into 
quantitative data (BAILEY 1978). This method was 
developed for the investigation of abroad spectrum of 
problems in which the content of communication serves as basis 
of inference (HOLSTI 1968). It is very prone to application 
in the analysis of educational documents (COHEN and MANION 
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1985,62), namely textbooks (RUMMEL 1977,152). 
In content analysis one must select a unit of analysis. 
The normal unit of analysis is the "reading" that is, the 
"text", since each reading textbook is composed of a 
collection of texts (NOTE 13 ). But we also counted as 
readings secondary texts like popular quatrains, proverbs, 
riddles, jokes, sentences and slogans, since they are very 
often vehiCles of mentali ty inCUlcation messages. For those 
secondary texts it is indispensable to refer the distinction 
between recording unit and content unit (BARDIN 1979, 104-108, 
BERELSON 1952,135). The recording uni tis "the smalles t body 
of content in which the appearance of a reference is counted". 
-The context uni t is "the largest body of content that may be 
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examined in characterizing a recording uni til (EERELSON 1952, 
135). In those cases the recording uni t is the secondary text 
and the context unit is the main text with which the secondary 
text is mest of the time related - generally the material unit 
which binds up together main text and· secondary text is the 
page or se: of pages (NOTE 14). For the purposes of this analysis 
exercise q~estions, exercises and all procedures related to 
homework or practical exercises were not considered questions. 
In the same way "images" or "pictures" were not considered 
as texts sir.=e they generally merely illustrate rna:'!". 
texts. It ""as considered irrelevant for the purpose of this 
analysis of mentality inculcation the form of the text -
- prose, poetry, fable, theatre, slogans ,proverbs, sentences, etc. 
The choice of the categories of analysi s should have 
the following qualities - objectivity, pertinence, exhaustion, 
mutual exclusion (BARDIN 1979,120, LEON 1980,170). The firs t 
basic categorization is "Mentality Inculcation Readings" 
Versus ~Other readings". But it is necessary to create 
categories within the broad category of "Mentality Inculcation 
Those categories follow, in a first stage, basically Salazar's 
motto - "Religion" (God), "Nationalism" (Fatherland), 
"Family" added by "Ruralism". The remaining was categorized 
generally as "Morals" which functioned as a residual category. 
But the size of this residue (26 % on average) made us create 
further subdivisions - thus it were created "Passive 
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Attitud~5" (obedience, resignation, humility. 
mildness, .::tc.), "Active Attitudes" (cour~g,=, diligence. 
study hat-its, promotion,etc.) and "Non Typif::'.:;;-j Attitudes". Thus 
"Morals" was reduced, as residual category. ':~st to 5% on 
average. The reliability of this later subdivision of the 
broad "Morals" category is not so high as for the other 
categorizations. since the categorization c! atti tudes into 
passive an= active is more open to different interpretations. 
but it is still very good, as will be referr~8. 
In the next chapter a detailed analysis 
of the content of mentality inculcation will te done and 
examples cf texts allocated to each category ~ill be given for 
better un~.::rstanding of the method of analysis. 
The ca tegories are clearly pertinent to the research as 
required and they are also exhaustive. Some =:fficulties 
arose with the requirement of mutual exclusic~ - as any 
reading should be categorized under only or.e category 
when two or more themes were present in the same 
text, the predominant one was chosen. This tides one of the 
most interesting and efficacious techniques v: the New State 
,- the deliberate fusion, of symbols and messages. generally 
nationalist and religious ones. The problem T~;as solved not in 
the quanti tati ve analysis, but by decl.icating one section to the 
analysis of this technique (qualitative conte~t analysis). 
The validi ty of the content analysis in~:rument was done 
through cc~tent validation (KERLINGER 1979.4:--459. FOX 1981, 
421-423,735, TUCKMAN 1972,141) - there was a ;:sitive judgement 
about the representativness of the categories :f analysis in 
regard to the ccntent of the basic mentality cefended by New 
State leaders (section 2.4.3). 
The results of the analysis were treated in frequencies. 
that is, the tables will present the number of texts in each 
category generally in relation to the total, that is, in 
percentages. 
The reliability of the categorization done (Table 3.6) 
was determined though inter-categorizer reliability of a 10% 
sample of the analyzed readings. The sample was stratified by 
periods of analysis, by textbooks and by categories of 
analysis. The general result is a very high reliability 
correlation coefficient (contingency coefficient C - SIEGEL 
1956,196-198) 95 %. In relation to the ca tegoriza tion of atti tude 
inCUlcation (passive. active and non typified categories) the 
reliabili ty coefficient was 81%. 
The results of the content analysis were treated in 
frequencies and are presented in tables, generally in 
percentages of the number of texts in each category. 
3.2.3. The sampling of reading textbooks by period 
The sampling of the reading textbooks used in the New 
State until 1968 was done by periods. Indeed the textbooks 
used were not the same in this long span of time nor did the 
system of textbook choice remained unchanged. In the formative 
period the regime demanded that all textbooks s~ould be 
approved by the Minister of Education, but there was some 
choice of textbooks for the same year cf schooling. In 1936 
it was decreed the regime of the sole textook which lasted 
until 1974 - only one official textbook should be used in all 
portuguese primary schools. In primary school this sole textbook 
should include all subject matters.In the second and third 
period (and in part of the fourth) it were used the sole 
textbooks planned during the late 1940s and early 19505 , In 
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1967 new sole reading textbooks began to be used. The sole 
textbook policy was never implemented in regard to the fourth class. 
Due :0 the delay between policy form~lation and policy 
implementation (see chapter one, introduction to section 
three) there was the need to define educational periods in 
terms of textbooks in force in primary schools in order to 
proceed to the adequate sampling procedures. 
The formative period which lasts from 1927 to 1936 in 
terms of educational policy formulation extends to 1941/1951 
in terms of primary school textbooks. The implementation 
of the sole textbooks planned in the educational policy 
formulated in the 1936 Reform (mobilizing period) began in the 
school year of 1941-1942 (for the first class), in 1944-1945 
(for the second class), and in 1951-1952 (for the third class). 
Throughout the whole stabilization period (1947-1964) those 
same textbooks went on being used in schools. In the stagnation 
and decline periods (1964-1970) it were changed textbooks in 
1967 an~ ~968. There was not time for th~ a~~lication of a 
spec if ic: ~olicy of the fi fth period in r'egcr d to primary 
educa t ic:-.. 
This means that textbooks which supposedly should bear the 
mark of ~he mobilizing period lasted much longer than political 
mobilization. This would contradict the main hypothesis of this 
work - the inculcation of a passive mentality as the 
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educatio~al aim of the New State. As it will be seen in sections 
3.3. and 3.4. of this chapter and in the n~xt chapter, this 
contradiction does not exist, since sole textbooks just try to 
use the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" 
(sectio~ 2.4.1.) to inculcate the basic mentality - God, 
Fatherla~=, Family and Authority (section 2.4.3.). 
In :~~ following presentation, the first pair of dat~s 
shown i~ :he titles of the sections refer to general educational 
evolutic~ and the second pair to textbooks implementaticn. 
We sampled fifteen reading textbooks, five from the 
formative period, five from the second and third periods and 
five fro~ the fourth period. On the whole we analysed 1632 
readin~ 519 for the first period, 553 for the second and 
third anc 560 for the fourth (which also includes the fifth, 
as will be later explained) - see Table 3.4 . 
The sampling procedure besides considering the periods 
of New State educational evolution as criterion, balanced the 
number of textbooks for the first and second year of schooling 
wi th thcse for the third and fourth, since the primary school 
curricult;;n emphasized the presence of History and .Geography 
of Portugal readings in the textbooks of those latter years. 
The sample considers for all periods two books for the first 
and second year and three textbooks for the remaining years 
-- the reason why the sample was not one textbook for each 
school year per period was the need to have at least two 
textbooks for the fourth class, since there was never a sole 
textbook for that year and those textbooks could have different 
orientations. 
We will present with the list of the textbooks samples 
in each period a brief description of educational 
policies relevant for this content analysis. 
3.2.3.a) The formative period (1927-1936)(1927-1941/1951) 
In the formative period (1927-1936) the regime quickly 
discovered the importance of the school as an agency of 
mentali ty inculcation for the shaping of the conformist man. 
"The propaganda made in schools, [ ... ] the notions learned 
there are those which always leave the most clear and lasting 
impression and can extend more easly to a greater number of 
individuals" (Decree 15088, 22-2-1928). 
It was. recommended, by the same decree, that there should 
exist colonial propaganda in schools in order to "create in 
our people a colonial opinion". 
Congruen tly wi th the above referred purpose the Bini s ter 
CORDEIRO-RAMOS determined, in 1932 (Decree 21014, 19-3-1932) 
that there should be inserted slogans in primary school 
reading textbooks. The slogans were "Your Fatherland .is the 
prettiest of all Fatherlands; it deserves all your sacrifices ; 
"Do not ever put your interest above that of your family, 
, 
since you pass away and your family remains"; "In the family 
the leader is the Father; in the school the leader is the 
Master; in the State the leader is the Government"; "If you 
kneON how difficult it is to command you would prefer to obey 
all your Ii fe" - one can easily see in those slogans, and 
similar ones also recommended, t·he Salazar's motto -
- Fatherland, Family and Authori ty (but not yet God). 
In 1935 propaganda was intensified - it was decreed by 
the Minister TAMAGNINI (Decree 25305, 9-5-1935, Dispatch 36, 
June 1935) that the photograph of both the Chief of State and 
the Prime Minister should be hanged in all classrooms. No other 
photograph could be put there. 
The sample for this period includes those of the approved 
reading texbooks more followed in primary schools before the 
implementation of the sole textbooks - this was indicated by the 
number of editions of the textbook. 
The quoted dates of textbooks are -naturally 
those of the editions analyzed and not those of the 
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first edition. This is the list of the samplec textbooks. 
1 - "Lei turas para a 2~ classe", Clotilde Mateus and J. 
Diogo Correia, Edi tora Livraria Enciclopedia de Joao 
Bernardo, Lisboa. 1939, 6th edition. 
2 - "0 Meu Livro de Lei tura (2~ classe)". Jose Maria dos 
Santos and Carlos Alberto Pinto de Abreu, Coimbra 
Editora. Coimbra, 1941. 
3 - "Livro de Lei tura para a 3! classe". Romeu Pimenta 
and Domingos Evangelista, Edi tora Educa9ao Nacional, 
Porto, 1938. 
. 
4 - "Leituras para 0 ensino primario - 3~ classe", 
Augusto C. Pires de Lima and Americc Pires de Lima, 
Domingos Barreira Editora, Porto, 1940, 12th edition, 
5 - "Li vro de Lei tura para a 4! classe", Romeu Pimenta 
and Domingos Evangelista, A.Figueirinha, Porto, 1933. 
3.2.3.b) The mobilizing and stabilizing periods(1936-1964)(1941!1951- 1967) 
In the second period (1936-1947), the roobiliz:::.ng period, 
CARNEIRO-PACHECO, minister of Education (1936-1940) integrated 
all the previous period policies in an integrated policy of 
propaganda of the New State and of mentality inculcation 
(NOTE 15). 
In 1938 it were distributed 84000 posters to the schools 
to illustrate "The Lesson of Salazar". They were to be used 
in reading classrooms and consisted of seven drawings vhich 
supposedly shew the Before the New State and After the New 
State situation. The previous situation was reproduced in dark 
or grey tones, the new situation in COlourful and modern 
images. It is a clear case of propaganda of the New State· in 
fi ve posters, of mentali ty inculcation in one poster and of 
corporative indoctrination in another poster (see "Escola 
Portuguesa" n SZ 181.14-4-1938). 
Those two last posters are reproduced in the folloving 
page. 
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I t '~;as CARNEI RO-FACHECO who introduCE":-c "Sod II in school s 
thus completing the presence of Salazar's motto in school 
education, which was still incomplete in the first period as 
seen. He decreed, in 1936, that all state primary schools 
should have a crucifix behind the chair of the teacher (see 
CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936b, and Law 1941,11-4-1936, base XII). 
The same minister of Education set up Cr.oral Singing in 
the curriculum "as an element of national education and 
cohesion", that is, as a mean of nationalistic inculcation 
(see CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1934b, Law 1941, base XII) (NOTE 16). 
Arithmetic problems were used as instru~ents of 
propaganda of the New State - see CORTESAO 1981, 191-194. 
As a :~lmination to all those strategies :~RNEIRO-PACHECO 
decided t~~: there should be a sole textbook ~:r each primary 
class wh~:h included all subject matters (L~~ 1941, 
Decree Law 27279, 24-11-1936, Decree Law 27882, 21-7-1937) 
"the spiritual weapon, indispensable to the formation of the 
national youth",as the bulletin "Escola Portuguesa" said 
(in SAMPAIO 1976,94)", which puts as end to an anarchic 
si tuation in which an unknov.'l1 author can proclaim "hi s 
truth against the interest of an elementary formative action 
even in the domains of that which cannot be discussed for the 
good of the moral unity of the Nation" (Decree Law 27882). 
The implementation of the sole reading textbook policy 
was not so rapid as the mobilizing style of CARNEIRO-PACHECO 
might indicate - indeed only the imple~entaticn of one reading 
textbook was still (partially ) completed in his rule. The reading 
textbook for the first class was used for the first time in 
194,-1942, that of second class was published in 1944 and that 
of third class only in 1951, that is, fifteen years after the 
law which set up the sole textbook regime. There was not in that 
period a sole reading textbook for the fourth class. 
As just seen the third class book was published already 
in the third period (1947-1964), the stabilization period. 
Indeed the sole textbooks for the three classes were used in 
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all that long period. There was a tentative attempt set up the sole 
reading textbooks for the fourth class (Decree Law 40362, 
20-10-1955) but again it was not implemented. Indeed there was 
never during the whole New State a sole reading textbook for 
the fourth class. 
The Minister of Education LEITE-PINTO tried to change the 
primary education curriculum and textbooks. He considered that 
their conformist message of an ascribed social status was not 
compatible with the attitudes needed for the industrialization 
of the country and the role of social promotion which the 
school should have (LEITE-PINTO 1966b). 
He determined the revi sion of primary education programs 
(Decree Law 42994,28-5-1960) and determined that it should be 
open to a ccr.1petition to adapt the textbooks to the new programs 
(Decree Law 43618, 22-4-1961). The primary school program had 
lasted twenty three years (from 1937 to 1969 for the three 
first classes) and thirty one years for the fourth class 
(1929-1960) - SAMPAIO 1977,46. 
The ~eans that during the whole two periods (1936-19471 
/1947-1964 ) there 'vJ€re in force the sole reading textbooks which 
implemented the policy formulated by CARNEIRO-PACHECO. 
In regard to the sampling of textbooks it were chosen 
two of the most used textbooks for the fourth class. In the 
first three classes it was anal~zed the~hole statistical 
populaticn since t~ere was only a sole textbook per,each 
school year at national level. 
The list of the books analyzed is the following 
1 - "0 Livro da Primeira Classe", Empresa Nacional de 
Publicidade, Lisboa, 1958, 8th edition. 
2 - "0 Li vro da Segunda Classe", Li vraria Cruz, Braga, 
1958. 6th edition. 
3 - "0 Livro de Leitura da Terceira Classe", Livraria 
Editora Figueirinhas, Porto, 1958, 4th edition. 
4 - "Li vro de Lei tura para a 4! classe", Edi tora Educa<;ao 
Nacional de Adolfo Machado, Porto, 1951 (?). 
5 - "Leituras para 0 Ensino Primario - 4i classe", 
Augusto C.Pires de Lima and Americo Pires de Lima, 
Porto Edi tora, Porto 1959 (edi<;~o dos autores), 27th 
edition. 
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3.2.3.c) The fourth period (1964-1970) - stagnation and 
decline period (1964-1970) (1967-1974) 
As stated earlier the movement to change the primary 
school textbooks was ini tiated by LEITE-PINTO, but it was not 
brought about under his rule nor in the third period. In the 
fourth period the regime recognized the need to adapt 
the curri~lum gradually at all levels (Decree Law 47587, 10-3-1967). 
GALVAO-TELLES, minister of Education in the fourth period, 
determined another revision of primary school programs in 1968 
that is. only eight years after the revision of 1960 (Portaria 
23485. 16-7-1968). All those revisions maintained the same 
orientation towards passivity of the first and ~econd periods 
programs (SAMPAIO 1977,4S). 
In 1964.the progra~ fer the complementary 
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cycle of the primary school was approved (see below , chapter four, section 
3.5) and the sole textbook was again used. after an ini tial 
hesitation (see SAMPhIO 1977,62). 
The textbooks analyzed in this period were the new first 
and second class textbooks. publ~shed in 1967 and 1968, which 
were in force until the 1974 "coup d' eta til. In regard to the 
fourth class three text:':.ck~ ,",rene a.'1a1~rzed(one more 
conservative. following clearly the conformist passive 
orientation. and two other less conservative which reflect 
some Change/. 
Those textbooks were still in force in the fifth period 
(1970-1974). The only change in this last period was the' 
publication of a new reading textbook for the third class. But 
it was published so late that was only just brought into force-it 
appeared in the end of 1973 or beginning of 1974 (see 
FERNANDES 1974.178). 
If we ignored the third class textbook (since the third class 
textbook in force during the fourth period and the major part 
of the fifth was one already analyzed - the 1958 one - and the 
new texbook was pratically not in force) one can say that 
this analysis is valid both for the fourth and fifth periods. 
This does nor mean that the fifth period is a continuation of 
the fourth (see Introduction, Chapter I, section 3.5), but 
ra ther that, due to the priori ty given in the fifth period to 
the reform of higher education and secondary education the 
si tuation in primary schools 'Was not basically different in 
this period than before. 
The list of the analyzed textbooks is the follo'Wing. 
1 - "Livro de Lei tura da Primeira Classe", Maria Luisa 
Torres Pires and Francisca Laura Batista and Gloria 
N.Gusm~o Morais, Livraria Cruz, Braga, 1967. 
2 - "Livro de Leitura da Segunda Classe", 
Manuel Ferreira Patricio and Silva 
Cruz, Braga. 1968. 
Judi te Vieira, 
Gra<;a. Livraria 
3 - "Livro de Leitura - 42 classe", Joaquim Gaspar, 
Livraria Rodrigues, Lisboa, no date, probably 1968. 
4 - "Novas Lei turas para a 42 classe", Edi tora Educa<;ao 
t,acional, Pc .... to, no date. (197 ... ) 
5 - "0 Novo Livro de Leitura da 4! classe", Antonio 
Branco, Porto Editora, Porto, 1974. 
(All those textbooks 'Were in force during the fourth" and 
fifth periods). 
3.2.4. A synthesis of the evolution of curricular 
implementation 
The following page presents, in a table, (Table 3.3) the 
synthesis of all 'What had been said about the curriculum 
evolution. 
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TABLE 3.3- PERIODS OF CURRICULAR IMPLEMENTATION 
POLITICAL E D U CAT ION A L PER I 0 D S 
PERIODS PERIODS GENERAL FDLIC--V OOMPULSORY SCHOOL COMPULSORY SCHOOL SECONDARY SCHOOL 
DELAY aJRRICUT.M IMPI.E- DF.LAY rur"l{ r r.ULA R IMPLE. DF.LAY CUr{RIClJLAR IMPLE [)F:I."''' FORMULATION MEm'ATTON-1 P 1 MI\I,'Y -1'1,'1-:1 '1\,,'1\11) IN ~l.;tlrI\TION 
1 st 1926 1927 1927-1929 1930 - 1932 
PERIOD to to +1 Reduction in pri +1 
- New curricula +4 mary education 
-FORMATIVE- 1933 1936 curricula 
2nG 1933 1936 1937-1951 1936 
PERIOD to to +3 Implementation +4 New structure +3 of sole - and new 
-MOBILIZING- 1945 1947 textbooks curricula 
3rd 1945 1947 1960 1947 - 1948 New structure 
PERIOD to to +2 +15 - and new '+2 
-STABILIZATION 
New programs 
curricula 1958 1964 
4th 1958 1964 1967-1968 1966-1~8 
to to +6 !New p~rams +9 lmplementa 10n of +8 
- -PERIOD f)[,lJnJr~ COJrple~'n Renewal of sole cH'V s hoo dn -
-DECLINE AND 1968 1971 textbooks I T r(l(~ tOI'~hml STAGNATION- ";IJCUre 
curricula 
5th 
1972 
1968 1971 1973 rd EX?t"rimmtal new 1970-1972 
:jt ucture rod PERIOD to to +3 Renewalof 3 +5 ~UrrlaU~a or an :'-4 New structure +2 I-r<ENEWAL WITIUN class sde (~X enc c><. pre para and new 
CONTI NUITY- 1974 1974 textbook tory school - curricula 
- -- ---
-_._ ..-
-N 
o 
3.3. Presentation of the results of content analysis - the 
confirmation of the hypotheses 
The tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 present the results of the 
content analysis. All tables give percentage numbers which 
are rounded for easier reading. Table 3.4 presents, in 
percentages, an analysis book by book. Table 3.5 
is a basic synthesis of the analysis done, using only two 
basic categories. Table 3.6 present the detailed analysis per 
period using all the used categories. 
3.3.1. Tables of resul:~ 
Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.E occupy the following th~~e pages. 
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TABLE 3.4- CATEGORIES OF PRIMARY SCHOOL C{fRRIC(Jl(J11 - TABLE BOOK BY BOOK IN PERCENTAGES 
~RIOOS 1 st PERIOD 2nd/3rd PERIODS 4th/5th PERIODS 
CLASS 2 2 3 3 4 1 2 3 4 4 1 2 4 4 4 
CATEGORIES U) 
~ § DAn: 1939 1941 193t 1940 1933 958 1958 1958 h951 n959 1967 1968 1968 197·· 1974 
MENTALI1Y INCULCATION 
U) 
49% 63% 59'- 5U 661 85}. 881 75'-' 82t 6H 55~ 38>- 681 56.t 56" 
w 
~§ aruER READINGS 51>.' 38~ 41'- 49~ 34'. lSi. 12;'- 25.} 1&' 39~ 4~ 62~ 32~ 44~ 44< 
~~ 
t!JU 
'IUI'AL • 100-; 101t lQO.1 lOOt 100-" 1m 100':- • 100i 100;' noo-t leXh lOOt l00{ 1W, 1CJO< 
RELIGION 2% 4% B"fo 1% O'fo 45% 36% 23~{ 2% 2% 13% 3% 9% O?~ 1 ~(, 
NATIONALISM 0% 3% l3% 10% 9% 0% 1% 22% 26% 28% 0% 1% 37% 2~% 26% 
---.-~---
POLITICAL ProPAC:AND1\ 1% 5% U 3% 0% 1% 3% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 
FAMILY CULT 7% 4% 8% 3% 13"10 '?Io 14% 6% 5% 2% 15% 6% 2% 1% 3% 
RURALISM 1% 3% 6% 1% 3% 1% 14% 9"10 5% 6% 9"10 12% 9°L ,0 5% 3~~ 
(f) PASSIVE ATTITUDES 13% 16% 11% 9% 14% 16% 4% 
w 
4% 24% 7% 6% 3% 3~{, 3/{, 7":-
H 
0::: ACfIVE ATTITUDES 7% 10% 3% 11% 18% 5% 11% D% 9% 6% 13% 3% 2% 8% 4~1 8 fO 
~ NON TYPIFIED ATTITUDES 8% 1a~ 6% 6% 8% 1~; 4% 2% 5% 6% 0010 3% 00/ 6°/ 0 0 : U /0 /0 _,0 
n MJRALS (residual) 12% CJ'fo 3% 6% 1% 5% 1~:' ')0/ 3°/ 3% 0% 6% 6~~ 11 ~,~ 4~:~ w ,-: fo) /0 
....l 
H 
e an1ER READINGS 51% 3B% 41% 49% 34% 15% 1ZG 25% 18% 39% 45% 6~1o 32% 44"1 44~~ {o n 
N= 136 80 71 140 92 74 74 157 121 127 47 93 115 108 197 
-N 
N 
TABLE 3.5- BASIC CATEGORIES OF PRIMARY 
SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
1stperiod 2nd/3 td 4 th 15 th 
CATEGORIES Periods Periods 
1927-1936 1936-1964 1964-1974 
MENTALITY INCULCA-
TION READINGS 56% 76% 55% 
-
OTHER READINGS 44% 24% 45% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 
n == 1632 519 553 560 
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AVERAGE 
63% 
37% 
100% 
T;',::::'E3.6 - CATEGORIE~ OF MENTALITY ::;:;'~:'(;ATICH 
I N PRIMARY SCHOOL CURRI S:;: .,::,~ 
. CATEGORIES -
. RELIGION 
, .-,' 
. NATIor~ALISM 
POLITICN... 
" . 
POOPACA"IDA 
.' 
_. FAMILY 
RURALISM 
, :PASSIVE 
ATTITUDES 
" 
ACTIVE ' , 
ATTITUDES,. ,',. 
NON TYPIFIED' 
ATTITUDES:' ~ 
, ' 
MORALS 
(residual) -. ..', 
nd r'C L; t:._ • ., 5tt 
1stpERIOD 2 and3 ::. .. -
PERIODS PEr~:::.s 
1927-1936 1936-1964 1964-1~4 
3% 18%.' 
, ' 
... 
6% . ':,' . 19% 
. , r .~ '\" ,.' 
2% 2% 
. . 
" 7% , 6% 
7% 
,.' .~, ; 
12% ,11 % 
t; -t. .: .. " 
10% 
l""' " " •. 
'" ,". f " . . , . 
. 7%'-, , : . • -4. ' 
; 
21% 
O.4! 
r::,C' ~/: . 
C:;C' 
~/C 
~ 
-
.' 
" . 
6% .-
. 
•. ".' ~;'" ~. ~ t: ',: : "= _ i! . " : . ~ .~ .,~ .. 
.. -:.: . t,·.: . ': 
'n = 1022 310 
AVERAGE 
8% 
16% 
1% 
6% 
5% 
9% 
7% 
5% 
'i- " , --. 
5%' 
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3.3.2. General analysis of the results 
Those resul ts are already conclusive in order to confirm 
or not confirm the hypothesis stated in section 3.1 • 
The hypothesi sa) - "There is a high degree of menta1i ty 
inculcation in the primary school curricul urn" during the New 
State regime - is clearly confirmed .63% of all reading uni ts 
conveyed the inculcation of mentality. 
The hypothesis c) - "The importance of mentality 
inculcation increases in the educational mobilizing period and 
decreases afterwards" - is also, confirmed. The textbooks for 
the first and second classes aim pratica11y only to inculcate 
mentality - the percentages of mentality insti1}ing are 
respectively 8S% and 88%. A general appreciation cf the results 
show that from 56% in the first period, mentality inculcation 
increases to 76% in the second period and decreases fo about 
the previous quantity in the fourth/fifth periods. The third 
period went on implementing the policies of the second during 
PIRES- DE- LIMA'· rule (1947-1955). Only in the second, part 
of the third period (under the rule of LEITE-PINTO, 1955-1961) 
the need to change those textbooks was manifested. All the 
textbooks ana1yted had their first editions either in the 
second period (the textbooks for the first and second class) 
or in the first part of the third· period (the remaining 
textbooks - in , 951 that of the third class, tn 1951/1953 
the 1 951 'and 1 959 edition texbooks . of the fourth clas~) ~ This 
mea~s that the hypothesis c) :is 'also' confirmed. 
But a more detailed analysis of those results is needed. 
The confirmation of hypothesis c) is based on the results 
for the two main categories - Religion and Nationalism. 
Religious inculcation increases six times from the' first to 
the second period and nationalistic inculcation increases more 
than ' three times. Rural mentality inculcation aiso increases 
more than three times. The 'decrea'se is sharp for religious 
inculcation in the fourth period. but the same does rot happen in 
other categories - nationalism 'increases slightly 
and ruralismdecreases very slightly. So the 'only categorywmch 
follows exactly the' expected "down - up -down" pattern is 
religious inculcation. 
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As seen na~ionalism does not fit into the ge~~ral 
down-up-down pattern of mentality inculcation ,- it is the 
only category ·which shows a constant tendency to increase. 
This is explain:d by,the beginning of the colonial 'war in 1961· 
and the compart .mentalized mobilization it provoked i~ the 
young males in order to mobilize them for the fight 
Africa (see ct"!apter one,. sections 3.4. 3.5,' chapter. six. 
section 2.3). 
The hypothesis d) - "The content of mentality inculcation 
is mainly based on Salazar's motto - God, Fatherland, Family 
and Authority" - is also confirmed. If one considers that 
respect for Au:hority subsumes all p~ssiv~ at~itijdEs the motto. 
mentality occu;:es 40% of all readings, that is, 64% of all 
mentality inculcation ones'(considering Authori~yjust 
translated in the direct inculcation of obedience the 
percentages are respectively 32% and 52%). Thus ttis' 
hypothesis is also confirmed. 
The hypothesis b) - _ "There is not political education in; 
the curriculum in a meaningful way [ ... 1" -,deserves a careful, 
analysis. 
For political education it is meant ideological education 
of masses (see above section 2.1 ). Poli tical propaganda in a 
broad sense includes political equcation plus publicity of 
realizations a~d advertisement of rulers (section 2.3). 
Political propaganda is used in the analyzed table in this 
broad sense. Sc the confirmation of hypothesis b) needs a more 
detailed analysis than Table 3.6 presents. 
~texts under this category were divided into three 
sub-categories - political education (corporative 
indoctrination, explicit deffense of overseas policy), 
mobilizing political propaganda; (which 
encompasses propaganda to "Portuguese Youth" and personal 
reference to leaders) and non mobilizing political propaganda : 
(which includes regimes structure description and presentation 
of New State achievements. mo~ly 'in public works). Let us 
analySe the presence of each of those sub-categories in 
relation to the total sample (NOTE 17)~ 
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TABLE 3.7 - TYPES OF POLITICAL 
PROPAGANDA 
1st Period 2nd / 3!'d 4th / 5th 
Periods Periods AVERAGE 
CATEGORIES h 927 - 193c 1936-19f4 n 964-1974 TOTAL 
IDEOLOGICAL 0.2% . 0.5% -
EDUCATION 
MOBILIZING 
POLITICAL 1.2% 0.5% -
PROPAGANDA 
NON MOBILIZINli 
. 
POLITICAL 0.6%· 0.9% -
PROPAGANDA 
TOTAL 2.0% 1.9% 0.4% 
n category 10 11 2 
Analysed 
n TOTAL 519 553 560 
(Differences in total percentage of the political 
propaganda category between Tables 3.6 and 3.7 
are due to rounding procedures) 
0.3% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
1 .5% 
23 
1632 
One can see that poli tical propaganda was not meaningful 
neither in general (1.5% on average) nor in any period (it 
never exceeded 2% ). Ideological education was completely 
irrelevant t being even in the mobilizing period just 0.5% • 
In this period ideological education plus mobilizing political 
propaganda represented just 1%of the total texts. So the 
hypothesis b) is confirmed (NOTE 18). 
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3.4. Conclusion 
As it was just seen, the analysis of the tables confirms 
the hypotheses put foward in section 3.1. The mere analysis 
of policy formulation documents (speeches, legislation) would 
point in the sense that direct political in·joctrination was 
more organized and more obvious after the implementation of 
the sole textbook (MONICA 1978, 298). But the implementation 
of the policy formul~ted by CARNEIRO-PACHEC~ in193~ was done 
slowly (see section 3.2.3. b), was done after the extinction 
of the mobilizing fire. What the analysi s done in this study 
shoys is just the implementation' of an organized approach to 
the inculcation of passive, conformist mentality, 
This can be seen as an exemple of the need referred in 
the Introduction (section 5.4) to permanently-confront New 
State policy formulation with pOli~y implementation. 
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4. THE INCULCATION OF A PASSIVE MENTALITY THROUGH THE 
SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
4.1. The adopted'concept of curriculum 
An examination of. all ~he syllabus 
and textbooks of all the different subjects in secondary 
school curriculum would clearly be out of proportion in the 
plan of this thesis~oa concept of curriculum different from 
that just used for the analysis of primary education was 
adopted for the analysisof.secondary education. 
As it was already said (section 2.6.3. ), we will use the 
fourth definition of curriculum - programme of ~ubjects. But 
we will include the outside classroom activities of the 
"Portuguese Youth" when they are compulsory - it is the case 
of 1936 and 1947 reforms,but not the case of the fourth or 
fifth period reforms. 
4.2. The content analysis 
Content analysis of the curriculum was done based on the 
analysis of the decree-laws which approved the different 
curricula - see in NOTE 19 a list of all this legislation. 
The analysis was done through the categorization of each 
subject in one of the four components of the curriculum 
presented above (section 2.6.4.). (The unit of analysis is 
thus the subject). The need of mutual exclusion of categories 
in content analysis would impose that subjects should be 
allocated only to one category .. But this would ignore the fact 
that moral outcomes come often from academic subjects. So when 
this consequence was explicitly intended the subjects were 
categorized partially in the academic component and partially in 
the moral component. 
The academic component generally includes Portuguese, 
Latin, French, English, Geography, Natural Sciences and 
Mathematics. 
The technical component in Grammar Schools includes 
generally "Manual Works" (Crafts) (for the exception to this 
categorization see NOTE 20). In technical schools the 
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technical component encompasses a variety of technical 
subjects. 
The artistic and physical component includes Drawing, 
Choral Singing (except in the second period) and Physical 
Education. In 1968 and 1972 Choral Singing was substituted by 
Musical Education. In 1972 Drawing 'Was substituted by Visual 
Education. 
The moral component includes Moral and Civic Education 
(1932,1936), Religious and Moral Education (1947 onwards), 
the compulsory acti vi ties of "Portuguese Youth" (in 1936 and 
in 1947), the compulsory cultural sessions in 1936 Reform, 
and partially Portuguese and History of Portugal: 
Although Religious and Moral Education was not 
compulsory (see chapter five, section' 2.2.7 ), social practice 
made it pratically mandatory through the social (and 
ocasionally political) consequences which could come from 
opting out. 
The activi ties of "Portuguese Youth" (which' was created 
in 1936) were considered only when they were compulsory ( which 
did not happen in 1968 and 197~. The work load of those 
activities was made operational considering equivalent to 
three hours one afternoon of activities -·thus it were 
counted three hours in 1936 and six in 1947 for Portuguese 
Youth activities in grammar schools. 
In 1936 it were.included in the moral component the 
fortnightly "cultural sessions",since they were compulsory' 
- they aimed at promoting the knowledge of the Colonial Empire , 
of portuguese art and of civic education. 
Since Portuguese and History of Portugal' were explicitly 
used for mentali ty inculcation they were included partially 
in the moral component. For instance, the, instruction of the 
syllabus for "Lingua e Historia Patria" (National Language 
and History) of the 1947 reform (syllabus of 1954 - Decree 
39807, 7-9-1954) for the fifth year of schooling said· "The 
dominant concern of the teaching of this subject ( .•. J is to 
irradicate in the spirit and the heart of the pupil noble 
sentiments of civism and love for the Fatherland"; so "the 
teacher should restrain entering in details or making 
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judgements creator of a defeated pessimism". This intention 
was more enhanced in 1936 than in other periods. To make 
operational this partial categorization in the moral component 
(wi thin the fOurth concept of curriculum) one has to attribute 
some hours of the subject work load to the moral component and 
some to the a::ademic component .. One had considered generally 
that those subjects contributed with one quarter (of the 
subject work load) to the moral component and three quarters 
to the academc component. In the second period, the 
distribution was in equal parts to represent the greater 
emphasis in moral inculcation. Although those parti tions of 
subject time have something of an arbitrary nature, they 
. '. 
neverthless represent more adequately the reality than just 
to ignore the.moral dimension of the referred subjects by 
including them just in the academic component. (This 
partition was applied only to History of Portugal not to World 
History) . 
In 1936 grammar school reform,Physical Education 
(partially) and Choral Singing (totally) were included in the 
moral component, according to the objectives allocated to each 
'. ' . . 
of those subjects in the legislation. 
, , 
The content'analysis was done by cycles of studies - in 
grammar schools the first cycle,~ncludes the fifth and the 
sixth year of schooling,the second cycle includes the seventh, 
the eight and the ninth years of schooling and the third cycle 
includes the tenth and the eleventh years of schooling. Due 
to its veri div~~sified structure the third'cycle was not 
included in the analysis. (In 1936 Reform the structure was 
changed from 2+3+2 to 3+3+1, but it returned to the previous 
framework in 1947). 
The class work load inclu·ded,. as it was said,' Moral and 
Religious Education and th~ ~ctivities of Portuguese Youth 
(NOTE 21 ). In 1936 it included also the forthnighly cultural 
sessions. The class work load.' was. ,taken from a whole cycle, 
but reduced to average hours per week. 
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4.3. The hypotheses 
The proposition of hypotheses for the analysis of 
secondary education curriculum has to consider three aspects. 
Firstly, the role of secondary school requires a greater 
importance of the instructional components of the curriculum. 
In grammar school, whose role is mainly the preparation. for 
the university, prevails the academic component. in technical 
school prevails the 'technical components. 
Secondly. the age of the student makes him/her more prone 
to the understanding of those instructional components and so 
it is natural that they are more present in secondary school. 
Thirdly, the fact that those students who attend 
secondary school (and mainly secondary gra~~ar school) are 
higly selected (a selected minority) - see chapter five. 
sections 3.3. 3.8 - makes socialization as social control 
more dispensable. The high middle class and the high class will 
provide this socialization within the home. 
Taken this into consideration one can put foward the 
following hypotheses: 
a) There is less mentality inculcation in secondary 
school curriCUla than in primary school curriCUlum; 
b) The academic and the technical components of the 
I 
curriculum will prevail respectively in gra~~ar and in 
technical schools; 
c) The importance of the moral component of the curriculu 
increases in the educational mobilizing period (see 
justification in section 3.1 ); 
d) The importance of the moral component is lesser in the 
. second cycle of study than in the first. due to greater 
. instructional concerns of a cycle of studies which is more 
close to the university and greater selection of its students; 
e) The importance of the moral component is greater in 
grammar school than in the technical school, due to the fact 
that grammar school was the via to acces to the elite though 
university degrees (see chapter five, section 3.4.2) and moral 
component was obviously important in the preparation of the 
elite. 
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4.4. Presentation of the results 
Tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 present the results of the 
content analysis of secondary education. This analysis 
excludes the third cycle, as it was already said •. In regard 
to technical education the analysis compares the Reform of 
Grammar School of 1947 wi th the Reform of Technical Education 
of 1948 (which lasted until 1970). 
. . 
All tables give percentages numbers (in relation to the 
week class work load) which are rounded for easier reading. 
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TABLE 3.8 - 5 th and 6 th YEAR CURRICULUM - EVOLUTION 
BY PERIODS 
CURRICULAR 
1 stpertod 2n~eriod 3I\>eriod 4t!period 5t.Yperiod 
" 
1927-1936 1936-1947 1947~964 1964-1970 1970-1974 
CG1PCMNl'S 1932 1936 1947 :1968 
Refom Refom ' Refom 
"CicIo 
Preparat'.' 
CLASS WOOK LOAD 26.5 27 33 'Z7 
-r 
(Per week hours hours hours hours . 
on average) 
, 
AC.ADEMrC ; 
CXJwiFONEm' 56% 50% 48% 51% -
" 
TEOmCAL 
a:MroNEm' 2% 076 3% 076 -
PHYSICAL AND AR- . 
TISTIC COMRl~;r 3~ 15% 21% 35% -
MORAL 
CXJ1roNENT 12% 35% 28% 13% - ' , 
TarAL lOO}6 100}6 10CJ?6 99% -
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AVERAGE 
28.4 
hours 
51% 
. 1% 
, 
. 
25% 
23% 
l~ 
i 
TABLE 3.9 - 7 th ,8 th ,9 th YEAR GRAJ'lMAR SCHOOL 
CURRICULu~r - EVOLUTION BY PERIODS 
l s tperlod 2n~eriod 3~erioC 4~eriod 5 t.hf>eriod 
CURRICULAR 1927-1936 1936-1947 1947-196-:1 1964-1971 1971-1974 
1932 1936 1947 1972-74 
Ccr-roIDn'S , experi-
.. . ' 
......... Refonn Refonn Reform .' 7mental ttl 8ttl 
years 
,. 
CLA...~ ~CRK lDPD 28.5 Zl 34 - . 31 
(Per week on 
average) hrurs hours hours hours 
ACADE~C ~ 
<XMFONENr ., 74%. 62% ; 64% - 55% 
; 
, . 
1 .. , 
TECHNICAL , 
<XMFONENI' 5% C% \ 0% - 13% 
.. 
... . .- ~ .... ,- -- -.-. '. " .. ' . . 
, ; 
, 
, 
: 
, 
, , , ! . 
PHYSICAL AND I i - . : , . 
ARTISTIC 18% • 4% t 12''' - 29% 
.... -, .. .. ' ',.-' . 
' .. - ' 
CXMroNENI' , 
~ 
; 
, , 
, : 
. , 
, '. : 
HORAL 
. > " '. 
, , 
~NEt-:r i J.: 34% , 24% - 3% 
' " " . 
~ .. ~ ..... 
.. ' - .. 
~ .... --
. ' 
.. 
TOl'AL lCXJ)6 , 1<X:1% 101% - 100}6 , 
" 
; .- . " 
r .... ." 
.. 
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AVERAGE 
30.1 
hoors 
64"~ 
5% 
16% 
16% 
101% 
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TI.l~:'E L 1(1 - TEC1!t\ICAL SCHOOL CUI(JUc...lJLU!~ - 1948 I<EHWJI: 
1941 
GRAMMAR 
A B C D E F AVERAGE SCHOOL 
.. REFORM 
, 
CLA:';:'; ''';("j<", i.,u;0 43 43.1 43 PO.7 31 44 '39.2 '34 
- in hours .. 
ACADEtlIC 
18% 29% 28% 32% 46% 11% 28% ·64% 
ca 1P'Jt 1/1:1.1' 
" 
" 
TECHNICAL AND 
CRAFTS 71% 60% 63% 52% 31% 70% 59% 0% -
CXMPONEtrr - . -. - . 
.. 
. ' 
PHYSICAL AND 
; 
.. 
ARTISTIC 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 12% 
c::cJ1R)NEtrr 
MJRAL 
. , 
c::cJ1R)NEtrr , 9% 8% 8% 12% 14% 10% 10% 24% 
.. , . 
'IUrAL 100% 99~ 10~ 99% 100~ 99% 99% 101% 
. , 
A 
-
Locksmith D - Chemical assistant 
COURSES B Electrician E -'Business 
.. .. 
C Electr ieal- p Girl's formation 
mechanician 
.. , ... (Those were the technical courses where enrollment was 
greater) 
4.5. Comment of the Tables '- confirmation,of the hypotheses' 
The hypothesis a) - "There' is less mentali ty inculcation 
in secondary school curriculum than in primary school 
curriculum" - is clearly confirmed, although one cannot 
, , 
compare directly the percentages ~f the moral com~onent of 
secondary education curriculum with the percentages of 
mentali ty inculcated readings in primary education curriculum, 
due to the different concepts of curriculum in which each 
analysis is based. 
The hypothesis b) - "The academic and the technical 
components will prevail respectively in grammar and in 
technical schools" - is also clearly confirmed.· The academic 
. ' . 
component occupies 51% of the first cycle and 64% of the 
second cycle of grammar school cur~icula. The technical 
component occupies 59 % on average 'of the technical ,courses 
analyzed. In the first two cases they represent more class 
hours than all the other c~ents put together (NOTE 22). 
The hypothesis c) - "The importance of the moral component 
of the curriculum increases in the educational mobilizing 
period and decreases after-......wards" - is also confirmed. This 
confirmation is important. If the previous confirmation 
could almost be taken for granted,this last one was more' 
problematic - did the mobilizing' purpose extend to secondary 
education or has it remained only on compulsory schooling? The 
answer is given by Tables 3.8 and 3.9 . They both show that· 
the moral component of grammar' school education follows also~' 
that curvilinear down ~ up ~ down pattern. For ,the first cycle 
the pattern is 12%, 35%, 28%~ 13%. For the second cycle it is 
. 3%, 34%, 24%,,3%. In both cases the peak '. is . exactly in the 
mobilizing period (a little more than one third of the 
curricular hours)· In both cases the third period follows 
closely the second one,asit'is the case with the primary 
school education where the' third period went· on implementing 
the policies of the second. In the second period the curricul~ 
was pratically reduced to two components - the academic and 
the moral components. 
This confirms both the, existence of a mobilizing period _. 
and, at the same time, its exceptional character (NOTE 23). 
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The hypothesis d) - "The importance of moral component 
is greater in the first cycle than in the second cycle" - is 
also confirmed. The moral component represents on average 23% 
of the total in the firs t cycle and 16% in the second. Thi s 
same trend is also indicated by the fact that there are greater 
variations in the moral component across periods in the second 
cycle than in the first (standard deviaton is 13.5 for the 
former and 9.8 for the latter) (NOTE 24). 
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The hypothesis e) - "The importance of the moral comp::ment is 
greater in grammar schools than in technical schools" - is also 
confirmed, as can be deduced from Table 3.10. One can see that 
the technical course which is more close to the gr~~ar school 
model - the business course - (this closeness is reflected in 
the greater weight of the academic curriculum) gives more 
importance to the moral' component.' 
One can end this section concluding that all hypotheses were 
confirmed. 
4.6. The content of the moral component in secondary education 
The content of the moral component is mainly nationalistic 
inculcation - Portuguese and History of Portugal, the activities 
. 
of "Portuguese Youth", the compulsory cultural sessions in 1936 
Choral Singing,in 1936, all envisaged nationalistic instilling 
(NOTE 25). 
The inculcation of a religious mentality was less important, 
as can be deduced from the analysis of the curricular status of 
"Religious and Moral Education". Using indicators of curricular 
hierarchy. (FERNANDES 1983, FORMOSINHO 1983 a) one can see that 
this subject was not compulsory, it was ,allocated only one 
hour per week, it was not.subje~t to'examinat~?n, it had not any 
influence on student promotion or in the entrance to the 
. . 
university. The feeling of the pupils and the,climate of 
classrooms was generally in accordance with 'this low,status 
- NUNES 1981, 149-150 (see chapter five, section 2.2.7). 
4.7. Conclusion 
One can conclude this chapter saying that secondary education 
analysis follows generally the trends also present in primary 
education. Both analysis confirm that the school was viewed by 
New State regime as an explicit agent of mentality inculcation 
to shape the "new" passive and conformist man, which should 
support the New State elitist non participatory theory of 
government. 
4.8 The use of conformist methods of teaching 
Since the methods of teaching used can promote passi vi ty 
or, on the contrary, promote mobilization, creativity, spirit 
of initiative their analysis is useful. 
According to SALAZAR portuguese education had 
traditionally being minimizing the physical dimension and the 
education of the will, while it used memory intensively. 
Such processes developed culture at the expense of research, 
developed "passivity of spirit" at the expense of initiative 
(SALAZAR 1933). CAETANO agrees wi th this diagnosis and says 
that the teaching merely concerned with reproduction of 
knowledge created by others (as it was the case in portuguese 
education) led to a "passivity of spiri til (CAETANO 1951 in 
ZORRO 1969, 58-59 - see also 158). This bookish and abstract 
education did not give to the student capaci ty to solve the 
problems of life (SALAZAR 111,393). 
The diagnosis seems to be adequate. but one must 
acknowledge that the therapeutic (if therapeutic was really 
intended) provoked exactly the same illness. (~ee in chapter 
two, section 1.3 a similar situation with the building of the 
new man of the New State which was very close to the old man). 
Portuguese education remained bookish, abstract, favouring 
memorization and reproduction of textbook knowledge. Thus the 
"passivity of spirit" went on, as it was the congruent design 
of the New State. The discipline methods used also inculcated passivity 
- see about methods of teaching and discipline in New State 
secondary school - BETTENCOURT 1983, 89-96, NUNES 1981. 
SANTOS 1985, 117-119. 
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In the next chapter it will be analyzed in detail the 
content cf the mentality inculcated by the school, 
circunscribing our analysis to primary education. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRACTICE OF NEW STATE 
EXPRESSIVE DEHOBILISING STRATEGIES 
- THE CONTENT OF THE PASSIVE MENTALITY 
INCULCATED'IH2JtGI THE CURRICULUM 
In this chapter it will be analyzed the concrete content 
of the passive mentality inculcated through the curriculum. 
This analysis will be restricted to primary·school 
curricul urn for various reasons. Firstly, only the concept of 
curriculum which underlines the an~lysis of primary school 
education allows a detailed ~ysis of the =ontent of the 
mentality inculcated, since it is comprehensive in relation 
to the manifest curriculum, including the content of education 
(syllabus, textbooks) - see chapter 3, sections 2.6.3 and 
3.2.1. Secondly, primary school was the only compulsory 
schooling until 1964, which means that all new ~ortuguese 
were subject to the inculcation of the mentality which 
will be analy!ed( thus making it very influential in the 
society at large). Thirdly, due to this characteristic, this 
analysis will be much more revealing of New State project to 
build the new man than the analysis of secondary school 
curriculum. 
The study of New State primary school curriculum was done 
following New State main principles very well described 
by Salazar, in 1936 (SALAZAR 11,127-141) - Q2.9., Fatherland, 
Family and Authori ty. It 'Will be added also Hierarchy which 
means respects for the existing social order and the existing 
social stratification, which is implicit and explicit in 
various New State sources. 
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1. FATHERLAND - ANALYSIS OF NATIONALISTIC INCULCATION 
Salazar said, in 1936, ,PWe have put without tea~ 
po~tugue~e nationalL~m a~ the inde~t~uctLble bed~ock ot the 
New State'" (SALAZAR 11.132). "Aii to~ the Nation, nothLn~ 
a~aLn~t the Nation" was one Salazar's motto included in 
reading textbooks. The study of this inculcation of a 
nationalistic mentality implies a clarification of the concept 
of nationalism. For this it will be used the usual method 
of analysing the primary sources. 
1.2. The analysis of the primary sources - natioQalism as a 
diffuse and pervasive concept 
Analysing Salazar speeches one can conclude that 
nationalism is a diffuse and pervasive concept. It has many 
meanings (NOTE 1 ). 
a) It can mean the creation of an independent and 
original poli tical model - see SALAZAR I, preface, 338, 373-
-374, 379-380. II,preface, 26-28, 113, III, 130-131, IV,191, . 
V,59, 320,401,407, and in FERRO 1982, 127 (see also CAETANO 
1956 in ZORRO 1969,64). 
This aspect will be referred in chapter seven, section 
1.3.2. 1t provokes a tendency for political and cultural 
isolationism - see chapter seven, section 1.3.3. 
b) It can mean the assertion of the interest of the 
Nation, represented by the State, above the interests of 
economic groups~ocial classes or parties - SALAZAR I, 134. 
(see also CAETANO 1952,14). This aspect will be analyzed in 
chapter seven, sections 1.1, 2.2.3. 
c) It can mean that all portuguese have to accept the 
national interest (as defined by the regime), since the 
leaders always acted in the name of the Nation (NOTE 2). Those 
who do not submit to this definition are not truly portuguese, 
are not the Nation, they are the "Anti-Nation" - see SALAZAR 
I, 267-268, III, 337, IV, 355-356. Indeed the partisans of the 
New State called themselves "the nationalists",the patriots. 
"Who i~ not pat~iot cannot be con~ide~ed po~tu~ue~e". (SALAZAR 
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IV, 356) - see al so CAETANO in ZORRO 1969,94). As one minister 
of Deffence said, in 1958, "~e a~e the Nation. not them 
C ... J we a~e the t~eedom, not them. TheV a~e the de~e~te~~, 
not u~, thelj. a~e the t~aito~4, not u~ C ... j we a~e 'Po~tu9a.l! 
(NOTE 3). So nationalism can have a repressive meaning - "We 
do not ~eco9niJe .libe~tlj. a~ a9ain~t the nation" (SALAZAR 
1939,209) . 
d) Nationalism can mean the assertion of Nation's 
historical rights over colonies and thus it is built on a 
defini tion of r~ation based on history (portuguese Discoveries 
and conquests) and on the notion of empire. 
This naticr.alism was translated in the first two periods 
in an explicit inculcation of a colonial spirit (SALAZAR II, 
131). Already in 1928 it was decreed that it was r.ecessary 
in all schools to intensify the study of portuguese colonies 
'to create in our people a colonial opinion" (Decree 15.088, 
23-2-1928) (NOTE 4). As CAETANO said in the thirties; "Africa 
is for us a moral justification and a "raison d'etre" as a 
power. Without it we would be a small nation; with it we are 
a great power" (in BLACKBURN 1974) (NOTE 5). 
After the beginning of the colonial war t in the fourth 
and fifth period) there was a gre,at insistence in the formal 
proclamation of Portugal as a "pluricontinental and multi-
-racial na ti en" (see chapter f1 ve, sect ion 2.3), Hence the 
motto "the whole Portugal from Minho Cthe northern region] to 
Timor [the farest cOlony) or the sentence "The;z.e a;z.e no 
Po~tu9ue~e p044e44ion4, but pa/l.t4 01. ~0/l.tu9a~ 4catte;z.ed in 
the wo~~d"(SALAZAR VI, 10 - see also 12 and 15). It is 
the space dimension of nationalism (NOTE 6). 
e) Nationalism can mean lithe undet.inab~e e44ence 01. t.he 
hi4to~ica~ continuitv 01. 'Po~tu9ue4e th~ou9hout the centu~ie4" a 
"mo~a~ entitv to~med th~ou9hout the centu~ie4"i (SALAZAR IV, 
354). This portuguese essence "i4 the t~adition which 
individua~iJe~ U4 amon9 the peop~e4, that which con4titute4 
OU/l. co~~ective cha~acte~ in a~~ epoch4 and in a~~ p.lace4" 
(CAETANO 1952,48). That is, nationalism is portuguese 
uniqueness. 
143 
f) Following logically this meaning nationalism means 
also the national project, portuguese destiny, portuguese 
civilizing mission. That mission was to propagate christian 
western civilization and christian faith to other lands 
and peoples. As Salazar said the Nation has a r~en~e ot a 
national de~tin~ which ha~ nothing to do with the mode~t~ ot 
itd ~e~ou~ced and itd low level ot in~t~uction. The Nation 
had detinitel~ the vocation ot C ... J civiliJing action, ot 
impe~ial ~~andeu~"/ (SALAZAR III, 37 - see also I, 265, II, 
132, III 43, IV 354-356). See about this chapter seven, 
section 2.2.1. 
The r:ew State used the images of the past arid the m:;th 
of the civilizing mission to embody the self appointed task 
of rebuilding the Nation (see chap~er seven, section 1.3.2) 
(NOTE 7). 
For the sucess of this task was necessary '!to imp-tint 
on the g~owing mind thOde high ideald which cha~acte~iJe ou~ 
civiliJation, togethe~ with the deep love ot count~~ akin to 
the love ot thOde who have c~eated and extended ou~ he~ita~e 
in the padt" (SALAZAR 1939, 209). 
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g) Nationalism means also, naturally, love for the 
Motherland (SALAZAR II. 131), "the p~ettiedt ot all frlothe;zlandd" 
as a textbook said. It means also pride of the Fatherland. 
For all those reasons it was necessary to inculcate 
nationalism in the new generations (see SALAZAR III, 201). 
1.2. Categories of content analysis of nationalism 
In this chapter it \dll be only object of analysis those 
aspects of nationalism which were seen by the regime as 
necessary to instill in children through compulsory primary 
education. The other aspects are treated els~where in the 
thesis, as has been being referred .. 
Nationalism had a time dimension which supported meanings 
d) e) and f). This dimension is naturally given by the study 
of the history of Portugal - thus the category of content 
analysis History of Portugal. 
Nationalism has also a space perspective through its 
imperial dimension. This appears in texts by reference to 
portuguese colonies (ei ther merely descriptive references or 
praising references) - see NOTE 4. This aspect of nationalism 
appears under the category OVerseas Texts. The specific 
proclamation of Port,ugal as a "pluricontinental and 
multiracial nation" or the def 2nse of colonial war is 
included in Political Propaganda. 
Nationalism includes also Patriotic Inculcation which 
means direct appeal for love or pride of the Nation. This 
category was divided into two main sub-categories 
- mobilizing appeals and non mobilizing appeals (it would 
probably be more correct to speak 9f more and less mobilizing 
appeals). Mobilizing patriotic appeals include epic texts 
(like epic poems, texts appealing for the service of the 
Nation or the def 2nse of the Nation - except specific 
references to colonial war - definitions of Portugal as 
nation), reference to national symbols (national anthem, 
national flag) and slogans (like "All for the Nation, nothing 
against the Nation", "Portugal, land of heroes and saints, 
navigators and marthys, you are the prettiest land in all the 
world", "Your Fatherland is the prettiest of all Fatherlands 
- it deserves all sacrifices"). Non mobilizing appeals include 
lyric references to love for the Nation (mainly lyric poems) 
and other non typified non mobilizing references (which 
represent 26% of patriotic inculcation category and include 
praise of concrete portuguese natural beauties or patriotic 
references to portuguese language ). 
1.3. The hypotheses 
Applying to nationalistic inculcation our demobilizing 
hypothesis one can draw the following sub-hypotheses: 
a) "History of Portugal" should be the prevailing 
category, since it is the less directly mobilizing one; 
b) In "Patriotic Inculcation", a mre mobilizing category 
by nature, non mobilizing appeals should have a relevant 
expresslon. 
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1.4. Presentation of the results 
Let us present Tables 4.1 and 4.2. which can confir:n or 
not these hypotheses. 
(Percentages given in these tables. as in the follc .... ing 
of thi s chapter, are referred to the total number of texts in 
the sample. For further information it is added the abs:>l ute 
numbers of the analyzed category and total absol ute n~~.!)ers 
of the sample. A very slight variation of total percentage 
.... hen categories are divided into sub-categories may result 
from accumulation of rounding procedures). 
146 
TABLE 4.1 -TYPES OF NATIONALISTIC INCULCATION 
IN PRIMARY SCHOOL READING TEXTBOOKS 
Types of 1 st Period 2Dd/{dPer th th 
Nationalistic 
4 /5 Per. AVERAGE 
Inculcaticn 1927-1935 1936 - 1964 1964-1974 'IUI'AL 
History of 2.;% 11.4% 12.9% 9.1 % Portugal 
Patriotic 2.3% 4.9% 4.1 % 3.8% inculcation 
Overseas 
texts 1 .5% 2~5% 4.3% 2.8% 
TOTAL 6.3% 18.8% 21 .3% 15.7% 
n l\ationalistic 33 104 119 256 
Inculcation 
n TOTAL 519 553 560 1632 
TABLE 4.2 - TYPES OF PATRIOTIC INCULCATION STRATEGIES 
IN PRIPARY SCHOOL READING TEXTBOOKS 
TYPES OF 1 st Period 2na /{Oper. 4 thIS thper • AVERAGE I STRATEGIES 1927-1g36 1936-1964 1964-1974 TOTAL 
Mobl.ll.zl.ng 
strategies 1·,3% 3.4% 2.5% 2.5% 
Non mobilizing 
strategies 1 .0% 1 .4% 1.6% 1. 3% 
TOTAL 2.3% 4.8% 4.1 % 3.8% 
. 
n PATRIOT. INC 12· 27 23 62 
n TOTAL 519 553 560 1632 
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1.5. Confirmation of the hypotheses - nationalism was not a 
mobilizing strategy 
1.5.1. General confirmation of the hypotheses 
Analyzing Table 4.1 one can confirm the hypothesi sa) -
- indeed the "History of Portugal" category prevails in 
relative terms (it is more than double and treble respectively 
of the other two categories) and in absolute terms (it 
represents 58% of all nationalistic texts). 
Analyzing Table 4.2. one can see that, on average, non 
mobilizing strategies represent 35% of the total! which 
represents a fair proportion. thus confirming hypothesi s b)' 
~le the mobilizing strategies category show the charac:~rist 
down-up-down pattern (1 ,3rcr-3,4%-2,5%)' the non mobilizing 
strategies shew a constant tendency to increase ('0%-1,4%-1,6%). 
The relative proportion of the two sub-categories is 42%, 30% 
and 39%. 
1.5.2. The compartimentalized mobilization of the fourth and 
fifth periods 
On a detailed analysis of Table 4.1 one can find a 
constant increasing trend in His.tory of Portugal (2,5%, 11,4%. 
12,9%) and in Overseas Texts (1.5%. 2,5%. 4.3%) -(only 
patriotic I nculcation follows the characteristic down-u~-do\A,'n 
pattern with the peak in the mobilizing period (2,3%. 4.9~~, 
4,1%~. This is reflected in the global constant increasing 
of Nationalistic Inculcation - 6.3%, 18,8%, 21 .3%. 
This constant tendency needs some explanation since it 
contradicts the rule that almost all mentality inculcation 
categories decrease in the 4th and 5th periods after the peak 
in thernobilizing period - see Table 3.6 
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As it was said in chapter one (section 3.4). ~n the 
fourth period it began the colonial war (soon fought in three 
fronts) which provoked a remobilization of a hard core of the 
regime elite. As will be seen below (chapter six. section 2.3) 
this compelled the regime to implement strategies of 
(comparttn talized) mobilization.( that is. a mobilization 
specifically addressed to young makes in order to inculcate 
in them the need to deffend the Fatherlan~. It is this 
compart mentalized renobilization strategy which is reflected 
in the general increase of nationalist inculcation in the 
fourth and fifth periods,~ specifically in the 113% increase 
of History of Portugal and in the 172% increase of Overseas 
Texts. 
1.5.3. Conclusions 
This internal evidence points to a general non mobilizing 
aspect of nationalism in education. with specific but limited 
mobilizing areas. This internal evidence must be supple~ented 
by the acknowledgement that nationalism did not serve ar.y 
aggressiveness against other nations (SALAZAR I. 337. V. 320). 
any aggressive campaign of chauvinism or xenophobia or 
sentiments of racial supperiority among european nations 
(indeed portuguese suffer c~ic~ly from a national 
inferiori ty complex - ARAGAO 1985. 147-160). Salazar did not 
believe in appealing to the heroism of the race without 
previous modification of the general mentali ty of por::..Iguese 
(SALAZAR in FERRO 1982. 165). 
This modification was conceived by Salazar in the 
direction of passi vi ty. the 'hew"· man he would like to build 
was the passive man (see chapter two, section 1.3). This 
passivity was a means towards a conformed behaviour. it did 
not mean a vacuum of ideas. This passi vi ty was best supported 
by a cult of the past which could substi tute the dull aspect 
of the present. Indeed the main objective of nationalistic 
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inculcation was to control the self-image of Portugal which 
portuguese held. in order to legitimize the present 
leadership as the most adequate to bring Portugal to the 
glory of the past and to give to portuguese a sense of a spiritual 
mission to fulfill (see NOTE 7). Thus the manipulation of this 
image of the past was very important in the day to day 
government. As an american diplomat said. after visiting 
Portugal - Portugal is ruled by a triumvirate composed 
by Salazar. Henry. the Navigator and Vasco da Gama (ANTUNES 
1985. 31). 
The non mobilizing characteristic of nationalism comes 
from its obsessive reference to the past - 58% of all 
nationalistic texts refer to the past. 
This obsession with portuguese past led to a self-
-centration which had a logical culmination in cultural 
isolationism, as it was hinted in section 1.1a). This 
isolationism had many implication for the educational and 
cultural systems - it meant control of foreign books and 
magazines, control of foreign educational credentials. control 
of foreign intellectuals who wished to visit Portugal, etc. 
This cultural isolationism was also consequence (and probably 
also cause) of political isolationism - Portugal liked to 
stand "Proudly above!". to use a. Salazar's motto in refernce 
to the portuguese posi tion in regard to the colo!1ial problem 
(see cha~ter seven, section 1.3.3) (NOTE 8). 
All this does not mean that nationalism did not have 
mobilizing aspects, like the support for a manichaean vision 
of reality divided between the good ones ("ours", the 
nationalist) and the bad ones ("them". the communists and 
crypto-communists). but this aspect was not the predominant 
one in school nationalistic inculcation. On the other hand. 
nationalism did serve to promote a compartimentalized 
mobilization in the fourth and fifth periods (The 
contribution of Portuguese Youth to nationalistic inculcation 
will be studied in chapter nine). 
Taking into account all that was said about the role 
of nationalistic inculcation in general, and the internal 
evidence of its role in primary school, one can conclude that 
nationalism in education had a general non mobilizing appeal, 
with specific but limited areas of mobilization. 
2. FATHERLAND - ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN 
NATIONALISTIC INCULCATION 
2.1. The concept of History 
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In order to inculcate efficiently a nationalist mentality 
through the manipulation of the image of portuguese past ,History 
could not be conceived as an impartial and objective Social Science. 
History was not conceived as the rigorous study of the past, but 
as a strategy to "teed in the co~~ective ~ou~ the ~4eat ce4titude~" 
(SALAZAR), as strategy "to imp4int on the 940win9 mind tho~e 
hi~h idea~~ which cha4acte4i~e OU4 civi~iJation, to~ethe4 with 
the deep ~ove ot count4~ akin to the ~ove ol tho~e who have 
c4eated and extended OU4 he4ita~e in the pa~t" (SALAZAR 1939,209), 
"to /.eed the nationai ~pillit thllou~h the cuit ol tlLadition~ I 
and 9iolLie~ ot the pa~t" (Martinho Nobre de Melo, a member of 
the regime's elite, in FIGUEIREDO 1976, 67-68).' 
History of Portugal was used to support all of the above 
referred meanings of nationalism. It was used to support the 
creation of an original political model (see chapter seven, 
section 1.3.2); to promote a strong state presenting as anarchy 
historical periods where the state was not strong; to promote the 
imperial definition of the Nationemphasizing naturally the 
Discoveries and portuguese colonial rights to stress the 
"uniqueness" of portuguese essence, the singularity of a Nation 
which is the "prettiest of all Nations" and has the "most 
beautiful History", as textbooks proclaimed; to inculcate love 
for Fatherland; all this served also to prepare children to accept 
the national project, as defined by the New State. As CAETANO 
said "The ~evoiution wa~ done-C ••• ! /.Oll the POlLtu~ue4e to'meet 
a~ain the ~~=_~ei4i~ with which the~ laced tenebILOU4 4ea4 
c. .. ! and buiit an cmpi4e" (CAETANO 1952, 14). 
History of Portugal was divided into good, white, nationalistic 
periods where great heroes, based on a strong state, and 
appointed by providential designs performed great deeds, and 
bad, black periods of state feebleness, disarray, confusion, 
chaos or conflict. To teach History was to chose the best 
periods and prcmote their heroes and deeds. Since History was 
based on provicential men, History should be the narration of 
deeds of those providential men - the heroes. In this 
conception "it is true all that glorifies the Portuguese 
Nation, it is false all that depresses it, 
diminishes it, debilitates or stains its reputation" said 
Alfredo Piment~ a nationalist historian (in CARDgSO 1982). 
CORDEIRO-RAMOS, the first important Minister of Education 
of the New State, already deffended those conce~tions of 
history (CORDEIRO-RAMOS 1933a), and published a decree which 
establishes guidelines for this approach to the teaching of 
history. "HiAtolLlJ ot 'Polltu~a-l env.i.,.,a~e-1 C ... 1 to t~~m 
POlLtu~ue-1e: a-1 ,.,uch it,., act.i.on ,.,hou-ld be h.i.~h-l1J nat.i.ona-l.i.~in~. 
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C ••• J A-l-l deed which mean,., an ettollt ot the Nation C ••• J ,.,hou-ld 
be exa-lted C •. l. Jt ,.,hou-ld be object ot jU-1tit.i.cat.i.on and 
~-lolLitication a-l-l that ha,., been done. in the ei~ht centullie-1 
ot Hi,.,tolLlJ ot POlLtu~al to ,.,tlLen~htcn the to-l-lowin~ 
tundamenta-l tactolL'" ot ,.,oc.i..al l.i..,te: FamillJ C ..• J. Faith C ••• J. 
AuthollitlJ [ ••• l. Fillmne,.,-1 .i..n ~ovellnment C ... l. Re-1pect ot 
H.i...ellaILchlJ C ••. J. L.i...telLalllJ and -1cient.i..ti..c cu-ltulLe" (Decree 21103 
15-4-1932). The decree adds that it is the State which should 
define the national truth, that is the truth which best fi ts 
the Nation. 
CARNEIRO-PACHECO, the minister of Education of the 
mobilization period, in order to reinforce integration of 
nationalistic messages with other mentality inculcation 
messages even determined that all historical texts were to be 
included in reading textbooks. This was impl~nted for the 
first, second and third classes, but it was never implemented 
for the fourth class (as it was referred in chapter three, 
section 3.2.3.b). As it was said ,in this mobilizing period, 
the best teacher of History of Portugal was that who could be 
the best interpreter of the national soul (in MONICA 1978,301). 
(There are several sources for this conception of History of 
the New State - NOTE 9). 
The logic culmination of thi s historical perspective. in 
regard to presentation of contemporary events. was to present 
the New State as continuation of past glorious periods, regime 
achievements as new deeds and Salazar as the herce of the present 
historical period(as the providential man given by God to 
Portugal in the hour of nee~. Salazar was compared to Henry the 
Navigator by his biographer Antonio Ferro (FERRO 1982, 178-
-179, 226-227) and was presented in posters as the "Saviour of 
the Fatherland" (see reproduction of poster in CORTE SAO 1982, 
90 ). 
This conception of History achieved the status of 
official histcriography, or even of official New.State 
doctrine. It ~'as so much def. -ended by the New State that it 
transformed certain historical heroes in nationalist figures 
of the regime. This meant that to 'discuss History of Portugal 
was necessarily to attack or to deffend the regime. Already in 
1932 Salazar ~as saying that the Opposition was attacking Henry 
the Navigator as if he was enrolled in the "National Union", 
(the sole party) (in FERRO 1982,192). Due to the highly 
political character of the teaching of History of Portugal 
many university history syllabus stopped at the napoleonic 
invasions to spare any embarassment (ROBINSON 1979,58). 
2.2. Evidence of the implementation of this conception of 
History 
It is now due time to find some evidence of the 
implementation of this conception of History. It will be used 
two indicators - one related wi th the content and the other 
,.,i th the methodology of the teaching of History. The content 
indicator will be the period(s) most referred in reading 
textbooks. The methodological indicator will be the use of 
heroes and deeds as predominant methodology. 
According to what had been said, Di scoveries should be 
the most referred period - indeed it would promote a glorious 
vision of Portugal, it would legi timize the imperial dimension 
of Portugal and it would justify present cooperation between 
Church and State, as a tradi tion which was intrinsic part of 
Discoveries , which were done "the ~rd in one hand r ... J the 
rosary on the other" (GALVAO-TELLES 1966a, 75). 
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There are other obvious periods which are all those where 
the independence of portugal was involved - the Foundation of 
portuguese nation in the 12th century, the crisis of 1383-1385 
where Portugal was about to be dominated by the spanish kingdom 
of Castile, the Restoration of Independence in 1640 after sixty 
years of danination by Spain - see about those historical 
events MARQUES 1976. 
In regard to 'methodological strategies in the teaching 
of History one has categorized texts as using heroes or deeds 
in the teaching History ,and texts which used other strategies. 
It is expected that, in accordance with the conception of 
History asserted by the New State, the former strategies 
prevailed. 
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TABLE 4.3 - IMPORTANCE GIVEN TO THE DIFFERENT 
PERIODS IN THE TEACHING OF 
HISTORY OF PORTUGAL 
1 st Period nd rd th th AVERAGE / Historical 2 /3 Per. 4 /5 Per 
Periods 1927-1936 1936-1964 1964-1974 /TOTAL 
Discoveries 1 .3% 4.7% 5.4% 3.8% 
Foundation O. 6~~ 1.3% 1.6% 1.2% 
of Portugal 
1383-85 Crisis 0.3% 1.4% 1 .4% 1.1% 
RESTORATION 0% 0.5% 0.9% 0.5% 
OTHER PERIODS 0.4% 3.4% 3.6% 2.5% 
TOTAL 2.6«: 11 .3% 12.9% 9.1 % 
.-
n HIS T .PORTUGAL 13 63 72 148 
n TOTAL 519 553 560 1632 
TABLE 4.4 -TYPES OF STRATEGIES FOR TEACHING HISTOi(Y 
OF PORTUGAL IN PRIMARY SCHOOL READINGS 
TEXTBOJKS 
Types of st p . d 2nd/{dPer. th th 
Strategies 1 erlO 
4 /5 Per. AVERAGE 
1927-1936 1936-1964 1964-1974 TOTAL 
Heroes 1.7% 6.0% 5.7''' 4.5% 
Deeds 0.2% 1,8% 3.9"" 2.0"" 
M:>nUJll?nts 0.4% 1.8% 0.7% 1.0% 
Other 0.2% 1.8% 2.5% 1.5% strateoies 
TOTAL 2.5% 11.4% 12.8% 9.0% 
n HIST.romJGAL 13 63 72 148 
n TOTAL 519 553 560 1632 
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2.3. Analysis of the results - confirmation of the 
implementation of this conception of History 
It is clearly confirmed the prevalence of the Discoveries 
over any other historical period - indeed it represents 42% 
of all historical references and it is three times more referred 
than any other period. 
All the periods which concern the independence of 
Portugal represent (on the total) an average of 31% of the 
total historical texts (NOTE 10). 
So it is confirmed at the content level the effective 
implementation in reading textbooks of this conception of 
history. Identical conclusions would come from an analysis of 
the content of Sistory of Portugal textbooks - see RADICH 1979 
(as it was already said ,in the second and third periods it only 
existed History of Portugal textbook in the fourth class). 
In regard to methodological level it is also 
owerwhelmingly clear the prevalence of the "heroes" strategy 
- it represents 50% of the total (NOTE 11). Puting together the 
"heroes" and "deeds" strategy one can see that they occupy 72% 
of the total. So it is also clearly confirmed, at the 
methodological level. the application of the analyzed 
conceptio:1 of History (NOTE 12) .. 
The implementation of this methodology by primary school 
teachers, whose preparation was not v~ry good, transformed,most 
of the time, History of Portugal in a sequence of names, dates arrd 
events to learn by heart in sequence, as could be experienced 
by any primary school pupil (see MONICA 1978, 302). This 
obviously decreased the effect of the methodology planned by 
New State leaders for the teaching of History of Portugal. 
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3. GOD - THE ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS INCULCATION 
3.1. Methodology of the analysis 
In the s~le reading textbooks for the first, second and 
third classes ( in the second and third periods), it was included 
an appendix of religious doctrine called "Christian Doctrine" . 
This is the i;::~lementation of a strategy decided by CARNEIRO-
-PACHECO whic:-. commanded that there should be a sole textbook 
for each class which included all subjects (see chapter three, 
section 3.2.3b). As it was already said, this norm was never 
applied to tt~ fourth class. 
The inc:~sion of the compor-ent of religious education 
wi thin the s::.~.~ textbook wi th ether readings had the effect, 
and most pre~=.:'ly the purpose, of integrating religious message 
with the othe~ mentality inculcation messages. This is the 
reason why tr.:s religious doctrine appendix was considered 
integrated in :he sample. (In the first and second class 
textbooks it v:a.s also included a mathematical appendix which 
obviously was r.ot considered part of the ana~~ed sample, 
since it had r.either the referred purpose nor the referred 
effect) . 
3.2. The role of religious inculcation in the passive 
conformist strategy 
Consult:r-g Table 3.6 one can see that religious 
inculcation ir.::reased six times from the first to the second 
period and decreased drastically in the fourth and fifth 
periods. This down-up-down pattern is still present even not 
taking into account the readings from the religious appendix 
(percentages would then be 3%, 7%, 4%). 
The massive presence of religious texts in the second and 
third periods show that religious inculcation had a decisive 
role in the implementation of the conformist strategy then 
designed. 
In first place, the simultaneous (and integrated) 
presence of religious and nationalistic inculcations represent 
a statement of simili tude between Church and State projects, 
and of coperation between New State and Catholic Church. This 
coopera tion was often procl aimed by both partners. CARNEIRO-
-PACHECO, minister of Education of the mobilizing period, said 
that "To exclude God from school is an abominable deed" (in 
SAMPAIO 1976,51 ).A pre-war Director of Secondary education 
added "The school mission now can only be the creation of a 
single, holy, Catholic, universal and personal method of 
comprehending and developing this temporal life as a function 
of and preparation for eternal life" (in ROBINSON 1979, 58). 
In 1966 the then minister of Education was saying 
"J think that education mu~t neve~ lo~e and ~hould ~athe~ put 
~~owin9 ~t~e~~ on the ~pi~ituall~t natu~e whlch de~ive~ t~om 
the ~hlnln9 ch~i~ti..an. t~adi..tion'" (GALVAO-TELLES .1 966a, 42) . The 
Church also proclaimed this cooperation and tried to integrate 
all education in a religious spirit"The t~ue and ~olld mo~al 
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and ~eii..9i..ou~ to~mation ot the ~tudent~ ~hould be done In 
~elation to aii di..~cipllne~ not onl~ i..n the hou~~ allocated to 
the cla~~e~ ot Reii..9i..on. ~on~equentl~, the teache~ ~r.oulca t~~ 
to lmp~e~nate all ~chool ~ubject~ with ~ell9i..ou~ ~pi..~i..t, In ~uch 
a wa~ that ~eli..9ion be the toundation and co~onation ot all 
educational etto~t"lPortaria 22966, 17-10-1967, giving 
instructio~ for the syllabus of Religious Education - whose 
responsability ~as committed to Catholic Church - for the 
complementary cycle of primary education). See about the 
relationships bet~een Catholic Church and New State chapter 
five, section 2.2 . 
In second place, massive religious inculcation contribute 
to give social legitimacy to Catholic Church and thus to 
actively encourage a powerful mechanism of social control 
- obedience to Church authorities as consequence of religious 
belief. As there ~as a "moral union" (see chapter five, section 
2.2) bet~een Church and State this was another ~ay for the Ne~ 
State to achieve conformism. Civic preaching of obedience ~as 
complemented by religious preaching of resignation, the 
inculcation of acceptance of social position was complemented 
by christian acceptance of fate or destiny, public strategies 
avoidmce ~as complemented by passive acceptance of daily events 
as God special design ~hich is useless to fight. The religious 
phenanenon 'Was used, as Salazar acknowledges (SALAZAR IV, 373) J 
as a stabilizing element in society and a contribution to the 
project of moral renewal of the Nation. 
In third place, this inculcation of a religious sense in 
portuguese history contributed to the acceptance of the 
providential character of Salazar's leadership. This character 
was explicity asserted by Church leaders - "the bold and 
tenacious man at the helm" (Archbishop of Braga, in 1959), "the 
instrument of Providence" (Cardinal Cerejeira, leader of 
Portuguese Church from 1929 to 1971, in 1940) - see about this 
chapter five, section 2.2.3. Salazar could then be presented 
in a religious language like the "Saviour of the Fatherland", 
the "Redeemer of Portugal" (NOTE 1 3 ). So it was possible to 
wri te "Let. them Ct.he pup.i..J.."J exaJ..t. w.i..th 5aJ..a~all.'" .i..dea~ about 
~£.£, about. Fat.hell.J..and, about. Fam.i..J..v" (our emphasis, in "Escola 
Primaria", 25-4-1940). Salazar encouraged this when saying, in 
1937. after an aborted attempt on his life" we are 
indestructible. because Providence has willed it so" (in 
ROBINSON 1979. 66) (NOTE 14). 
Finally, thi s massive reI igious inculcation minimized the 
possible ill efects of Ii teracy policy (through the acess to 
reading "subversive" books or newspapers. for instance). as 
MONICA explains - "To the question t Should we teach people 
to read?'-the orthodox answer was yes. provided the book be the 
Cathecism" (MONICA 1 978,120). 
To conclude this analysis of the role of religious 
inculcation in the global passivity and conformism mentaliw 
inculcation of Ne~ State strategy one must call attention 
to the fact there were other means( at least as powerful as 
school curriculum),to transmit this message of cooperation 
between New State and Catholic Church - for instance, the 
presence of religious authori ties in state cerfJnonies and the 
presence of regime leaders in liturgic cerdmonies. 
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3.3. The strategy of integration of messages 
3.3.1. The integration of religious and nationalistic 
inculcations 
An integrated message combining religious and nationalist\t 
elements should probably be more powerful than two separate, 
unrelated messages. Indeed this is one of the most used 
mentality inculcation strategies of the New State - integration 
of messages. 
The integration between portuguese nationalism and 
portuguese catholicism had certainly historical roots. These 
roots were greatly emphasized by both sides - St~te and Church. 
"To aspire to study the hi s tori cal evol u ti on of the Portuguese 
people by first removing its religious life and the mission c£ 
the regular and secular clErgy, wOilld be taf\tamount to trying 
to understand the circulatory system without the blood vessels" 
said an historian of the Church - Fortunato de Almeida (in 
ROBINSON 1977). The same ir.tegrated effort was present in 
Discoveries and "'as cor.te'l1pOrarily present in the New State def::ense 
of christian western civilization (,.hich was God I s appointed 
mission to Portugal). 
So it is natural that the integration of Church and State 
projects (this "moral unior:"), haq expression in education. As 
the leader of portuguese Catholic Church said "Portuguese 
education cannot cease tc be Catho:ic without Portugal givir.g 
up being portugal" (in ROBU;SON 1979,63). 
How was this integration transmitted through school 
curriculum? How can we analyse this integration? Due to the 
necessary characteristic of mutual excl usion of categories in 
quantitative content analysis (see chapter three, section 
3.2.2), the methodology of content analysis used until now 
cannot reflect integration, since this by nature implies 
mixing of categories. So we will use qualitative content 
analysis to study the strategy of integration. 
In first place,integration between nationalism and 
catholicism was done through a kind of teaching of portuguese 
history which emphasized the Discoveries period in the crusade 
for faith and empire perspective. The regime reserved a glorious 
role for the Church in the narration of the past(BRUNEAU 1976). 
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The second integraticn strategy was the mixing of 
nationalistic and religicus symbols like in the following texts 
(reading textbooks are quoted by the school year, the date of 
the analysed edi tion and the number of the page) - "We are the 
chosen host I For the final victory I Portugal of our life I 
I Be confident in us, Portugal" (3 rd , 1958, 142); or "Who wants 
to see the bf=autful barg~ I That is going to sea? Our Lady 
is in it I Angels are rowing it, I St.Vicent is the pilot I 
. 
I Jesus Christ is the general I What a beautiful flag they 
carry I I t is the flag of Portugal" (3rd , 1958, 156). 
The third integration strategy was to hint a special 
relationship of God with Portugal which was counterpart of 
portuguese mission in the world, which was the deffense of 
Christian western civilization against the "Winds of History" 
- Fatima cult was one of the main pillars of this special 
relationship, the providential appeara nce of Salazar another. 
There are texts where this strategy can be seen (and evidenced) 
- "Our Lady of Fatima I Dove of the Highest Dove - Cot I 
lOne day she flew from Heaven I And landed up in Portugal" 
( 3rd , 1958, 164). "Land of the Motherland - monastery I Vw"ar 
trumpet, mass book! I knight and nobleman I God save you 
Portugal" (3rd , 1958, 74). The second and third strategies were 
mainly present in the second and. third periods. 
The fourth integration strategy was the presentation of 
an ideal image of man ~'here both nationalistic and religious 
qualities were present - "Good Man, good Portuguese IGood 
Christian this is the rule I To work in the world I All the 
good there is to be done" ( 4th , 1968, 140). 
This integration of nationalism and catholicism in 
education went beyond the curriculum. The nationalist youth 
movement ("Portuguese Youth") had a strong religious component 
- the Church had representation in the high command posts of 
the organization; still, in 1972, a dispatch allowed "Portuguese 
Youth" to coordinate the activities of the "Moral Formation 
Offices" (Gabinetes de Formac;~o Moral) - see chapter five, 
section 2.2.7 and notes 22, 23 ,chap~r nine, section 2.2.2 . 
To understand all the integration role of religious 
inculcation a more detailed analysis of the content thus 
categorized is needed. 
161 
3.3.2 Methodology of the detailed analysis of the content of 
religious inculcation 
All the religious inculcation texts were divided into 
three rrore detailed categories: 
a) Religious doctrine texts - texts of direct exposi tion 
of christian doctrine like texts about the creation, narration 
of gospel events and Jesus life episodes, Commandments, 
Misteries, Sacraments, etc. 
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b) Religious atti tudes texts - texts instilling religious 
dispositions a~d habits, like christian charity, confidence in 
God, thanksgiving at meals, feeling of God's pre~€~ce in Nature, 
respect for Sunday, etc. 
c) Popular Religiosi ty texts .- texts referen: to rural or 
popular aspects of religion like popular religious legends, 
popular religious quatrains, religious processions, religious 
fairs and popular festivities, aspects of religion in the 
countryside like importance of church bells or Angelus Tolling. 
3.3.3. Presentation of the results 
The resul ts of this analysi s are presented in Table 4.5 
TABLE ~.5 - TYPES OF RELIGIOUS I~CULCATION IN REA~ING 
TEXTBOOKS IN PRTI-4,ARY EDUCATION 
CATEGORIES 1
st 2nd/3rd 4ttr 5th AVERAGE / 
Period Periods Perioos /T'JfAL 
Religious 
doctrine 1.5% 13.4% 0.4% 5.1% 
ReligiOUS 
attitudes 0.4% 1.6% 0.4% 0.8% 
Fbpular 
religiosity 0.8% 3.4% 2.9"10 2.4% 
'IDTAL 2.7% 18.4% 3.7% 8.3% 
n Religious Inc. 14 102 20 136 
n T'JfAL 519 553 560 1632 
3.3.4. The integration of r~ligious and rural inculcation 
As it is clear the largely predaninant category is 
"Religious Doctrine" (without the Appendix, "Religious Doctrine 
would be the second category representing 1,2% of the total). 
It is also worth-while to call attention to the fact that 
non popular religious indoctrination was prevailingly done by 
direct indoctrination and not by diffuse religious atti tude 
inculcation. All this is explained by what have been said 
until now about religious inculcation. 
What is now interesting for the study of the integration 
role of religious instilling is the analysis of "Popular 
Religiosity" category. This category represent 29% of all 
religious texts. It is part of the strategy of integration 
between religious and rural inculcation, which have translati~i 
in many texts - "Blessed tree, blessed shadows, blessed 
fruits! Blessed be the hands who planted you Ithe treel" (1st, 
1958,89) . "The bells toll the Angelus /Cease the harvest-women 
in the fields/The oxen return to the farms / It dies the 
rustle in the threshing-floor / Night comes, day is going / 
Hail MarY! (3rd, 1958,8) - see also 1st, 1958, 83; 2nd, 1958, 
36-37; 3rd, 1958, 97-98. This integration reinforces the 
"ideal new man"of Salazar, which was built at the image of the 
rural man (chapter two, section 1.' 3 ) 
The whole role of religious inculcation in the integration 
of New State messages. can only be completly understood in the 
end of this chapter, since it will be still studied the 
integrating role of religious messages with respect to 
Family, Authority and Hierarchy inculcations. 
4. GOD , FAMILY AND AUTHORITY - ANALYSIS OF FAMILY AND 
AUTHORITY INCULCATION 
We are going to consider all those aspects in one 
section since they are often integratedly presented in 
textbooks. It is thus an illustration more of the strategy of 
integration of messages. As SALAZAR said we do not d.i.Acu~~ 
~od r ... j, we do not. d.i..~cu~~ t.he Aut.holt.i..t.v. t ... j, we do not. 
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di4cu4~ the Family" (SALAZAR II, 131 -134). 
As the f ami 1 y i s th~ ;.:os t fundamental cell of the Na tien 
it should be pr~ted by the State (see chapter seven, 
sections 2.3.1,4.1.2) "we do not /l.eco~rt.i.3e l.i.be/l.t~ a4 a!;-a.i.n4t 
G .. ! the tamily" said Salazar (1939,209). 
4.1. The ideal family 
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The inculcation of respect for family as insti tution and 
for family values was done in great part through the presentation 
of an ideal image of family. 
The ideal family was an hierarchic structure where 
a~thority and obedience w~re the prevailing values. It 
resembled nothing~the a-:hievement oriented bourgeois 
fa~ily (MONICA 1978,272). . 
In this hierarchy the head was the father. "In the family 
the chief is the Father" (1932 slogan), "The Father is the mes: 
learn'2d person of the family", "It is the father who lays dQl,;~ 
th'2 laws in the family" (from instructiors to teachers in 1937 
- i:; I-10NICA 1978,274), "The father is the authority in the 
farr,ily" (1 st, 1958,75). 
The \tX)man is seen predominantly as mother and housewife, 
working excl us i vely at hc:;,e - "My mother cares for the hone" 
( 2:-:d, 1 958,11 ), "My dear r.:other! [. . .] how she seems to be 
everY'I-:here ir. the house! C . .J How she manages to have every:~g 
i r. order ( 2nd. 1853.6-7 ). "My mother spent the day :~ 
the kitchen" (1st,1967,99) (NOTE 15). 
4.2. Family and God 
The integration of family inculcation with religious 
inculcation ~'as perfect. "In the crad 11e I learned to say 
Mother. In my Mother's arms I learned to say Father. Then, my 
Father and my Mother taught me to say God" (2nd,1958,5). 
The family was protected by God - the boy prays to Child 
Jesus for Him to protect his father who is a fis.herman and is 
at the sea (1st,1958,72). Parents and grandparents pray to God 
for their children - the grandmother says "Lord Jesusl Do 
protect and bless my child. Do make him, like his father, 
ob'2dient to Your Law, do make him good and useful for the 
Fatherland" (1 st, 1950,59). 
The integration of Fa~ily and God was logically 
culminated in references to the Holy Family. 
4.3. Family and Authority 
It is within the family that the cult of Authority should 
begin, since the New State saw a direct relationship between 
attitudes towards the pare~ts and future attitudes to~ards 
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public leaders. So authority enforced in the family should be the 
model of the authority wished by the regime. "Just as you will 
be towards the Family you ~ill be towards the Nation" (4th 
class,1968,140). "In the :amily the chief is the Father, in 
the school the chief is t!-.-=- Teacher, in the t\ation the chief 
is the Government" (1932 s:ogan included in several textbooKs) 
So obedience to pare~ts was ihe most congruent way to 
inculcate respect to auU:~ri ty. "The fat her is the a:..lruri t y 
in the family. Chilcren are compelled to love, respect and 
obey him" (1st class,1958,75). "Sole textbooks showed 
monotonously how children should obey to their olders - paren~ 
grandparen ts and other re~a ti ves" (MONICA 1 978,295). Er.!phasi s 
was put on obedience to the father since he is the head of the 
family (NOTE 16). 
Those who obey are h2.;;ier th~ those 'v.'ho command - "I f 
you kne\'J hew difficul tit is to cemmand, you would prefer to 
obey all your life", "Obe:; and you will learn how to command", 
"The easier the obedience, the milder the command" (1932 
slogans compulsorily included in textbooks). "Never envy those 
who are above you, since they have responsibilities and duties 
that you ignore" (4th, 1951 ,119). 
Obedience is thus a social phenomenon - in a factory the 
worker obeys ~ the foreman, the foreman obeys ~ the engineer 
the engineer obeys ¢ the owner, the cwner obeys ¢ the laws 
prescribed by the Government of the Nation and Government 
leaders obey )0 their conscience formed in the love of God, 
Fatherland and Family, says a non sampled textbooks (in MONICA 
1978,288). 
The logic culmination of this principle is obedience to 
the Government ("All portuguese should respect and obey the 
GovernIi,ent of the ~~ation" - 3rd, 1958,178) ane respect to·,Nares 
the President of Republique ("To venerate our Chief of the 
State [ .•. J and carry out what he commands is a duty of loyal ty 
towards Fatherland" - 3rd,1958,174). 
4.4. The religious legitimation of obedience to public 
authorities 
This obedience to parents and to public authori ties was 
gi ven religious legi timacy. Both God and Authori ty should not 
be discussed, as Salazar explained in 1936. 
"The father is the authori ty in the family [ ... J The 
teacher is the authori ty in the school C .. ] It ·is God who 
commands us to respect our superiors and to obey to authorities" 
was incLi:cated since the very beginning (1st,1958,75). Ttis 
is just an application of Church leaders thought expressed in 
the follo· .. ing words of Cardinal Cerejeira (the long lasting 
leader of the Church during the New State) addressed to the 
Presiden t of Republique "[J amI ~he h.i~he4~ It.. epll. e4 ent.at.-4.. ve V1. 
~oll.tu9ai ot a ll.eii9ion whirh command4 ~o accept, to ll.e4pect 
and to obe~ to the powell. ot which ~ou t ... l all.e the hi9he4t 
ll.epll.e4entative"(NOTE 17). 
5. FAMILY AND HIERARCHY - ANALYSIS OF THE INCULCATION OF THE 
SENSE OF HIERARCHY 
All the mentali ty inculcation of the New State is based 
on a hierarchic perspective of society. "I believe in 
hierarchy, not in equality" said SALAZAR (VI,41). 
This hierarchy should be preserved. The common portuguese 
wanted to preserve the existing hierarchy. This judgement was 
based in a diagnosis of portuguese society as a conservative 
society, which was true in many respects - see WIARDA 1977, 
passim (NOTE 18). 
Hierarchy, in an comprehensive defini tion, encanpasses both 
respect to authorities and obedience to superiors and also the 
atti tude of preservatioo of the existing social stratificatiQ'l. 
As the firs t aspect was deal t under the "Authori ty" mot to of 
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Salazar, Hierarchy here is analyzed just in the second meaning. 
5.1. Family and Hierarchy - family as agent of preservation 
of existing social hierarchy 
The ideal family was also the conformist family, ""hich 
accepted its social position and did not aspire to social 
promotion. In portuguese society status was ascribed, rarely 
achieved. This ideal was much more fulfilled by the rural 
family than by the urban one. "Wha tever pedagogues may say, it 
is unquestionable that in what refers both to sentiment and 
to culture the village family is superior to the town one" 
said a member of parliament, in 1938 (in MONICA .1978,270). 
Thus one can expect that most of the references to family 
in reading textbooks respect to rural families. Table 4.6 will 
confirm or not this hypothesis. 
TABLE 4.6 - 'IYFE OF REFERENCES TO FAMILY 
1YF£S OF 1st 2nd / 3rl 4th/5th 
FA~LY Period Pericx:t Pericrls AVERAGE 
'927-1936 1936-1964 1)64-1974 
RURAL FAMILY 29% 100'10 80"10 71% 
URBAN FAMILY 71% 0% 20% 29"10 
'IUI'AL 100% 100"10 100% 100% 
n FAMILY 7 9 5 21 
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(The sample for this table includes only the family 
categori zed texts which char-ac teri ze the social type of the 
family referred. Thi s excl udes the majori ty of family texts 
(77%). It were also not considered references to rural family 
which were put in the category "Ruralism" and not in the 
category "family". 
Percentages in this table, 
other tables, are referred just 
to the tctal sample). 
contrarily to those of the 
to the small sample and not 
The demonstration is clear - rural family is the 
predomina~t one,even not counsting references to rural 
family in "Ruralism" texts. 
A ve:-y brief study of Ramiro MARQUES which refers eight 
reading t~xtbooks of the first six years of schooling confirms 
this - f!"'om the 53 references to' family in those textbooks 
34 are without reference to social origin of the family (64%), 
16 respect rural families (30%) and 3 to bourgeois families 
(6%) (MARQUES 1981). This means that rural family references 
represent 84% of all socially situated families. 
5.2. Family and Hierarchy based on ~ the initiation in 
family of differentiated sex roles 
Society was based not only on a hierarchy based on social 
origin an: social posi tion, but al so on a hierarchy based on 
sex. Each social cell should have head and man was "naturally" 
the head of the family cell )woman should be the mother and the 
housewife (it was never presented a text referring a woman 
professional worker) - see SALAZAR I, 203-204, in fERRO 1982. 
156-158 . 
Great part of the sex differentiation was initiated 
through the differentiated social roles of husband and wife, 
father and mother, son and daughter. 
This differentiation was supported on a biological basis, 
since only women can be mothers, and on a psychological basis 
- "Man is audacious, violent and independent; 'Woman is timid, 
affable and docile". so "one rust not give to the feminine sex 
the same intellectual preparation [ ... J t the same ideal given 
to boys" said a Philosophy textbook for secondary education 
(NOTE 19). 
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The differentiation implied separation of sexes during 
the whole educational carreer (segregation). But it assumed 
also an hierarchic differentation which was translated in 
different compulsory education norms and differences in 
curricul um - see chapter five, sectjoo 3.6. 
5.3. The cuI t of the family insti tution and the promotion of 
only private strategies 
Family should be valued per set as the most basic and 
fundamental social cell. So all the good persons· should live 
for their families. liDo never put your interest above that of 
your fam~ly, since you pass away and your family-remains" said 
one of t:::-se 1932 slogans compulsorily included in reading 
textbooks. This living for the family was part of the habitual 
life Salazar encouraged (NOTE 20 f. 
This total cuI t of the family institution contributed to 
the confcr~ist strategy, since once one is totally engaged 
only in fa'dly affairs one limits his activity to private 
strategies. So no time will be available for public strategies. 
BRADFORD attributes the low public spirit of portuguese 
ci tizens to their excessive involvement with family affairs 
(BRADFORD 1973, 142). JESUiNO (19E2) says that the mythicizing 
of family ~e~resents a pshycological obstacle to the 
politiciz~:ic~ of behaviour. 
One car. confirm this strategy through the analysis of a 
table where all references categorized as "Family" were 
attributec three sub-categories inculcation of atti tudes and 
sentiments which contribute to a conformist oriented strategy 
(Gratitude + Respect + Obedience + Valuation of family 
institution) ;inculcation of love sentiments (love + union); and 
inculcatio~ of other various sentiments. 
(Similarly to the previous table, percentages in the following 
table are referred just to the small sample and not to the 
total sample). 
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TABLE 4.7 - TYPE OF CRIENTATION IN FAMILY REFERENCES 
1st Perioo 2na / 3m 4 "ttl/5th 
Pericxis Pericxis AVERAGE 
1927 - 1936 1936 - 1964 10/..-4 - 1974 
CONFO~ST 
ORIENTED 39'10 41% 30% 38% 
REFERENCES 
LOVE 
ORIENTED 53% 47'10 55% 51% 
REFERENCES 
arHER 
SEI\'TlMENTS 8% 12"10 15% 11% 
REFERENCES 
-
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
n FAMILY 36 34 20 90 
(In this analysis each text could be categorized under one cr 
more of those heading - gratitude, respect, obedience, 
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valuation of family, love, union, other sentiments. Some texts 
did not allow any of those categorized references and other texts 
had more than one categorization. So~, in tr.is analysis, does 
not mean, as usually means, the number of t~xts, but the 
total categorized references - 90 references for 91 texts). 
Thi~ table does not fully confirm the demobilizing 
hypothesis since conformist oriented strategies do not prevail 
over love oriented ones, but it shows clearly that a very 
significant percentage of texts (38% on average) were dedicated 
to inculcate conformism through family values orientation. 
Those 38% represent an average of 2.1 %, in terms of the total 
sample - see JESU1NO 1982,90. 
The analysis confirms the expected down-up-down pattern 
(39%-41%-30%) which shows that it was during the second 
period that conformist oriented references occupied more 
space in the family references (NOTE 21). 
6. FAMILY, HIERARCHY AND RURALISM - ANALYSIS OF RURAL 
INCULCATION 
It was already said that the predominance of references 
to rural families can be s~en as part of a strategy to 
inculcate satisfaction wi th present social posi tion in rural 
children. 
6.1. The rural society as the ideal society 
Salazar considered rural society as the ideal society. 
Being himself of rural origin and adopting for his life the 
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tradi tional rural values, he disliked the ci ty .. "(J/hat a pi..t!/-
J teel! J, ~on ot the count4!1~i..de, 9~own up unde4 the mU4mu~ 
ot i..4~i..~ati..on wate4~ and unce~ the ~hadow ot t~ee~, J Pi..tSl 
tho~e Li..~bon peop~e who ~pend~ the~~ lei..~u4e hou~~ and daSl~ 
pu~hi..n~ each othe4 ~adl!l i..n na~40W ~t4eet~" (SALAZAR I, 274). 
CAETANO also wrote, in 1927, against~cities - in MONICA 1978, 
142. 
He feared that industrialization destroyed the rural 
world and rural values. His ideal was "to tlee t~om the 
mate~i..ali..~m ot toda!/-: to make the ti..eld~ mo~e te~ti..le, wi..thout 
~i..lenci..n~ the~ei..n the me~4!1 ~on~~ ot the 9i..~1~; to weave 
cotton 04 wool i..n the mo~t mode4n loom~, wi..thout i..nte41aci..n~ 
wi..th the th4ead cla~~ hate and wi..thout bani..~hi..n~ t~om the 
tacto4!/- 04 the w04k~hop vu~ old pat~i..a~chal ~pi..~i..t" (SALAZAR 
II, 276, translation of ROBINSON 1979,165). He seemed 
sometimes to regret the beginning of the industrialization of 
thecountry in the 1950's - see chapter one, section 3.3. 
Was school curriculum going to promote the necessary 
mentality change to support industrial development or, on the 
contrary, would try to counteract its effects in rural 
population? 
6.2. The passive rural man as the ideal man 
The ideal man Salazar wanted to build was the passive man 
moulded at the image of the rural man (chapter two, section 
1 .3), the true Nation was the rural nation, urban people was 
just masses ( chapter two t note 10) t the very defini tion of 
Nation appealed only to its rural dimension (chapter seven t 
section 2.2.1). 
So it was indispensable that compulsory education of 
rural people did not provoke any aspiration of social 
promotion which could resul t in internal emigration to towns t 
it was essential that the school should not "bleed" the land 
(NOTE 22); on the contrary, education should tie the man· to 
the land, as the First Congress of National Union decided in 
1934. 
To tie rural children to the land (thus avoiding internal 
emigration and preserving existing social division of labor 
and social stratification) two solutions in regard to 
curriculum could be conceived - to create different primary 
school curricula for rural children and for urban children, or 
to include in the general curriculum massive doses of rural 
inculcation. Although there was the intention of using the 
first solution (see chapter five, section 3.4.1), the second 
alternative was the chosen one. An average of 5% of all the 
1632 texts analyzed were dedicated to this task - to inculcate 
ruralism in children (NOTE 23). 
6.3. Analysis of rural texts 
Many texts sing the virtues and joys of the life in the 
country~de , actively encouraging children to enjoy being 
farmers. Anthony begin to enjoy life in the country since 
birth r ... J When it came to age he ~nt to the mili tary 
service .He came back to his village longing for the father t 
for the oxes and for the land. He married. Today he is father 
of many children. He works and is happy. He is respected by 
all in the village" (3rd , 1958,12). "My land, how I wished to 
be an humble peasant" (3rd , 1958,31), "Do you like your 
(shepherd] life? Yes, I do" (1 st , 1958,89 - see also 2nd ,1958, 
rd 64-65, 3 , 1958, 39-40). 
There are many texts praising concrete form activities 
- "All work is like this - it gives health and joy" it is said 
about 'Weeding (3rd , 1958,15), "I t is charming to water the 
fields" (ibidem, 56), "There is no hard labour, 'When it does 
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not lack the will to work" it is said about t.arve ting (ibidem 
58) or "All harvesting works are done with joy" (2nd ,1958,44), 
"Grapes gathering is the most joyful work of farm activities", 
(3rd , 1958.73) (NOTE 24). 
Several references are done to the utility and digni ty 
of farmer's activities - "All occupations are honourable 
C ... J but none is so productive and useful as agriculture" 
( 4th , 1951.71), "Farmers are the most useful men" (non 
sampled textbook, in MONICA 1978,293). Popular knowledge was 
also valued (2nd , 1958,40,62-63). 
To complete this rural inculcation it were included 
several texts confronting directly ci ty life and. country life 
and concl :..:=ing invariably for the advantagEs of the latter. 
There are interactions bet~een town and village boys where 
the?e ones (or countryside life) are praised (2nd , 1958, 29-
r,..l 
30 , 33 ; 3 '"', 1 958 , 7 - 8 ) . There 
City and Village, where this 
breast the soul of Portugal" 
is even a direct dialogue between 
one says that it has "wi thin its 
( 4 th , 1951, 161-162). Life in 
countryside is more healthy "Air and sun, which are so 
necessary to heal th, are very abundant in villages and lack 
in towns r ... J. There is no greatest good than heal th; while 
countryside preserves it, many things damage it in towns" 
(4th , 1959.149 - see also 2nd , 1,958,55). 
So o~e can conclude that "Happy are those who can like 
peacefully in the mountair.s and in the countryside" (2nd ,1958. 
55 ). 
6.3. Ruralism and Hierarchy 
social stratification 
the preservation of existing 
Ruralism meant also, until the 1950' s, the poli tical and 
social option for a rural society as the model for portuguese 
society, a society where the inevitable' progress coexisted with 
the preservation of rural values (see SALAZAR II, 276). In the 
1950's it began a slow process of industrialization following 
a strategy of "conservative modernization" (MONICA 1978,105). 
So it is not surprising that the policy formulated in the 
second period increased greatly the inculcation of rural 
values - from 2% to 7%. 
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The fact that this policy was partially implemented 
in the industrialization period does not contradict the 
previous assertion, since it was the very inevi table need of 
industrialization which provoked the context of a necessary 
rural mentali ty inculcation to tie the major part of the farmers 
to the land and thus to avoid internal migration to towns. 
It is surprising the Ii ttleness of the decrease in the 
fourth period - just from 7% to 6%. This cannot to be totally 
explained by the normal delay between political change and 
educational formulation (of change) and between educational 
policy fcrmulation and educational implementation. The need 
to tie the man to the land resul ted thus proba!:ily from the great 
attracticn emigration to France and Germany ~~erted 
farmers cf more l!eglected areas. 
6.4. Ruralism and integration of messages 
OVE:'r most 
As it has been just seen,rural inculcation is 
inextricably integrated with the inculcation of Hierarchy. But 
rural ism ~as also integrated with nationalism - the very 
concept of Nation is based on its rural dimension; it was 
promoted a competition to decide which was the most portuguese 
village (see BRITO 1982). There are several examples in 
textbooks of this integration - in the alrea~y referred 
dialogue between City and Village the latter :ays it has 
"within its breast the soul of Portugal" (4th,1951,161-162). 
"Do you know what is Fatherland? r ... ) In Fatherland there are 
the rich cornfields , the green meadows, the shadowy woods, the 
vineyards wi th their black or golden grapes, the hills wi th 
their white votive chapels" (3rd,1958,5-6); "My land how I 
wish to be / an humble farrrer C ••• J My land now I wish / to be 
a known poet r ... J To show to the other nations / an uprisen 
Portugal" said a poem called "Portugal" (3rd,1958,31). All 
this inculcated the message that the true essence of Fatherland 
was in rural Portugal. 
The integration of rural inculcation wi th religious one 
has already been seen in the emphasis given to popular 
religiosi ty. It \rIaS shDNn the relationship of the liturgic calendar 
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with agri,:ultural activitie2 ( 2nd, 1 958,62-63). Further!TC!'",= 
sucess in agricul tural ::tivi ties is sometimes presented as 
being conditioned by res;:>~ct for religious cerimonies "All 
[agricul turalJ works wil: certainly go well during the w'S-~~, 
since everyone respectec the day of the Lord" (1st,1958,88;. 
There was also inte;ration of rural inculcation and 
family respect incu1cati~~ - the joys of rural life were 
in tegra ted wi th the jcys cf family life in countryside (2nd, 1 958 ,LL-
-46; 3rd,1958,113-114,);!".atural wieh of imitating the fat:-.er 
was used to tie the chi:= to the land (3rd,1958,12). 
Rural inculcation ·,,;as also ocasionally integrated 
politica: propaganda,as :~ the text where a farmer argues 
•. : - l-oA _ ..... 
his cror.:,' in favour cf ;.a::ing taxes to the Government s::,.:e 
they had been being app::~d in several beflefits in rural 
cour.trysi=e like roads, fountains·, schools (3rd,1958,123-:~":) 
(NOTE 2 5 ). 
Thus rural inculca::on is also a good example of 
integraticn of messages. 
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7. CONCLUSION - AN INTEGRATED PRESENTATION OF AN 
AUTHORITARIAN CONFORMIST MESSAGE 
Having adopted a defini tion of curriculum where methods 
of teaching were included a brief reference should be done to 
them. 
7.1. The use of conformist methods 
The predominance of memorization as a method of learning 
is typical of New State methods in primary school (MONICA 1978 
323-329, 346, NUNES 1981. 28-30). This identification of 
learning ~ith memorizing is an instrument of passivity 
inculcaticn. This had already been superbly commented by a 
portuguese reno~ned writer of the ~ineteenth century - "If the 
student gets used [ ... J to memorize each night, word by word, 
paragraphs which had remained unchanged for forty years, 
without criticizing them, without commenting them, it gets the 
healthy habit of accepting without discussion and with 
obedience preconceived ideas, adopted principles, proved 
dogmas, known institutions. He loses the funest tendency -
- which produces so many evils - of wanting to study the 
'raison d' etre' of things, of examining the truth of the facts; 
he loses the deplorable habi t of 'free inquiry [ ... :1 Free 
inquiry is the beginning revolution "( E~A DE QUEIROZ, in '0 
Conde de Abranhos''', page 59). 
7.2. The integration of messages 
It is worth while to reflect about the content and method 
of mentality inculcation to which all portuguese now (1986) 
aged between 26 and 50 years of age were subject in primary 
school (NOTE 26). 
The theme of integration of messages is a good way to 
deal with this question since it reflects both the content and 
the method of mentality inculcation. 
The efficacy of New State inculcation message resulted 
not only of mere juxtaposition of several conformist 
strategies about God, about Fatherland, about Authority, about 
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Hierarchy, about Rural life, but it resulted also of its 
integrated presentation. 
Such integration is not a strategy extrinsic to the 
message, it resul ted naturally d. YI an integrated conserva ti ve 
vision of a static world for which the new generations should 
be prepared by inculcation of a passive mentality. 
As MARTINS (1985) comments Salazar discourse rather than 
to establish control over national activities relates them 
to a value system producing a belief relationship. This value 
system is subordinate to the norms of catholic morals and, in 
this sense, Salazar's order is total since it proposes a 
comprehension of life and death. 
The several dimensions converge for the inculcation of 
passivity. Civic preaching of obedience is integrated with 
religious preacnng of resignation· and passive acceptance of 
God wishes. It is also integrated with rural fatalistic 
acceptance of weather influence in agricul turel works. Civic 
preaching of obedience is also integrated with exclusiv~ 
dedication to family affairs and with quiet acceptance of 
social stratification reproduction in a static hierarchic 
world. Such integrations were based on the diagnosis of 
portuguese people "natural predispostion for social discipline 
(chapter two. section 1.1 ). 
Religious Education wasa very powerful integrating 
mechanism in all that conformist strategy, since it implied 
naturally a belief relationship. Indeed, as it had been seen, 
religious inculcation was integrated wi th the various other 
messages. Through the integration with nationalism( representoo 
in the lei tmotiv of the defense of christian western 
civilization), is was achieved a control of historical 
consciousness and an intensive ceremonialization of the 
past which was one of the most effective inculcation methods 
(MARTINS. 1969). 
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1.3. Does this integration of messages represent a 
totalitarian intention? 
If this integration of messages comprehends, as it had 
been said, a complete message about life and death, does it 
represent a totalitarian project? 
According to the research principle stated in the 
Introduction the answer will be first searched in the primary 
sources. In 1936, MARIO DE FIGUEIREDO (later Minister of 
Education (1940-1944), several times speaker in the 
Parliament. and Salazar's crony since student days) said about 
this '"The New State ha~ a tota~ita4ian doct4ine, which even 
-encompa~~e~ m04a~~ and the concept of. ~if.e r ... 1 but thi~ 
doct4ine, at ~ea~t in what 4e9a4d~ m04a~~ and concept of. ~if.e 
which a4e domain~ of. individua~ con~cience, i~ not impo~ed, 
but ju~t p4opo~ed, th4ou~h o4ientation of. education in o4de4 
to awake them in ~ou~~" (FIGUEIREDO 1936). Following this 
reasoning the integration of messages is not totalitarian 
because it is just proposed (see chapter one, section 1.3.2). 
But there is another important reason for the non 
existe:-nce of totali tarianism - since the doctrine about life 
and death was based on catholic doctrine (chapter one, section 
2.1.2, 2.1.4) only an assumedly religious State could be 
called t=talitarian. As this is not the case, as will be seen 
in next c!'1apter (section 2.2.4), the integration of messages 
remains ~ithin the authoritarian framework. 
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CHAPTER V 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEW STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES 
- THE ANALYSIS OF COMPARTMENTALIZATIO~ 
IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
In this chapter we will analyse how the New State 
used administrative and organizational 
pursue de~obilization. In spite of 
action they had an important role 
passivity. 
strategies to 
their more discrete 
in the education for 
We will analyze 
than the admini s tra ti ve 
more the' organizational 
ones, since chapter ten 
strategies 
is all 
dedicated to the administrative strategies used in the 
educational system. The analysis of the strategies used 
towards the most important social organizations - the Army, 
the Church, the Uni versi ty - will occupy the major part 
of the first division of this chapter. 
The second part of this chapter will analyze in detail 
how the organizational strategy ,of co:np~~~r.ta1ization on was 
applied in the educational system. ~e will distinguish two 
main strategies - unequal a=C~S3 to (post-compulsory) 
education and a:c~ss to unequal education. The formulation and 
implementation of educational policies pursuing those 
strategies will be examined in relation to the different 
levels of schooling. Finally we will research how efficacious 
were those strategies in achieving social ~ompartmentalizatio~ 
and social stratification, that is, we will examine how social 
passivity and conformity was achieved through school 
structure. 
179 
180 
1. ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES 
1.,. Administrative strategies 
1.1.1. Direct control of acess and resources 
Administrative strategies have been definedCchapter three,section 1.) 
using direct control by the State through administrative 
mechanisms of acess, resources and decision-making. 
Direct control of access is reflected in ':ontrol of access 
to jobs, to job security, to promotions, to salaries, etc. 
Direct control over resources implies the pos2:bility of using 
the allocation of resources to ac~ieve confor~:ty from pErsons 
groups, departments, organizations. 
There are several organizations which Ii ved in the New 
State COT:"lpletely under this system - the civil service (that is, 
public ad11inistration services) ,local government, corporative 
bodies, publicly owned companies, universities, the army. 
The New State used this direct control to promote 
situationism among civil servants and employees of those 
organizations. Direct control was used to impe~e access to jobs 
by opposi tionists, to promote preferentially "nationalist" or 
merely si tuatior.:'st persons, to avoid promot:':!:s of the less 
conformist, etc. Civil servants had to swear fidelity to the established c!"'der. 
There was control of voting behavio/ of ci viI servants, 
'Which is a partial explanation for the constancy of the turn 
out in elections (see above chapter two). 
LUCENA points out "Portuguese underdevelopment favours 
[ ... J administrative forms of pressure (LUCENA 1976a,146). 
MARTINS calls attention to the fact that control measures over 
the public sector automatically controlled half of the 'Working 
population" (NARTINS 1970). 
So direct control was us~ as a strategy of promotion of 
si tuationism in large part of the portuguese\\K:>rking force. As 
such it was a powerful conformist and demobilising strategy. 
It is certainly not by chance that g~ part of the active 
opponents to the regime were independent professionals, mainly 
lawyers and doctors. 
1.1.2. Centralization 
The other very important administrative strategy is 
centralization. The demobilising influence of centralization 
works through two different mechanisms. 
Firstly,by removing from local agents all m~aningful 
decision-making power or innovation which reduces local 
servant I s role to implementation of policies formulated and 
adopted elsewhere. This effectively demobilizes local agents 
for any participation in decision- making. 
But centralization works towards demobilization in a less 
visible way. If decisions in the educational system, or in the 
heal th or social securi ty systems, were to be partially made 
at local level it would increase the probability of local 
citizens mobilizing themsel ves to achieve concrete objectives 
from public administration. This could happen also to local 
organizations - local industry, local commerce, local church, 
local trade unions, etc. So centralization also contributes 
to the active avoidance of mobilization within local 
communities (NOTE 1 ). 
RIEGELHAUPT concludes that in Portugal, at local level. 
no public strategies could be articulated. there was only room 
for private strategies (RIEGELHAUPT 1979a). 
1.2. Organizational strategies 
1.2.1. COmpartmentalization 
CanpartrrlE-ntalization is the confinement of sectors of 
society or organizations ~. hin self cormined . 
compartments through (cHfficUI tating iffusion of information. 
communication and intera~ lone The main goal of this strategy 
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was to prevent broad alliances which could introduce 
resistance factors to government action. 
Through compartmentalization the power of the State over 
civil society is increased and mobilization within civil 
society is prevented or minimized. This strategy of isolation 
of sectors whose interaction could be mobilising can be 
considered an organizational application of the old Roman 
political adage "To divide in order to rule". 
MAKLER studied compart~entalization in the portuguese 
economy in the New State and SCHMITTER applies the concept to 
portuguese corporati sm (SCHMITTER 1975a, 58). For MAKLER "i t 
appears that the regirre atterr.pted, through 
compartmentalization to both maintain and contain the 
traditional class structure" (MAKLER 1979). This 
compartmentalization of intra-elite mobili ty found its echo 
in the cc:mpartTT1E'!'1talizaticn of interest representation. 
1.2.2. Co-optation of organizational leaders 
Co-optation to the elite of leaders of potentially 
mobilizing organizations, by the eli te, was an organizational 
strategy commonly practiced by the New State. "A constant 
process of co-optation of leaders is the mechanism by which 
different sectcrs or ir:sti tutions become participants :'n the 
system" (LINZ 1975,266). 
As a resul t of this constant co-optation there .. ·~!"e in 
the eli te few professional poli ticians and the eli te !-.ad an 
heterogeneous background (LINZ 1975,266). It contained co-
-opted members of the most important - and potentially 
mobilizing - organizations: Army, Church, University. 
As seen in chapter 1( sec. ~'~5 co-opt a ti on is part of t he non 
responsible pluralism feature of the regime - the co-opted 
member is not institutionally accountable to its organization 
or to its diffuse constituency, but it is personally 
accountable to the members of the elite and mainly to the 
leader. So co-opted members are involved in a conflict of 
loyalties, their future in the eli te being dependent on 
accepting the prevalence of accountability to the leader. 
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In this way the m:.st influential local leaders are not 
only removed from daily contact wi th their organizations. but. 
through loyalty to the elite and the leader,neutralized in 
their mobilizing capacity within their organizations. 
But there is another feature of co-optation which favours 
demobilization. Co-optation provides organizations also with 
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an informal channel for representation of their interests,but requires 
thelN\,. to be satisfied ~th informal and behind the scenes 
demands and negotiations. This constitutes a non mobilizing 
alternative of interest representation (based mainly on patronage). 
There are several episodes in the history of the Ne~ 
State where co-optation to demobil.ize active groups was very 
important - most of the merr.bers of the national-syndicalism 
movement were co-opted into the "Uniao Nacional" (National 
Union) whose congress had as one of its main objectives to 
prepare this co-optation (see chapter one, section 2.1.1, PARREIRA 
et alia 1982). Creation of the radical youth movement 
"Ac<;ao Escolar Vanguarda" served also the purpose of co-opting 
young national-syndicalist militants (see chapter one, section 2.1.1, 
PINTO and RIBEIRO 1982). It was then the turn of the members 
of "Ac<;ao Escolar Vanguarda" to be co-opted by the new youth 
organization "Mocidade Fortuguesa" (NaTE 2), 
1.2.3. Organizational pre-emptying 
Organizational pre-emptying is a strategy of occupation 
of a certain space which could be mobilized by spontaneous 
efforts of citizens, organizations of civil society or 
oppositionists. This occupation of space with a New State 
organization was not in order to mobilize this space but to 
prevent its mobilization. 
"The Il.e~iffle'~ f-eall. of- mobiJ...i.lat.i.on. matched .i.t~ f-eall.. of-
d.i.~oll.~an..i.lation. OIl.~an.i.lat.i.on. w.i.thout mob.i.J...i.lat.i.on. - th.i.~ wa~ 
the ll.e~Lme'~ f-Oll.ffluJ..a. And thi~ f-Oll.ffluJ..a ll.e~u.i.ll.ed the 
deactivatiun ut a~~ u~~ani~ation~ potentia~~~ capab~e ut 
a~ticu~atin~ and mobi~i~in~ ~ecto~~ ot the popu~ation to~ 
po~itica~ inte~vention [ ••• ] And ~et thi~ ~ame tu~mu~a 
~equi4ed the fi~~in~ of a~~ o~~ani~ationa~ vacuum~ [ .•• ] And 
it wa~ via the co~po~ative ~~~tem that the 5tate'~ 
o~~ani~atiuna~ ~cheme~ we~e to be 4ea~i~ed" (MAKLtR 1979). 
SCHMITTER also concludes that the corporative system has 
mainly a preemptive .dimension, since it "seeks to set out from 
above structures of associability and channels of interest 
representation in anticipation of spontaneous efforts by 
affected classes, sectors or groups" and a preventive 
dimension ensuring that passive participation wi~hin its 
structures will occupy a certain space foreclosing alternative 
uses of the same space (SCHMITTER 1975a,58). 
But it was not only the corporative syste~ which was an 
instrument of this organizational occupation strategy, product 
of what SCHMITTER calls the regime's horror of the vacuum 
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( SCHMI'II'ER 197 5a, 23) - the creation of National Union (chapter two 
section 5.4.4 ), the creation of a youth organization in the 
educational system (chapter ten,sect.2.5) are part of this 
strategy. 
One can sum up this strategy in MAKLER's (1979) 'tJOrds-
organization without mobilization. 
2. INCULCATING CONFORMITY IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS - THE ARMY 
THE CHURCH, THE UNIVERSITY 
, . 
It is useful and enlightening for our hypothesis to 
analyse how the different administrative and organizational 
strategies were applied to the most powerful social 
organizations - the Army, the Church, the University. We will 
give more emphasis to the strategies aimed towards the two 
last ones, since they are much more influential in the 
educational system. 
2.1. Compartmentalization and co-optation of the Army 
As Salazar was well aware , armies are the most common 
agents for a regime's overthrow, due to their control over 
the heavier means of legitimate violence, (SALAZAR 11,78). 
Armies are generally natural corporations, self-contained 
and self compartmentalized . But one cannot regard Armies as 
organizations unable, due to their self compar'bnentalization. 
to mobilize masses or be mobilized by them - just as example 
see the case of liberation movements armies and the case of 
Portugal 1974-1975. 
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The New State eli te knew fully well that the Portuguese Arnty 
could mobilize itself to act in the name of the Nation (see CARRILHO 1985. 
SARAIVA and SILVA, 1976,19 and SERRA and MATOS 1982). So it 
was necessary to make self-containment give a fair return in 
term of benefi ts, since it meant no interference in 
political life. 
The first reinforcement for canpartmentalization was the 
special treatment and privileges given to military men -
reasonable pay, better social benefits, cheaper p~rol, 
special supermarkets, etc. (NOTE 3). 
The second reinforcement was a certain degree of self-
-government not allowed to any other organization (WIARDA 1977. 
122-123,297-298,305). Due to this autonomy mere direct 
control cf the Army was not feas~ble (NOTE 4). 
Besides reinforced canpart:mentalization the ~ew State 
also used co-optation. The most important person co-opted from 
the Army was the President of Republique, which was alw'ays a 
military man. But the Arnty had also the command of all police and 
paramilitary bodies (like "Legiao Portuguesa" - Portuguese 
Legion) and the administration of some ministries (Army, 
Navy) • 
The krrry. 'w'a.S co-opted to perform a kind of moderating role 
(WIARDA 1977,305) - the Army "does not govern, but should 
guarantee the conditions of government, through the upkeeping 
of order" (CRUZ 1982c). 
The colonial war (1962-1974) gradually decreased 
compartmentalization of the Army (chapter six,section 2.4.1.). 
2.2. Co-optation and compartmentalization of the Church 
The analysis of the relationship between the Catholic 
Church and the New State is of the utmost importance since 
the Church was the organization wi th greater potential for 
mobilization of people (i t is just enough to recall that the 
biggest mobilization of people in Portugal was - and is - done 
in the occasion of Fatima pilgrimages). Furthermore the 
Catholic Church is the agency, outside the State, more 
influential in the educational systems. Most part of the 
private education system was run by catholic organizations. 
It is necessary to do a brief analysis of this 
relationship to understand it clearly (NOTE 5). 
2.2.1 A brief historical glance 
In 1910 the Monarchy was abolished and a Republican 
Regime began. As it was said above (chapter one, section 2.3), 
the republican ideology and practice was strongly anticlerical, 
anti-catholic and anti-religious (NOTE 6). It is not 
surprising that the republican policies pushed the catholic 
leaders to accept an authori tarian regime in which the Church 
could be protected. 
In fact the founding elite of the New State was based 
predominar.tly in catholic leaders (chapter one, section 2.3). 
The leader of the regime from 1928 to 1968 (Salazar) and the 
leader of the Portuguese Church from 1929 to 1971 (CEREJEIRA) had beer. 
students together, university professors in the same 
university, catholic leaders of the same organization at the 
same time, they entered in leadership posi tions in the same 
period - that is, the insti tutional cooperation was supported 
by very strong personal links among leaders. 
From such beginnings one could expect close cooperation 
between State and Church. Indeed the relationship of State and 
Church in the New State can be described, using the words of 
a portuguese contemporary jesuit in 1936,as one of "moral 
union with economic and administrative separation" (CERQUEIRA 
1973, ROBINSON 1979, 61) (NOTE 7). 
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2.2.2. "Moral union" - co-optation of :he Church 
This moral union came from communio~ of ideology and 
interests "For the first time since the 18th century an 
ideological agreement between Church and State [was 
established]" (FERNANDES 1982). 
The Hierarchy of the Church was co~servative and remained 
so (BRADFORD 1973.95). The New State claimed to follow the 
social doctrine of the Church when created a corporative state 
(NOTE 8). It also considered itself the champion of the 
western C~ristian civilization in the world. 
This "moral union" led to a close cQoperation betweE:n 
Church a~d State. which has its traditicns in 'Portugal (see 
ROBINSO!: 1977). "The regime did not al I c·,,; emergence of 
threats :0 the church' s influence" (BRUr:S;'.u 1976) and in 
return the Church proclaimed "Honor and glory to the New 
State in which the peace and the harmor.y between Church and 
State are based" (Cardinal Cerejeira in 1940). 
Such cooperation led some to speak of Portugal as a 
clerical conservative state (see BRUNEAU 1976) which is an 
exaggeration (NOTE 9). 
This cooperation was carried to the extent of open support 
of the Ch'...lrch for the New State as when Cardinal Cerejeira 
defined r.i~self to the President 'Of Rep~~lic as "The higtest 
represer. t a ti ve in Portugal of a reI :'gior. i.'hich commands t: 
accept. to respect and to obey the power of which you [ ... J 
are the r.ighest representative,,'(in MONICA 1978,102) (NaIT 10). 
This support meant even that "parish priests, 
particularly in the rural area, [acted] as the allent of the 
government policies" (BLUME 1977). This had sane 
traditional precedents in the submission of the 
Church in the liberal monarchy in the 19th century - it was 
created~'cle~ical state bureaucracy being the priests and 
bishop effectivelly ecclesiastical ci viI servants" (ROBINSON 
, 977 ). 
187 
2.2.3. Role of the Church in relation to the political 
reg lome 
The Church had a very important legi timation function 
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of the regime as MONICA (1978)and CERQUEIRA (1973)GEORGEL 1985)point out.The 
Church considered Salazar a gift from God to Portugal t "the 
instrument of Providence" (Cardinal Cerejeira in 1940) t "the 
bold and tenacious man at the helm who restored the nation's unity around 
the sacred symbol of the redeeming Cross" (Archbishop of Braga 
in 1959) (NOTE 11). As LUCENA 1979 puts it "C ... J charisma, 
given as it was by God himself, always depended upon 
confirmation by the Church. In Salazar's case such a 
confirmation always arrived punctually". 
As it was said before (chapter four t s,=ction 3.2), the 
simultaneous and integrated presence of religious and 
nationalistic inculcations represent a statement of similitude 
between Church and State projects, and· of cooperation between 
the regime and the Catholic Church. Thus the fact that, since 
the second period, Church and State were glorified together 
in texbooks, the deliberate mixture of national and religious 
symbols, the integration of the religious message with all the 
other mentali ty inculcation messages. Both Church and State 
were involved in the defense of christian western civilization 
(NOTE 12). 
All this transformed the Church into a powerful agency 
of social control. Due to the social legi timacy this "moral 
union" gave to the Catholic Church obedience to Church 
authorities was another way of inculcating a passive 
mentality (NOTE 13). 
2.2.4. Economic and administrative separation -
- compartmentalization 
But side by side with this "moral union" existed the 
"economic and administrative separation". That is, the 
relation between Church and State is a twofold question - it 
concerns ideology and power (see FERNANDES 1982, FORMOSINHO 
et al.1982). If the State shared the ideology wi th the Church 
it was not prepared to share the power. So there was no 
intention to reunite Church and State and Portugal did not 
transform itself into a confessional state (ROBINSON 1979,61 ). 
Salazar was very explicit in 1940 "J think it dan~e~oud t04 
the dtate to ac~ui~e the idea that it had the powe~ to do 
violence to Heaven, but J think it equall~ un~ea4onable that 
the Chu~ch, badin~ itdelt upon the dupe~io~it~ ot itd 
dpi4itual inte4edtd, ~hould ~eek to b~oaden it4 activit~ to 
intluence what the ~odpel itdelt ~ou~ht to ent4u4t to Cae~a4" 
(SALAZAR 111,239). (NOTE 14 - see also· SALAZAR 1,173-174, IV 
373, CAETANO 1977,411-415. 
Therefore "The catholic feature of the New State must be 
emphasized but not exaggerated for Salazar I s regime (unlike 
Franco's) never posed as an 'apostolic' system engaged in some 
kind of crusade against anti-Catholic elements" (MARQUES 1976, 
1 93 ) . (NOTE 1 5) . 
This separation between Church and State can be seen 
clearly in the Concordat between the Portuguese state and the 
Holy See signed in 1940. "C ... J the concordat is one of 
separation and not of union but does protect the church as a 
privileged institution with a very large role in society" 
(BRUNEAU 1 976 ). 
2.2.5. Submission of the Church to ·the State - co-optation 
and compartmentallzatlon as lnstruments of control 
• 
In this partnership the Church was the subordinate part. 
As BRUNEAU sums up the Church was "an important, but 
subservient part of the system", "merely one more pillar of 
the conservative authoritarian regime[ ... ] directed by 
Salazar". 
This subordination was achieved in several ways the least 
of which was not certainly the faculty the State obtained 
through the Concordat to de facto veto new appointments of the 
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Church high Hierarchy (NOTE 15 ). So a "conservative catholic 
leader accomplished a far reaching submission of the 
Portuguese Church which was never completely fulfiled by his 
his liberal, positivist or anti-clerical predecessors" 
(FERNANDES 1982). 
That is, the moral union was seen as an instrument of 
control since it was implicit that the partnerships only 
existed with a certain kind of catholic church, that is, with 
the tradi tional, clerical, conservative "catholic, apostolic, 
roman" Church. 
This implicit condition had to be made explicit when some 
catholi~ in late 1950s and from 1960~ onwards b~gan to 
criticize the regime. In 1958 the bishop of Oporto wrote a 
letter to Salazar which was pL4blicized. He was expelled from 
the country because in his letter he said things like 
corporati sm had been a device to deprive portuguese workers 
of their natural rights of association. Those catholic voices 
who refused to claim "Honor and glory to the New State" - then 
called "progressist· catholics" - sometimes made coali tions 
with other oppositionist groups (NOTE 17). 
As thi s minori ty was undermining the moral union the New 
State used repression to make clear the limits of the 
partnership. 
If moral ur.ion was an instrument of control of which 
conservative and merely apolitical catholicswere partners, 
economic and ad:r.inistrative separation was also an instrument 
of control and submission. 
There was control over the appointment of bishops, 
administrative control of some church activities, strict 
control of catholic schools, as will be seen. 
All those controls are part of a strategy of submission 
of the Church to State interests through compartmentalizing 
its activity into the religious, spiritual and private moral 
area. The experience of the "progressist catholics" is clear 
evidence that when catholic organizations or groups entered 
public moral areas or social or educational matters its 
freedom of movements was much more restricted or even subject 
to repression. 
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2.2.6. Conclusion 
To conclude, the enormous mobilizing power of the Church 
was confined to private areas and expressed in 
. 
religious ceremonies (masses, processions, pilgrimages, 
religious festivities). From all these one must call attention 
to Fatima pilgrimage which was (and is) the greatest rally of 
persons' in Portugal (NOTE 18). 
This mobilizing power was directed to,,'ards inculcation 
of the same mentali ty of respect by God, Fatherland, Family 
and Authori ty which SALAZAR proclaimed as the aim of the New 
State. This is not a coincidence since the New State found its 
inspiration in Catholic doctrine and its leaders. were 
convinced Gatholics. This was the strong point of the 
partnership, this was the justificaticn of the "moral unicn". 
This moral union is a great par"t of the explanation of the 
acceptance of the New State by the majority of portuguese 
population, which was strongly Catholic. 
But this moral union had a weak point, which only 
revealed itself in the 1960$. The New State not only 
gave up an autonarous ideological production (except in 
the corporative dimension), but, in the same way, did not 
control the main source of its doctrinaire source. That is, 
changes could happen in the Cathol ic Church, at 
international level, which were completely outside the 
regime's control - these changes could greatly affect the 
moral union. That what indeed what happened after the Vatican 
Council II in the 1960s , which provoked an enormous change in 
the Catholic Church. 
This provoked the first serious fissures in the moral 
union and was the basis which legitimized the action of a 
minority of catholics - progressist catholics - in the 1960s 
and 1970s of opposition to the regime (NOTE19). 
Summing up, the strategies of co-optation and 
canpartmentalization were interdependent. Once co-optation, 
through moral union, began to fissure, cornpartimentalization 
became less feasible and repression of non conservative 
catholics appeared as an alternative strategy. 
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2.2.7. "Moral union" and "economic and administrative 
separatlon" ln the educatlonal system 
~ysis of the strategies used by the New State towards 
the Church was not complete if it ignored the ,=ffects of those 
strategies on the educational system. 
This analysis will enlighten more the State-Church 
relationship, will allow us to understand the role of the 
Church in the educational system and to have a more complete 
picture of schooling in Portugal. 
The role of the Church in the educational system can only 
be understood in the twofold framework of the "moral union 
with economic and administrative separation". 
The "moral union" is absent from the origirlal text of the 
Consti tution of 1933 - "the education supplied by the state 
is independent of any religious cul t". But a law in 1935 (Law 
nQ 1910, 13.5.1935) already states "The education supplied by 
the state aims ( ... J the formation [' .. J of all civic and 
moral virtues, these being guided by the principles of 
Christian doctrine and morali ty tradi tional in the country" 
( NOTE 20). 
Cardinal Cerejeira put it like this "The 'o4tu~ue4e 4tate 
which aiiow4 t4eedom ot 4eii~ion and 4u4tain4 no otticiai 
chu4ch, i4 not neut4ai in m04ai ~nd doct4inai matte4~ G .. J 
'o4tu~ue4e education cannot cea~e to be Cathdiic without 
'o4tu~ai ~ivin~ up beinp f04tupai" (in ROBINSON 1979,63). 
The Concordat between Portugal and the Holy See (1940) 
stated that religious education was to be given in state 
schools to anyone who did not ask to be excluded from it. The 
syllabus and the appointment of teachers was the Church's 
responsibility. It also stated that education in state schools 
was to be oriented by principles and doctrine of a Christian 
character,traditional of the country. 
The "moral union" was seen very clearly in the Curriculum 
of the primary and secondary schools (in chapters three and 
four) (NOTE 21 ). 
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In relationship wi th the youth organi zations namely the 
"Mocidade Portuguesa" (Portuguese Youth) which existed in 
every school, the same union prevailed. The Church had a 
represen ta ti ve in the directive body of "Mocidade Portuguesa" 
to care for the "aspects rel ati ve to the moral formation of 
youth" (NOTE 22). Another example which shows that the moral 
union was still at work in 1972 - a dispatch of that year 
allowed the "Mocidade Portuguesa" to coordinate the activities 
of the Moral Formation Offices (Gabinetes de Forma~ao Moral) 
then created in preparatory and secondary schools (NOTE 2~. 
But the "economic and administrative separation" was as 
much present as the moral union. 
First of all, the portuguese educational system was not 
a confessional one and Religious and Moral Education \\:as not 
compulsory as it is. for instance,' in England (NOTE24). On the 
other hand,Religious and Moral Education was a low status 
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subject in the curricul\JTI (NUNES 1981,149-150)- it was allocated only one hour per 
week, it was not subject to examination nor had any inf1 uence 
on student promotion (NOTE 2~. There were no morning 
assemblies or compulsory prayers. 
Secondly, the absence of protection to private schools, 
for the most part under catholic control, illustrates clearly the 
subordination of the Church to the State - the establishement 
of a school depended upon governmental authori zation; those 
schools were not subsidized by-the State and they were 
compelled to fOllow the curriculum of state schools; 
futhermore their students were examined only in State schools. 
In short, church schools were tightly controlled by the State. 
Thirdly, the control over the educational degrees awarded 
by private schools was striking - the degrees awarded by 
Catholic private schools were not officially recognized, the 
degrees awarded by religious seminaries were also not 
recognized. 
Fourthly, there were never great facilities for the 
establishment of Catholic higher education institutions (apart 
the seminaries for the preparation of clergy) - the Faculty 
of Theology which was extinguished in 1911 was never restored, 
a Catholic University was only founded in 1972. 
2.3. Managing for conformity of the University - direct 
control, centralization and co-optation 
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Almost all administrative and organizational strategies were 
used to achieve conformity and cooperation from this important 
organization - the University. 
While the State directly controlled and centralized 
university management, at the same time it co-opted its 
leaders to occupy important positions in the regime and in 
Public Admini s tra tion and thus provided the tmiversi ty 'IAorl. th 
powerful informal channels of interest representation. 
2.3.1. Direct control of the University 
The most important strategies used wer~ direct control 
and centralization (for the subject see FORMOSII~P.O et al 
1982). The universities were dependent 01 an administrative 
department -th-= Higher' Education Department ("Direc<;ao Geral do 
Ensino Superior"). This department controlled the allocation 
of resources to uni versi ties, which was a very effective mean 
of achieving conformity -since 1930 all University income came 
from the State. Admission of staff was also controlled by the 
central department and even curricular reforms had to be 
approved by the government. 
As all uni versi ty teachers were civil servants, as such 
dependent on t:',,? ~f-;.:ral administration, they could be 
poli tically controlled. 'i'heir admission was subject, as that of 
all civil servant s, to informa tion frem the secret police, 
which could have de facto veto power. As all civil servants, 
university professors could be dismissed if they involved 
themselves in poli tics (that is, in opposi tionist poli tics) 
, 
(NOTE 26). 
In spi te of being a natural corporation the university 
was never subject to the corporative system (V,'IARDA 1977,124,196,229): 
it was instead subject to the tight control of the 
administrative system. 
2.3.2. Centralization of university management 
Centralization is a strategy of control and 
demobilizaticn very much interdependent with direct control. 
The story of the University in the New State (until 1971) 
is the narration of its gradual losS of pedagogic, scientific, 
administrative and financial autonomy Since 1930 to 1971 
"all new government policy was designed to e!1hance 
centralization and state control" (FORMOSINHO et alia, 1982 
- see also BRAGA 1980). 
In 1930 the regime published a new statute for the 
Universities (Decreto n2 18717, 27/2/1930) whereby 
Universi ties ceased to have self-government, the appointment 
of professors (not that of assistant teachers) depended on 
the Mini s ter. The rector (principal) of the uni versi ty ceased 
to be electe=, being instead freely appointed by the Minister. 
In addition :~ all those centralizing measures it imposed 
uniformi ty to all Facul ties of the same subject - they had to 
have the same curriculum and the same statute, which was 
approved by :~e Government. 
In 1942 even the appointment of assistant teachers was 
transferred to the Minister of Education; in 1949 the Minister 
called to hi~self the power to open up competitions for 
professorship, which was a very heavy blow for the little 
autonany Uni versi ties had (NOTE 27 ); in 1952 Faculties lost 
their admini s tra ti ve autonoTlT>' 
Direct c:ntrol facilitated this general trend towards 
centralizaticr., which was of course contrary not only to 
University rcle and tradition, but against corporative 
principles (as shall be seen). 
2.3.3. Co-optation of the University 
The New State co-opted most effectively the elite of the 
University. The University elite is composed by the full 
professors (called "catedraticos", that is chair. holders, in 
the portuguese educational system). The New State co-opted 
those "catedraticos" for important posts in Government, Public 
Administration and mixed economy companies (NOTE 28). 
This predominance of tenured university professors in the 
elite structure of the New State is a very original 
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characteristic of this regime. It is referred toby many authors 
as a "catedratocracia" (that is, the rule of "catedraticos") 
- see LUCENA 1976a,165, 1979a, MAKLER 1979, ~~RTINS 1971, 
ROBINSON 1979,161, SCHMITTER 1979, WIARDA 1977,13,283. 
Thi s "doctorate'S dictatorship " (LUCENA 1976a,16S) 
transformed the professoriate into the main rulers and policy 
- makers of the regime. They constituted the roost important 
recruitment source for the "ruling caste" (LUCENA 1976a, 165). 
SALAZAR was proud of this system - he said in 1934 "At 
a time when it was thought that the Dictatorship would crush 
everything in an attempt to create a mili tary despotism, we 
see the Government composed almost exclusively of members of 
the higher teaching professions" (SALAZAR I, 306, translation 
in SALAZAR 1939,203) (NOTE 29). 
This "catedratocracia" can be. evidenced by some 
indicators: 
- Firstly, over half of all civilian ministers ~re academics (MARTINS 
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1971 ) and around 15% of the members of the Corporative Chamber( SCHMITTER 1975a, 35); 
- Secondly, according to SCHMITTER's study, professors 
and educators constituted 27.1% of the hard core of the 
formative pOli tical eli te in Portugal (1934-1942), being the 
largest group in this hard core eli te (SCHMITTER 1979) (NOTE 
30). As he concludes "the Estado .Novo was founded and staffed 
in large measure by a new generation composed mainly of civil 
servants, technicians and professors of fairly provincial 
origins" (SCHMITTER 1979); 
- Thirdly, the two leaders of the New State were both 
"catedraticos" - SALAZAR was law professor in the Uni versi ty 
of Coimbra and CAETANO was law professor in the University of 
Lisbon; both retained their full professorship during their 
political carreers; 
Fourthly, all Ministers of Education but one were 
uni versi ty professors (NOTE 31). 
This co-optation counterbalanced centralization and direct 
control over universities, since it represented a very 
effectiv~ channel of informal repres~nta:ion of some interests 
of the Un:' versi ty (as seen by its el i te ). On the other hand, 
it avoided the possibili ty of great dissatisfaction of this 
powerful organization - the University. 
One can conclude calling attention to the fact that 
"catedratocracia" can be considered an elaborate application 
of the theory of the government by eli tes. Salazar spoke of 
the use of Universi ty human resources to solve the problems 
of the country (SALAZAR I, 306-307), wtich \\'as partially due 
to the 1 ack of prepared el i tes in the country '( CAETANO 1959, 
338 - see also e2-84). 
In the remain~ of this chapter it will be analyzed in 
detail h~~ the organizational strategy of ccmpartmentalization 
applied to the Army and the Church, to maintain demobilization, 
was applied with the same purpose in the educational system. 
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3. THE COMPARTMENTALIZATION STRATEGY IN EDUCATION - EDUCATION 
FOR MASSES AND EDUCATION FOR THE ELITES 
The strategy of compartmentalization was intensively and 
extensively used in the educational system. Indeed the 
con f inm,=n t of di fferen t social classes wi thin sel f -con tained 
compartm,=nts was instrumental to guarantee the reproduction 
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of social stratification thus contributing to avoid mobilization 
for social promotion, so ens~ ring social conformism. The 
~ducatic;.al system should fulfil an im~Qrtant function in this 
y·eproduction. 
• 
3.1. The school as agent of reproduction of "natural" social 
stratification - analysis of New State leaders statements 
Tha~ the fur.ction of school was to reproduce social 
stra~ification was self-evident for New State leaders. Since 
ineq'.lali:y is r.atural ("I do not believe in equality", SALAZAR 
VI ,41 ), : t would be unnatural if school interfered 
in the process. That meant that social. differences should be 
reflected in levels of schooling differences. 
This social inequali ty was given scientific explanation 
"Men a~e neithe~ bo~n no~ ~o on in ~ite in tu~L t~eedom and 
equaLit~. The he~edit~ bind~ them, ~ince bi~thJto the 
quaLitie~ and detect~ ot thei~ p~o~enito~~ G .. ] the~e i~ an 
ab~~~ between an imbeci~e and a ~eniu~" says a popular and 
long-s tanding sole textbook for secondary education (AFONSO, 
no date,22). As CAETANO said "the gestation of a superior 
intelligence is the work of many years, even centuries" 
(CAETANO 1928). 
The Minister of Education (1934-1936) TAMAGNINI invoked, 
in a public interview, an american pedagogue to give 
scientific basic to car.partrnentalization in education - this 
pedagogue divided school population in 8% of non educable, 15% 
of normally stupid, 60% of averagely intelligent, 15% of 
superiorly intelligent and 2% of notably intelligent 
(TAMAGNINI 1934) - see MONICA 1978,309. 
Thus each child should have just the education allowed 
by the possibilities of hisinherited ability, otherwise I 
As Ca~tano comments - the intelligent son of a 
Skilfu11 and honest worker who was "~elected by the p~lma~y 
, ~chool teache~ to ~tudy ~clence~ to~ wh~ch hi~ ~pi~lt had not 
the ~anie he~editall.y p~epa~atlon a~ to~ the cll.att, will not be 
othell. than a mediocll.e intellectual" (CAETANO 1928). 
SALAZAR acknowledges that since there is a social 
hierarchy there exists privileges in favour of the richer 
classes which corne from the way education is organized 
(SALAZAR 1948) (NOTE 32). CAETANO said, in 1928, that the 
teacher's selection would very probably interfere with the 
~ . 
natural process of ascension of practical intelligence in 
families (CAETANC 1928). 
"The ide~ that the ~chool ~houldbe cha~~ed with the 
~electlon ot ~he ~e~t one~ l~ ~eallyan idea adequate to a 
pa~ty 0 t pedar;.ogue4 with political' ambitlon~" ( that is, it is 
a republican idea) (CAETANO 1928). Furthermore, the school is 
not able to do this selection, adds Caetano. "What 14 lmpo~tant 
l~ the ex.~~tence ot an ~.i.lte 'In' each ~oclal cla~~; to to~m' a 
~lnr;.l~ elite, that ot lntellect~al~, :would be, a calamity, a 
catacl~~m"(CAETANO 1928). 
Thus the school should not interfere in the process of 
"natural" social stratification - it should'reproduce it. This 
meant obviously that to different, social strata should' 
correspond different levels of schooling - we should be "All 
together but each one in its place" as one reading primer 
said (NOTE 33) or "A place for everyone, everyone in his 
place" as a Minister of Education said (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 
1935a). This implied unequal acess to education. 
:Thus the educational system should be predominantly 
designed to prepare the elites in order to maintain social 
stratification. 
But there was another powerful reason to put the 
educational system at the service of the elites ~ as the 
great national problems could only be solved by the eli tes' 
acting upon the masses, it. was more urgent the' preparation of 
eli tes was rrore urgent than to' teach the people to read (SALAZAR in FERRO 
1982,296, in GARNIER no date, 62) (NOTE 34). 
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As a result of the aim of reprod~cing social stratification 
and from the theory of government by eli tes (see chapter two) 
for the New State, the main function of school, besides 
mentality inculcation, was the preparation of elites. 
If the school has as its main function to prepare the 
eli te, then the members of the eli te which stayed wi thin the 
school system to become teachers are very important, since 
they are going to be the educators of the future elites. 
Consequently the top positions should be given to the 
professors of those teachers, that is, to the educators of the 
teachers of the future elite - the university professors. 
Hence the "catedratOcracia" of the New State which was 
analyzed in a previous section of this chapter - this 
"catedratocracia" is a lOgicJ application of the intersection 
of the functicn of the educational. system in regard to the 
elite and the theory of government by elites. 
3.2. Compartmentalization as the main organizational strategy 
to serve the 1lnatural" reproduction of social 
stratification 
The non interference of school in the process of social 
reproduction implied that it cooperated with it - that is, 
to different social strata shoulq correspond different levels 
of schooling. Thereby was social conformism to be aChieved. 
In order to confine the different social strata in 
different self-contained status positions and different 
occupational activities the school system should recreate 
within itself the different social paths. The 
compartmentalization strategy was thus naturally used. 
Three main paths were created - the only compulsory 
schooling path, for the rural stratum and for most part of I 
the children of the workers; the compulsory schooling plus 
:~:::~c:~d c~~:S;a~~tht:::r:sn :~~ teS::ia~or:ne:s p:lnidti~:~ :~~~~: 1 
i 
through grammar school and uni versi ty education, mostly for 
high middle class and upper class children. 
These three vias were created through the use of two 
basic mechanisms - unequal access to education and access to 
unequal education. 
Unequal access to education was aChieved through entrance 
examinations to secondary education, through less accessibility 
of secondary schools for rural population (due to its 
concentration in district capitals and no construction of 
school residences) and through allowance of economic selection 
to work. 
Access to unequal education was achieved mainly through 
the creation of a dual school track in secondary education, 
one leading to higher education and the other to technical 
courses. This was based on the idea that early selection was 
essential for the good preparation of the elite (TAMAGNINI 
1936,9). 
The fight against the "escola unica" (unified school, 
comprehensi ve school) had been a constant in the educational 
thought of the New State during the formative period, when 
there was still the need to fight hard educational republican 
ideas - see, for instance, CAETANO 1928, TAHAGNINI 1936 (for 
this debate see MONICA 1978, 132-144). What unifies the 
persons is not an unified school, but the common mentali ty, 
the duty to be at the service of the nation, in the expression 
of the Minister of Education TAMAGNINI ( 1936,10) ,the common 
objective (CAETANO 1928), that i~ ,the inculcation of an 
"unified" mentality. 
The dual school track implied different entrance 
examinations, different schools network, different buildings, 
different curricula, different possibilities of access to 
,higher education, and consequently, in the end, different 
school status and different social status. 
The same carpartJrentalization by dual school track was 
applied to post-co71Pulsory education, which was divided into 
"ensino m~dio" (high te~hnical education which is not included 
in higher education .and primary school teachers erucation -
- see SAMPAIO 1973,132) and higher education. 
But there were other types of canpartmentalization 
rural schools and urban school differed very much in 
accessibility to populations, quali ty of teaching staff, type 
of facili ties, etc. There was also separate schools for boys 
and girls. 
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3.3. The compartmentalization through non acess to post -
- compulsory education - unequal acess to education 
3.3.1. Formulation of the strategy 
The basic strategyof compartmentalization is the division 
of children into n.1O great groups - those who have just the few 
years of compulsory schooling and those who follow up studies. 
For this strategy to be efficacious there needed. to be created 
an enormous and unsurpassable gap between the non educated 
mass and the highly educated elite. 
The size of this gap was the object cf debate wi thin New 
State political circles - ~ wanted a co~pletely radical 
approach which implied not to teach the people neither to read 
nor to count. That meant a clear disti~=tion bet~een a 
completely u~nstructed social g~oup a~d a higly educated 
social group. A less radical approach defended the view that 
compulsory schooling should only teach the people to read to 
wri te and to count. This became the official position. There 
was still a minority group, the mobilizing group, ""ho wanted 
to use schooling to indoctrinate and mobilize the people and 
thus was favourable to teaching the people to read 'Well (this 
account of these three positions was based on MONICA 1978, 
115-121 ). Between total compartmentalization and 
doctrinaire mobilization prevailed the alternative of high 
canpartrrEntalization (wi th mentali ty i;.culcatic;.). 
The gap was thus fixed between eleven and ttirteen years 
of study - three or four years compulsory schooling for the 
mass, fifteen or sixteen, on average, for the elite. 
This meant that no attention was paid to mass education, 
which was already a contemporary accusation about Salazar's 
policy - see FERRO 1982, 134, GARNIER,no date,62 (NOTE 35). 
3.3.2 Implementation of the strategy 
The republican government (1910-1926) had created the 
infant education (4 to 7 years), the general primary education 
(7-12 years), which consti tuted the five years of compulsory 
schooling, and the high primary education (12-15 years), which 
was not compulsory. 
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Already in 1926 the new regime abolished the high primary 
education. in 1927 divided the general primary education in 
elementary (7-11 years) and complementary (11-13 years), being 
only the first one compulsory. Thus compul scry school ing was 
reduced from five to four years. 
In 1930 a new bill divided the elementary primary 
education in two levels, being the first of three years 
compulsory. Thus compulsory schooling was again reduced -
from four to three years. In 1932 the New State abolished the 
complementary primary edufation, that had never really been 
implemented, thus making "impossible for the rural population 
to have any accessible post-compulsory educatio!1. There was 
then a one year gap between the end of compulsory schooling 
and the beginning of secondary education. which ~as very 
important for the efficacy of the canpartmentalization 
strategy. 
All those reductions in compulsory schooling were done 
in conjunction with reductions in primary school curricula 
(in 1927,1928,1929 and then again in 1936 - see SAMPAIO 1976) 
_ the motto was that for the people it was enough the learning 
of reading, writing and counting. 
The education of primary school teachers was also object 
of successive reductions. In 1928" three Primary Teacher Training 
Colleges ("Escolas r:cr:nai.s") were closed orJ.y to be reop-?r:ed in the same 
year. In 1928, the entrance requirements for these colle;es were diminished 
and fees were set up. 
In 1930, entrance requirements were lowered again (now 
to four years of study) and the teacher education curricula was 
reduced from twelve to six subject groups. In 1931, a new 
reduction of the curricula was made and pre-school teacher 
education courses were suspended. In 1935,the curricula of 
teacher training were once more simplified. 
To symbolize the new approach to primary school teacher 
education the name of training Colleges was changed, in 1930, 
from "Escolas Normais" to "Escolas do Magisterio Primario". 
The policy of reduc 'ing the quali ty of primary school 
teacher education was brought to absurd limi ts when CARNEIRO 
PACHECO, the minister of Education in the mobilizing period 
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(minister from 1936 to 1940), cancellec, in 1936, 
enrollments in the primary schools teacher training 
colleges. This si tuation persisted un til 1942, which Ireant 
that teacher training colleges were closed for six years 
and no new teache~ was certified until 1945. This led, in 1940, 
to the closure of 134 schools and the non appointment of 
teachers for 380 primary schools. This si tuation created the 
need of emergency procedures in primary school teachers 
recruitment. In 1942.the teacher education colleges were 
reopened with new teaching staff all partisan to Salazar's 
leadership. The curricula were once' more reduced. 
All these integrated policies of r€<~:..lc ing compulsory 
schooling, primary school curricula. teacher educaticn 
curricula and teacher education colleges entrance requiremen~s 
were not designed for the eli te. but obviously for the mass. 
This makes clear the canpartmentalization strategy used 
to separate the mass from the elite (and also the aim of 
preparing passive and conformist teachers). 
3 .4. Cmpart:neltaliiaticn 
track 
3.4.1. Conpartmentalization 
education 
through the creation of a dual 
by dual track in primary 
Compulsory schooling in primary s=hools 'Was subject t~ 
dual track canpartmentalization ,. In 1931. the regime created the 
"postos de ensino" (teaching posts). transformed in 1936 in 
"postos 'escolares" (schooling posts). This "cosy school of the small village" 
was located in rural areas and only supplied the canpulsory schooling. that 
is. the first, the second and the third classes. This made 
very difficul t for rural children to enter follow up studies since 
before entering secondary education they had to attend the 
fourth class in primary schools of villages or towns (NOTE 
36 ) . 
The teaching staff was not the same in normal primary 
schools and in "postos escolares". Normal primary schools were 
staffed 'With certified teachers and the schooling posts wi th 
"regentes escolares" ('Which can be translated 'as "primary 
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school moni torS'), who were persons wh~ had just the fourth 
class and were good Olristians and morally gcod. 
Salazar justified in 1933 the system of the schooling 
posts staffed with primary school "regentes" as one 
adequate to a poor country (SALAZAR in fERRO 1982, 135-137) 
(NOTE 37). 
But the members of parliament did press for a further 
compartmentalization - rural school sho"..lld have a different 
curricul urn fran t4I'ban schools. They did approve a law, in 1935, 
creating the primary rural school, but it was never 
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implemented (the Corporative Chamber and probably the Government 
were against - see MONICA 1978,139). 
3.4.2. Compartmentalization in seco~da~~ ejucatio~ 
CompartJmentalization in secondary ~~~cation ~as do~e 
through the dual track - grammar ·school/technical school (!\OTE 38). 
Therefore grammar schools were reserved for those born 
within the elite who will be the future elites the~sElves. By 
its nature they must be cared for: "~J'LammaJ'L 4chvv..l educat.i..on 
[ ••• ], ..located a4 .i..t .i..4 .i..n the wa~ that ..lead4 to h.i..~heJ'L 
educat.i..on, and con4equent~~ tv the pJ'Lote44.i..on4 ot the h.i..~he4t 
~oc.i..a~ 4tatu4, .i..4, .i..n OUJ'L countJ'L~, a4 .i..n a~~ countJ'L.i..e4, the 
touch4tone ot OUJ'L de9J'Lee of_ c.i..v.i..~.i..3at.i..on" (Statute of Grar:1.'nar 
School Education of 1932, Decree.nQ 20.741, 11-1-?32, in the 
preamble) . 
Thus one 0: its very important, if not the mc~: impc~tant 
role, was to provide students for higher educatio~. As the 
1947 Statute says Hlhe 9J'LammaJ'L 4chov..l4 tecch.i..n9 w.i....l..l be 
d.i..4tJ'L.i..buted b~ thJ'Lee cSfc..le4. The f_.i../l.4t ( ••• J and t.'te 4econd 
~ .. J ha4 the obJect.i..ve ot ~!E~~-t£~he~i~!~_£l 
~tud.i..e~ and 9.i..ve the mOJ'Le conven.i..ent cu..ltuJ'Le f_OJ'L the 
-----~at.i..~f_act.i..on of_ the common need~ of_ the ~oc.i..a~ ..lit.e C ••• J. I he 
)/Ld c~c..le C ... J ma.i..nta.i..n.i..n9 the ~ame obJect.i..ve~ .i..~ ~!E~~..l..l~ 
~e~.i..~ned ~~e!!~!!_!~!_~~ud!~~-l~-!~~_~~!~~~!~~_~~~~! 
!~~~~t.i..~" (Statute of Grammar School Education of 1947, 
Decree nQ 36.508, 17-9-1947, articles 1,2 and 3) (our enphasis) 
A humanist curriculum seemed appropriate to convey the 
objectives of grammar school education. The "goal cf the 
general course is C .. J the acqui si tion not of certain 
knowledges but of a certain degree of c~lture" (Decree Law 
36.507, 17-9-1947, preamble). As BOURDIE~ says about the 
cuI ture being the "key instrument in the integration of the 
eli te" - "The sharing of a common cuI ture [ ... J is probably 
one of the surest foundations of the deep underlying 
fellow-feeling that unites the members cf the governing 
classes, despite differences of occupation and economic 
circuns tances II (BORDIEU, 1981). 
The 1936 reform goes even further than the others and 
purposes a core curriculum for the thirc cycle regardless of 
which uni versi ty course the students were intending to follow 
- what was necessary in the last year 'v,;='S a "p~ilosophical 
synthesis of the acquired knowledges" (F:~form of Grammar 
School in 1936, Decree Law 27084, 14-1(-1936, i~ the 
prea .. ble ). 
As for the technical schools they were clearly vocational 
_ as the Minister of Education Pires de Lima said "7 do not. 
t.h~nk t.hat. it. i~ po~~~b~e to encompa~~ ~n one t~pe ot cu~tu~e 
a~~ t.hat ~~ nece~~a~~ and convenient on t.he ~t~u~~~e to~ ~ite 
[ ... J. Jt. ~~ pll.etell.ab~e to maintain t.he t.echnica.l educat~on 
wit.h a tendent.iou~ technica~ cha~acte~ ~n t.he t.echnica.l ~choo.l 
and education with a tendention~ cu~tu~a~ cha~acte~ in ~~ammall. 
~choo~~" (PIRES DE LIMA, 1951. ir: REIS 1971). 
Within technical education there we~e still courses aimed 
at white collar jobs (commerce and"femir.ine formation'; for 
ins tance, which were two of the mos t fcllowed of the four courses) 
and courses aimed at blue colI ar jobs. which were the great 
majority (NOTE 39). 
Technical education accomplished the goal of creating an 
elite in each class, creating an elite within workers (see 
CAETANO 1928). 
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The means usc-d to make efficacious this dual track 'were 
various. first of all. there was a public campaign against the 
tend~ncy of many families (in spite of cifficulties) to prefer 
grarr.mar school education. "A J.e~i..-1J.at~ve lleI.ullm G .. J upened 
the acce~~ U/. ~ecundall~ educati..un to the chi..J.dllen U/. the 
i..n/.elli..oll. cJ.a,,~e~ [ ••• J. Jt i..~ i..mpolltant, 1.i..Il~t ul. aJ.J., to put 
an end tu thi..~ J.egaJ. uvell.plluducti..on ul. i..nteJ.J.ectuaJ. /.ollce~, 
becau~e i..t i.." a I.actull ul. ~oci..aJ. g;~J.P~j~0~~~ [ ••• ]. Jt i..~ 
i..ndi..~pen"abJ.e to modell.ate the unll.ea"una~J.e a~pi..llati..un" that 
i..mpllegnate the ~pi..lli..t 01. the POOIl and the humbJ.e, i..t i..-1 
nece~~all.y tu de~tllo~ that glleat i..J.J.u~i..un that cuJ.tulle blli..n~~ 
i..n:'aJ.J.i..bJ.~ weaJ.th and powell" said the !,~inister of Educa:ion 
TAK':',:;!GNI (in l-10NTEIRO 1975,147). 
"Noll.maJ.i..t~ wi..J.J. be ll.e-1tabJ.i.."hed when /.ami..J.~e-1 undell-1tcnd 
that the ~Il.ammall ~chooJ. COUIl~e-1, d~/./.i..cu~t by thei..1l vellY 
natUll.e, mu~t be Ile~ell.ved I.OIl the ~tllon~e-1t and /.011. the abJ.e-1t 
and when ~eJ.ecti..on O/. ~tudent~ wi..J.J. be done a-1 i..t mu~t be, i..n 
Oll.der.. to Il.e"ti..tute to ~ll.amma"J ~econdalZ.y educati..on, and 
con~equentJ.~ to hi..ghell. educati..on, that de~llee O/. di..gni..t~ that 
each o/. them (each one i..n i..t~ own "phelZ.eJ ~houJ.d have"'(Statute 
of Grammar School of 1932, in the preamble). 
A .second rreans used was, naturally ,to supply more technical 
education than grammar school edu,cation - see the Statute of 
1932 in the prearr.ble. Technical educatic:-: supply had a grea! 
increase when the industriali sation of the country beg.::.;. in 
the 1950s - see CAETANO 1959, 223, 1977, 406-407, 511 
(X)RTS$Ao 1982, 104-106, MIRANDA 1978, 1981 ,S. GRACIO 1986 (NOTE 40). 
A third mea~was the implementatio~ of academic selection 
in grammar school s .i1)the establishment of' entrance examinations 
(NarE 41 ) (2) an examination in the end of the 
first cycle of secondary education ("it is during and in the 
end of this cycle that the main selection of students should 
occur" - Statute of 1932, preamble) ~ 3 ~l irnination of those who 
fail three consecutive years or five non consecutive years 
(Decree Law 21.681, 15-9-1932 )(~lncrease of fees for those who 
fail (Statute of 1932, article 100). 
A fourth mean was the implementation of a "numerus 
clausus" system in grammar schools - in 1932 the total number 
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of c:asses in all the state grammar schools should not exct-ed 
461 c:asses (article 17 of the Statute of 1932), in 1936 it 
should not exceed 600 (article 17 of the Reform of Gram~ar 
Schoc,l Education in 1936; no references to "numerus clausus", 
appEa~ in the 1947 Grammar School Statute). 
A fifth meaffiwas through the diversion of non able 
grarr~,ar school students to technical education - ."1 n. the 
~eto~m ot the educat~onai 4~~tem ~t i~ nece~~a~~ to p~event 
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the ove~popuiation ot g~amma~ ~chooi~ an.d Unive~~itie~ th~ough 
the c~~t~~but~on, ~n due time, ot the ~tudent~, acco~d~ng to 
the~~ abiiitie~, between g~amma~ ~chooi and techn~cai education" 
(art:'-:le VIII of the Law 1941, 11-4-1936) - see also articles 
32 a:-.j 36 of the Reform of Grammar School Education in 1936. 
But ::Je psychometric means to pursue this policy were r.ever 
impl~~ented (NOTE 42). 
A sixth mean - last but not the least - was economic 
selec!ion - gram.'1'1ar school fees were increased in 1928 (Decree 
15.9L l), fees of grammar schools were greater than fees in 
technical schools (from 2 to 4.8 times greater),exemption fram 
fees was easier in technical schools than in grammar schools(NmE 43). 
So compartmentalization was a very clear strategy in 
secondary education, until the fifth period (NOTE 44). 
3.4.;. Compartmentalization in post-secondary school 
Co~partmentalizationat the level of post-secondary 
education was accomplished mainly through the creation of a 
non tigher education track and a higher education track. 
The non higher education track was called "ensino medio" 
(which can be translated cs "intermediate education" or 
"median education", meaning a kind of teaching which is no longer 
secondary education, but it is not yet higher education 
- see GALVAO-TELLES 1969,48, SAMPAIO 1973,132). "Ensino medio" 
schools were mainly high technical schools of industrial or 
commercial nature and primary teacher education colleges. 
In the fourth period the expansion of "ensino medio" 
beca"!'le an important strategy to avoid the nass population process 
in universities (see a good exposition of this problem in CRUZ 
1973). The Minister of Education GALVAO TELLES was highly in 
favour of this expansion (GALVAO-TELLES 1969. ~8.61); the last 
Minister of Education of the fourth peri~d (J.HERMANO SARAIVA) 
had proposed a bill in this direction - see CRUZ 1973 (NOTE 
45 ). 
The certification given by "ensino medio" schools had 
neither the school nor the social prestige of higher education 
mainly of university education (NOTE 46). Only university 
education gave (and still gives) access to the educational 
certificate of "licenciatura" (license), which is socially 
accepted as giving the social expectation of being addressed 
as "Senhor Doutor" (li terally Mister Doctor) - this custom is 
only prac~ised now by Portugal and Ger~a;;y (~ERR~O 1967). This 
addressing right symbolizes the belongi;;~ to a specific status 
group. This social consequence became C;;5 of ~~? main 
motivations to follow university courses - both Salazar and 
Caetano complained that Portugal was a "country of 'doutores', 
meaning a country where all wished to become "doutores". 
This social phenomenon is very well reflected in the 
complexity of personal address forms in the portuguese 
language, '-"hich reflect a strong socially hierarchic society 
(CINTRA 1972). This is a cause of strangeness for foreigners 
(see FRYER and PINHEIRO, 1961,230). 
Thus the University educational credentials had an 
intrinsic relationship with the social hierarchy and social 
pattern of personal relationship:; in portuguese 
explainS the importance of compartmentalization 
-secondary level (NOTE 47). 
society. Thi s 
at the post-
The main means of promoting this compartmentalization 
\'laS the very compartmentalization in secondary education. Bt.:t 
therewere also tight entrance examinations to the universities. 
3.5. Expansion of schooling in the fourth period in a 
canpart:nentalizro framework 
During the third period of the New State the Minister of 
Education of the middle part of this period - LEITE-PINTO 
(1955-1961 ) - began to consider the need for expanding 
schooling as a means to promote the industrial and cuI tural 
development of the nation and to reform mentalities (see 
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GRACIO 1985. SAMPAIO 1977.5-28).He accepted the n~ed for q~antitative 
educational planning (see MIRANDA 1978.1981.REIS 1971.S'roER 1982,1986),but 
he clearly maintained the conviction of the role of the school 
in the promotion of a nationalist mentality (LEITE-PINTO 1960. 
1963. 1966a). He considered that for too long the regime had 
accepted that great masses of illiterates could be maintained 
and that the elite could be selected just among a restricted. 
number of man chosen by the chance of their birth (LEITE-PINTO 
1966c). He thought that the school should prepare the elites, 
but should also be an instrument of social promotion (LEITE-
-PINTO 1960,7, 1966b,7-8); thus the reading textbooks should 
not transmit the message that poverty is a natural fate 
(LEITE-PINTO 1966c). 
He favoured the expansion of compulsory schooling for six 
years in a unified format - he proposed,in 1960, the expansion 
of compulsory schooling for six years in a sole school (he 
cri ticized strongly the later ccrnpartmentalized expansion of 
schooling (LEITE-PINTO 1966b, 32-37). He considered that it ~as 
not fair that the choice of the type of schooling be dependent 
only upon geographical or economic reasons (LEITE-PINTO 1966b, 
34). But his plan ~as not adopted because it involved too much 
spending-so LEITE-PINTO left the government (see CARVALHO 1986, 
797) (NOTE 48). All he could do. in this respect, ~as to 
increase compulsory schooling from three to four years for boys 
in 1956 (Decree-La~ 40.964, 31-12-1956) and also for girls,in 
1960 (Decree-La~ 42.994, 28-5-1960). 
This Minister of "hybrid ideology" and "frustrated 
practice" ln the ~ords of REI S (1971 ), ~as subs ti tuted by 
GALVAO-TELLES (1962-1968), a more orthodox member of the 
ruling elite, professor of La~ in the University of Lisbon(NOTE 49). 
He mistrusted quanti tati ve educational planning (GALVAO-
-TELLES 1963b, 1963c, 1 964a, 1965a). he clearly favoured the 
role of the school in the preparation of the elites. 
We ~houid be t04~wa4n~d a~ain4t th~ dan~e4 fot dete~io~ation ot 
quaiit~1 and do aii we can to avoid the iowe~in~ ot ~tanda~d4 
p~oduced b~ the ma44 4chooiin~ phenomenon" (GALVAO-TELLES 
1 963c). "The cuitu~ai a4c~n~ion ot ma~4e~, whi.ch i.~ in it4eif-
a phenomenon and a hi~hi~ commendabie intention, ma~ make U4 
~un ~he ~e~iou~ ~i~k ot ~~~an~~in~ o~ hu~hin~ up ~he 
intellec~ua~ e~i~e",;which should be clearly avoided since 
society "need~ al~o ~he top pe~~on~. who can be li~ht, 
~adiance and a ~ead to~ ~he o~he~~, which can on~~ b~ them~e~ve~ 
~ive new ho~iJon~, open up new wa~~, int~uence menta~itie~, 
make ~~ea~ wo~k~, ope~ate deep t~an~to~ma~ion, c~eate" 
(GALVAO-TELLES 1964b). (As it can be clearly noticed. in this 
period, the process of school reproduction of social 
stratification was not seen as natural as it was seen in 
the first two periods - the tone of the discourse became 
defer.sive ). 
According to those views he formulated a policy of 
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expa!"'.~ing compulsory schooling in a tr.reefo1d track fra;nework 
For rural children who wanted to follow',;;> studies he created 
"Telescola" (compulsory school through the public television 
network GALVAO-TELLES 1963d, 196~d, 1965b); for rural 
chilcren who did not want to follow up studies he created the 
"complementary course of primary education", in primary 
schools; for urban children he created "preparatory schools" 
(NOTE 50). 
With the lucidity which characterized many leaders of the 
New State -see Introduction, section 5.3 -G\LVAo-n:LLES affirms that 
he does not label this expansion of schooling as "democratization 
of education". but just as "generalization of education" 
(GALVAO-TELLES 1966c. 16-17) (NOTE 51). 
He justifies this canpartmentaljzction wi th several 
arguments - first of all, there should exist a different 
curriculum for those who follow up studies and for those who 
do not; secondly. the extinction. at this level. of the 
tradi tional secondary education is not justified since it had 
been the traditional solution; thirdly, the generalization of 
grammar school education at the fifth and sixth year level is 
[economically] utterly impossible due to the fact that it 
demands several subject specialized teachers; lastly, the 
generalization of the fifth and sixth year only in the 
primary schools would not be desirable [for middle and high 
class children] because it is the most elementary of all the 
three vias (see GALVAO-TELLES 1964b. 1969. 51-54). He 
acknowledges that this situaticn could lead to the 
accentuation of social divisions, but the same happened in the 
other levels of the educational system namely wi th the option 
between grammar and technical school, between "intermediate" 
and higher education (GALVAO-TELLES 1969, 52-53). 
The implementation of this cQ'IlPartmentalized 
generalization of education was 0.5 follows -
policy of 
- in 1964 the compulsory schooling was extended from four 
to six years (Decree-Law 45.810, 9-7-1964); 
- in 1965 the "Curso Unificado da Telescola" (Unified 
Course by TV) was created (Portaria 21.113, 17-2-1965), 
which set up a Television course similar to the first cycle 
of grammar school and technical school (more close to the 
latter); 
- in 1966-1967, the "Compleme-ntary Course of Primary 
School" began to function, with an optional character; 
- in 1967 the "preparatory education" (Decree-Law 47.480, 
2-1-1967) was created which substituted the first cycle 
of grammar and technical schools; 
- in 1968 the "Cur so Unificado da Telescola" was 
transformed in "CicIo Preparat6rio·TV" ("Preparatory Cicle 
through Television") (Portaria 23.259, 9-8-1968), which was 
declared equivalent to the direct preparatory education; 
- in 1968-1969 both systems of preparatory education 
began to work and the new compulsori ty was effective for the 
first time for the children who entered primary school in 
1964-1965 ; 
- in 1971 the first public posts of TV reception were set 
up (until then there was public broadcast and only private 
reception) . 
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By that time the threefold track of expanded compul sory 
schooling was fully implementatoo., according to the 
compartmentalizing aims of the Minister of Education GALVAO-
-TELLES. 
One can conclude that the New State regime remained 
fai thful to its compartmentalization strategy in the 
compulsory schooling increase policy,(until the fifth period). 
3 • 6. The canpa.rtJrentalized education of boys and girls 
As it bad already been seen, the curriculum clearly 
transmitted different social expectations and social roles for 
boys and for girls (chapter focr,section 5.2). Th-is expressive 
strategy was congruently supplemented by an organizational 
strategy of sex compartirnentalization. 
This compartimentalization was mainly implemented 
through the creation of separate schools for boys and for 
girls 'and through the creation of two separate branches of 
"Mocidade Portuguesa" (the portuguese youth organization ). 
In girls schools only lady teachers could teach; 
teachers of roth sexes could teach in boys schools. 
As it was seen above, in chapter three, there were no 
separate curricula for boys and for girls, but there were 
specifi6 feminine subjects in the curricula of girls 
schools and some specific girl s , courses (see ARAUJO 1985). 
" " Feminine Portuguese Youth had a very different character from 
the masculine one (see ARRIAGA 1976, 113-128, DUPONT 1982, 74 
- see also "Escola Portuguesa", the official bulletin for 
primary education, 9-12-1937). 
How was this cOJlipartmentalization policy implemented? 
In less than a fortnight of the seting up of the New State 
regime ( 28-5-1926) co-education was abolished in the great 
population centers (Law 1880. 8-6-1926). Less than a year 
after that,co-education was officially substituted by the 
system of separation of sexes (Decree 13.619. 17-5-1927). In 
1928 and 1931 new decrees were published to hasten the 
implementation of the new policy (see SAMPAIO 1976. 95-96). 
Co-education was condemned by the "double e4404 ot puttng 
on ~e 4ame 4ituation ot knowledge acqui4ition pupil4 with 
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dissimilar growing rates and different psychological 
characteristics and of perturbing the sex differentiation 
of personality, through the reciprocal influence, in school 
hours" (Decree-Law 28.081, 9-10-1937). Co-education may be 
adequate for nordic countries , but not for Portugal, said, in 
1938, the Corpora ti ve Chamber (in SAMPAIO 1976.98-99). There 
is the duty to differentiate the education of women and men 
as early as possible. "~i4~~ ~hou~d be tau~ht b~ women 
teache4~ and with adequate cU44icu~a. 8oy~ ~hou~d be tau~ht 
b~ men teache4~ who can make them men" said a member of 
parliament in 1938 (in SAMPAIO 1976,99). 
The implE:::1entation of this policy in prima!,y education, 
in those villages where there was only one school, led to the 
creation of two shifts - a boys shift and a girls shift 
in the same buildings (Portaria 9389. 30-11-1939). 
Beyond t~is sex compartimentalization policy was the 
intention of providing less education for girls. This is clear 
in the 1936 reform of grammar school education - in the 
curriculum of the third cycle the reform proposes a 
"philosophical synthesis of· the acquired knowledges", but it 
was also created, for girls, a more prosaic "Family Education 
Course". The intention is obvious - to divert girls from 
entering the rniversity. But the ~ourse was never 
implemented by lack of demand - indeed for those who reached 
the end of secondary education the natural sequence was the 
grammar school via, which gave acess to the uni versi ty. not 
an upgraded housewife course. 
3.7. Evolution of the compartmentalization strategy - a 
synthesis 
In the first period, the formative period, the regime 
efforts in education were nnre directed towards organizational 
and administrative strategies than to expressive or repressive 
ones. First, it was the implementation of unequal acess to 
education, through reducing compulsory schooling and primary 
school curricula, thus increasing the gap between the mass 
and the elite. The foundations of the accessto unequal 
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education strategy were also solidly launched in this period. 
One can say that the compartmentalization policy of the 
New State in regard to education was basically defined in this 
formative period. 
The second period, the mobilizing period, was more 
dedicated to the formulation and implementation of expressive 
strategies, as it was seen in the previous chapter, but it 
confirmed and developed the dual track strategy. 
The third period, the stabilization period, returned to 
the emphasiS on administrative and organizational strategies. 
I t confirmed the dual track strategy in seco!'icary education, 
maintaining a tendentioy s technical school and a tendentious 
cuI tural school in separate tracks (as the Minister Pires de 
Lima said, in 1951). Technical schools were de~eloped to suit 
the needs for ir.dustrial. development. In the second part of 
this period, there began a conflict between the most tradi tional 
sector of the eli te (favouring strongly canpartr.lentalization 
strategies) and the more development oriented sector 
(favouring expansion of schooling in an unified framework) -
- see MIRANDA 1982. The first sector asserted its posi tions; 
the latter sector could only influence the expansion of one 
year in compulsory schooling. 
The fourth period, the decline and stagnation period, 
implemented the expansion of schooling in a .ca;.partrnentalization 
framework, which represented the traditional sector position. 
All these canpartm2ntalization policies were overcome 
in the fifth period, the renewal within continuity period, 
which is not the object of study in this work. The Veiga Sim~o 
Reform CLaw 5/73,25-7-1973) proposed the expansion of 
compulsory schooling for eight years in an unified framework, 
created an unified secondary school and abolished the "ensino 
medio" (intermediate education). Some step were taken towards 
this aim before the endJlof the regime in April 1974 (NOTE 52). 
Table 5.1 synthe l~zes all this eVOlution. It includes 
the delay between general political policy formulation and 
educational policy formulation(A)and between educational policy 
formulation and educational policy implementation CS and C) 
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TABLE 5.1 - STRATEGIES OF COMPARTMENTALIZATION IN EDUCATION - EVOLUTION BY PERIODS 
POLITICAL mUCATIONAL STRATEGIES OF CCMPARTMENTALIZATION 
PERIODS PERIODS PER I CDS UNF.QUi\L A(A-ESS J(l'F.SS TO UNEQUAL DELAY TO ED~CAT ION h DELAY i:.l)UCA1l0N . DELAY (A) cunp~r~~ sc cd. ( B ) dual tr\;lck . ( C ) strategy 
1st Period 1926 
1~27 - fran ) - 1931- Two tratks i, 
1927 years to 4 rr.l.a[~ e~uta Ion R~s s e ensl-
no 
to to +1 years +1 : 1932 - co.parti •• +5 
f-FORMATIVE- 1933 
1930 - fran 4 to in secondary 1936 3 years education 
2nd Period 
- 1936-Confir.ation 
1933 1936 of the two tracks 
to 
s~s et.ln prl.ary 
I-MOBILIZING- to +3 
e uca Ion 
.3 
-
-
- 1936 - ideM in 
1945 1947 secondary 
education 
3rd Period 1 956 - fft; 3 4 
-1947-1948 f ~gnftr 
1945 1947 ~ar o· lIatlon ~ e we ears or tracks sy.s e. In 
to to +2 )Is feconrary educa-f-STABILIZATION 1960 - 4 ~ars +11 Ion ra.~ar +2 £chgo fn 
1958 1964 £gs ys ec nlca schools 
girls 
4th Period 1958 1964 1964 - fran 4 -1964-1968 - Thrt~ 
-DECLINE AND to +6 y(:'(U'~ tll 
i~ the 5 
to 
-+6 and 6 year +6 
STAGNATION- 6 years . 1968 1970 
5th Period 1968 1970 1973 - Proposed -1973 - Proposed the 
RENEWAL WIllHN to to +2 8 years of -+5 
unification of 
compulsory preparatory and +5 
rorrr NUITY- 1974 1974 schooling secondary I schooling 
N 
-en 
3.8. The efficacy of the compartmentalization strategy 
How efficacious was the implementation ~f those 
compartmentalization strategies? This questi~n will be 
answered using statistical indicators of unEq~al acess to 
education and of acess to unequal education. 
The sucess of the first strategy will be indicated by 
the follow up rate of the compulsory schooled pupils. 
The success of the dual track compartmentalization 
strategies will be indicated by the number of enrolled 
students in each track and the number of secc~jary schools, 
(taking into accou~t the state and private ones: in each track. 
The success cf the threefold track com~artrnentalization 
in the expansion of compulsory schooling, in :~e fourth period. 
will naturally be indicated by the number of ~;.rolled 
students in each track. 
The efficacy of sex compartimentalizatic~ will be 
indicated by the number of girl students which have access to 
the eli te, that is, which are enrolled in tt-e uni versi tv and 
d 
by the percentage of non mixed and mixed schccls. 
All the following tables were drawn wi th data obtained 
from the official national statistics of education 
("Estatlsticas da Educa<;ao", Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 
Lisboa) either d:~ectly (Tables 5.2, 5.4, 5.5. 5.6) or through 
SAMPAIO (1973) a~=lysis (Table 5.3). 
The numbers :ire presented in thousands and are rou!1ded 
off to one decimal for easier reading. Percentage numbers are 
always marked %. "Yo"hen no information could be get the symbol? 
appears. 
We will first analyse the follow up rate in Table 5.2. 
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TA8LE 5.2 - rOLLOloJ UP RATE or COMPULSORY 
SCHOOLING STUDENTS 
(state and private schools) 
PERIODS 2nc1 pERIOD 3 rc1 PERIOD 4t.hpERIOD Sltt>E R 100 
follow 
(A)1943-44 (A)1948-49 (A)1958-S9 (A)1966-67 (A)1971-72 
(8)1949-50 (8)1972-73 
up Rate (C)1945-46 (C)1950-51 (C )1960-61 (C)1968-69 (c)1973-74 
. 
rd 87,5 101,1 PASSED 3 class,A. 158,3 164,8 166,9 
th 
ENROLLED 4 elas. 
(B/C) 67,3 (C) 83,9 (B) 183,0 (C) 203,2 (C) 203,5 (B) 
th 
FAILED 4 class 
(A) 20,1 23,3 39,0 47,9 53,5 
FOLLOW UP RATE 53,9% 59,9% 91% 94,2% 89,9% 
th 
PASSED 4 elas{A) 42,0 55,8 114,0 138,6 151,9 
ENROLLED SEC. 
SCHOOL (B/C) 9,2 (C) 12,1 (B) 39,5 (C) 73,3 (C) 108,4 (B) 
st FAILED 1 year 
Sec.S (A) 1,7 1 ,1 2,3 13,1 19,9 
FOLLOW UP RATE 17.9% 19.7% 32.6% 43.4% 58.3% 
PASSED {d class(A) 87,5 101,1 158,3 164,8 166,9 
ENROLLED SEC. 
SCHOOL (C) 9,2 13,4 39,5 73,3 129,1 
st 
FAILED 1 year 
SEC.S (A) 1.7 1 .1 2.3 13.1 19.9 
FOLLOW UP RATE 8.6% 12.2% 23.5' 36.5% 65.4% 
(The figures represent the number - in thousands -
of the enrolled students) 
218 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, 
I , 
I 
1 
I 
i 
The logic of this follow up rate was to compare the 
number of enrolled s tuden ts in the next year (Year B or C) in 
the fourth class and in the first year of secondary school wi th 
the number cf passed students in the previous year (Year A) in the 
previous level (third class and fourth class respectively). 
This was done firstly in reference to the stay on rate in 
primary school after the compulsory schooling of three years 
(first line); then it was done in reference to the follow up 
rate between fourth level and the first of seconadry school 
(second line); finally, the follow up rate says how many of 
those who finished the third level went on to secondary school 
which is important mainly for the second and thi~d period~ 
since the third class was the only compulsory schooling t..::-:til 
1956-1960. The first year of secondary school represents, in 
the firs t three columns, the firs t· year of grammar school 
plus that of technical school; in the last two cclw.ns 
it represents the first year of preparatory school. 
To obtain an accurate information one has to deduce from 
the number of enrolled students in the next year(B or C) in the 
4th level or in the first year of secondary school, the number 
of those who had failed in the previous year in those same 
levels. 
Thus the follow up rate ass~mes that all those studer.ts 
who failed in the previous year in the same level are enro~led 
in school in the next year, which may not be true - some ~~st 
probably dropped out. On the other hand, the follow up rate 
treats all those who fail in the previous level (3 th or 4th 
. f to the 4th level or 1 st f d level 1n re erence year 0 secon ary 
education) as they had given up studying, since they do not 
enter in the present?d statistics of year B - this is also not 
true, since the majority of those will stay on. Those effects 
act in opposite directions and so they.counterbalance each 
other to some extent. 
Due to the fact that statistics of education were not 
published every year, one has not always the logic sequence 
of year A, year B, year C. So one has to assume in three of 
the five columns that there are no meaningful variations in 
enrollment from one year to the next. and so one used year C 
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instead of year B when data for year B was not available. 
In spite of all those(unsumnuntable) limitations the 
follow up rate shows very clearly the sucess of New State 
strategy of unequal acess to education. Let us analyse firstly 
the two first columns, since they correspond to the compulsory 
schooling of three years. 
The last line follow up rate shows clearly this 
efficacy - from those who passed the third level only 9% or 
12% followed up at the time that this level was the only 
compulsory schooling. That means that the mass was around 90% 
and the candidates to the elite were among those other 10% 
(from those only a minor part entered the university). The stay 
on rate from third to fourth class was naturally ;'luch higher 
than the follow up rate from the fourth class to the first 
year of secondary education, since'in most schools the fourth 
class was in the same buiding and locality. 
The increase in canpulsority in 1956 and 1960 increased 
greatly the stay on rate wi thin primary education, as it was 
intended, but it did not reach 100% (NOTE 53). The follow up 
rate from primary to secondary education also increased - it 
increased 13%, 11% and 15% in the last part of the third 
period, in the fourth and fifth periods. 
In the fourth and fifth per~od the compulscry schooling 
of six years was already in force - so one can ccnclude that 
there was a great degree of drop out during compulsory 
schooling mainly in the promotion fran primary to pr-eparatory 
school (57% in the fourth period, 40% in the fifth period). 
The compulsory schooling of six years was only gradually 
implemented. 
In sum, the strategy of unequal access to education was 
very efficacious until the increase of compulsory schooling 
for six years, and its effects were still present after that. 
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LEVELS 
OF 
SCHOOLI!:S 
PRIf'!.ARY 
(only St2:.:';; 
SECONDARY 
POST -
- SECOI~AEY 
:ABLE 5.3. THE EFFICACY OF DUAL TRACt 
COX?ARTMENTALIZATION STRATEGY IN EDUCATION 
- NUMBER OF ENROLLED STUDEKTS (State 
and Private Schools) 
?~RIODS 2nd 3m 4th 
PERIOD PERIOD PERIOD 
"fYF>S:: 
5th 
PERIOD 
cr. 1940-41 1950-51 1960-61 1966-67 1972-73 
SCH:(:'S 
1-:::~1AL s. . 469,0 548,1 733,4 783,5 ? 
-
2-::-:':::-S 67,5 61,8 122,6 60,4 
" 
~; 1,1 ?8TAL 87,4% 89.9% 85.7% 92 .8~~ ? 
1-G?·;MHAR S 35.5 48.5 111 .8 155.4 178,5 
2-7:: :-:-mr CAL 37.7 34.3 94.7 152.0 139,2 
% 1/TUfAL 49.2% 58.6% 52.4% 50.6% 56.2% 
~ -:::::VERSI. 9,0 12,9 19,5 30,1 47,7 
t?-I~::t:JM:-
CIATE 3,0 5,1 7,5 8,7 14,8 
% 1/TOTAL 75% 71.7% 72.2% 77.6% 76.3% 
(The figures represent the number - in thousands -
of the enrolled students) 
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LEVELS 
OF 
SCHOOLING 
SECONDARY 
(State) 
SECONDARY 
(Private) 
SECONDARY 
(Total) 
TABLE 5.4. THE EFFICACY OF DUAL TRACK 
9Cl1PAR1ME!JT1LlZATION Ir\ SECO!l4"DARY EDUCA7I8~: 
- NUMBER OF STATE AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
2nd 3m t~ FtRIOOS 
4 .. 
PERIOD ffiRIOO PERI::> 
1YPE 
OF 1940-41 1950-51 1960-61 1966-'::-:-
smoots 
1-GRA~ 43 43 43 47 
2-TECHNI CAI. 51 63 92 101 
% 1tror~ 45.7% 40.6% 31.9% 31 . E~~ 
1-GR.AM-'AR 261 297 342 4CE 
2-TECHNICAI. 80 109 47 - . 
-
% 1tror~ 76.5% 73.2% 87.9% 84 .65; 
Total 
Grarrmar/ 69.9% 66.4% 73.5% 72.1% Total 
Schools 
5th 
PERIOD 
1972-73 
119 
134 
47% 
342 
20 
94.5% 
75% 
(The figures represent the number of schools). 
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In these tables only the two main tracJ;:s in secondary 
education were considered (grammar education versus commercial 
and industrial education), ignoring special courses like 
nursery, agriculture or religious seminaires courses - the two 
main tracks represent around 93% of all secondary education, 
in terms of enrolled students. 
The same cri terion was used in higher education - only 
university education was considered in higher education since 
only this track led to the status group of "doutores" -
- university education represents, in the period of time 
considered, around 80% of all higher education. In 
"Intermediate Education" were considered the h.igh technical 
schools ("Institutos Industriais" and "Institutos 
Comerciais") and primary school teachers edu:atio~ colleges. 
In those Tables (5 .3 and 5.4)· it is ignored, in the 5 th 
period, preparatory education since its introduction would 
make impossible comparisons across periods and there is a 
Table specially dedicated to compartimentalization at this 
level (Table 5.5). 
The Table 5 .3 shows that the most sucessful strategy was 
that applied to secondary education. This can be logically 
explained by the fact that the great strategy to'Wards the mass 'Was 
that of unequal access to educat~on. In fact, during several 
years the proportion between the students enrolled in the 
secondary and post-secondary education and the st~jents 
enrolled in the four years of primary education was 
respectively 16%, 17%, 27%, 41%, 70% (NOTE 54). The logic 
sequence, in the strategical level, for this minority who 
follo'Wed up, during the second and third period 'Was to 
compartmentalize those 'Who followed up studying in order to 
select access to the elite (the same logic applies in the 
fourth period for those who follo'Wed up after the six years 
compulsory schooling). This 'Was done indeed and 'With relative 
success. At the post-secondary level compartmentalization 'Was 
not so necessary, since the main selection 'Was made in 
secondary education. So it is understandable that dual track 
compartmentalization 
education level. 
should be pursued in the secondary 
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As was said above, one of the main means to promote 
compartm<::ntalization is to supply more technical education 
than grammar school education. According to Table 5.3 it seems 
that there was an almost perfect balance between technical and 
grammar education supply, which would contradict the 
proclaim~d intentions of the New State to offer more technical 
educa:icrl to maximize compartmentalization Table 5.4 allows 
us to Mave further inquiries into this strategy, through the 
distir.~tion between state and private supply of secondary 
schools (the importance of private supply of education is only 
meanir:gful at the secondary level - see ".chapter nine,section3.6; so 
this :ype of analysis is not useful' in t~e other.levels of 
schcc: i ng ). I t is clear, from the analys is of Table 5.4, that 
state supply of technical schools was grc~ing steadily 
in r'elation to that of gramIilar schools, until the fifth 
peri cd - indeed the percentage of state grammar schoo£ in 
relation to the total secondary state schools is always 
decreasing until then This had no effects on student 
etllrOlIrl€?r:t due to the opposite policy in the pri vate sector 
- in this sector the percentage of grammar schools in relation 
to the total private secondary schools is much greater than 
that of the state sector and increases from the second to the 
fifth period. While the state onl.y buil t four grammar school 
in twenty seven years (1940-1967), the private sector 
created one hundred and forty five. So it was the private 
supply of secondary education which diminished greatly the 
effect of the compartmentalization strategy of the New State 
regime. Thus, from the part of the state, the 
compartmentalization policy at the secondary level was indeed 
purs ued according to plan - from a ratio of 1.2 it developed 
into a ratio technical/grammar schools of 2.1 In a global 
evaluation, the strategy was moderately efficacious in relatim 
to the regime'S aims. 
All those strategies ended in the fifth period. 
In 1973-74 there 'w°ere already comprehensive seconaaI'Y 
school s - there were 85 grammar school s (35% ), 93 technical 
schools (38%) and 65 comprehensive schools (27%) (EMiDIO 1981) 
The relationship between state and private schools cha~ged 
dramatically, because the state bought many private schools to 
implement the masS schooling policy rapidly. 
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TABLE 5.5 - THE EffICACY OF COMPARTIMENTALIZATION 
IN THE EXPANSION Of COMPULSORY 
SCHOOLING FOR ~IX YEARS 
4thFERIOO 5 "LnpERIOD NOW 
1969 - 70 1973 - 74 1982 - 19:3 
DIRECT 110,5 211,7 308,9 
PREPARATORY 
SCHOOL 60.1% 78.8% 83.4% 
1ELEVISION 1 ~1 29,3 61,3 
PREPARATORY 
SCHOOL 10.4% 10.9"10 . 16.6% 
CJMPLEI-1ENTARY 542 
I 
27,8 0,049 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOL 29.5% 10.3% 0.01% 
'roTAL 183,8 268L 8 370.2 
(The figures represent the number - in thousands - of the 
enrolled students) 
Only the first column, referJng . to the fourth period, 
shows data about a period where 'Compartimentalization VIas an 
adopted strategy - 1968-1969 was the first year when the 
threefold system of compulsority was in full operation; in 
1970 it begans the fifth period. So there was Ii ttle time to 
test the efficacity of the model. Even so it is clear that 
compartimentalization was at work - 60% of the students 
frequented the noblest mean and 30% the mean designed for 
those who did not follow up studies. 
The two follo~ing columns (referent to the 5th period 
and nowadays) show that the de-compartimentalization intention 
operated through gradual extinction 01' the complementary 
primary school via (see FERNANDES 1973.47). The last column 
proves the almost complete success of this intention, but it 
shows also that the system designed in 1964-1968 still 
influences the present situation, since the extinction of the 
third via was obtained mainly through the increase of the 
Television via (the demonstration of this influence was the reason to 
include the analysis of nowadays situation in Table 5.5.). 
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TABLE 5.6 - THE EFFICACY OF SEX cx)MPAR1MENTALIY.7ION 
- NUMBER OF GIRL STUDENTS ENROLLED IN 
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION 
PEP':JDS 2nd i'd 4th 5th 
PERIOD PERIOD PERIOD PERIOD 
ENROLLED 
STUDENTS 1940-1941 ~ 950-1951 1960-1961 1966-1967 1973-1974 
TOTAL NUMB::~ 4303 12903 20139 32059 54975 
GIRLS 738 3354 6535 13345 26977 
GIRLS ENRC:.:':~NT N 
PERCENTAGE ~~ 17.2% 26% 32.4% 41 ; E:;~ 49.1% ~ 
TOTAl. 
ENROLL!'Z: :T 
As it was said above, the intention of sexual 
differential r=le inculcation and of sex compart~entalization 
was the transr.1ission of a message of 'less stat~s for girls 
in society, that is, of sex social compartmentalization. This 
message was based on the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral 
structure" of ::-.e society of the ·first periods of the New 
State. The in~~;.tions became more clear in the already 
referred 1936 ?eform of grammar school education. 
This schc:~ and social message was effective in the 
second and third period, as can be seen in Table 5 .6 . But it 
is also clear :hat it became gradually less effective - in 
the fifth period there was pratically the same number of boys 
and girls in universities. 
Another ir..portant strategy of sex compartmentalization 
was the differentiation of school attendance - there should be girls 
schools and beys schools. How was this strategy implemented? 
In this respect the deeds were less than the intentions 
mainly because its full implementation at all levels would 
be very expe~sive. 
In relation to primary schools, in 1942, around one 
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third of the primary schools were still mixed (~OTE 55). 
Only slowly separation of sexes was implemented in primary 
education. 
In reference to secondary education the separation was 
never fully implemented, except in Lisbon, Oporto and 
Coimbra. In 1932, there were 34 grammar schools - 23 mixed 
(68%) anc 11 separated (32%) - those eleven were in Lisbon, 
Oporto a~d Coimbra, being seven for boys and four for girls. 
In 1947, there were 43 grammar schools, 29 mixed (67%) and 
14 separated (33%) - those fourteen were in Li sbon, Oporto 
and Coimbra, eight for boys and six for girls. The situation 
remainec stable until the fifth period. In five.mixed 
grammar s=hools a separate girls section was created in 1947. 
The same norm applies for technical ed:..:cation - 21 of 
the 65 technical schools listed in the Statute of 1948 were 
separate (32%) and 44 were mixed (68%). From those 21 
separate schools 12 were boys schools and 9 girls schools. 
At the post secondary level there was no sex 
compartmentalization. 
Congruently with the Veiga Sim~o Reform the fifth 
period ended the sex compartimentalization strategy - the 
Decree-Law 482/72 (28-11-1972) set up co-education in 
compulsory schooling, that is, in primary and preparatory 
school s (see "Co-educa<;EIo no ensino basico", M. E. N., 1972). 
Co-education was experimentally generalized to all secondary 
education in 1971 (see DUPONT 1980,93). 
3.9. Conclusion 
One can conclude that the main strategy of 
compartmentalization of the New State was unequal access to 
post-compulsory education. The policy ~as formulated and 
ir.lplemented, in sreat part, in the formative period. It ",:as 
efficacious, as seen in Table 4.2. 
'The compartmentalization by dual track. in secondary 
education, which diverted many students from grammar schools 
was complementary of this unequal access strategy. The dual 
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track was sucessful, al though not as effica-::'ous as the 
policy formulations aimed, by the reasons alrea=y analyzed. 
But it was efficacious enough to maintain the :'asic social 
stratification. 
Through those devices, carefully set up, t~~ 
reproduction of'~aturar'social stratification was achieved. 
(There was not only a social basis, but als~ a 
terri torial based stratification system which was related 
to regional educational opportunity (see MARTINS 1971, 
PIRES 1984). For instance, the two districts 0: Lisbon and 
Oporto alone accounted for 46% of university st~jents in 
1963-1964. This means that the system also repr~~uced 
regional social stratification~ 
This cC:7.partmentalization strategy was successful also 
in its other aim - the preparation of elites. :~e 
percentages cf universi ty students in relation t::> the total 
is very low, as can be deduced from Table 5.3 . :n 1960, 
only 1.2% of the active population was university educated 
(3.9% had secondary education, 37% primary educa~ion and 58% 
no school diploma) (MARTINS 1971). "The basic orientation 
of the secondary and university systems is of course towards 
the conferment of diffuse elite status". As such 
universities acted as agencies ~f cultural immc~ility rather 
than of social mobili ty (MARTINS 1971 ). 
To end c~r analysis one must call attentio~ to two 
important age~cies of social mobility through ec~cation, 
which constituted the source of exceptions to the described 
pattern - the Army schools and religious seminaries. In 
1963-64, 64% of the universi ty students came from families 
whose educational background was university or secondary 
education, 33% came from families whose fathers had primary 
education and 3% from families whose fathers had no school 
diploma (MARTINS 1971). This shows that there ~as some 
degree of social mobility. Many of those who were promoted 
through education carne from those agencies, mainly through 
religious seminaries. Thi s strategy was practiced more by 
rural families who had able students and was often combined 
wi th patronage. A clear indicator of this family strategy 
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of social promotion is the fact that only 20% of those 
enrolled in religious seminairies opted for priesthood 
(COSTA 1974) - see above pages 196-197. Salazar is the most 
noteworthy example of this rural family strategy, which was 
practiced even before the arrival of the New State. 
This social mobility allowed a slight degree of openess 
in eli te recrui tment, but did not put at risk the values of 
the regime - indeed the co-opted members had been 
adequately socialized in the traditional values by those 
co-opted agencies of social education - the Church and the 
Army. 
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One can conclude this chapter stating that the 
organizational strategy of compartmentalizaticn was implemented 
in the educational system to reproduce "natural" social 
stratification in order to pursue social conformism and' to 
avoid mobilization through massive social mobility. 
CHAPTER VI 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEW STATE 
REPRESSIVE STRATEGIES 
The sixth chapter of this work will have two distinct 
parts. In the first part we will analyse the tteory of New 
State repressive demobilising strategy - the theory of 
suppression of freedom (freedom of press, freedcm of political 
association) and the theory of repression of freedom. 
The second part of this chapter will ana:::ze the effect 
which the social change and the political evol~:ion in the 
1960s had on those repressive strategies (and or. the other type 
of strategies )~articular attention will be paid to the 
repressive strategical answer of the regime to the 
mobilization in the Universities of the 1960s. 
One concludes analyzing the expressive dimension of 
repressive strategies. 
230 
1. THEORY OF NEW STATE REPRESSIVE DEMOBILISING STRATEGIES 
As it can be deduced from what was said in Chapter I 
authori tarian states do not differ from totali tarian states 
because of the quanti ty of repression, but because of other 
features - passivity rather than mobilization, mentality 
inculcation rather than articulate ideology, preservation of 
areas of private life free from state invasion, limited 
pI urali sm (LINZ 1970, 266-267). 
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From those differences one can deduce that repression is 
qualitatively different in the two regi;.!es. In totalitarian 
regimes repression :is carried out by pppealir.g to the masses,to tr.e people 
for cooperation or surveillance; it can even be done by the masses 
themselves in revolutionary moments through terror, purges and 
the kind. As it is always done in the name of ideology it can 
be practiced more on the basis of intentions and ideas rather 
than acts. 
In authori tarian regimes repression is not carried out by appealing 
to the masses, it has a support in legal ground (although this 
can take just a formal aspect) and it is based on 
(oppositionist) acts rather than'intentions or mere ideas. 
Repression in both cases take the preventive form of the 
suppression of freedoms or the active form of restraint of 
oppositionist activities. 
1.1. The New State theory of suppression of freedom 
To suppress the free exercise of natural freedoms is the 
first action in a repressive strategy. The freedoms at stake 
are - freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of 
press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of 
meeting, freedom of religion. 
The Portuguese Consti tution guarantees all of them, but 
the New State published a "festival of diplomas emptying up 
the rights and freedoms" (LUCENA 1976a,134). 
It guaranteed freedan of thought, meaning that no one was 
arrested by the mere fact of thinking differently; but there 
were times where those who thought differently, even not 
having any poli tical or civic mi Ii tancy, could be harmed in 
their careers by the mere fact of their ideas. 
In relation to freedom of expression, freedom of speech, 
freedom of association and freedom of meeting one can say that 
they were subject to several regulations promoting exactly the 
opposite - see about this LUCENA 1976a (NOTE 1 ). 
The control over freedom of press and freedom of 
political asscciation will be analysed apart. 
There was religious freedom but the Catholic Church was 
very much pri viliged and protestant believers were many times 
mistrusted socia:ly. 
CAETANO, in 1934. was already ° legitimizing all those 
restrictions to individual rights distinguishing between civic 
freedoms and political freedoms. The latter were just 
instrumental to preserve and achieve the former; consequently 
one cannot renounce civic freedoms, but it is legi timate to 
restrict poli tical freedoms. CAETANO considers civic freedoms 
to be - freedom to circulate, freedom to choose 
occupation, freedom to raise a family, freedom of religion and 
freedom of property (CAETANO 1950,22-23). 
In fact :~e regulation of the use of freedoms was so 
complex that e°.,ren Salazar acynowledged in 1949 that "the -1~-1tem 
-L-1 not pe/Z./-ect and can give the imp/Z.e.-1-1ion, even to pell.-1on"j 
in ~ood I-aith, that the t/Z.eedom which the~ U-1e i-1 not a /Z.i~ht, 
but jU-1t a I-acultat-Lve conce-1"ji.on 01- publi.c autholl.itie~" 
(SALAZAR IV,365). 
1.2. The New State theory of suppression of freedom -
suppressing freedom of press and freedom of political 
association 
t2.1. Suppressing freedom of press - the censorship 
TIle Portuguese people is emotive and thus is an easy prey to 
demagogy (SALAZAR VI. 47.248). Free use of the press could 
allow the creation of campaigns to influence dangerously 
232 
public opinion. As "to govern is to protect pecple from 
thenselves" tt,~ regime fel t it necessary to create a system for 
the implementation of such "protection" - it was 
censorship. On the other hand ,the opinion of the masses is 
very inferior to the true public opinion of the Nation 
(SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,272) (NOTE 2). As "one cannot avoid 
[ ... J that it is the State which represents effectively the 
Nation" (SALAZJ..R 1933) it is up to the State to make sure that 
the public opinion of the Nation prevails. Besides there is 
an analogy which can be used - "the newspaper is the spiritual 
food of the pE:~ple and so should be inspected as other foods 
are" (SALAZAR :n FERRO 1982,95). 
In sum "the 5 tate had the .incumbence of. def-end.in~ pub../...ic 
opinion of. a../..~ tacto~~ which d.i~o~.ientate it a~a.in~t t~uth and 
ju~t.ice" (SALAZAR VI,45). 
Censorship is an evil, but a necessary evil, since "the~e 
i~ ../..e~~ dama~e .in not ../..ett.in~ c~itic.i~m come out than in not 
bein~ obe~ed" (SALAZAR 11,133), it is the "../..e~.itimate def.f.ence 
of. the f.~ee ~tate~" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,267, - see also 
SALAZAR V, 506). 
There was not only censorship of press, but also 
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censorship of cinema, theatre and private radio. In the case of 
Television and of state radio censorship was embedded in 
ownership. All :hough censorship was never officially extended to books 
they were freq·..:.e::tly wi thdrawn on police orders (!·:ARQtES 1976,187) 
Ironically censorship was somewhat decentralised in a 
centralised cot,;ntry since each district or town had its own 
body of censors which could imply geographical variations in strictness. 
(MARQUES 1976.187). 
What effects did censorship have? The most important 
consequence was passi vi ty as a result of self - censorship. As 
MARQUES points out "This self censorship has often led to 
extrenes of caution with little real justification" (MARQUES 
1976.187 - see also MARTINS 1970). 
Another consequ E!1ce was an hypercri ticism from part of 
the "intelligentsia" of all that was said in newspapers, radio 
of television (NOTE 3). 
Th(: role of c(:r.s'Jrship in Portugal WE:nt far beyond its 
usual political uses in dictatorship. Censorship had also the 
role of ~uffering socially and morally public opinion. Events 
which w(:re considered asocial or limDral were suppressed. We 
will giv~ just some ~xamples of this role of censorship taken 
from th(: verbal instructions given by telephone to an Oporto 
newspaper ("Jornal de Noticias") between 1967 and 1974, 
publish(:d by Cesar PRINCIPE - one can find as suppressed items 
murders, assaults, cruelty to animals, corruption, social 
charitabl(: activities of (leftist) students ,etc. (see GEORGEL 1985,379-382). 
What was at stake was not only political propaganda, but 
to creat~ an image cf Portugal as it should have been -
passive, quiet, gooc, Christian and obedient. That is. the 
Governm~~t transmitted through the media thE: image of the 
demobilized and morally unpollued Portugal it wanted to 
achieve. The regime created not only "an imaginary poli tical 
world wr.:':h was domi!iated by the guidelines of the official 
governme!'".: posi tion" (BLUME 1977), but also a imaginary social 
world. Demobilised and quiet Portugal began as an image 
transmitted through the mass media. This is probably the 
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reason why was not enough for social control to have an a posteriori 
press control - "A good press law can repress the abuses, but 
it does r:ot prevent them ... " (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,96). 
To conclude, one must emphasize again the expressive 
consequer.c~s of this repressive strategy (see chapter tr.ree, sections 
2.3 , 2.5.i). It was one of the most po~rful sources of dernobilisation since 
it controlled the indispensable prerequisi~ of all 
mobilization - circulation of information - and because it 
provoked that self imposed passi vi ty which carre from the sensation 
that "Salazar put a policeman in the heart of each portuguese", 
to quote a curre~t saying at the time. 
1.2.2. suppressing freedom of political association 
SALAZAR was against the parties ~ he disliked party 
system in general, but considered it even more detrimental in 
the particular case of Portugal due to latin temperament 
(SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,161 ) (NOTE 4). 
Partisan splrl t distorts the analysis of problems sirJce 
the ground for reaching solutions is party interest and not 
national interest (SALAZAR IV, 361, CAETANO in ZORRO 1969,136) 
Parties produce also superficial analysis (SALAZAR 111,387) 
and suffer from personalism, factionalism, clientelism a~d 
favouritism (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,67,161). 
The suppression of parties even provided more freedom -
people will be freer to vote without parties, since then they 
will "not be involved in dirty poli tical fights" (SALAZAR in 
FERRO 1982,278); members of parliament will be freer since 
"Is there worse dictatorship than that of the party?" (rWTE 
5) • 
In Portugal parties had been the cau~e of 
disorgani zatior: of ?t.:bl ic Adminis tra tion and of the· S -: -3. te :. n 
general (SALAZA~ 1,125,340, CAETANO in ZORRO 1969,137-139) and 
would be again :'f allowed, since there would be then, due to 
latin individualist temperament, a proliferation of parties 
- there would be at least six ou seven main parties (SALAZAR 
V,467,403- see a2.so RATO 1958,78). 
This is so evident that other nations would soon follow 
the portuguese example. As RATO said in 1958, glossing the 
master, "the Portuguese Nation [ .•. J goes on under Salazar 
pointing up to the Western world good consti tutional paths" 
(RATO 1958,88). 
This distrust of parties is linked with New State regime 
distrust of urban men (see chapter ThQ,section 1.3) and with his 
conception of the ~ation and the role of the State towards the 
Nat ion (see chapter seven, section 2.2.3) 
1.3. The New State theory of repression of freedom 
Repression means here direct action· against "subversive" 
political, social, cultural activities which becomes 
materialized into arrests, judgements, detentions or 
dismission of person and destruction or seizure of material. 
SALAZAR diagnosed that due to tradi tional "mild customs" 
Portuguese did not like violence (see chapter two,sections 1.1,1.2) 
and thus "the State should be so strong that it does not 
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need to be violent" ~SALAZAR 1,81). This points up to ar. 
a legal framing of repression (see SALf:\lAA.. II, 70). 
New S ta tE: repression had several characteri sties which 
is useful to summarize . 
Repressicn was legally framed - there was no lack of 
decree laws and regulations to legalize arrests, deterltions 
dismi ssions and the like (see about thi s legi slation CO:~I SSAO 
... 1985). A consequer,ce of this legal framing is emphasis on 
acts rather than intentions as a basis for repression (see 
SALAZAR 11,71 ). 
Repressicn was i.!oderate and rational (LUCENA 1976a, 146); 
the regime strived "for an optimum of terror, rather :~an a 
crude maximuTT!" (MART:IJS 1969). 
Repression was ~iscrete (SARAIVA 1974,60-61 ),not to 
mobilize attention,a;.d patient (MONICA 1978,97). 
Repression was systematic and constant, as a kind c: 
routine - there were "no wide swings between I excesses' and 
I liberalizations'" (l'.ARTINS 1970) .. 
This system of legal, moderate and rational, discrete and 
patient, systematic and constant. habi tual repression can be 
seen as an application of the "mild but constant pressure" 
strategy (see chapter n.ree, section 2.4.2). One can say that the New State 
created a system of "i.lild but constant repression". 
SARAIVA c~mrnents that. compared wi th Paris, Lisbc:-; was 
a ci ty wi thout police in which nobody, not even in hi shouse 
speaking wi th friends, speaks loudly about poli tics (SARAIVA 
1974,61 ). 
To achieve effectivness wi thout terror the regime made 
the repression machinery omnipresent. In this sense the myth 
of the efficiency of secret police VIas as important as its 
real efficacy (ROBINSON 1979.55). As it was sometimes said 
"in portugal nothing 'Works except PI DE (secret police)". 
This omnipresence implied visibility. since visibili ty 
increases power (NOTE 6). Thus the repressive machinery should 
be at the same time very visible and very discrete. This VIas 
achieved through the creation of certain codes only known to 
the secret police and the active opponents of the regime, thus 
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creating a kind of compulsority reverse complicity among them. 
In this way repression was very pr~sE:nt for an activist 
minority and relatively invisible for the great majority (NOTE7). 
This activist minority was composed mainly of communist 
militants (MARQUES 1976,189 - see SALAZAR's reference to 
communists in VI,252). This is the equivalent in the 
repressi ve strategy to the manichaen presentation of facts in mass 
JJl2dia (see chapter three, section 2.5.1). The regime tried to isolate 
(canpart:J'rentalize) communists wj thin Portuguese society and 
even among oppositionists. 
This explairo the two very different versions of the New 
State regime circulating - the oppositic~ist one where 
repression is seen as the main strategy of the regime (see 
LUCENA 198~ a~d the common m2~ c~e wh~~~ the 
routine, habi tual and "mild but constant pressure" appear as 
important. 
The firs t verson invaded mas s JJl2dia after the 25 thAPril Revolution 
and was proclaimed as the official version of the new regime 
about the old one, which is naturally enough since the 
politicians of the new regime were then communist, 
ex-communists, active opponents, ex-exiles, political refugees 
and persons transferred from the old regime who found this 
explanation the most rehabili tating one for themselves. The 
generalization of this version as the official one led 
LOUREN90 to write that fascism r.as neve; 
existed, since it did not exist for the majority of the Portuguese 
(LOUREN90 1976,229-239). 
Both versions are factually acurate, but their 
explanatory power is greatly different as it is implici t in 
all this work - nei ther repression was the main strategy of 
the regime nor it was the main cause of its survival. One can 
even say that repression was not so important for the majority 
of citizens by its active character, but by the generalized 
fear and apoliticism it provoked. Again and again one finds 
important expressive dimension in all New State strategies -
it was the case with censorship (chapter three, section 2.3,2.5.1; 
this chapter section 1.2.1), it is the case wi th direct repression 
Ori-:: can sum up by calling attention to the integrated 
charact~ristic of New State strategies where mild but constant 
pressur~ and repression are partners of the same game. 
Repressi::::;n had also as its aim to demobilize the common man 
through !ear and intimidation. The myth of efficiency and 
omnipresence of the secret police made fear justified. Self 
control and self-censorship are also self-demobilizing attitudes. 
Th~ fact that apparently everyone could be an informer 
introduced an element of mistrust in private relationship 
(people was only open with very intimate friends - see 
RIEGELHhJPT 1979) which provoked a kind of 
compart~~ntalization of social relationshipsin regard to 
social, =~ltural ar.d political discussions. 
Ir. sum,there was a common aim of expressive and 
repress:.· .. e strategies to produce mass demobilization. This 
may explain why without using much physical violence New State 
rule was one cf the most suffocating (NOTE 8). 
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2. CHANGES IN NEW STATE STRATEGIES IN THE 19605 
2.1. Social change and political evolution 
2.1.1. Social change in the 19605 
All the strategies analyzed until now suffered 
qualitative changes in the 1960s and early 1970s . So a 
second part of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of 
those changes. As explained in the Introduction this work will 
cover only the period which ends with the substitution of 
Salazar in 1968 - so we will not analyse the changes brought 
about by the rule of Caetano (1968-1974). 
The cause of those changes of strategy comes, in first 
place, from several social and economic changes. There were 
economic changes due to a slow industrialization process and 
decline in agricul ture (NOTE 9), social changes due to a slow 
process of urbanization, growing emigration for France and 
Germany, increasing diffusion of television and other mass 
media and g~n\..ral changes in habits and atti tudes (NOTE 10), 
religious changes due to reform in Catholic Church started 
wi th the Second Vatican Council which provoked the appearance 
of the progressi s t catholics (see chapter five, section 2.2.6) ,cul tural 
changes which increased what ROBiNSON calls the "symbolic 
divorce between the intellectual world and the regime" 
(ROBINSON 1979,165). 
2.1.2. Political evolution in late 1950s a~d 1960 
There were also specifically political causes which 
provoked the evolution in New State's strategies. The years 
1958-1962 were full of political events all of an adverse 
nature to the regime, as can be seen in chapter one (section 3.4). 
All those events obviously shook the regime and, at the 
same time, mobilized various sectors of the population -
intellectuals, students, progressist catholics and even 
elements within the Armed Forces - against the regime. 
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2.2. Repression - the main strategical answer of the regime 
to the new situation 
The predominant answer of the New State to those 
changes and to those political events was repression which 
gradually developed into the building of a police state. As 
MARQUES said "con trol had almos t completely passed on to the 
censorship service and the Secret Police [ ... J Repression 
haunted the late 1960s as in the days of triwnphant Fascism" 
(MARQUES 1976,224) - (NOTE 11). Beyond the traditional 
sufferers of repression (firstly, communists and 'secondly, 
other opponents) there began to be involved in repression 
intellectuals, students, progressist catholics (NOTE 12). 
The building of the police state came about through 
coordination of the various suppressive and repressive means 
and its articulation with the state machinery - the secret 
police, other police forces, the censorship service and public 
administration could interchange information. The vetoing 
of people for public jobs is a good example of this 
articulation. 
There were other measures which helped this building 
- the mili tari zation of all police force s (see MARTINS 1970), 
the establishr:-:ent of special tribunals for the judgement of 
political crimes (see BARREIROS 1982). 
This building of a police state began after 1945 
(MARTINS 1970) - which is an irony since then democratic 
trends were triumphant allover western Europe and the 
fascist like period of the regime VIas over - and VIas used to 
increase repression in the 1960s and early 1970s . 
- -
So there was not a change in the regime itself to 
ansVler to the neVI si tuation - there VIas no attempt to refresh 
the eli te, renew the polices, revive public administration. 
"'The New State, then, was [ ... J institutionally petrified and 
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powered only by inertia" (ROBINSON 1979,81), it "went to 
sleep, it became petrified and dinosauric" (WIARDA 1977,308). 
Even Franco NOGUEIRA, who can be considered as the almost 
official biographer of Salazar, acknowledges this decline (S~~ 
NOGUEIRA 1985). 
This decline may explain the increase in repression. 
It is probably not coincidence that the gradual building of 
the police state began after the end of the less demobil:z:'ng 
period of the regime - the role of a more mobilizing elite was 
taken by the agents of the repressive machinery in the sense 
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of provoking passivity and demobilization thrc:..Igh inti::!:'dation 
and later through increase in direct repressio~. 
Once one puts at work a repressive mach:":;ery there can 
exist an organizational pursuiness .of efficien~y which is 
instrumental to gain power over the opponents and wi thin the 
regime. In fact the police state machinery became wi th time 
a state within a state (MARQUES 1976,188) (NOTE 13), but 
it never created a climate of terror which could compel us to 
change the previous judgement about the role of repressive 
strategies in the New State. 
23. The new expressive strategy - the proclamation of the 
"pluricontinental and multi":racial nation" 
The regime was "ideologically bankrupt" (ROBIt;SON 1979, 
81), corporatism was in decline (WIARDA 1977), the "basic 
sentiments of portuguese moral structure" were in conflict 
with the social evolution. But this would not be terribly 
important since authoritarian regimes are based on passivity. 
As LINZ said - for large parts of the population in 
authoritarian regimes habit and self-interest may be more 
important, and belief unnecessary for effective control (LINZ 
1970,269). 
But there was an external event which provoked the need 
of some kind of mobilization - the guerilla war imposed on th~ 
regime in the colonies. The regime tried,at first,to 
canpartmentalize this mobilization in order to minimize the 
impact of the war on civil society. But prolongation of war. 
growing international isolation, a certain deterioration of 
the image of Portugal in Europe and in the world, began 
to be res~nted by the social eli te which trave lIed abroad, 
and the rising of political and social unrest in Portugal led 
the regime to assert the need to give an answer to this 
si tuation also at the ideological level. This need became 
more co~~anding when so~e portuguese youth, mainly university 
students (which was the recrui tment basis for the Army which 
fought the war) began to shew signs of non conformis~ with 
regard to the war situation. 
T~e ideological answer was the proclamation as 
political dogma of the doctrine of the "multiracial and 
pluricontinental nation". The overseas provinces were as much 
Portugal as the metropolis; all their inhabi tants became full 
Portuguese; "we are only one people, forming only one Nation under 
a sole government" (NOTE 114); as the portuguese Foreign 
Minister said in 1967 "We (the Portuguese) consider ourselves 
to be an African nation as well, through integration and 
multiracialism" (in MARQUES 1976,229). This doctrine was 
. 
propagated mainly through the mass media. 
T::us in this period the regime clearly cpted for some 
ideological indoctrination, but confined to the colonial 
policy and again provoked by defensive needs. Of course 
this doctrine had been explicit within many documents and 
policies of the New State. but it was an external need which 
made necessary to assert it so loudly and to make it object of 
ideological indoctrination. 
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This can be evidenced by the analysis of Table 3.1 of Chapter Three 
(Page 87l The slight increase in communications addressed to the 
masses (from 37% to 42%) in a decline period is mainly due to 
this ideological indoctrination - 80% of all communications 
addressed to the masses in this period (8 out of 10) were 
dedicated to colonial issues (five were exclusively dedicated 
to colonial policy and three were partially dedicated to it). 
Thus this nr:I'..:: provoked what MARTIJ~S called thl2 
"refascistize.::on if the regime" (l1Ar<TINS 1970). '~e will call 
it mere F.!deqt,.;~:ely a "remobilization" of the regime. 
New m:.bilizing organizations ~re created like the "National 
\"anans Movement" "(Movimento Nacional Feminino) to give moral 
support to tr."'= army soldiers in the war,or re·vived organizations 
like the "Ligc. dos Combatentes" (Veterans Association). 
It is c-srtainly not by chance that LOURENC;O (1982) in 
his article a:=~t fascist culture in Portugal only found 
clearly fascis~ cultural productions in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. ::-.e "remobilization" was favourable to the 
reappearance :: the pro-fascist intellect~al minority group. 
The e f: :>:aci ty of such "remobili za tion" was very 
limited in rE;=~d both to its external aims of preparing a 
generation fe:- ',;ar (the rate of desertions and flight fran the 
country to av:~d entering the war increased) and to its 
effects in tt~ renewal of the regime. 
The Ne~ Etate was already in decline and only 
defensive re=.sons imposed the remobilisation. The only fact 
which could re':erse this declive was the change in leadership 
in 1968 - Sal=.zar's substitution by Caetano. But this is 
another story :0 be told in other work. 
2.4. Organizational strategies 
2.4. 1. Decornp=-=-"':":"LI2ntalization of the Army 
By stress of circu~tances cC11partrnentalization 
no longer feas:ble in regard to the Army. Several reasons 
compelled the .!.rmy to decompartmentalize. 
was 
First, it was necessary to recrui t mili tiamen to fight 
in the guerilla war on three fronts. More and more mili tiamen 
were incorporated wi th the professional soldiers in the same 
mili tary uni ts. As their permanence in the ranks was extended 
to four years ~here was time for abundant interactions. On the 
other hand, as part of those exchanges took place in the front 
where comradeship is naturally greater, their influence was 
mOre lasting. 
Secane, it happened that many of those mili tiamen who 
fimshed their military service enlisted again in the Army with 
a special sta:~s, thus bringing to the very Army corp new 
ideas and inf::.!~nces (NOTE 15). 
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ThirC!lj', th~ mili tiam'=:n were recrui ted fr'j:'. j'o'..lng m"2n 
of whom som'S had university courses. Those ha-j 9s:'H:=rally more 
important roles to perform in the army machi!'",er:,r. Th'ls a good 
part of the irr.;::>ortant posts filled by new recrui ts was given 
to students corning uni versi ties where poli tical 
mobilization,ideological debate, mass meetings and general 
political Cicti"J:ty wer'€ constant. More than H.at, it happened 
that the punishment to "subversive" universi ty students was 
to send them earlier (that is, before finishing their degrees) 
to the Army. It seems that they were more influencers than 
influenced agents. 
The Minister of Defence was already saying in 1970 thet 
"Subversion t:-ies to reach the Armed ForcEs through the 
sources of re:rui tment of I cadres I - the school s [ ... J. If 
such p€!"'Vers:':.;. goes on and develops we have to a1 ter the 
system of pre~3ration of complementary office~s and sergeants 
[ ... J" (i nTH C >~A Z 1 98 3 , 1 42 -1 43) (NOTE 1 6 ). 
Fourthly.the Armed Forces elements entered into C0r.";act 
during the war wi th the guerilla movements. This contact had 
great influence on some officers as it was later acknowledged 
by some of the;n (see JEsuiNO 1982) and is clearly visible in 
the liberation movement spiri t of the Armed Forces Movement 
in the revolutionary period of 1974-1975. 
The young generation of professional army officers was 
more prone to ::ccept all those new ideas bro'...lght in by those 
agents than the old guard. So it gradually developed an abyss 
between the old guard and the captains (such a'1 abyss is already 
referred in BRADFORD 1973 and MARTINS 1969) - it were 
captains who overthew the regime in April 1974 and took the 
power in their hands. 
In sum, the colonial war" decompartmentaliseC" the Army 
- thi s" deca:'fIMtmentalisation 
State. 
" proved to be fatal to the New 
244 
2.4.2. The fissure in the moral union between Church and State 
As it was already said (chapter three, sections 2.2.5,2.2.6) the 
moral union between Church and State had a fissure since the 
late 19505 , which became more important in the 19605 and 
s 
early 1970 . 
This compelled the New State to set up clearly the limits 
for the moral union, which was made repressing those 
"dissident" catholics (NOTE 17). 
So repression became also part of the strategies the New 
State used towards members of Catholic Church. 
2.5. Mobilisation in the Universities 
No reference to the changing strategies of the regime in 
the 1960s was complete without calling attention to student 
mobilizational ~ovements in the Universities (r;OTE 18). 
2.5.1. Mobilisational events in Universities 
One must tegin by the resistance that Universities 
always offered to the penetration of "Mocidade Portuguesa", 
the nationalist youth organization created in 1936 to a~t in 
all levels of ti:e educational system. Policies to enhance the 
role of "!10cidade Portuguesa" in Universi ties failed utterly 
(MARQUES 1976,205 ,GEORGEL 1985,397-398) (NaTE 19). 
So the uni versi ty space was more free than other spaces 
for other move~ents to act - social and cultural groups, 
Coimbra tradit:o~al pr~s movements (NOTE20), Coimbra 
traditional residences called "republicas", cattolic movements 
(mainly JUC), ~:c. All this activity reflected also in the 
degree of mobilization which student's official associations 
managed to achieve. 
After some mcments of student lTObilization in the 1940s (GRACIO 
1987) the first great mObilization of students was in , 956 to 
demand the revokation of a decree-law (DecretO-Lei n Q40900) 
which restricted very much the activities of student's 
associations (see RICARDO 1982) (NOTE 21 ). The students even 
protested in the National Assembly where the decree-law was 
send to be discussed in a governmental delay strategy. 
This protest proved that an alliance of liberal, 
socialist, communist and progressist catholic students to 
demand concrete government actions could be effective. It 
began here also a movement to create a national association of 
university students. 
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Since 1956 the self gov~rned student houses 
("republicas"J transformed gradually from bobe;;tian centers 
into political ones and gradually overcame th~ traditional 
hostili ty between students and non students ("futricas") (see 
RODRIGUES 1982). The Delgado campaign reinfor~ed this tr~nd. 
In 1960-1961 it was elected for the fir st time, in the 
University of Coimbra, a leftist governing bo~y for the 
university student's union (NOTE 22). This l~d to the academic 
crisis of 1961-62 - see about this RICARDO 1982 and PODRIGUES 
1982) . 
246 
In April 1961 if. was published a "Lette~ to a Pcr:'JglJese[rcmc:tltj 
Student" whicr. appealed for the social and sexual liberation of 
women. I twas · ... rri t ten to tte girl for whom "1 ,:;ve' is pas s i vi ty, 
duty and oblig::.tion" (NOTE23). 
In Febru::.~y 1962 ~ ",,'as created a prc'lisional r;::.tional 
association of students ar.d promoted tte first national 
meeting of stL:::ents in Coimbra. In March 1962 it was promoted 
the Student's Day in Lisbon which provoked the arrest cf many 
students and physical confrontation between students and 
police. I t was the beginning of the cri s is. In the sequence 
of events many students were arrested, demonstrations were 
violently broken by the police, students we~e suspended from 
uni versi ty and others expelled, others calle.= to the mi Ii tary 
service before finishing their courses as pL:~ishment. The 
students association saw tl:eir head:Iuarters ~ealed off by 
state police, subventions 'Were suspended. 
2.5.2. Mobilizing for change 
Thus repression of all sorts was the regime's answer to 
students mobilization. This repression was instrumental in the 
radicali sation of student's posi tions which in turn provoked 
more mobilization to which more repression was the answer -
a vicious circle. This means that repression was at the same 
time consequence and cause of mobilization. 
As those events shaped a whole generation - henceforth 
called the 1962 generation - and since this generation became, 
after April 1974, part of the political and cultural 
establishment it is worth while to analyze in more detail this 
mobiljsation for change. 
Firstly, the students demonstrated during the crisis that 
they have capaci ty to mobilize themsel ves against the regime 
and were willing to press for changes (NOTE 24). 
Secondly, it used in Portugal, for the first time, 
new methods of mass mobiliSation like mass rallies, student 
assemblies ("Assembleias Magnas"), permanent meetings; 
conflicts wi th the police and occupation of buildings; class 
- strikes, boycotts, transformation of classes into debates, 
etc. All those actions were mobilisation for change. 
Thirdly, those movements tried not only internal 
. 
coordination (for instance, through the creation of a naticnal 
association of students) but also prc~oted alliances wit~ 
other sectior.s of society - oppositicr. groups,mainly co~~unist 
party and socialist groups, progressist catholics, faculty 
members. This alliance wi th some liberal or leftist facul ty 
members was very important to question "cate:iratoaia " and 
university support to the regime thrcugh co-optation. 
This alliance with faculty members revived university 
authonomy. Though this the crisis provoked some dissensions 
within the elite - Marcello CAETANO, then Rector of the 
Universi ty of Lisbon, resigned because of police intervention 
in the University (ROBINSON 1979, RICAROO 1982). 
Fourthly. the student I s movements questioned the basic 
conservative mentality of the New State. This is clear in the 
"Letter to a Portuguese Student", but also in the practice of 
new kinds of relationship between sexes, new attitudes towards 
authority, towards politic and religion, etc. The conservative 
right saw in the letter referred to above just an appeal to free love 
and dissolution of customs, but the letter represented really 
the questioning of the kind of submissive attitudes which 
were the basic support of passivity and demobilization. 
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2.5.3. Consequences cf stud~nt mobilization for New State 
strategies towards them 
Which consequences had this student mobilization in New 
State strategies towards them? 
Firstly, the Uni versi ty became an 
poli tical debate" (FORMOSINHO et alia, 
" autonorrous arena of 
1982). It became the 
only arena where conservatives, socialists, communists, 
maoists, trotskyists openly competed for power in elections for 
student associations. So the University beca~e the only sector 
of society really mobilized and, furthermore, mobilized on a 
mass basis. 
Sec 0 n d 1 y, the stu den t sin v 0 ked the au tonorny of the 
University to avcid police intervention and pOlitical 
interference . Thus they tried self- compartmerltalization as 
a strategy to enlarge their freedom of movements. Many members 
of the Faculty also claimed the need to maintain police and 
political personalities outside the University. 
Later on, in the 1970s , after the great crisis in the 
Uni versi ty of Coimbra in 1969, which was not analysed here, 
the need of coali tions wi th other sectors of society openly 
assumed by many radical students, made this strategy less 
important. 
Thirdly, the coali tions of some Facul ty members wi th 
students affected somewhat the natural character of the 
previous co-optation of "catedraticos". The political division 
of Facul ty staff became each time neater and thus co-optation 
began to mean clear and assumed coopera tion wi th the regime. 
This transformed co-optation into a polemic personal atti tude 
and an academic political issue. 
That is, student's mobilization affected seriously 
traditional strategies of the University both towards students 
and Faculty members. As said belo~ repression was the main 
answer of the regime to this new situation. The repression 
towards the students was oficially legi timiS?d in mass media 
interpeting all mobilisations as result of subversive 
activities of the communist party. It is obvious that this 
failed to explain why the student mass was now more prone to 
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be influenced by student activists than before, but the regime 
was not interested in understanding that mobilisation, but 
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just in repressing it and legitimising publicly that repression. 
A great part of what happened in CAETANO's rule within 
Universities. the Army (see this Chapter, section 2.4.1), the 
Church, the opposition cannot be understood without reference 
to the student mobilisation. 
Further, the popular and POlitical mobilisation after th~ 
25th April "coup d'etat" ar:d the pattern of behaviour of good 
part of the present cultural and political establish~ent 
cannot be understood witho~t reference to this mobilisation 
(NOTE 25). 
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3. CONCLUSION - THE EXPRESSIVE DIMENSION OF REPRESSIVE STRATEGIES 
Contrary to a vision which was very popular immediately 
after the 25 th April 1974 "Co·...:~ d' etat', repression was not the 
main strategy of New State re;ime - in this sensf', "fascism 
never existed", as LOURE::~O sa:'d (LOUREtj~C 197G,2z.-.23~i (T;OTE: ~6). 
The importance of repressive strategies can only be 
clearly understood when taken in conjunction with the 
expressive ones, that is, in~egrated in a global strategy. As 
said abovE:' (SecriOfl 1.j). the poss:'bility of repression was as 
important as the actual repr~2s:'on. This means :~at 
repression was a strategy n8: ~nly aimed at an active mir.c~ity 
of opponents, but part .:f a:". :'ntegrated exprE:ssive str~:egy 
to inculcate conformism and a;cli ticlsm in com.-:-.cn man tr.rcugh 
fear. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the dual character of 
repression - it was, at the sa~e time, visible in its 
potential aspect and invisible in its active aspect. That can 
only mean that repression was, in its intllriddting side, a 
generalized strategy. If the =~ew State was for the majcri ty 
of Pcrtuguese people wha: :. t · .. :~s 'for some its u!"l'Jsually 
long survival could be I abe 11~: in the ca tegory of hi s tor :'cal 
miracles (LOURENi;O 1976,233) ; ::CTE 27 ). One can see here an 
adaptation of the regime to y:.rtuguese characteristics '~;hich 
abhor violence. 
Censorship must be emphasized as a vital repressive 
component of the integrated expressive strategy. The ce!:sorsh:';: 
role in this strategy is to inculcate in every man an attitude 
of self-restraint and even active self-control. 
To sum up the role of re~ressive strategies one can 
conclude wi th Salazar's ser.tence :~,at "Insti tutions and laws s!1ould 
work in such away that one must be a patriot by need, when it 
is not by discipline or by virtue" (SALAZAR in ASSAC 1952,40). 
CHAPTER VII 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE NEW STATE REGIME 
- THEORY -
The relevance of this chapter for this work is centered 
around the need to carry evidence for the derrobilising 
hypothesis showing that the role of the State in general, and 
wi thin the educational system in particular, was such as to 
prevent and effectively avoid mobilization within civil 
society (sC',::, Intrcx:h.lc~i:r;, s::;,,::-::icJn 4.~). 
In fact the achievement of conformism and passivity 
through demobilisation implies apartition cf tasks betwe~~ the 
State and civil society where the former has the lion's stare. 
If many social and educational tasks are given freely to 
private individuals and organization this de~ands, implies and 
allows a mobilisation of various sectors of civil society. 
Thus the achievement of demobilisation implies a strong 
control of the State over all aspects of national life. 
Was this strong control of the State over social life 
envisaged by New State elite? How was this control compatible 
with the assumed non totalitarian nature of the regime? 
To answer those questions this'chapter will analyze the 
theory of the New State about the role of tne State in tte 
portuguese regime. The next chapter will ~,&lyse ho.. much c·f 
this theory was practiced; it will study the kind of state 
which the regime shaped - an Administrative State, where the 
Public Administration had the monopoly of policy formulation. 
In·chapter nine we. will study the practice of the role of the 
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State in the school educational system to conclude (in chapter ten) that, . 
wi thin a centralized framework, the portuguese state had an 
overwhelming power in all aspects of educational decision -
- making, thus preventing any mobilisation of the educational 
agents. 
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1. THE THEORY OF THE STRONG STATE 
Analyzing primary sources about the role of the State one 
can find two divergent discourses about the concept and role 
of the State and its relationships wi th civil society. There is 
one discourse based on interventionism - the strong state 
discourse - and another based on self-government - the 
corporative discourse. The first one is much more consonant 
with demobilisation intention and the last one demar.ds 
mobilization of social, economic and cultural agents. If our 
hypothesis is correct the strong state discourse should have 
prevailed over the corporative state. 
To make easier the proof of our hypothesis :n regard to 
this aspect the two discourses will be exposed separately, 
showing the internal congruence of each. 
One important caveat should be made at this stage -
the explanation of the theory of the New State about the role 
of the State as two separate discourses is an analytical 
method to enhance two different logics present in New State 
theory. It is a decision of the researcher. The New State 
actors intermingled both discourses (presenting each one as 
limitation to the full application of the other) into a single 
doctrine. Such a doctrine is extremely ambiguous since it shift~ 
its emphasis with different actors and different rno~ents (~ee 
LUCENA 1976a). The ambiguities and contradictions are 
hopefully better understood through the analytical device used. 
On the other hand, this device allows us' to make clear which 
emphasis prevailed in the practice, which is instrumental to 
prove our hypothesis, as it was said. 
We will analyze first the interventionist discourse and 
then the corporative one. 
1.1. The theory of the strong state 
The motto of the strong state is one of the very first 
of the authoritarian regime. As early as 1930 SALAZAR was 
saying that II "The S~a~e ~hould be ~o ~~~on9 ~ha~ it doe~ no~ 
need to be violent". (SALAZAR 1.81 "in 1934 he said "we have 
to achieve the ~t~on9 State in name ot the mo~t ~ac~ed 
inte~e~t~ of. the Nation" (SALAZAR 1,289 - see also SALAZAR 
I I , 71 , IV, 66) (NOTE 1 ). 
The very existence of the dictatorship (1926-1933) is 
justified by the crisis of the state (see SALAZAR 1933). The 
state had not being been up to the value of the Nation - "if. 
~he Na~ion wa~ not up to it~ individual value~, the State wa~ 
~~iLL inf.e~io~ to the Na~i~n"' (SALAZAR 1933). Thus the 
expression "New State" symbolized this doctrine of the strong 
state and the poli tical will to build a renewed state - see 
SALAZAR 1,288,301, CAETANO 1968. 
In this doctrine of a strong ,state it is implicit the 
notion of an autoncmous state, "a ~~~on9 S~ate r ... J 
independent and ~upe~ciLiou~ towa~d~ p~iva~e, 9~ouP, cla~~ o~ 
f.action inte~e~t~" (SALAZAR IV, 268 - translation of ROBINSON 
1979 - see also SALAZAR I, ,134 - NOTE 2), "han9in9 ove~ the 
powe~ f.~ac~ion~ - ~e~vice~, municipaLitie~, p~ivate and 
pubLic activi~ie~, LocaL Lif.e, coLoniaL domain.~, ~he ~hou~and 
manif.e~tation.~ of. Lif.e in. ~ociet~ - C ••• J the State wiLL 
ex.tend t.he ~h~oud of. i~~ unit~ C ••• J and i~~ ~t~en9h~" 
(SALAZAR 1,81). "We wan~ a 5~ate·di9nif.ied enou~h and ~t~on9 
enou~h not t.o be co~~upted b~ them (the o~~aniJ.ed int.e~e~t~J" 
(SALAZAR 1,302) (NOTE 3). 
All this emphasis on a strong state is obviously 
congruent with the authoritarian character of the regime. 
1.2. The theory of the doctrinaire state 
The New State rejects very strongly the liberal State, 
passive spectator of economic and social manisfestations, 
which is considered responsible for the social and poli tical 
crisis of the western world (see SALAZAR IV,183, CAETANO 
1941,21-22,129-132). 
Salazar reasons that - any state is inherently a 
poli tical structure based on some conceptual system; as by 
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essence any power instance tends to achieve survival an1 
continuity it cannot allow discussion about th~5e conc~~ts. 
On the other hand, if the S ta te bel ieves in tht superi ori ty of 
its conceptual scheme it cannot be conceived neutrali ty 
since it could be equivalent to denegation of this conceptual 
construct. Thus any state is a "doctrine in action" and thus 
cannot be indifferent to the propagation of its doctrine 
(SALAZAR 1936). 
So the State must be able to define a general policy 
(SALAZAR V,57), must have an economic thought (SALAZAR 1,208), 
an educational policy, a scientific policy, etc. (see SALAZAR 
1,291,111,235-236). 
The state must have a moral role in society. (CARDC~C,1949 
11 ), it must be a moral leacer (LEITE,' 936 ). Tr;e 
interventionist state is an "ethical state" since it S'='E:¥:S tc 
impose more justice in social relationships (AFONSO, no date, 
25). "The ethlca~ ~tate ha~ not on~~ a po~ltlca~ objective. 
but a~~o ~pl~ltua~ and mo~a~ conce~n~ and alm~: to accomp~l~h 
a hi9h tunctlon ot mo~a~ ju~tlce, to lmp~ement a mo~a~ and 
economic doct~lne within the unltled Nation" (AFONSO, no date, 
26) • 
As CAETANO says "The State cea~e~ to be con~lde4ed a~ 
t~ame which can be ado~ned lnditte~ent~~ with an~ lma~e: it 
p~ote~~e~ a doct~lne, exp~e~~e~ an ldea~, it a~~ume~ a 
po~ltion in mo~a~~, econom~ and ~oclo~o~~ C ••• J the State 
be~leve~ in ~ome p~inclp~e~ and lntend~ to lmp~ement and 
dettend them C ••• j, It l~ the peda~o9ue which teach~ the who~e 
Nation"" (CAETANO,1941 ,'33 - see ibidem 145-147). 
The "doctrine in action" State is defined clearly in 
opposi tion to the liberal state since this was the conception 
of the overthrown republican regime, but it took since the 
very beginning an explici t posi tion against a totali tarian state 
conception. Analyzing the ini tial statement s of the leaders 
of the regime (1928-1934) one can obtain enough indicators of 
this theoretical distance - the State will respect, al though 
with limitations, basic individual freedoms (SALAZAR 1,80,134, 
341,382, CAETANO 1934 in CAETANO 1941,107-126), will let free 
for private action several fields like family life, 
professional activities, cultural arenas, etc. (SALAZAR I,383~ 
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it will respect private initiative in economy (SALAZAR 1,202-
211 ), it will respect chri s tian principles and the Catol i c 
Church (SALAZAR 1,341 ). Besides those indicators there Wf:f'e, 
as said in chapter one (section 1.3.1), explici t statements 
rejecting totalitarian conceptions and identification with 
Mussolird's fascism (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 113-115,1 79-eO, 
289,340-342). 
In sum,a strong state is an interventionist state, it is 
a state with a doctrine, but it is not a totalitarian state. 
1.3. The theory of the State as rebuilder of the Nation 
1.3.1 .Th~ rebuilding role 
As said above.it is the crisis in the State which just~ed 
the dic~atorship. This crisis is not new. In New State 
presentation of portuguese history the liberal period ( 1828-
-1910) and the republican period (1910-1926) were dark periods 
(see MONICA 1978, 299-305 and RADICH 1979,103-115). The New 
State regime ini tiated a period of national grandeur, iJhich 
could continue the glorious periods of the "Reconquista" and 
the Discoveries (NOTE 4). 
In fact,the State assumed the task of rebuilding the 
nation through awakening energies which had been numbed by 
previous regimes. "What. we aile d,?i..n9- i..~ [ ••• J t.o ~ave what. 
t.helle i~ ot mo~t. vit.a~~~ deep in t.he 9-eni..u~ ot POIlt.u9ue~e 
Nat.ion C ... J wit.h new enell~ie~ which a~~ow u~ t.o maint.an t.he 
identi..t.~ ot ?ollt.u9a~ thllou9h t.he centulli..e~ G .. ] in oll.dell. to~ 
U~ to be o~d without. bei..ng anti~uated, t.o be expell.i..ent without 
bein~ c1.o~ec. to expelli..ence~". (CAETANO 1951 in ZORRO 1969,64 
- SALAZAR's interviews to FERRO often reflect the same 
ideas). 
It was necessary a return to the (rural) people values 
and traditions. For this it was necessary to fill the State 
with persons with the new mentality, that is, it was necessary 
a nelJ eli te. JOAQUIM, which is an excellent analyst of this 
role of the New State, puts it like this - "The eli te r ... J 
is people which is not just people C ... ] The elite which 
defines itself in regard to the people is the only people 
there is" (JOAQUIM 1979) ·The role of the eli te is to make all 
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portuguese become lastingly people (NOTE 5). 
But it was not ~~Qugh to possessthe State in order to 
rebuild the Nation - "the po~~e~~~on ot the State, wh~ch ~~ 
a nece~~a~~ cond~t~on to ~ave the Nat~on t~om tota~ ~u~n and 
d~~o~de~, ~~ not enou~h to~ mate~ia~ and mo~a~ ~enewa~ r ... J 
Such ha~ t.o be ~ooted in the ~ef.o~m of. educat.ion C .•. J .let. u~ 
he~d t.he State ~n ou~ hand~. but ~et U~ [a~~oJ o~ientate ~n 
a good d~~ect.~on the ~nte~.l~gence and t.he w~.l.l. of. t.he 
po~t.ugue~e" (SALAZAR 1933). 
So the educational system was seen as the main instrument 
for this rebuilding of the Nation. It will be seen later on 
how this idea was implement~d through the school curriculum. 
1.3.2. The construction of an original political structure to 
rebuild the Nation 
The political structure which the regime set up to 
rebuild the Nation had to be logically based in the very 
values and historical heri tage of this same Nation. As there 
is said to be a specific "Portuguese soul" (see caetano in ZCRRO 1969,116 
-124) there should also exist a specifically portuguese 
political structure. Hence the motto of the originality of the 
.npo~t.u9ue~e po.l.~t.ica.l. expe~ience", as it was called (see 
SALAZAR II, preface) 
"We t.~~ed to mak.e a po.l~tica~ c~eation ~t~uctu~a.l..lSl 
po~tuf}ue~e C ... J the ma~n ~ou~ce of. ~n~p.i.~at~on of. the 
gu~de.l~ne~ of. ou~ po.l~tica~ ~t~uctu~e ha~ been ou~ h~~to~~. 
ou~ t~ad~t~on, ou~ tempe~ament. ~n ~um. e£!i:.~Que~~!:.~.l~t~" 
(SALAZAR I I 1,30-31 ). "J t wa~ ~epudiated C ... J :the me~e 
impo~:ta:tion ot po~it~ca~ f.o~mu.l.ae de~~gned to~ human~t~ ~n 
ab~t/Lact'" (CAETANO 1956 in ZORRO 1969,64). , "One dav. it wi..l.l. 
be /LecOf}ni.1ed :that ~o~tuf}a.l. i~ .lead b~ an o~i.f}i.na~ ~SI~tem, 
~pec~tic ot he~ hi.~to~SI and f} eo9/Laphv." (SALAZAR I, 338 - see 
also about the originali ty of the regime I, 373-374,379-380, 
II 26-28, III 130-131, V 59,320,401,407 and in FERRO 1982,127) 
(NOTE 6). 
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1.3.3. Consequences of !!'.:'s role of the State - national:'sm 
and isolationism 
The fact that the Sta:e took to itself the role of 
rebullder of the Nation cased on the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of this S~7.e Nation led naturally to 
nationalism. 
The educational syst~:n is pervaded by inculcation cf a 
patriotic mentali ty of c'..il t of the glories of Fatherland. of 
love for the sweet Motherl and. It al so led to giving to the 
curriculum subject Hi story a very important formative role. 
All this had been anal vze-1 ir. ,:r.apter ;. four. 
It led also to cuI t :: portuguese tradi tions and use:s -
just as examples one can ~~int the re:building of national 
monuments. the competit:c~ to chose t~e "most portuguese 
village of Portugal" (see about this BRITO 1982), the 
importance given to "fado" as the national song (see MATOS 
1982), etc. 
It led also to poli tical and cuI tural isolationism 'Which, 
coupled with Portugal peripheral situation in Europe,made 
Portugal a country bypassed by the great european poli tical 
and cuI tural movements - "pll.oud.lv. a.J.one" as SALAZAR commented 
about portuguese political isolationism in the 1960s due to 
overseas policy (NOTE 7). 
1 .4. The theory of the leading role of the State in society 
1.4.1. The leading role of the State in society 
Modern societies demand more of the state, they created 
"the elephantoid character of this monstruous modern State" 
(SALAZAR IV.245 - see also 111,235-6). This solution is 
inevi table - "the m~n.-dtIl.OU-d modell.n. State r ... J even. when ~ive-d 
up ot pO-d-de-d-d~n~ the ~ou.J.-d, cannot Il.etll.a~n tll.om ~mpo-din.9, 
~hll.ou9h a thou-dand ~n~ell.vention~-dt act-d and competence~. 
9uideLine-d and Limit-d to tll.ee expan-dion vt -dociaL .J.ite" 
(SALAZAR IV,245 - see also III 235, V,109-110 and CAETANO 1970a 
183) . 
So the State has nowadays a leading role in society. In 
fact "Collective lite r ... J doe-d not oll.dell. it-deLt 
-dpontaneou-dL~. Jt i-d an ilLu-dion to think that -dociet~ -deall.che~ 
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o~ tind~ b~ it~eJt it~ own ~uideline~" (SALAZAR II1,389). Thus 
one has to accept a "beneteciaL ~tate inte~ventioni~m" 
(SALAZAR V,93 - see also 1I1.369). "The State wiLL be an 
ettec~lve in~t~ument ot p~o~ecution ot the nationaL inte~e~t, 
not onL~ in ~eJation to ~he hi~he~ objective~ ot ou~ inte~naL 
and exte~naL poLicie~, but al~o in tuJtillin~ the mo~~ t~iviaJ 
ta~k~ ot daiL~ admini~t~ation, which a~e not Je~~ e~~entiaJ" 
(CAETANO 1 959,171 ). As a posi ti ve resul t the New State became 
"a ~~ea~ national ti~m which need~ dail~ to ~oLve the mo~t 
va~ied, complex and u~~ent p~obJem~ ot vitaJ inte~e~t to~ 
coJlectivit~" (CAETANO ibidem). 
In consonance with all this the Constitution of 1933 
gives the State as tasks "to coordinate, to stimulate and to 
lead all social activities" (article 6,.2). 
This is also applied t~ the division of competencies 
between central government (carried out by the state) and 
local government (carried out by municipali ties). BAPTISTA, 
an important member of the elite, home minister under CAETANO, 
says '''The State ~hould inte~phe~e C ... J in municipal ,Ute and. 
r ... J t~om that int~omi~~ion. i~ can ~e~uLt atte~ all benetit~" 
(BAPTISTA 1957,38 - see also 38-42). 
1 .4.2. The fragility of portuguese society demands from the 
Portuguese State a;. even more leading role than in 
ether nations 
"The t~a~iJit~ ot po~tu~ue~e Jite in aLJ a~pectJ" '(SALAZAR 
IV,245) will compel the state to go too far (SALAZAR 111,68), 
"The ~enden.c~ to~ thi~ ~e~ime C-1tate ~ociaJi~t7Uamon~ u~ mLl~t 
be tound mo~e in the e~~ence ot OLl~ ~ace which i~ dep~ived ot 
ini~iative, than in othe~ ~ociai conce~n~'" said SALAZAR to 
FERRO (in FERRO 1982,106) (NOTE 8). 
In Portugal all "in fact depends from the beneficial or 
detrimental breath of the Power" (SALAZAR IV,246). "The ~ocial 
to~mation ot po~tu~ue~e peopie iead~ to the tact that the 
State iA eve~~thin~ o~ aimo~t eve~~thins;." (SALAZAR in FERRO 
1982,188 ). 
This umeItievelopment compels at the same time the state 
to intervene. "Tho~e rcount~ie~l which b~ ~ome motive iet 
them~eive~ ia~ behind have to ~ubmit them~eLve~ to ~Llch an 
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~mpu~~e which can cvme vn~y t~vm a cent~a~i3ed action C··l 
t~om a concent~ation ot mean~" (SALAZAR IV,245). BAPTISTA also 
justifies state contr~l over local government because Portugal 
is a country "wh~ch J.et he~~e~f. J.a~ beh~nd in the conque~t ot 
many f.actv~~ vt mate~ia~ p~v~~e~~" (BAPTISTA 1957,38). 
1 .5. Limits to the role of the State 
All the strong s~3te discourse is punctuated with the 
firm assertion of sev-:ral limi ts to the role of the state in 
society. There are ic-=~logical limits, ethical limits and 
merely pragmatic limi:s. 
The ideolocical :imi ts come from the rejection of the 
liberal state ar.d frc~ rejection of the totalitarian 
sta~e either in Naz:, fascist or socialist form (se~ 
chapter one, section· .3., this chapter, section 1.2,). 
The New S ta te p!"~~l aimed solemnly two et hi cal 1 1:;.i t s-
Moral and Law. To assert publicy this self-limitation the 
article four of the 1933 Constitution affirms: "The Po~tu~ue~e 
Nat~on con~titute~ an independent State who~e ~ove~ei~nt~ onJ.~ 
achnowJ.ed~e~ a~ J.imit~, in the inte~naJ. o~de~, mo~aJ. and J.aw" 
- see for the same acknowledgment SALAZAR I,80,341,II,71,III, 
237,239,IV,366.VI,41 ,1936. 
Those limi ts are not perfunctory ones, since they have 
a concrete content (s€e LUCENA 1976a,129-133. WIARDA 1977.84). 
One first limit is what CAETANO calls the civic freedoms 
(seecrapter s1x,sectionl.JJr""Otsubject to renunciation by any state. 
To consider law as a limit means that the New State 
accepts theoretically the principles of an "Etat de Droit" 
(see CRUZ 1982a). It means also the respect by the state of 
the very own laws it creates (see SALAZAR 11.71). In fact, the 
Ne'W State only exceptionally violated its own laws (LUCENA 
1976 a,130). This implied that even repression was legally 
framed and generally all repressive acti vi ties were legally 
covered - see chapter six, section 1.3. 
To consider Moral as a limi t means that Roman Catholic 
tradi tional lOOral law. is going to be respected. This implies three 
kinds of limits - those derived from it being the moral 
traditionally adopted in the country; those derived from the 
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authority of Portuguese Catholic Church; those which come fro~ 
the fact that the sourc~ of this moral is an external one 
(NOTE 9). 
There are also merely pragmatic limits to the role of 
state in society. In creer to obtain efficiency state 
interventionism should have limits. The State should not 
substitute agents of national activities (SALAZAR 1,81), it 
should not inhibit private initiative nor become a 
businessman or an indus tri ali st (ibidem 127), it should not 
extend its functions (ibidem 211), it must not control all 
economy or absorb all the life of the Nation (SALAZAR 111,67, 
349) . 
As SALAZAR said "ihi.." "t.at.e "oci..a./..i...-1m [. •• J wou.l.d be an 
i..dea./.. ~~"t.em t.o ~~at.i..t~ t.he i..n bo~n ~e./.t-i..ndu.l.gence and 
bu~eauc~at.i..c de'/'i..~i..um ot common po~t.u~ue~e C .. J St.at.e 
"oci..a'/"i..~m i..~ t.he bou~g.eoi..~ ~eg.i..me ipa~ ex.ce./../..ence I C ... J. 
Jni..t.i..at.i..ve" do not. appea~, do not. t.l.ou~i..~h, becau"e t.he bo,,~ 
i..~ i..mmat.e~i..a./., a./.m04t. an i..mage. Thi..ng." 90 ~./.ow./.y, wi..t.h 
i..ndo./..ence, wit.h ~./.e~p" (SALAZAR in FERRO 1982.106-107). CAETANO 
reinforces thi s idea saying that it would be a very dangerous 
illusion to see in the State the dispenser of all wealth 
(CAETANO 1959.237). 
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2. THE THEORY OF THE CORPORATIVE STATE 
2.1. Definition of corporatism 
The Portuguese regime adopted oficially a theoretical 
system of social and political organization based on 
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corporative principles -see article 5 of the 1933 Constitution W::;TE 10). 
Corporatism can be defined in general terms by three 
important features. 
First of all, corporatism is a "system of interest 
represen tation in which the cons ti tuen t uni ts are org ani zed 
into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non competitiv~, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognized cr licensed (if not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate rep'resentational monopoly [. .. J" 
(SCHMITTER 1975,8-9). 
It is an alternative to other models of interest 
representation of which pluralism (unlimited pluralism) is the 
best known and the prevailing one in western democracie (see 
SCHMITTER 1974). 
To put it in another perspective - it is a "particular 
model or ideal-type institutional arrangement for linking the 
associationally organized interests of civil society with the 
decision st~~ctures of the state" (SCHMITTER 1974, our 
emphasis). 
As it is implied in the defini tion corporatism is most 
at ease in an authoritarian regime where the state has an 
important role of control of civil society and there is a 
limi ted pluralism of association - the corporative state is 
a limited pluralist state. 
A second feature of corporatism is its emphasis on the 
cooperation of classes stressing social solidari ty and class 
harmony rather than class conflict. Society is composed not 
of antagonistic classes but of harmonious groups divided 
according their social function. The cooperation among classes 
is mediated and controlled by the State in the name of the 
national interest. 
A third feature of corporatism is that it generally 
presents itself as a third alternative between capitalism and 
socialism (or liberalism and socialism). 
The Portuguese authori tarian regime adopted corpcratism 
as its official doctrine and proclaimed itself a Corporative 
State in the 1933 Constitution (article 5). 
Corporatism was very much in line with the Catholic 
social doctrine which was a source of inspiration for the New 
State, as said above (chapter one. section 2.1.2) 
Corporatism was very popular between the two World Wars. 
Several factors like the decline of political liberali£~. the 
Russian socialist revolution and the great economic depression 
of the 1930s all pushed some leaders to find a third way 
between capi talism and socialism, in the economic level, and 
between liberalism and totalitarianism, in the political level· 
Italy, Spain, Austria, Portugal and also, in a minor scale 
France, Poland, Rumania and Brasil all experienced some kind of 
corporative system. 
The main references about portuguese corporatism are 
LUCENA's, SCHMITTER's and WIARDA's works. 
We will begin our analysis of, Portuguese corporatist 
theory by the discourse about the incorporation of the Nation 
into the State. The first step towards implementation of 
corporatism was to incorporate the Nation, with all the 
different manifestations of collective life, into the State, 
so that the State becomes the Nation corporatively organized. 
Then we will present the basic principles of corporatism. 
Finally we will present.the main features of the 
Corporative State and introduce a theoretical categorization 
of corporatism which will be very useful in the analysis of 
corporatist implementation. 
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2.2. The theory of the incorporation of the Nation into the 
State 
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The building of a corporative state may imply the 
incorporation of the Nation, organized in corporative 
organizations, in the structure of the State. Thi s was :~.'O: ~ute 
chosen by the New State. 
2.2.1. Definition of Nation 
As it was already said ~(chapter one,section 2.2) the Ne~: ~:ate 
adopted more than one definition of Nation. But it is t~~ 
definition of Nation as the historical heritage contin~~: 
which bes t fi ts its principles. In Salazar's words it _ _ "th e 
unde~~nabie e~~ence 01. the h~~to~~cai continuity vt ror.t_~ue~e 
t.h~ou~hout. t.he cent.u~~e~" (NOTE 11 ), it is a real i ty i:-. -,,-:-,ich 
it is comprehended independence, organic unit and a 
civilizing mission" (SALAZAR IV,356). For Salazar the :;:=.tion 
is not adequately represented by the body of electors (~~~ 
SALAZAR V,39). Thus the historical and organic Nation 
prevails over the democratic and liberal definition of ~:=.tion. 
As such the nation is an abstract notion whose hist~rical 
essence must be interpreted (and can be reinterpreted). That 
is, nation is what the New State wants it to be since it 
implies an emphasis on some elements of the past and C:l i vion 
of others. The New State defined that portugal was a ::.=:ior. 
with a civilizing mission (NOTE 12) and a nation which ~.=~ 
teaching the western world new ways of organizing the 
political structure (see NOTE 6). 
By the same process of (re)definition Nation is the rural 
people, but not the urban masses - "t.he di~t.ance which ~oe~ 
t.40m u~ [c~t.{.t men] [ ••• 1 and t.he t.4ue Nation ~~ eno~moi..t~" 
(SALAZAR 1933). As Salazar said "~ove/l..nment.~ ~houid not be 
en~iaved b{.t t.he opin~on ot. t.he ~~~, aiwa~~ ~nte~i04 [ ••• J 
to the pubiic opinion of. the Na~£::." (SALAZAR in FERRe 1 982, 
272 - our emphasis). It is not only by pure conservatism, but 
in consonance with this rural definition of Nation that it was , 
said, in 1927, that the healthier part of the Nation wer-e the 
illiterates (in MONICA 1978,119) (NOTE 13). 
Nf:-i :)-,~r the hi s tori cal heri tage Nation ncr the 
rural Nation VJ'2re in crisis. The crisis was caused by 
a divorce between a liberal and urban state and an organic and 
rural Nation. The sclution was to build an organic state and 
fill its agents with rural values. In other word~ the solution 
was to incorporate t)-le Nation into the State, to rebuild the 
state according to t~e image of the Nation. 
2.2.2. The incorporation of the Nation into the State 
"The ~~eate~t poLiticaL p~obLem 01. ou~ e~a mu~t be the 
need to 0~9aniJe the Nation C .. J in o~de~ to tit it into the 
State [ ••• J (SALAZAR 1,386), "to 0~9aniJe the Nation, f-~om 
top to bottom, with the ditte~ent mani..te~tati..on~ 01. coLLective 
Lif-e, ~ince /.amLI..!J. to admi..ni~t~ati..ve bodie~ and economic and 
mo~aL co~po~ation~, and inte~~ate the whole into the State" 
(SALAZAR r,91) - see also SALAZAR 1,84-87, 1,208, 1,288, IV, 
259. Thus tIthe State i~ the Nation ~ociaLL!J. o~~aniled" 
(SALAZAR rv, 1 a 1 ). 
"T he State not onL!J. k.now~ the economic Lite t ... J and 
lead~ it C ..• J but the economic eLement~ - p~oductive to~ce~ 
_ ente~ into the ~t~uctu~e 01. t.he State,_ t.he~ a~e pa~t 01. it~ 
con~titution" (SALAZAR I ,288). CAETANO says, in the same 
direction, that "the State should icentify itself with the 
Nation as rr.uch as possible" (CAETANO 1956, in ZORRO 1969,65). 
2.2.3. Consequences of this incorporation - the State is the 
only representative of the Nation 
As a consequence of this incorporation of the Nation into 
the State this is the only representative of the Nation. "One 
cannot avoid, mainL~ in a count~~ which wa~ to~med a~ ou~~ wa~ 
to~med, that the State be the ett.ect.ive ~ep~e~entative of- the 
Nat.ion" (SALAZAR 1933 - see also SALAZAR 1939,84,251). He 
adds that the expression of the Nation is more or less 
dignified in accordance with the very dignity of the State. 
As this relationship should be an umbilical one. it 
cannot have intermediaries. One can hypothesise that this is 
one more reason why the party systems had to be rejected, 
since parties embody the existence of different interpretations 
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of the national int""::!"':st. "Above C ••• ] nati.ona.l.. pallt.ie~ Oil 
.intellnat.iona.l.. .ideo.l..o~i.e~, above a.l...I.. thelle .i~ the Fathell.l..and, 
the pOlltu~ue~e .inteli.e",t"· (CAETANO 1944, in ZORRO 1969,94). 
"Que~t.ion~ ot. the hi.~he",t nat.iona.l.. .i..ntelle",t welle [.in 
pOlltu~ue~e pllevi.ou~ pallt~ ~~~tem~J ~ubolld.inate to the mOlle 
tll.iv.ial pallt~ con veni.ence~" (CAETANO 1 948, ibidem 136 - see 
also SALAZAR IV, 361 i. As long as there is only one State and 
one Nation there is only one national interest (the national 
interest). The Stat~ through this new corporative relationship 
wi th the nation is a~le to formulate and implement, wi thout 
party intermediaries, this national interest. In fact, the 
State is a better r~;resentative of the nation than the 
parties since it in~:~porates the nation corporatively 
organized - SALAZAR :,87,288. It is what Salazar someti~es 
called "Oll~an.ic demoC:i.ac~"(NOTE 14). 
2.3. The basic principles of corporatism 
2.3.1. Man is seen i~corporated in primary groups 
Society is an a~straction. What really exists is various 
societies (CAETANO 1941,45-49). All men live in those 
societies which are natural groups like family, neighbourhood 
communi ty and vol un tary groups Ii ke profession, associations, 
etc. (see SALAZAR I,~5-87, CAETANO 1941,46-49,60-61). Thus 
society is net an a=~ociation of indivic1u.:1lc:, but a com:nunity 
of primary societies (CAETANO 1967 in ZORRO, 1969,49). 
Individuals should ~=t be seen in isolation, but only as being 
incorporated in those societies. 
Those primary ~ups can be natural or voluntary. The most 
important natural group is family, ".i..ltlleduc..ible ~oc.i..al cell"; 
(SALAZAR 1,85) on "v.rhose moral solidi ty the structure of the 
Nation is built" (SALAZAR 1936 - see also SALAZAR I,203, III 
357, CAETANO 1941.46). The second is neighbourhood community 
(the "commune" in CAETANO's words) - vicinage is source of 
much community of interests (see SALAZAR 1,86, CAETANO 1941, 
47-48) . 
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From the voluntary groups the most important 
in which "~.im.i.l..all.it~ .in l.ive.l...i..hood, communion in 
wolth, contllibuti.on t.OIl the ~ame objective [ ••• ]" 
48) creates naturally communion of interests. 
is the "profession" 
patteltn ot. 
(CAETANO 1941 
There are several associati0ns to w~ich men belonQs -
cultural, educational, scientific, literary, technical, 
welfare, religious, entertaining associations where communion 
of interests is the main reason of their creation and 
existence (see SALAZAR 1,86, CAETANO 1941,60). 
Then it comes, on the top of all, a natural group to 
which everybody belongs - the n~tional community. 
2.3.2. Organic representation of interests 
All those social group are the "~t./l.uct.u/l.a.l e.lement.~" or 
"component. o/l.9-an.i.~m~" or ".l.i.v.i.n9 /..o/l.ce~ /' of the Nation (t\OTE 
15). Those struct~ral elements are incorporated into the State, 
as said above. This incorporation provides a system of 
interest represen tation y,rhich is more effective thm that 
based on trade unions and employer's association and on 
democratic liberal principles. As SALAZAR says - "he/le.i.t..i.~ 
a man.i.te~t.at..i.on ot t.he /l.ep/l.e~ent.at..i.on ~~~t.em wh.i.ch -i~ mO/le 
ta.i.t.htul t.han an~ ot.he/l.", SALAZAR 1,87). 
Organic representation of interests is the essence of 
corporatism. Corporations are the institutional instrument 
which embody organic representation. They are "9/leat. nat.-iona.l 
a~~oc-iat.-ion~ wh-ich -int.e9/lat.e t.he 0/l9an-iJat..i.on~ wh-ich /lep/le~ent. 
t.he va/l.i.ou~ act..i.v-it..i.e~ and p/lote1~ion~ cont./l.i.but..i.n9 t.o a 
~pec.i.t.i.c ~oc.i.a.l tunct.ion, mak.i.n9 ettect..i.ve t.he peacetu.l 
coope/lat.-ion ot a.l.l t.ho~e -int.e/l.e~t.~ -invo.lved -in t.he pe/lto/lmance 
ot t.hat. tunct..i.on, unde/l t.he conce/ln to/l nat.-iona.l -int.e/l.e~t." 
(CAETANO 1950,11 ). "The~ a/le neve/l o/l.9an-i~m~ me/le.l~ d-i/lect.ed 
t.o economic 9u-idance; t.he~ a/le ~oc-ia.l bod-ie~"( CAETANO 1941,24)' 
Corporations are artificial persons, autonomous from the 
state, which can issue norms and regulations for their members 
(CAETANO 1941,24-25). They "coordinate, represent and deffend 
its interests in prosecution of common good" (Law n Q2086, 
22-8-1956). It is an important role of Corporations to adjust 
individual or group interests to the national interest. 
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2.3.3. Cooperation of classes 
A third basic principle of corporatism is class 
cooperation as opposed to class struggle. "We do not. accept. 
the Ldea of. LncompatLbLiLt~ of. Lnt.e~e~t~ between empio~e~~ and 
wo~ke~1" (SALAZAR V,463-464 - see also 1,193,207, V. 495-496; 
CAETANO 1941,61 ,65). ."Co~po~atLon~ a~e Ln~t~ument~ of. 
concLiLatLon of. ten~Lon~ ~ene~ated withLn ~~eat nat.Lonai 
activLtLe1" (CAETANO 1 969,24 - see also pages 42 a'1d 192) (NOTE 16). 
As a logical consequence employers , technicians and 
'Workers should participate in the government of corpora ti ve 
bodies (CAETANO 1941,71) (NOTE 17). 
2.3.4. Hierarchv 
organic representa~ion gives the re~resentational 
monopoly of interests to corporations - as such it presupposes 
a regime of limited pluralism and thus i~plies an 
authori tarian regime. Such a regime favours a hierarchy which 
is also implied in organic representation. 
As PINTO says corporatism is based on the principle of 
"vertical structure of society" - that is, society instead of 
being divided into strata it is divided in vertical slices, 
each slice encompassing all the acti vi ties of a nation in a 
certain domain (see PINTO 1960) .. Wi thin each slice there 
should be a hierarchy. 
As each hierarchichal level has its own powers and 
corporations are not dissolved into the State, corporatism 
does not give all authority to the state, but, using CARDOSO 
expression , divides and pul veri zes authori ty (CARDOSO 1949,11 ). 
2.4. The Corporative State 
2.4.1. Types of corporatism 
Corporatism can be integral when all activities of 
society are corporatised! or partial when only some acti vi ties, 
generally the economic ones, are subject to corporative 
organization. 
Corporatism can be pure when corporative organizations 
are the only basis of poli tical structure or subordinate when 
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the corp~rative structure is dependent from a political 
structur~ not based on corporatist principles. 
Corp:>ratism can also be a corporatism of association 
when corporations are created by spontaneous initiative of 
agents of social life and can develop outside the state. State 
Corporatism happens when it is the state which creates 
corporations and incorporates them into the state or controls 
them. 
(See about those distinctions MARTINEZ 1967, SCHMITTER 
1974,1975. WIAR~A 1973,1974,1977,7). 
Those distinctions will help to characterize the type of 
corporat::;r.1 that it was formulated and that which was implenented 
and thus :0 enlighten the role of the state in regard to civil 
society I :;~TE 1 S ) . 
2.4.2. Features of the Corporative State 
a) :te Corporative State as global model of society 
AS ;lobal model of society, encompassing economic, 
political. social, cultural, educational activities, a 
corporative state must follow an integral and pure corporatism 
of association. As such it is an alternative both to communism 
and capi:alism. to socialism and liberalism (NOTE 19). 
b) 7;.e Corporative State creates a new way to structure 
~=::;nor.1ic life 
The economy should be self-governed by great corporations 
represer.ting the main economic activities, which is better 
than an economy led by the government - see SALAZAR 1,239, 
SALAZAR 1936 (NOTE 20). 
c) The Corporative State represents a new organization 
and structure of political power 
The basis for the participation of any individual in the 
governmer.t tasks of the state is his social utility; as this 
social utili ty is generated in the primary group in which he 
is incorporated he should only exercise his political rights 
in those primary societies (CAETANO 1967 in ZORRO 1969,49-51 
- see also CAETANO 1941,61 ). 
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In a pure corporatism those primary societies will be th~ 
main contributors for the election of sovereignty bodies a:1d 
for the elaboration of laws. They will constitute a 
"corporative parliament" (CAETANO 1972 a,330) (NOTE 21). 
d) The Corporative State proposes a new structure for 
public administration 
The new structure of public administration is brought 
about by the setting up of corporative administration as 
important part of public administration. As CAETANO says "The 
co~po~at~ve ~e9~me ~~ that one ~n wh~ch the p~ob~em~ ot each 
one ot the 9~eat econom~c. ~p~~~tual and mo~a~ tunct~on~ ot 
the Nat~on a~e handed ove~ to tho~e who pa~t~c~pate ~n the~~ 
execut~on o~9an~Jed ~n ~lobal a~~oc~at~on~ called f£~e£~~i~£~~ 
C ... J J t ~~ the C o~po~at~on wh~ch w~ll ler;.~t~mately. abta~n a 
~ha~e at publ~c powe~ to o~9an~Je. ~e9u~ate and d~~c~pl~ne 
tho~e acti..v~t~e~ C ... 1 ~' (CAETANO 1941,89)· - see also CAETANO 
1970 a,370). 
There v:ill be three main types of public administration -
~tate, local and corporative administration. As the state v:i11 
have to share important administrative tasks wi th local 
authorities and corporations one will have a decentralized 
administration. "The co~po~at~ve ~e9~me ~~ one at ~e~t-
-90ve~nment, a ~y.~tem h~r;.hiy. decent~ai~J~n9 ~n economy. and 
adm~n~~t~at~on, wll.O~e cent~~tu9-ai tendency. w~il be balanced 
~y. a ~t~on9 ~()ve~nment" (CAETANO 1941,90 - see also ibidem 56, 
88, CAETANO 1970 a,248,370. SALAZAR 1,86-87, III 361). 
The transformation of the "social pluralism" into 
"juridic pluralism" "constitutes a reaction against 
centralist tendencies" (MARTINEZ 1967). 
But corporative principles should penetrate also state 
administration - CAETANO said that in a corporative regime all 
ministries must be corporations, meaning that they should 
proceed according to corporative spirit and in perfect 
cooperation with corporative organizations (CAETANO 1950,13). 
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2.4.3. T~~ relationshi~ b~t~een the Corporative State, 
i~1ividuals and civil society 
"C04po4ative o~9aniiation aim~ in tact to ~o~ve the 
p~obiem ol ~eiation~hip between the individuai and the State 
in a wa~ which ~eem~ to me adequate: to ~e~t~ict and t~an~t04m 
the exe~ci~e ot po~itica~ and economic t~eedom to p~e~e~ve 
individuai l~eedom"' (CAET~~O 1941,118). It is "the oni~ 
t04muia ~hich mana~e~ to ha~moniie the need ot 0~9aniiation 
with the p~incipie ot l4eedom" (CAETANO 1950,24). 
Cor~~ratism is clearly put by CAETANO, in 1934, as a 
system '~:_:ch guaranteed to persons as mucr. indi vidual freedcr:1 
(civic fr~edom) as liberal:sr:1, but in a new framework of 
relatio~5hip state - in~ividual (see CAETANO 1934 speech "The 
individt.:c.l and the State :.:: corporative doctrine" in CAETA~:O 
1941,107-126) (NOTE 22). 
As can be deduced also from all that v,'as said until no'", 
corporatism proposes a new sc~ for the relationship 
between state and civil society, by incorporating interest 
repre5e~tation of the latter into the former. 
This representation is done by intermediary social bodies 
called Corporations ""hich ;nedia te between the individual and 
the state. In representir.; civil society interests upon the 
state th;j' will subordinate individual and corporative 
interes:s to national interest. 
In crder to accomplish this mediating role the State 
conferred upon corporations certain powers - they are 
artificial persons in regard to the law, they can produce 
common law, they perform public administration tasks and are 
the basis of political representation. 
There is a transformation of the "social pluralism" into 
"juridical pluralism" thus reinforcing the autonomy of the 
corporati ve organizations in regard to the state (see CAETANO 
1970a, 369). 
2.4.4. The role of the State in the Corporative State 
It is clear that Corporations and intermediary 
Corporati ve organizations are autonomous from the state (see 
CAETANO 1941,56,88-89, CAETANO 1950,22); they even should be 
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free not to obey unJubt or abusive commands of tht:: 
POlitical power (CAETANO 1950,22). 
The state is at the same time a corporation and a 
supercorporation. As corporation it had tasks of public order, 
national defense and external representation. All other 
activities which haj been being absorbed by the State (as 
education, health, communications, etc.) could be handed ever 
to corporations. So the corporative state would be, in the 
purest version of the theory, a minimum state; but not in the 
liberal way, that is, by leaving tQ private initiative all 
those activities, but by transfering them to intermeciate 
bodies (see CARDO~: 1949,29, HARTI!;EZ 1967). 
But the stat~ is also superccrpcration whOSe task, i~ 
that quality, is t~ coordinate an= supervise corpora::ons 
(MARTINEZ 1967 - see also SALAZAR r,89, CAETANO 1941,26). 
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3. CONTRADICTIONS AND PARADOXES WITHIN NEW STATE THEORY ABOUT 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
3.1. Contradictions within New State theory about the role of 
the state 
3.1.1. Contradictions and paradoxes 
As it is clear, there is contradiction between a streng 
state discourse and a pure corporative discourse. 
The state must be strong and have a doctrine in order to 
rebuild the nation and lead society, being its moral leader; 
but, at the same time, the state will set up Corporations 
representing the various interests which will be autonomous 
from the state and will prepi tiate a system of econorr.ic SE:lf-
-government. 
Those Corporations should be autonomous from the state, 
but, at the same time, incorporated into it, as all the nation 
corporatively organized, must be incorporated into the state. 
The very state has a dual nature - it is a the same time 
a corporation and a supercorporation. 
The ambigui ties, contradictions and even paradoxes go up 
to the political structure, based, on one side, on 
concentration of powers and a strong and dominant Government, 
according to the strong state discourse, and based, on the 
other side, in pulveri~ation of authority and sharing of power 
through the bestowal of juridic status to Corporations. 
The contradictions go on to public administration which 
should be, at the same time, centralized and decentralized. 
The relationships between the state and civil society 
appear sometimes as that of a state-father or the national 
"patr~o" (boss) (softened by the image of the state-pedagogue 
of the nation) which effectively eliminates intermediaries 
between the nation and the state; on other times, one is 
presented with a more liberating vision of a society in 
dialogue with the state through those intermediary social 
bodies - the Corporations (NOTE 23). 
Corporations will be the main basis of political power 
and, at same time, CAETANO proposed a "national corporation of 
politics" which is the sole party(CAETANO 1938), which would 
take away from real corporations this power. 
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3.1.2. The exemplificaticn with New State discourse about t~e 
role of the State in economy 
All those inconsistencies are present as contradictions 
or hesi tations in the regime discourse about the role of the 
state in economy, which will be used as exemplification of what 
was said. 
SALAZAR asserts that "The proposi tion that the naticn' s 
economic interests should be directed by the state is almost 
self-evident" (SALAZAR 1,291, translation of ROBINSON 1979. 
129) and CAETANO sees in it a natural consequence of the 
primate of Spirit over Matter (CAETANO 1934, in CAETANO 1950, 
23). On the other hand, SALAZAR thinks that a· self-governed 
eco~omy :5 better than an economy led by the government 
(SALAZAR 1,293) and CAETA~:O cri tici zes, in 1950, the appa:-en t 
abandon of this self-government (CAETANO 1950). 
In 1953, SALAZAR says that the five years plan was 
formulated takir.g into account "the whole set of (financialj 
possibili ties that State and individuals can use for certain 
objectives" (SALAZAR V,124, our emphasis). At the same time, 
all New State discourse is punctuated with several bows to 
private initiative, statements about State intentions to give 
up mixed ownership of mixed capi tal companies once they WAre 
properlly launched (SALAZAR I, preface,V,109-110), solemn 
denegations of a~y intenticn to put the control of the ""'hcle 
economy in the hands of the state (see, for instance, SALAZAR 
I 11,67), abjuration of any s ta te sociali sm (SALAZAR in FERRO 
1982,106-107 ). 
Just to impress more the extent of those contradictions 
a brief reference to New State practice is needed (a more 
detailed reference to the statist practice will be done later 
on in this chapter) . 
. In order to implement the "mode~ate inte~ventioni~m" 
(SALAZAR 1,211 ) effectively practiced, several mechanisms were 
proposed and set up - the "Organizations of economic 
coordination" (see CAETANO 1970a, 361-363), the five years 
plans ("PIanos de Fomento") launched in the 1950s(NOTE 24), 
many administrative departments, the setting up of mixed 
capital companies (privately and publicly financed) (see 
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SALAZAR I, prefac~, V,109-110), the existence of public 
companies, credit facilities for economic agents (CAETANO 
1959,224-225), public investments in basic industries (ibidem) 
the "condicionarrento industrial" (industrial conditioning) (see BRITO 1985). 
But, in 1957, 'were finally created the economic Corporations, 
that is,not just lower and intermediary level corporative 
bodies, but the full ones the corporative bodies"par excellence" 
the ones which would assure economic self-government. 
3.2. The awareness of New State leaders of those contradictions 
and their danger - the fear of the "socialism without 
doctrine" 
The leaders cf the New State were aware of some of those 
contraditions. 
The need to produce apologizing statements or to blame 
some factors for the excesses of state interventionism are 
indicators of this awareness. For instance, CAETANO, in 1957. 
says - "it were infrequent the cases in which the intervention 
(in industrial cOr:1panies] was a resul t of deliberate purpose 
in order to implement any policy in consonance with any 
doctrinaire interventionist principles" (CAETANO 1959.222). 
Several factors had been blamed for those excesses - the 
fragili ty of portuguese society (this chapter,section 1.4.2) the 
characteristics cf portuguese people (chapter two,section 1.1) 
the Second 'vJorld War (chapter eight, section 2.2.2), etc. 
Thi s awareness can al so be read in the between the lines 
doubts and in the lines hesitations. For instance, SALAZAR 
seems to mistrust state willingness to give up partial 
ownership of mixed capi tal companies once they were properlly 
launched (SALAZAR I. preface, SALAZAR V,110); he fears state 
corruption through intervention in the economy (SALAZAR I, 
preface); CAETANO, in 1951, doubts that had been reached an 
equilibrium between government I 5 authori ty and professional 
and economic freedom (in CAETANO 1959,173-174). 
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But the main indicator of the awar~ness of New State 
leaders ~f thc~e contradictions is the fear of their 
onesided statist solution. Indeed they feared the 
implemente:tion in Portugal, through gradual unnoticed state 
interven:ionism,of a n~ociaLi~m without doct4ine n (CAETANO), 
a "~tate ~ ocial.i~m " (SALAZAR ), a "white bol.~ch e vi~m" ( TEOTONIO 
PEREIRA) . 
As ~arly as 1932 SALAZAR confesses to FERRO his fears 
about th~ adequa~ of a state socialism to the 
characteristics of portuguese people, to their inborn 
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self - indulgC::!1ce c.rld bureaucratic delirium (see this chapter, sections 1.4.2.,1.5) 
This pcr:~gues~ tendency to live at the expenses of the state 
could i!1~~ce ~~willingly a state socialism. 
The SA~AZAR's socialist fear syndrom is revealed in 
several state;n<;nts - for instance, he speaks of "tte 
elephantcid ctaracter of the mounstruous modern State" 
(SALAZAR IV, 245 - our emphasis) and he does not see "in the 
growing socialization neither economic interest C ... J nor 
social ir.~erest C ... J nor poli tical interest" (SALAZAR I, 
210) • 
CAETANO seems even more obsessed than SALAZAR by the 
possible invasion of the society by the State. He particularly 
fears thE: cornir.g of a "socialism. wi thout doctrine". He fears 
that "um.,r:' 11 ir.gly, and even wi thout one noticing it, we go 
Ii ttle by Ii ttle sliding towards pure socialism", towards the 
"wors t of all social isms II the "~ociaLi~m without doct4ine" . 
This kind of socialism can be introduced under non socialist 
principles, or even under anti-socialist ones; thus it does 
not provoke any reaction of the victim, whose awareness of its 
coming will be too late (CAETANO 1950,19-20). 
He was already protesting in 1941, against "this idea 
that nothing is possible wi thout the favour of the state and 
its permanent protection" (CAETANO 1941,27). Still in 1957 he 
considers a very dangerous illusion to see in the State the 
dispenser of all wealth (in CAETANO 1959,237) (NOTE 25). 
Even corporatist implementation was seen, in the 
beginning, by some,as a sort of "white bol.~chevi~m" (see 
PEREIRA 1937). 
All those fears of SALAZAR and CAETAI~,) are cl ear 
indicatcrs that they too were aware of the contradiction. 
3.3. An hypothesis - two separate discourses about the role 
of the state 
All those contradictions and paradoxes cannot be seen as 
mere product of natural oscillations of emphasis in order to 
make clear either the differences in regard to the liberal 
state or ~he frontier in regard to the socialist state (NOTE 
2f». ThO:::1 also cannot be explained just :;. ter1!1s of natural 
gaps wi t~~in the same ideological context ~~tween theory and 
practice, theoricians a~d practicians, int~~lectuals and 
politicia~s (NOTE 27). 
In the beginning of this chapter the p~esentation of 
New State theory as two separate discourses was justified 
as an analytical method. Now one can go Orie step further and 
hypotesize that the "strong state" discourse leading to 
"moderate interventionism" (SALAZAR 1,211) and the corporative 
discourse leading to a predominantly self-governed economy and 
society are really two separate discourses. 
To carry evidence for the l~gi timacy of this hypothesis 
a table ef canparison was drawn which shows t::e complete internal 
logic of each discourse. 
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TABLE 7.1 - COMPARISON OF NEW STATE DISCOURSES 
ABOUT THE ROLE OF TEE STATE 
CORPORATIVE DISCOURSE 
1 - Emphasis on Nation 
2 - A minimum state 
3 - The historical Nation as 
mould for the State 
4 - "Incorporation of the 
Nation into the State" 
5 - Social and juridic pluralism 
as guara~tee of respect for 
individ~al rights 
6 - Self-government of economy 
STRONG STATE DISCOURSE 
1 - Emphasis on State 
2 - A "strong state" 
3 - The State as 'rebuilder 
of the Nation 
4 
-
The State as leader 
of society 
5 - Ethical and pragmatic 
-
limits to State action 
6 - The State leads economic 
life-"moderate 
interventionism" 
i I 7 - Political power is based 7 - A "strong government" 
I 
I 
on the organic naticn, 
that is, in corporations 
8 - A decentralized 
administration 
9 - Mediaev~: municipalism 
as admi~istrative model 
8 - A centralized 
administration 
("concentration of all 
kinds of resources") 
9 - Enlightened despotism 
and 1930s authoritorianism 
as sources of inspiration 
for an administrative 
model. 
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3.4. An initial explanation for the contradictions and 
paradoxes of New State discourse about the role of the 
State 
There are not only internal contradictions within the 
theory, but contradictions between theory and practice, which 
will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
But one can already call attention to some aspects WhlCh 
contribute for an initial explanation of the contradictions. 
3.4.1. Tr.e corporatist theoreticians explanation-
O~e must acknowledge that Portuguese corporatist 
theoreticians were aware of (some of) those contradictions, 
which is evidenced by the theoretical cover they tried to give 
to such discrepancies (NOTE 28). 
Their usual explanation in that there was a pre-
-corporative stage before full corporatism could be set up to 
its full application. In this pre-corporative stage the state 
had to be a strong state, a moral leader preparing the future 
corporative stage. This is the only one which could be 
properly so called corporative (see about this LUCENA 1976a, 
WIARDA 1977). 
In this an enlightening explanation or just a mere 
theoretical face saving formula? Had the regime lived al'l..'ays 
in a pre-corporative stage? 
3.4.2. Contradictory historical sources for New State theory 
One must call special attention for the contradictions 
in the different historical sources of inspiration of New 
State, since they can enlighten the referred internal 
theoretical contradictions (NOTE 29). 
The New State doctrine is explicitly inspired in 
portuguese history and traditions (this chapter,section 1.3.2) This 
inspiration is affiliated in different historical traditions, 
periods and ideas. It reflects respect and nostalgia for 
mediaeval and modern age municipalism and corporatism ( as a 
system of self-government of local and professional 
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communities) and, at the same time, fascination for 
Enlightened Despotism (Enlightenment); that is, New State 
leaders missed local seltgovernment and corporative traditions 
and t at the same time, they admired absol ute power from divine 
origin. 
This same ambiguity was already present in one of the 
ideolooical sources of the reaime - "intearalismo lusi tano" 
(chapter o~e ,section 2.1.1) - NOTE 30) and, in a certain way, in 
portuguese corpora tist theory. In this respect one can call 
attention to the role of moral leader given to the state which 
contains the seeds cf interventionism (see FERREIRA 1951, for 
instance), the incorporation of the nation into the state 
"which makes thi s one only representative cf the Nation, the 
dual nature of the stat<:= as corporation c!id supercorporation 
and the very tradi ticn cf natural corporat:sm which is one of 
patrimonialist state corporatism (see NOTE 29). 
That is, the New State used to build its political theory 
sources which appealed both to self-Governnent and to central 
government, to decentralisation and to centralisation to a 
lively civil society and toa =ontrolled one. The traces of 
those different tradi tions are imprinted in New State theory 
about the role of the State. 
3.4.3. The international context "in which ~ew State theory was 
built 
To add to those contradictions in the historical sources 
one must acknowledge that international context in which New 
State theory was built was also contradictory. 
Side by side with international Catholic pressures 
towards the implementation of some sort of corporatism which 
could incorporate the Catholic Church social doctrine there 
were totalitarian trends and practices. 
During the 19305 several regimes adopted the label of 
"New State". The main principles of those "New States" were - the 
necessity of state intervention in economic life,the important 
role of the state in maintaining social uni ty, the existence 
of strong government (see CAETANO 1968). But those principles 
can both be realized in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. 
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T~at is, internati0~al influences w~!e also contradictory. 
But on~ must acknowledg~ that the totalitarian trend was 
very influent at the time. 
3.4.4. The heterogeneity 0f the elite 
Or.e had already saie that nei ther r:-:w State ideological 
sources were homogeneous r.or it was hO:T,cgeneous his eli te -
- see cr.apter one,section 2. 
The differences in historical and tra=itional sources 
interact wi th those ideological and pol: ::cal differences in 
the elite. These differe~:es are even tra~slated in the 
existence of groups with:~ the regime. 7~~ corporatist 
group '",'as a very intellE:'::ual minori ty '",': ::-.in the regime, as 
can be seen in WIARDA's s:udy about Pc:'t\..!;-...;.::-se corporatism' 
(WIARDA 1977). This group emphasized a5p~:ts which were 
forgotten by the other group which was :-;.~re statist oriented 
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- see v.'IARDA 1977,194 (NCTE 31). From t:-.:se other groups one 
must acknowledge that, as seen above (cha;:ter o~e,sectio!1 2.1.1 }there ".;:::.= 
one which was even oriented towards a tot:::.litarian state. Eut 
this group was also a minority group. 
That is, the heterogeneity of histcr:cal and traditional 
sources and of international context ~a5 reflected in the 
heterogeneity of the elite. 
Those are not full explanations of the contradictions and 
paradoxes of New State theory about the :-cle the State. They 
serve just as immediate and ini tial explanations useful for 
a better understanding of what was said a~d of the coming 
section. Indeed it is now time to enquire ~hat was the 
prevailing discourse about the role of the state regarding 
education. Does it reproduce the same =~r.tradictions present 
in the general discourse about the role of the State? We will 
try to answer this question in the next section. 
4. THE THEORY ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN EDUCATION 
There was, at l~ast, initially, also contradictory 
discourses about the role of the state in ~ducation. 
There was a non interventionist discourse favouring the 
control of the family over the education of their children. 
This was the corporative discourse in which the family was 
considered the first "structural element" over which the 
corporative nation was organized - s~e this C'haptE'r,s~t. 2.3.~ ,2.3.2. 
But soon an interventionist discourse was developed, 
which was strongest in the period of the fascistization 
of th~ ~i711E'. Tr.~ Minister of Educ~tl(jn 
CARNEIRO PACHECO (1936-1940) personified t~e totalitaria~ :one 
of this discourse and the Hinister of Ed;..;-:~tion PIRES DE :'U1A 
(1947-1955) its authoritarian administra:ive version. This 
last version represents the true discourse of the New State 
about the role of the State in education, the one which 
prevailed and was implemented, as shall be seen. 
We will present first the corporative discourse, linking 
it with corporative theory, and then the interventionist 
discourse, linking it with the "strong state" discourse. 
4.1. The corporative discourse in education 
As theorical background to uncersta;;~ the corporative 
discourse in education a brief exp1anatic~ of the integral 
concern of corporatism will be needed. 
4.1.1. Portuguese corporatism should be an integral 
corporatism 
As seen ab:>ve (this chapter,section 204.' ), corporatism can 
be integral when all activities of society are corporatized. Portuguese 
corporatism was explicity intended to be an integral 
corporatism. SALAZAR said, in 1934, that the organization of 
corporations "comprehends from material interests to 
intellectual and moral ones" (SALAZAR I,288), comprehends 
"moral corporations" (SALAZAR I,345) such as education, 
science, arts, entertainment, sports, welfare ,etc (see CARDOSO 
1949,28-29, MARTINEZ 1967). As portuguese corpora ti sm was not 
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restricted to the econcmic sphere and thus should be an 
integral corporatism (NOTE 32), education should be 
corporatized. 
4.1.2. The rrevailing role of the family, primary corpora:~ve 
structural element, in the education of children 
The main "structural element" of corporatism - the f2.:7.:ly 
- should be the primary responsible for the education of 
children (see SALAZAR 1,341 ). 
This principle was given consti tutional status. In the 
Consti tution of 1933, family is considered "the pll.i.mall.!I ba~i-1 
of.. education" being tbe role of the Statt;; and municipal: :::'025 
to "f..acilitate to pall.ent-1 thi-1 dut!l of.. in~tll.uctin~ and 
educati.n9 theill. chiidll.en" (articles 11 a~~ 13) (NOTE 33). 
"[ducation and in-1tll.uction all.e compul-1oll.!I and all.e entIl.U-1te~ 
to f..amii!l and to of..f..icial Oil. pll.ivate educationai 
e-1tabLi-1hment~ in coopell.ation with the f-amiL!I" (article 42). 
There was a clear distinction between education and 
instruction, the latter being the transmission of informa:ion 
and education the socialization in values, norms, habits, 
attitudes. So what the Constitution says is that the State 
cannot instruct or educate against the values of the fa.:7.ily 
and ,at the sa.'TIe time, that the state has, in the educat:'cnal 
field, a merely sl.lplemental role (SALAZA:\ in GARNIER no ~~te, 
63-64) . 
But th:s discourse was already marked wi th some me!': tal 
reservatio~ for instance, the same Consti tution which co;:-~;,i ts 
to fa:nily the role of educating the new generation cornmi ts to 
the state "the formation of character, of profissional value 
and of all civic and moral virtues" (article 43). Thus it is 
possible that state socialization contradicts family 
socialization. 
Another example of thi s reservation can be seen when S/u'/lZA.~ 
conditions the merely supplemental role of school to the 
recognition of "educating competence" in concrete families 
(SALAZAR in GARNIER no date, 64). 
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4.1.3. The corporatization of educational government and 
management 
In consonance wi th the predominance of the family in the 
education of children. and by application of the general 
corporati ve discourse. the government and management 0: the 
educational system should be corporatized and decentralized. 
There should be minimal state interference and a 
proliferation of corporative bodies, where the major part of 
the decisions were bargained and taken. Some would be taken 
at state level, but even then in corporative spirit since, 
according to corporatist theory. all ministries should 
proceed with corporative spirit. 
The Corporation of Education should be the apex 0: all 
educational government of education. The influence of fa~:lies 
within this corporatism should be prevailing. 
4.1.4. The corporatisation of Universities 
The University, as the main educational organi~tion. 
should also be corporatized. Indeed the university was already 
a natural corporati on but should now be corporatized in the 
national scheme of corporatisation of society activities. 
The subject of corporatis 3.tion of uni versi ty was not a 
main concern of corporatist theo~icians. but even so deserved 
more attention than the general corporatisation of the 
educational system (NOTE 34). 
The first aspect of this corporatisation should be, 
according to CARDOSO's book "The University - corporative 
institution", published in 1952, the setting of a corporative 
hierarchy - the School or Faculty - the University - the 
Federation of Universities - the Corporative Council. 
The second aspect of this corporatisation is the 
initiation of a different pattern of social relationships 
between students and professors. The university professor 
should interact wi th his students outside the classroom thus 
providing opportunity for the fulfilment of his role as 
educator of youth. This is a so important aspect that CAETANO 
made an important conference only about this theme ("New 
Uni versi ty - the problem of relationships between professors 
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and students" given in Coimbra, in 1942) and CARDOSO su~g,=sts 
the se~ing up of a social interaction classroom of on~ hour 
per discipline per week (CARDOSO 1952,16) (NOTE 35). 
A third aspect of the corporatisation 
is the participation of students in the 
university (CARDOSO 1952,26-27). 
of the Universi ty 
management of th~ 
All this implied a more autonomous university than ~'= 
know it was the case (s,=,-,::, chapter 5, sKtion 2.3) - see CAETA:'~O 
1949, CARDOSO 1952,25 . 
4.1.5. The inculcation of a corporative mentality - a 
corporative curriculum 
The corporati sa t ien of the educa tior,a1 sys tern and c: all 
national ar:tivities irr.plied the inculcat:'on of a corpc:-:=.:ive 
mentali ty in the new generation through the school. The.: is, 
it was necessary to scci;.lize children a.lJd youth wi th 
new corporative ideals and institutions. 
This corporative curriculum was indispensable for t~e 
preparation of corporative eli tes. As the main role of s::::hool 
was the preparation of eli tes (chapter tw:),section 2.1) a'1d t!'.~ 
preparation of corporative elites was instrumental in the 
inplementation of corporatism (chapter thrE"?,section 2.2.1) t:-.-::-
corporative curriculum was instrumental for the establisc~ment 
of the Corporative State. 
4.2. The strong state discourse in education 
Alongside this corporative discourse applied to education 
there was also the strong state discourse. That is, New State 
ideas about education follow, at least initially, the same 
contradictory pattern already seen in the discourse about the 
general role of the state. 
4.2.1. The pedagogical role of the state towards society 
The strong state should have a pedagogical role towards 
society - SALAZAR speak of the "educative function which 
should be given to this moderate interventionism" (SALAZAR I, 
211 ), CAETANO asserts that the state is the "pedagogue which 
teaches the whole Nation" (CAETANO 1941,133 - see above page 
107) (NOTE 36). 
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The strong state, as an ethical state, :~ould be the 
moral leader of society (CARDOSO 1949,11 FER?EI RA 1951, LEITE 
285 
1936, SALAZAR in GARNIER no date, 63 -see this chapter, s~cti0n 1.2). 
The role of the state as educator,as moral leader, 
directs us to the problem of the state as psli tical educator 
of masses. As seen above, al though there wo:re deftenders of 
such a role (chapt~r on'?,section 2.1.1 )political ejucation of 
masses was not implemented because it was incompatible wi th 
the true authori tarian nature of the regime (chapter three, 
section 2.2). 
Tha tis, if one considers that the ed:..:ca ti ona1 role of 
the state demands m:,bilisation of masses to ;:::li tically 
educa te :r;Ern, one mus t acknowl edge that those s tatemen t s were 
just part of tte radical tone inherent to th~ :3ctical a~d 
defE'nsiv,= mobil i si ng s tra tegi es of the f as:: s ti zati on period 
of the regime. 
If O;je considers that the educational role of the state 
towards society can be performed through the shaping of 
structures and insti tutions, that is, through administrative 
and organizational strategies and through "a i7:ild but constant 
pre s sure" (cha~ter three, section 2.4.2) then the NE-.... ' State perfor1l,ed 
such a role. 
4.2.2. , r~c:""~r~~ t·; 11' ty T:-:e '=- :-'_l._ ... ~ of the state in th~ instructio~ and 
€cucation and youth 
We have already said that the .cor.urjt:n'lE:'r.: to families of 
the main responsabi1i ty in the education (soc:alisation) of 
children was a qualified attribution. As SALAZAR clearly said 
in 1934 "Jt i.A .iJnpo~~.i..b-le /.Oll. u~ to conce.i..ve ne.i..thell. wou-ld we 
evell. aJ.J.ow .i..t, that OUIl. ~chooJ.~ ~hou-ld be d.i..voll.ced tll.om C ... 1 
the nat.i..on C, •. 1 neithell. couJ.d we pell.mit that the ?oll.tu~ue~e 
~chooJ.~ -'Jhou-ld Il.ema.i..n neutll.aJ." (SALAZAR 1.307.313 - see also 
SALAZAR 1936 ). 
SALAZAR recognizes the development of modern trends which 
give to the State "The po~~e~~ion at ch.i..-ldhood and ~outh, 
educat.i..on in a nationaJ.i~t dill.ection, the /.oll.mat.i..on at a 
~enell.aJ. menta-l.i..t~, exell.ci-'Je~, ~ame~, ~P0ll.t-'J, the call.e /.Oll.. 
ph~~ica-l and mOll.a-l Il.enewa-l 01. Il.ace, concell.n~ tOll. -'Jc.i..enti/..i..c 
/l.e-1ea/l.ch" (SALAZAR I ,291 ); "the State C ... 1 ex.tend-1 itA 
demand-1 to the tV/l.mation ot the tamil~//l.evindicate-1 the 
in-1t/l.uction and education ot ~outh, cvnt/l.ol O/l. di/l.ect-1 
intellectual acti vit~': (SALAZAR I I I, 235 ) . SALAZAR accepts as 
inevitable this growing role of the state, but rejects its 
totali tarian tone and consequences (fer instance, he rejects 
the control of the State over art - see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 
265). 
All this is not new to us - we have already seen that, 
according to SALAZAR, it is possible the partial modification 
of the portuguese character through education (chapter two,section 1.3) 
the building of the new ma~ depends on educatlon (chapter two, same 
section), through a "mild but constant pressure" a~d the inculcation of 
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a basic mentality (chapter three, section 2.4) ar.d through non mobilizational 
conformist methods (chapter three, section 4.8, ~r~pter four,section 7.1). 
Thus it is evident that the state vindicates for itself 
both the instruction and education of the new generation Thi s is 
contradictory with the solemn constitutional commitment of 
giving the main educative role of children to families. 
This contradiction cannot be solved by theorising that 
the family educates the new generation in a context where the 
state educates society and thus families - first, because this 
meant that the right of families 'was just a delegated 
attribution and net a natural one, which centradicts New State 
statements; second, because the State clearly vindicates the 
direct and immediate use of its right. 
Thus one has again a contradictory discourse of the New 
State about the role of the State in society. 
4.2.3. The theory of the New State about the role of the 
Catholic Church in education 
As have been said above (chG.pter five, section 2.2) there was between 
State and Catholic Church a "moral union with economic and 
administrative separation". 
This relationship was reproduced in the educational 
system (chapter five, section 2.2.7). There was since 1935 an implicit 
pact thereby the state promoted religious education in its 
own official schools (";noral union"), b:.;t under its control, 
and, at the same time, controlled tightly all private schools, 
even those religiously orientated ar:d Ch~rch owned ("economic 
and administrative separation"). 
That is, the New State principle is that the state should 
have the control of all education, incorporating in its own 
schools religious education. 
This is a clear example of a non totalitarian strong 
state discourse. 
4.3. Towards a non totalitarian strong state in education 
It is evident that the New State di5~our5e about the role 
of the State in educaticn reprodU':<:s th-= same contradictions 
of the general discourse about th~ role ~f the State. 
But it is also obvious that the tone cf the 
corporatist discourse applied to ecucati=n is non convincing. 
The dis~ourse ei ther is defiended just by some corporatist 
theoreticians \ as it is the case of the corporatization of 
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uni versi ty), or its just an indication of good i.ntentions (portuguese 
corporatism should be an integral corporatism, the curriculum 
sho'.lld be the transmi tter of corporative r.Jentali ty) or it is just the 
mere application of general corporatist ~rinciples (the 
corporatization of educational government and management). 
The statement about the role of the family is a 
traditional Christian principle which was given a corporative 
phraseology. But even this solid principle is limited and 
contradicted in the same Constitution which recognizes it. 
The strong state applied to education is clearly much 
more convincing; it is much more easy to believe that is meant 
to be implemented. There appears to be even some totali tarian 
tones in part of this discourse. But this tone is part of the 
radical tone used in the fascis ti za tion period - as has been 
seen, it was not implemented any political education of masses. 
There are specific indicators, beyond the general ones 
already analyzed in previous chapters, of rejection of a 
totalitarian version of the strong state in education. First, 
the mere existence of a non interventionist discourse, even 
in a feeble tone; second, the consti tutional status given to 
the role of the family in education, even with its li~itations; 
third. the moral union with the Churc~. 
Thus the strong discourse is mu(::-. more convincing than 
the corporative discourse. but its totalitarian version is not 
accepted. This seems to point to the prevalence of the 
implementation of an administrative st~~~g state in education. 
The implementation of New State theory a!:Jout the role of the 
State in education will be analyzed in =hapter nine. 
On can conclude from all that was said until now that the 
formulation of the theory of the New S:ate about the role of 
the state in education was done throug~ two different 
discourses - the corporative discourse and the strong state 
discourse. 
Before analyzing the implementatic~ of this theory it is 
necessary to proceed to the analysis of the implications for 
our main hypothesis of the practical prevalence of one of 
those two discourses. 
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5. TWO TYPES OF STRONG STATE PRACTICE - THE MOBILIZING STRONG 
STATE VERSUS THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRONG STATE 
It is now due time to clarify the notion of strong state 
and thus to link thi s chapter wi th the previous ones and to 
proceed to further clarification of how it contributes to the 
confirma tion of the main hypothesi s of thi s work. 
As said in the beginning of this chapter the achievement 
of conformism and passivi ty through demobilization implies a 
parti tion of tasks between the state and civil society where 
the former has the lion's shere. This means that the 
confirmation of the hypothesis demands the prevalence of the 
strong state disco~rse. 
On the contrary. the implementation of a true corporative 
state would imply the invalidation of the hypothesis. In fact, 
thi s implementation would imply the exi s tence of mobili zation 
wi thin corporative bodies at all levels. even at the primary 
level, it would imply the preparation of mobilizing 
corporati ve leaders. On the other hand, the rebuilding of the 
Nation by the State is in itself a mobilizing task. In the 
same way, the decentralizing consequences foreseen in the 
corporative discourse are much more mobilizing than 
centralization, since this restricts much more the number and 
type of citizens involved in decision-making processes. 
Thus it is cor.cluded that only a strong state is 
compatible with our hypothesis, since the achievement of 
demobilization implies a strong control of the State over all 
aspects of national life. But how is this control compatible 
with the non totalitarian nature of the regime? In other words, 
is a totalitarian strong state compatible with our hypothesis? 
The answer is clearly no, since as have been seen in chpater 
one, by defini tion the totali tarian state is mobilizing (see 
LINZ 1975). So the control over civil society must be made in 
authoritarian moulds. 
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That i~, the strC)ng state to be :'~.plemented must p"~rsue 
passivity and demobilisaticn, must ha"J':: a limited non 
responsible pluralism, mechanismsof ncr. participation of 
citizens in public life, control of el<::-:toral processes (when 
they exist), must use organizational a~~ administrative 
strategies and must not use expressi v<:: mobilizing strategies 
like political education. That is, it must be an authoritarian state. 
The authoritarian demobilising st!":;!1g state tends to be 
an Administrative State, that is, a st=:e where decision -
-making is centralized and concentrate~ in Public 
Administration departments and is done ~revailingly with 
b~reaucratic rules a~d criteria. The r~=scn is that the 
co~centration of decision making enhac~E non participatic~ 
beth of citizens and elites in decisie~-~aking and thus 
effectively achieves passivity. The abs~~ce of a clear 
ideology inhibit3 ideologically base': jecision-r.laking 
processes and facilitates the setting ~~ of bureaucratic r~les 
for decision-making; on the other hand, the Public 
Administration has not a party as cOIr,;:.eti tor for formulation 
of policies, as it happens in totalitarian or democratic 
states. 
Now C!1e has some cri terion to dis:inguish which type cf 
strong state was implemented by the Ne~ State. This criterion 
is - opposed to an ideologically based decision-making, 
typical of totali tarian states (where the Sole party is the 
main policy formulator and mobilizing means of policy 
implementation are used), there is, in an Administrative State, 
a pure bureaucratic process of decision-making in which Public 
Administration is the main policy formulator and mere 
administrative strategies are used for policy implementation. 
In the next chapter (the analysis of the 
practice about the role of the State in society) these 
criteria would be used to confirm our main hypothesis as 
translated into a practice about the role of the state in 
society - the New State became in his practice an 
Administrative State. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE NEW STATE REGIME 
- PRACTICE -
The practical uut~ome of New State theory about the role 
of the State will be studied first comparing corporative 
implementation with corporative theory· Then ar.alysing New 
State practice as an Administrative State. The next chapter 
it will analyse the practice of the theory about the role 
of the State in education. 
I -SUBORDINATE AND STATE CORPORATISM 
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The analysis of corporative implementations will try to 
answer three questions, which follow the above referred (chapter 7, 
section 2.4.1 ) qualifications of corporatism. 
- Was corporatism the main driving force of the nation 
and were Corporations-the main center of its political 
structure? In other words, was the implemented corporatism 
pure or subordinate? 
- Were the Corporatiot'ls really representative of society 
interests and " .. ere they independ~nt from the state? In other 
words, was the implemented corporatism a corporatism of 
association or a mere state corporatism? 
We will try to answer those questions in this part. 
The answer to the last question will be given in next 
chapter when the problem of corporatisation of ecucation will 
be analized. This last question is 
- Were the various areas of society actually corporatis~d? 
In other words, was the implemented corporatism an integral 
corporatism orjust a partial (merely economic) one? 
1. SUBORDINATE CORPORATISM 
1.1. subordination to political power 
The answer to the first question - was corporatism the 
main driving force of the nation and Corporations the main 
center of its political structure? - is cl€;arly a "no". 
Portuguese corporatism was not pur~ corporatism, but just 
a subordinate one. This fact is acknowl~dged even by 
corporatist theoricians (CAETANO 1972a, 330-331), CARDOSO 1949 
25-28, MARTINEZ 1967) and also by scholars (LUCENA 1976a, 162-
-165, WIARDA 1977). 
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In fact corporative organizations did not have poli tical 
power, nei ther through primary organization nor through the chamber 
of all corporations - the "Corpora ti ve Chamber" (NOTE 1 ) . 
This chamber should be the apex of pol:: tical power based on 
functional representation of interests. Although "The 
Corporative Chamber is, by its origin and composition, ::"luch 
wore representative than the [National] Assembly, of the_various 
interests existing within the Nation" (SALAZAR I\;,435) it 
never had more than a strictly advisory :-ole (see articlE 103 
of 1933 Consti tution). But his action was limi ted even ""i thin 
this already restricted role since its "parecer" (written 
advice) was only corn?ulsorily given in case of bills presented 
(by government or members of parliament) to the National 
Assembly - this was a tiny minority of the overall legislative 
output of the New State which was mainly based on Goverr.ment 
decrees 
In logical cansorumce with all this, the Corporative 
Chamber was not considered a sovereignity body, what is an 
indisputable anomaly in a state which claims itself 
corporative (LUCENA 1976a,123). 
So it is obvious that no "organic democracy" (SALAZAR) 
(see WIARDA 1977,175,183) ever existed ~n Portugal. 
This subordination of organic interest representation to 
political representation comes from the belief of most regime' 
leaders (Salazar included) that organized interests were 
egoist by nature and thus could not adequately represent 
national interest (see SALAZAR 1.388, lII,368-369. IV.435). 
As "the Nation is more than the arithmetic sum of institutions" 
(as a member of Parliament said - NOTE 2) national interest 
is much more than the sum of functional interests. There exist 
a "general political interest. specific of the Nation 
as entity and moral uni ty". "national interests. state interests 
properly speaking" (SALAZAR ibidem). 
293 
Since a corporative parliament could not adequately 
define general interest (NOTE 3 ) there was the need to 
maintain a chamber to represent such national interest 
(SALAZAR V,494) - NOTE 4 . Furthermore. as the state should 
perform the role of representative of the Nation (chapter seven, 
section 2.2.3) • it makes sense that not only it mus t 
intervene in the definition of the national interest (SALAZAR 
1.293, V 464), but also that it is up to the state the 
formulation of the nation irteres'tS. 
From all this it follows naturally an eclectic solution 
in which corporative structure was subordinate to poli tical 
structure (NOTE 5 ) - see chapter one. section 2.2. 
1.2. The most important organizations were not corporatiled 
As said above (chapter five, section 2.3.1. r.otes 3 and ~) 
neither the Army, nor the Church nor the Uni versi ty, al though 
natural corporations, were ever corporatized. Public 
Administration was also not subject to the corporative 
structure (this chapter, section 41 ).This means that the mos t 
important organizations were never corporatized, which 
reinforces clearly the incomplete character of corporative 
implementation. 
2. STATE CORPORATISM 
The answer to the second initial question - are 
Corporations representative of society interests and 
independent from the State? - is also no. 
2.1. The New State implemented a regime of state corporatism 
The three scholars who made the most important studies 
"about portuguese corporatism agree to label the regime as one 
of state corporatism - LUCENA 1976a. 1978b. 1979b. SCHMITTER 
1975a, WIARDA 1977 (see also MAKLER 1979, MONICA 1978.93-94, 
ROBINSON 1979,130-133). 
There are several indicators of state control over 
economy which contradict the whole corporative idea of self-
-direction and there also indicators of government control 
over the corporative organizations themselves - the non 
creation of Corporations until 1956, th,,:: I::zist~nce durir'9 th~ 
whole span of time of the corporati Vf:: T'1::~ime (1933-1974) of 
gover~mental agencies for economy control ("organismos de 
coordena~ao econ6mica"), the governmental practice of 
regulating economic life and other activitiE:s without 
consulting the corporations, the compartim~ntalization of 
corporatism into one ministry which exist~d alongside other 
ministries which controlled and regulated activities which 
supposedly should be corporatized, the elaboration of a 
fi ve-year national development plan formulated and implementd 
by the government, governmental appointment of corporative 
representatives( !), excessive member of civil servants in the 
Corporative Chamber are enough indicators of-
state ~orporatism. 
Eesides this U:e fact that corporatis:.i was incof.",plete -
- practically speaking was 1imi ted to economic acti vi ti es as 
shall be seen later on - left all other act:'vities 
subject to control by the state and not coordinated by (non 
existent) corporations. 
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How did the regime evolve towards s ta te corpora ti sm? How 
was this evolution explained by corporatist theoreticians? Ho,",' 
can this evolution be really explained? 
The answer to the two first questions will be done in the 
remaining of this chapter. The answer to the last questions 
will :ompel us to transcend the corporative framework a~j will 
only be dealt in the following chapter. 
2.2. The evolution towards state corporatism 
The 'Whole story of portuguese corporatism is the story 
of its evolution towards state corporatism (see about this 
evolution LUCENA 1978b, 1979b, 1979c, WIARDA 1977). 
2.2.1. Implementation period (1933-1939) 
The ini tial implementation period is coincident wi th a 
mobilising period of the regime, as has often been said. In 
order to facili tate the carrying into effect of corporative 
structure the government created governmental departments for 
regulation of the economy ("organismos de coordena~ao 
econ6mica II - organizations of economic coordination). Those 
were pre-corporative structures to be inco!"';Jorated into the 
Corporations, once they were created. Several corporative 
organizations at primary level were set up. All those efforts 
would be culminated with the planned creation of the first 
Corporation in 1938, in which the governmental departments 
were not incorporated as it was previewed (for this period see 
TEOT6NIO PEREIRA's memoirs - 1973 ). 
2.2.2. The advent of war and corporatism discredit(1939-1949) 
The war invalidated the creation of this Corporation and 
brought about the governmental use of corporative 
organizations to control the economy in order to impose 
austerity (see WIARDA 1977,163-173). All corporative leaders 
were appointed from above. 
In the post-war period ccrporatism entered into discredit 
and it was even set up a Parliamentary Investigation Comission 
to corporative organizations, whose conclusions were so 
devastating that the government refused to give it any 
official attention (see about this report LUCENA 1979~. 
2.2.3. Corporatist revival - 1949-1968 
All this discredit made many believe, even within the 
regime, that the days of corporatism had gone. But in 1949 
SALAZAR said "It is time to relight the fire and continue the 
journey·, that is, it is time to complete the corporative 
scheme (see SALAZAR 1949 - see al so SALAZAR IV f 369, V f 141-
-142 ). 
This provoked a flourishing of theoretical studies 
criticizing the kind of corporatism implemented until then 
(NOTE 6) and pointing to war as the scapegoat of the 
situation (NOTE 7). Many theoretical studies were then 
published (see WIARDA 1977,184-193), being CAETANO's 
conference in 1950 - "Present situation of Portuguese 
Corporatism" one of the most important and influential~ 
ir:t had been very much Quoted in this work (NOTE 8 ). 
All those cri tiQues provoked a ~renewal of corporatism, 
but in the state corporatism mould. 
Following this renewal there was created in 1950 the 
Ministry of Corporations; in 1957 all economic Corporations 
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w,=re created (NOTE 9); in 1959 and ir. 1966 were crE:-ated the 
moral Corporations, and the corporat:'Je building was formally 
complete. 
The Corporative Chamber had slightly increased powers and 
had, in practice, a more important adv:sory role than befcrE. 
But all this renewal was done in t~e moulds of state 
corporatism as indicated by 
- the creation of a Ministry specific for Corporations, 
which is against the ideal of all minis~ries being filled with 
corporati ve spiri t (sEe CAETANO 1950 - !;:TE 10). 
- the vertical sch,=me followed i~ :he creation of 
Corporations which favoured control by :~e state (NOTE 11 ). 
- the permanence of the organiza::~~s cf economic 
coordination alongside the Corporatior:s created in 19£7 
(NOTE 12). 
- the setting up of exclusively governmental controlled 
economic planning through the "PIanos c.e Fomento" (see 
NOTA 24 of chapter four). 
- the control by the government cf all elections in 
corporative bodies. 
- strict control over all corporative organizations. both 
workers and employers (NOTE 13) .. 
- the governmental appointed members were the 
overwhelming bulk of Corporative Chamber membership - only 
a third was appointed by the corporative organizations 
(before 1960 even these were selected by the government from 
a list of "acceptable" names submi tted to it) (NOTE 14 ). 
2.2.4. Corporatist decline - 1961-1968 
The social changes of the 1950s led to a shift in 
corporatist orientation which translated the decline of 
corporatism as a poli tical and social doctrine and the basis 
of New State structure. The corporatist structure was put 
predominantly at the service of social welfare (social 
securi ty and social assistance), thus building the basis of 
the future Caetano's "Social State" (Estado Social) - see 
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about this decline WIARDA 1977, 209-252. 
In the ne~ building of the Ministry of Corporations, 
inaugurated in 1966, corporative activity ~as gradually 
confined to one of the t~enty-one floors (WIARDA 1977,232). 
( The date of 1961 ~as put as the beginning of this period 
since the appointment of anew Ministry of Corporation, in 
May 1961, made this underlying change clearly visible). 
2.3. Conclusion - Corporatism was in Portugal always state 
corporatism 
It is not difficult to conclude from what had betn said 
that the state controlled the whole corporative organization 
and used it (alongside with the so-called pre-corporative 
bodies) to regulate economy. 
The slow process of industrialization initiated in the 
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1950 I s wi th the launching of the above referred (chapter seven,section 
3.1.2,this chapter, section 2.2.3) "PIanos de Faner.:c" dema.YJdE-d that th-=- State 
t..:sed all the avaiable means to coordinate efforts tC".vards the achievemer;t 
of the self-proposed economic targets. 
The poli tical dimension of corporatism - the Corporative 
Chamber - represented more the government than the organized 
interests. The Corporative Chamber was thus really a 
government advisory body, 
As it is clear, portuguese corporatism ~as not a 
corporatism of association, but clearly a state corporatism. 
Such tendency to~ards state corpora ti sm began w'hen 
the implementation of corporatism was ini tiated, as had been 
seen (see about this LUCENA 1978b,1979b, WIARDA 1977,142,155). 
It is important to remark the domain of the State in economic 
and social life. This domain made Portugal similar in some 
respects to many eastern european countries and could be 
described by several authors as a state capitalism system. 
, 
2.4. The analogy of portuguese state with eastern socialist 
states 
It seems that the fear of regime's leaders of the coming 
of a socialism wi thout doctrine was justified. since several 
authors made analogies of Ne~ State economic structure wi th 
eastern european socialist states. 
"'04tu~aL came i40nicaLL~. ~iven ~he ~e~ime/d dt~on~L~ 
anti-Communidt ideoLo~~. to ~edembLe m04e the cent4aLi~ed, 
dtate-4un economied ot Ea~te4n EU40pe than the pLanned but 
dtiLL in La~ge meadU4e Laid~e~ tai4e d~~temd ot the Wedt" 
WIAR:A 1979 - see also WIARDA 1977.85.3C5.342). 
"The c04po4ative dtate ~'haped a new '04tug,aL. ve4l/ much 
in thp ~ociaLi~t wa~, wh.i. cll '1.';.LL be ha4d to dedt40~" (MARQUES 
1976.183 - see also page 199). "SALAZAR had Lett 'o4tu~aL in 
exceLLent condition~ to~ the e~tab~idhment ot a 'dociaLi~t 
4e~ime' [ ••• 1. The State wad dO powe4tuL. ~he count4l1 4evoLved 
dO much a~ound the ~tate appa4atud and itd bu~eauc4acll ( .•• ] 
that it wouLd be ext~emeLlI eadll to t4andto4m 'o~tu~aL into a 
'dociaLidt' ~epubLi~ue/''(SARAIVA and SILVA 1976.41). LUCENA 
expresses similar opinious (see LUCENA 1978). (NOTE 15) 
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This similari ty. between the economic structures of the Nev.-
State and those of eastern european countries probably o~rred 
al so sometimes to regime I s leaders. This is indicated by the 
fear of the "socialism wi thout doctrine" (chapter seven .section 
3.2 ). but also by occasional specific positive comments 
about certain aspects of communist regimes. SALAZAR 
acknowledges the "superiority of its state organization. which 
is translated into unity of command and into its power of 
decision-making and implementation" (SALAZAR V.421) (see the 
same ideas in SALAZAR IV.252 and in SARAIVA and SILVA. 1976. 
39) and see similari ties between communist and state 
corporati sm perspective about social conflicts - there is not 
only producers and workers interests but the natural interest, 
which should prevail (SALAZAR V,464) (NOTE 16 ). 
The analysis of these similari ties makes natural the next 
section - the study of the tendency for state capitalism in 
the New State. 
2.5. From state corporatism to state capitalism 
If one forgets New State theory and analysis only its 
practice one can cor:cl ude that the r~gime createa an ec~nomic 
system which is close to "state capi talism" - see GRAHAr~ 1974, 
LUCENA 1976a,174, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976,28,38-39, WIARtA 1977 
143,302-304,309,352). 
This tendency towards state capi talism al though limi ted 
and controlled by the New State (LUCENA 1979b) was inexorable 
(LUCENA 1976a,174) - eventually the system of state capitalism 
which grew up alongside supplanted the corporative structure 
(WIARDA 1979). 
This "capitalism without capitalists" (SCHMITTER 1975,8), 
bureaucratic and semipublic" (LUCENA 1979b), linking together 
government and the major interests (WIARDA 1979) was common 
in the !b"2riall latin-american world (GRAHAM 1974). 
This growing control of the state over economy was 
instru!'nental to the industriali sation of the country wi thout 
lost of traditional values, that is, industrialisation without 
rupture wi th tradi tional society - LUCENA 1 976a, 111, MONICA 
1978,102-105, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976,39. For Salazar there was 
not even true progress if the old traditional values 
disappeared (LUCENA 1976a.119). 
For Salazar the ideal was to mechanise agriculture 
"without ~ilencing the jo~tul 4on94 ot the 9i4l4; to weave 
cotton 04 wool in the m04t mode4n weave4'4 loom. without 
inte4Weavin9 in the th4ead the c~a44 hate n04 t04cin9 out t40m 
the w04k4hop 04 the tact04~ OU4 oid pat4ia4cha~ 4pi4it -
(SALAZAR II,276). 
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Thus there was ~ot in the New State a global and explicit 
opt:on for development. which could r~present a certain d~gree 
of rupture wi th tradi tional society (FRANCO 1982). But still 
the~e was a policy of slow development (see AMARO 1982, 
JES::INO 1982). Salazar "wanted economic growth for Portugal 
and industrialisation, but he would permi t none of the social 
anc political concomitants (greater pluralism and 
participation in society and poli ty) that normally accor.1pany 
the modernization process" (WIARDA 1977,335). 
This means that state capi talism supplanted corporatism 
in c!"der to assure a safe process of industrialization which 
co;.;:d maintain the a<..:tr.ori tarian nature of the r~gime an~ its 
de~:bilizational stra~egies to induce citizen's conformis~. 
3. CONCLUSION - THE CORPORATIVE STATE STRUCTURE AT THE SERVICE 
OF THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME 
3.1. The authoritarian demobilising nature of the regime 
prevented the implementation of doctrinaire corporatism 
One can conclude from what said that corporatism had by 
no neans lived up in practice nei ther to its doctrinal importance 
as :te basis cf the Kev: State. nor up to its own principles. 
Cor;:>cratism was merely a subordinate cr:e. i t ~'as implemented 
in tte state corporatism mould, and entered in decline in the 
19607 
There are important structural reasons (social. economic 
and cultural ones) which can explain this development of 
corporatism (NOTE 17). There are also specific political 
reasons related wi th the poli tical structure and the nature 
of New State regime. 
What interests us now is the analysis of the 
compatibili ty of pure corporatism (integral non subordinate 
corporatism of association) wi th the authori tarian nature of 
the regime. 
Indeed one can ask several questions on this line: 
- was pure corporatism compatible wi th the concentration 
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of powers inherent to authoritarianism? 
- was pure corporatism compatible wi th the demobilising 
nature of the regime? 
- was pure corporatism compatible with political 
repression? 
- was pure corporatism compatible with the non 
doctrinaire character of a regime mainly based on the 
"basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure"? 
The Corporative state demands limited freedom of interest 
association and gives the state a moral role - in those 
aspects it fits well with authoritarianism. But there are 
several features of pure corporatism ",,'hich do not fi t wi th it 
- true representativness of Corporative organizations 
members, freedom of the corporative representatives to put 
forward solutions opposed to those proposed by the Government, 
autonomy of Corporations, cooperation of classes by direct 
relationships without intermediaries 4 self-direction of 
economy, decentralized administration. 
The strong state is inherent to authoritarinism and, 
consequentlY,concentration of powers is typical of 
authori tarian regimes. But this concentration is clearly not 
compatible wi th the juridic recogni tion of social pluralism, 
decentralized administration and pulverization of authori ty, 
which are raerred to above as features of corporatism. 
The non participatory nature of the regime prevented true 
representativness of corporative organization members and 
freedom of corporative elections(when existing at allL As 
WIARDA says "Even in its least authori tarian periods r ... J the 
regime hence never functioned in the truly representative, 
parti.c.i.p.::ttory way that was the original vision" (WIARDA 1977, 
343 )(NOTE 18J· 
It is necessary a climate of freedom to achieve true 
representativn~sfreedom and autonomy in corporative 
organizations. "Right from the beginning came the conflict 
between the desire for implementing corporative reforms and 
the need to control those who Opposed such changes by means 
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of repressive instru;;~!"Jts" (WIARDA 1977.343 - see alsc pages 
184,206). That is, -:l':t:: repressive strategies of the regime 
were not compatible wi th the implemeritation of corporatism. 
The gradual building of a police state was also not com~atible 
with a true corporative revival in the 1950s . It even 
happened that the corporative organizations were incr~asingly 
seen as integrated ir. the repressive strategies of the regime 
(WIARDA 1977. 179-180). 
For corporative organizations to be the basis of the 
whole functioning of society and political structure, as 
corporatist theoreticians pretended, it was necessary tc have a 
proliferation of lea~~rs at grassroots a~d inter~ediat~ level 
(not only at central l~vel) and their Education in corp::rative 
theories and ideals. All this obviously demanded a de:;:~e of 
mobilization. The nor. mobilizational nature of the regi~~ 
prevented the recruitment. education and mobilization c! 
corporative leaders. This explains why the frequent com~laints 
of lack of preparation of corporative leaders (for instance, 
CAETANO 1941,31-32,80-81, CARDOSO 1949. CAETANO 1950,12) were 
not fruitful. 
The same reasoning applies to the corporative education 
of masses and eli tes. In fact few Portuguese knew what 
corporatism was really about in its original vision (see 
WIARDA 1977.138). 
To sum up, one can conclude that the authoritarian 
demobilising nature of. the regime prevented (in conjunction 
wi th other factors to be analyzed later) the implemer.tation 
of doctrinaire corporatism or even of a structure with 
reasonably recognizable corporative features. Thus the 
corporative structure became naturally at the service of the 
authori tarian regime. If what came about can still be called 
corporatism is clearly beyond the scope of our work (NOTE 19). 
But this does not mean that one can throwaway the whole 
corporative doctrine, ideal and practice ,as utterly irrelevant 
for the understanding of the role of the state or for the 
understanding of the nature of the regime. 
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Indeed the fact that corporatism did not perform the 
functions which its doctrinaire discoursE- promised does not 
mean that it did not perform other functions which are 
rE-levant for the referred purposes (NOTE 20). 
3.2. The real functions of corporatism 
J have emrhC1A.i..Jed f..OU/l. CMpect.", of.. the plI.c.ct..i..ce of.. 
",ta;te CVII.PO/l.a;t.i..-Jm w!U..ch ",eem to me C/l.uc.i..a.l t.o uruie/l.",tan.di..n.g. 
.i..t-1 /l.eA..at.i..on, on the one hand, to ",oci..a.l ",tll..u.ctUl/.e and, 
on the vthe'l. hcuu:f, tv public deci.A.i..on-maJu.n~ .i.n an 
autho/l.-i..tall..i..an polit.i..ca-l. context. 
The f...f.A",t .i..", the extent to wIU..ch '", pon",o/l.ed' V/l. 
",tate cOlI.pvlI.a.ti..-Jm .i", pll.eemptive, .i... e. ",eefo.", to ",et out. f,./Lvm 
above ",t./zuctull.e", of.. CM",oc.i..ab.i..utv. and chQJVteA..", of. .i.ntvz.e",t 
/l.eplI.e",entat.i..on .i.n ant.i..ci..f.XU..i..vn of.. "'.DOntCJf1.eO~ ef./...o, .... t'" 
by. a/./.ected c.,/,a"",~, ",ecto/l.", 0/1. ~ouP"'. The ",econd -iA the 
extent to w!U..ch the cO/l.po/l.atiAt expell.i..ence .i..", plI.eventive, 
.i... e. atteJTlpt", not to mob.i..li3e Vlt /l.epJ.ment .i..t", -Jub,iect", 
f..OIt po",.it.i..ve ",ta;te-",e.lecteci ta",k", but to ~ul/.e that 
noruna.l Olt PCJ"'",.i..ve paIt.ti..ci..pation within .i..t", ",tltuctu/l.e", 
w.i...l..l. vccu~ a ceJtta.in ph~"'.i..ca.l. tempo/l.a.l and .i..deat.i..ona.l 
, ",pace', f-o/l.eclo-1.i.ng. ,.i..f- not pl/.JJ!U..b.i~, a./.;te;zna.ti..ve ~~ 
of- tha;t ",arne ",pace. The tfUlI.d .i", the extent to uiU..ch ",uch 
a mode of- .inteJt~t /l.eptl.~enta;t.i..on ~ def-en",.ive, .i... e. 
encoUlwg..~ (J.-j",oci..atiVn-1 to act ptUmcvz.U!I. .i../. not exc1..u"".i..VeA..y., 
.in the ptl.otec.ti..vn of- "'peci..a.l coltpo/l.ate '/l.-i..g..ht", I. 
pJt.ivUe~e-1 0/1. exemption", 9A-CJf1.ted /.!tom above, /l.athe/l. than 
.in the 'a.9-lt~"'.ive' ptl.cJmolivn of.. new p/l.oj..ect-1 Olt .i.nteJte",t-1. 
The f-OUll.th iA the extent tv which .it iA compcvz.tmenta-l.. .i. e. 
manag..~ to ccnf-.i.ne potentia.l contli-ct", wUlWt "'peci..ali3eci, 
non-.intell.act.i.ng.. dec..iA.i..ona.l 'oll.de/l.'" I, thell.eby p'1.event.i.ng.. ~i.e 
C/l.eat-ion of- mu.l.tip.le .i..",,,,ue and mullip.le ",ecwll. affiance", 
Olt b.lock.i.ng. I paIl.ti-1an' appea./.", to w.i..delt pubuc", and 
cuente.le-1. 
When one comb.i.n~ the",e f-vUIt obv.iou-1.ly .i.nteltlte.lateci 
di.men-1.iOn-1. one i", .led to the con~ion that the Il.o.le 
and. cOn-1equence-1 of- ",ta;te COltpolta.ti..-1m mu-1t be a",,,,~,,,ed. 
not pll..i..malt-i.lv. in teJtm-1 of- what .it open.Iv. and po-1.i..tive.ly 
accompLiAhe-1, but.i.n tell.m-1 of- wha;t .it "'U/l.Itept,i.tiou",1.~ and 
nega;t.i..veq. ptl.evenu f,.Il.om happen.i.n~ 
(SCHMITTER,1975a.58) 
T~is long quotation of an author who studied deeply 
portuguese corporatism sums up . clearly the real 
functions of corporatism (see also STOER1982,72, WIARDA 1977, 
336-337). 
The preemptive and preventive functions of corporatism 
correspond to the organizational pre-emptyi~ strategy already 
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d~s~rib~~ in chapter five (section 1.2.3) Corporative 
erg ~rii zc::::' ons Occllpied a certain organi za tional space thus 
pr~'/~nti!".g the formation of strong trade unions and of strong 
employer's associations which could put at stake state 
autsnomy !see SCHMITTER 1975a.59). 
Cor~orative organizations had. in the economic syste~ a 
fun~tior. ~imilar to that which National Union performed in the 
V-,l: ~i('dl ::::::~·-m (cL lp t":'f' twc. ~"Ct:'on 5.4.4; chapter five. section 1 .2.3). 
The SCP.~ITTER's pre-emptive and preventive functions 
reflect a:so the regime's expressive strategies to pursue 
passi vi t:.:. 
The ~CHMITTER's compart~ental function of c~rporatism 
(also ve:::' \l.'ell analyzed in HAKLER 1979) was also a strategy 
of c~mot:~izatior. (chapter five. secticn 1.2.1 J. 
This :rleant that the corporative structure was at the 
service c: the authoritarian regime. This means also that it 
is in the strong state discourse which one should seek the 
real role of the state in portuguese society and in the 
educatior.al system. It is what will be done in the second part 
of thi s crlapter. 
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II - THE NEW STATE 
AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
The strong state di scourse could be trad:lced ei ther into 
a totalitarian or into an authoritarian state. As it was 
already said the New State opted since the beginning for the 
authoritarian mould. That is, it opted for a strong state 
which pursued passivity and demobilization. 
As it have been said the state had a prejomj.nant role in 
all portuguese life. How was this role perfc::-~ed? If nei ther 
a mobilizing party nor the Corporations ser'Jed as mediators 
between the state and civil society how was this predominance 
exerted? The answer will be given in this part. 
The New State was an Administrative State, that is, a 
state where all decisions, even poli tical decisions, are made 
by a centralized Public Administration. In an Administrative 
State the policies are administratively formulated and 
bureaucratically implemented. In this situation participation 
of citizens in public life is impossible and even participation 
of many areas of the elite is di~couraged passivity is 
effectively pursued. 
This part will analyze the New State as an 
Adminis trati ve State. Indeed several authors categori ze the 
New State as such - GRAHAM 1975, RIEGELHAUPT 1979a,b, 
SCHMITTER 1975a, YJIARDA 1977. CAETANO acknowledges that the 
regime he aided to build was an Administrative State <CAETANO 
1966). LINZ's subtype of the authoritarian regime 
"bureaucratic-mili tary authori tarian regime" parallel s the 
/ 
model which is more frequently called Administrative State. 
As just said, an Administrative State is essentially a 
state where a non responsible Public Administration has a 
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centralized bureaucratic control over all aspects of nation's 
life (see GRAHAM 1975,7-11, WIARDA 1977,21,290 - for a review 
of literature about the Administrative State see GRAHAM 1975). 
But a more detailed and operational definition of 
Administrative State is needed to facili tate the analysis of 
New State practice. 
Several characteristics can be deduced from the above 
defini tion. Some related to who detains the power - a) and b) 
- others related to how it is exerted - e) to g). 
So, in an Administrative State 
a) Public Administration performs a very important role; 
b) Public Administration is the main formulator of policy; 
c) There is a fusion between administrative and political 
carreers, being GOvernment part of Public 
Administration; 
d) There is concentration of powers traduced in a strong 
Government; 
e) There is centralization of decision-making; 
f) There is no autonomy of local government; 
g) There is no participation of the administered ones; 
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h) Problems are administratively formulated and bureaucratically 
implemented. 
4. CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW STATE AS ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
4.1. The importance of Public Administration 
Both Salazar and Caetano gave importance to Public 
Administration. SALAZAR defines the State as "The ~eade~, the 
gove~nment, the ·bu~eauc~ac~, ihat ~~, ~ough~~ ~peakin~ a 
con~tant th .ou~ht, an enli~htened will, a bod~ ot ~tud~ and 
execution":(SALAZAR 111,389-390) - see also SALAZAR 1,121,111, 
392,V,408. CAETANO calls it the "dili~ent and etticaciou~ 
appa~atu~ ot 'ove~nment action": (CAETANO in ZORRO 1969,64}. 
So both leaders devoted time and effort to the 
administrative reform. Indeed administrative and financial 
reforms were a "lei tmotiv" of many speeches of Salazar (see 
SALAZAR I,121,II,23,III,66,277-285,V,43,122) and were one of 
the regime's achievements (MARQUES 1976,202). But the 
industrialization effort attracted the best "cadres" for the 
pri vate sector and Public Administration became quali tati vely 
understaffed (CAETANO 1966). This renewed the concern for the 
administrative reform led to the creation, in 1967, of a 
Secretariate for Administrative Reform. (NOTE 21). 
The ini tial " a dmi.ni..,j.t.ll.a.t.i..ve di.c.t.a.t.oll."hi.p" maintained, 
during the initial period, ma~y high civil servants of the 
previous regime - see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,118, CRUZ 1 982c, 
MARTINS 1970 (chapter five, note 2; this chapter, section 4.3) NaTE 
2~. This is an indicator of the importance given to the 
stabili ty of Public Administration (NOTE 23). 
A more powerful indicator of the importance-of Public 
Administration is the massive presence of members 
Administration in the founding elite of New State. 
(1979) in his analysis of New State formative elite 
of Public 
SCHMITTER 
( 1 934-
-1942) finds that around half was composed by civil servants; 
in the first sesson of the legislative assembly (1934-1938) 
they were 74.6% of the total. Civil servants went on being 
very influent in the National As sembly (chapter tvJo,section 5.2.2). 
and predominant in the Corporative Chamber: (see I~01E 14) ar.d 
in the National Union (chapter two, section ).4.2). 
One indicator more of the importance of Public 
Administration is the sheer size·of bureaucracy - see SARAIVA 
and SILVA 142, WIARDA 1977,301 (NOTE 24). The defini tion of 
civil servant includes categories which are note considered 
as such in other systems - teachers, university professors, 
judges, policemen, military men, etc. 
Due to its importance Public Administration, alongside 
with the Army, the Church and the Universit~ was never 
corpora tized (this chapter, section 1.2). 
4.2. Public Administration as the main formulator of policy 
One must acknowledge that in the Portuguese authoritarian 
regime there was not other decision-making center which 
effectivelly could formulate policies-the Presidency of the 
Republique and the National Assembly were very limi ted in their 
real powers, the National Union was not a mobilizing party 
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which could become an al tt::rnati ve policy formulator center 
(see CRUZ 1982c, SCHMITTER 1979), Corporations and Corporative 
Chamber were controlled by the State through the Government 
and Public Administration, local government had not any 
significant role in the regime. The Catholic Church was 
co-opted, the University centralized and co-opted, and the Army, 
soon became compartimentalized again after the military coup. 
Due to lack of unlimited political pluralism there was no 
political parties or civic associations which could be policy 
formulators. 
So Government and Public Administration were left alone 
to formulate, adopt and implement policies. Due to the fusion of 
poli tical and administrative carreers there is an abse:-;ce of 
a specific political level of decision-making. Thus the 
Government appears predominantly as the head of Public 
Administration. So Public Administration (headed by the 
Government) is by absence of competitors, the only policy 
formulator. 
This monopoly of policy-making is acknowledged by several 
authors - GRAHAM 1975,14,33, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976,41,80, 
WIARDA 1977,290-292. 
CAETANO canrr~:mting on the subject of the relationship 
between Politics and Public Administration says that "The 
administration ceases to to be characterized as a function to 
assert itself as power", being the separation between 
Adminis tration and Poli tics a mere question of levels of deci sion 
-making (CAETANO 1 970a, 9,15) (NOTE ~ ). 
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This administration co-opts institutions of civil society 
being the most notorious case the Universi ties (chapter five,section 
2.3.3.) (NOTE 26). 
4.3. Fusion of administrative and political carreers 
As had been said one can encompass Government and Public 
Administration as part of the bureaucratic apparatus of the 
Administrative State (WIARDA 1977,124,292). Ministers, as 
administrative heads of their ministries, are an important 
part of Public Administration. 
Ministers have a political role as members of the Cabinet 
and an administrative role as heads of the administrative 
departments cf their ministry. In an Administrative State this 
administrativ'2 role is the most important. SALAZAR said, in 
1943, that his ministers were condem ned to be the "chief 
technicians 0: their respective l'1inistries" instead of being 
just "technic:'ans of general ideas" as it should be (SALAZAR 
I I 1,393 ). This WJuld be due to the theoretical and booki sh 
character of c~r school system. 
CAETANO recommends, in 1951, "a stable government with 
ministers whi~!1 can be really administrative heads" (in 
CAETANO 1959,:72 - see also CAETANO 1970a,263-264). 
But, in ·966, in his study about portuguese public 
administratic~, CAETANO attributes partially to the increasing 
administrativ~ role of ministers the decline in public 
administratic~ (CAETANO 1966) (NOTE 2n. 
The real cause of the overvaluation of the administrative 
roleof minist~r does not lie, as it is evident, in the bookish 
character of portuguese education, as Salazar pretends, but 
in the very ac~inistrative and authoritarian nature of the 
regime. The concentration of power of decision-making in 
Public Administration compelled ministers to be administrative 
heads in order to exercise effective power - otherwise power 
would be passed on to directors-generals (see GRAHAM 1975,55). 
The stability ~f government favoured the process (see CAETANO 
1966, MARQUES 1976,203). But there was another essential 
reason - the ~ractice of autocratic rule by the prime-minister 
which concentrated all important political decisions (chapter 
'two, section 4} . obviously deval uUed the poli tical role of 
ministers. 
All this led to a fusion of poli tical and administrative 
carreers which is the organizational translation of the 
confusion between political and administrative levels of 
decision-making, indicating a subordination of politics to 
administration (NOTE 28 ). 
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It goes wi thout saying that this fusion implied a gr'E:at 
ideological and poli tical control over Public Administration 
membership. Until 1935 the regime used a strategy of 
co-optation of the prew,us civil servants (chapter five. r::'TE 2) 
and so no significant purge of semior civil servants 
was done. But then the fascistoid mobilizing period of the 
regime began and control became strict. 
There was strict control on admissions which were 
preceded of information of the secret police (see COMISS~O ... 
1982). The newly recruited should swear "J dec~a~e upon m~ 
honou~ that J am within the ~ocial o~de~ e~tab~i~hed b~ the 
1933 ~o~itical Con~titution and J actively ~epudiate cvmmun~~m 
and a~~ ~ubve~~ive idea~". 
Civil servants showing "a ~pi~it at oppo~ition tv t~e 
tundamenta~ p~incip~e~ ot the ?o~itica~ Con~titution, o~ ~ho 
do n.ot ~ua~antee coope~ation. in achievin~ the hi...~het;, Q<.m~ 
of. the ~tate, wi~~ be ~.u~pended o~ ~eti~ed ( ••• J o~ C ••• J I..::i f..~ 
be di~mi~~ed"· (Decree Law nQ 25317, May 13th,1935). Several 
poli tical purges of civil servants were done based or. those 
legal dispositions. There were significant purges of 
university teachers in 1936,1946-7 and 1962 (see COMISSAO ... 
1982) (NOTE 29). 
There was also a strict control of actual voting c: civil 
servants (chapter two, section 5.3.2) and no trade ur,io!"Js or 
corporations of civil servants were allowed. 
As "portuguese underdevelopment favours cul tural ar.d 
administrative forms of repression" (LUCENA 1976a,146) ar.d as 
public service employed many persons, this means that tr.rough 
those strategies the New State controlled almost half of the 
working population (MARTINS 1970). 
Naturally enough Public Administration was considered a 
strong and safe political support of the regime (see 
FIGUEIREDO 1976,63, PORTAS and GAGa 1980). 
4.4. concentration of powers - a strong Government 
An Administrative State is not a state based on 
separation of powers as the classical liberal state formula 
of the "t:tat de droit" (see CAETANO 1972a,32S). On the 
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contrary, it is a state basf2d on concentration of po· ... '=:rs on 
the executive body - the Government using Public 
Administration. 
The classical distinction between a legislative bo=y 
assuring the legislative function, an executive body assuring 
the executive function, and a moderating body assuring t~e true 
political function was not accepted (NOTE 30). All those 
functions were concentrated in one body - the Governm'=:r.t. So 
the Government in the regime was the most powerful 
sovereignty body - (see about the role of the Government in the 
New State CAETANO 1972a,645-662 (analysis of the Government 
as sovereignty body) CAETANO 1970a, 251-274 (analysis -:,f the 
Government as administrative body), CRUZ 1982C, LUCENA 1976a, 
147-160, WIARDA 1977,292-293). 
Indeed the motto of the need for a strong g::vernment is 
linked by Salazar to the need for a strong state - "Tr.e:-e is 
no strong state where the Government is not strong" he ~epeats 
often (SALAZAR I,81,385,IV 66,357). So SALAZAR defen=.= the 
strenghtening of the executive power (SALAZAR 1,81-84,227,385, 
IV 357,V,399, in FERRO 1982,274). This means that the 
Government does not depend on the Parliament (but depe:1ds on 
the President of Republique who appoints the prime-minister), 
it is the normal legislative body (NOTE 31). 
Thi s "dictatorship of the executive" (L DCENA 1 97E::, 147 ) 
was made stronger through the practice of autocracy (NC:S 32). 
Indeed the Government was the "only active pOlitical 
reality", as CAETANO already acknowledged in a letter to 
Salazar in 1947 (CAETANO 1977,229 - see chapter two,sectio:1 5.4.2) 
(NOTE 33). As a slogan compulsorily included in readi!"!g text 
books in 1932 said NJn the tamil~ the leade~ i4 the Fathe~, 
in the 4chool the leade~ i4 the ~a4te~; in the Chu~ch the 
leade~ i4 the ~~ie4t; in the Nation the 1eade~ i4 the 
'ove~nmentN. (Decree n2 21014,19-3-1932). 
4.5. Concentration of powers - centralization 
concentration of powers means not only a strong 
government, but a concentration of decision-making on the top 
level of the central services of Public Administration. Public 
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Administration in an Administrative State is centraliz~=. 
Centralization had a very long tradi tion in portuguese 
history, due to geographical,historical, political and social, 
€'Cononic, cuI tural and ideological reasons (BARRETO 1924). 
continuity to 
1926) policies 
The New State centralizing policies gave 
the liberal (1820-1910) and to republican (1910-
- see BARRETO 1974, CAETANO and others 1982. 
Centralization is entirely congruent with the 
administrative character the regime took, but inconsister.t 
with corporatist doctrine and municipalist tradition, b~th 
invoked by the New State (chapter s'='/':;'!".,section 2.4.2.d), ~.::' 
Anyone who studied the New State could not ~ail tc r.otice 
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t~at the centralization mould was v~ry much influenced ~y the 
napoleonic mould (NOTE 34). The c~;.-::ralization invade:: areas 
which have generally in western trad~ tion a certain degree of 
autonomy like university government ~chapter five,sl?ctior.~ 2.3.1, 2.3.2) 
or local government, as will just be seen. 
SALAZAR's praise of concentration and continuity in 
administrative life (SALAZAR 1,374) and of an unified co~~and 
("many prepare, one above decides and executes" SALAZAR 1,375) 
obviously led to centralization. SALAZAR's autocratic style 
of government (chapter two, section . 4) enhanced the effects of 
centralization. 
Centralization did not bring efficiency. Speakir.; about 
the educational system MARQUES comme!1ts "Sucessive refcr::-.s in 
each group of upper schools enhanced centralization ~ut had 
very little impact on quality of education" (MARQUES 1976,205) 
Only from the top one could see all, but this did not mean one 
could modify it (GRAHAM 1975,60). 
4.6. Concentration of powers - no autonomy of local government 
Despite initial statements about decentralization 
(SALAZAR 1,86), the cult of the tradition of municipalis~ (see 
above pages 129-131) and corporative doctrine (see 'above page 
121 ) tight control over local government was exerted as soon 
as 1926 (ROBINSON 1979,53). This control initially intended 
to do away wi th local republican patronage (PORTAS and GAGO, 
1980) • 
The i ntf'~T'ft::'I'ence of central governmen t in local af fairs 
was justified by New State lea:ers with the advantages of 
concentration of power in underdeveloped countries (see 
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SALAZAR IV,245, BAPTISTA 1957,37-42 - cr.'::P~'":7:r· sev~n, section 1 4 l' . . ) 
with the lack of human and material resources in local 
communities (CAETANO 1970a, 245-246) (NOTE 35). 
The logic of the strong state leads directly to this 
interference as was already hir.ted in ini tial statements ( chapter 
SE:'ven, sectic;J 1.1 ~ There was no lack of legal mecr.anisms for 
thi s in terference (see CAETArW 1 970a, 352-359). On the other 
hand, local government bodies had no general duties but 
specifically detailed ones, regulated by law, which was a 
strong limitation (see CAETA~O 1970a,318). 
Naturally the mayor was appointed (CAETANO was against 
his election - see CAETANO 1972b,634-635) and ~hould represent 
both the municipality in regard to the State and the 
Government in the municipality. This made the mayor both a 
local and state body (see CAETANO 1970a,288,323). Even at the 
lowest level (parish) there was a "base of carefully screened 
safe Government people" (BLUME 1975). 
Beyond all those controls, financial control was decisive 
and made autonomy non existent - see MARQUES 1976,198, 
REGEL HAUPT 1979. 
So there was no autonomy whatsoever of local government 
(NOTE 36). This led to concentration in Lisbon of the major 
part of the human resources of the State and consequently of 
the headquarters of the major economic groups. Portugal 
developed a macrocephalic aspect - a body where the 
head is out of all proportion (see BARRETO 1984, COSTA 
1966) . 
4.7. No participation of the administered citizens in 
decision-making 
Al though every ci tizen \Vas higti.y dependent from the 
State, it could not participate in any quali ty in any level 
of the process of policy formulation, adoption or even 
implementation. The authoritarian nature of the regime created 
mechanisms of non participation, of which centralization was 
not the least important(.see chapt~r five,section 1.1.2; chapter seVE-rl, 
section 5; chaptc-I' elght, seetl:>r: 4.5) 'TI .' 
10se nechar.ls~S 
w~re reinforced by repressive m~chanism: and wLr~ 
helped by several strategies to promote demobilized attitudes~ 
that is, participation was not legally available, was not 
de facto possible and hopefully would be not even desired. 
This non participation extended to rural and urban areas. 
RIEGELHAUPT concludes that the New State "controlled peasant 
participation by effectively eliminating all possibilities of 
local-level participation in the political arena 
(RIEGELHAUPT 1979) (NOTE 37). 
" 
Not even local elites could be very influential in a 
system where all decisions were taken at central level - ASSIS 
GONt;ALVES, Salazar's secretary in his early year~ as prime 
~inister(and later given a role as representative of the 
Government in a district far away frcT'l". Lisbon )reports several 
conflicts between local nationalist leaders (unable to make 
promises or to appoint or promote persons which could 
reinforce their own political position) and central 
departments (NOTE 38). 
Of course this non participation neither of the 
administered ci tizens nor, in a much lesser extent, of local 
elites in decision-making is related with the non 
accountability of Public Administration, natural in a non 
responsible limitedly pluralist regime. 
4.8. Administrative formulation and bureaucratic 
implementation of problems - an administrative style 
in decision-making 
4.8.1. Administered Politics 
The monopoly of decision-making by Public Administration, 
the concentration of powers and the fusion of poli tical and 
administrative careers led to a style of decision-making 
where all problems were administratively represented and all 
solutions bureaucratically framed. As MANNHEIM (1952) says 
"T he t.undament.a.l .tendenclJ 0 t. a.l.l bUll.eaucll.at..i..c .thour;.ht. .i..;j .to 
t.ull.n a.l.l pll.ob.lem;j ot. po.l.i...t.i..C;j .i..nt.o pll.ob.lem;j of.. adm.i..n.i..;jt.ll.a.t.i..on". 
Questions were put into bureaucratic categories 
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previewed in previous leGislation (MERrON 194~j so the bureaucrat's job i~ 
to fit problems in the most adequate bureauq~tic category and 
to apply to it the general rule pre-decided f~~ this 
categorized situation. In such situation rule making is the 
important formulation task and categorizing the important 
implementation task. 
CAETANO gives a clear account of this ~rocess "Foil the 
bUlleaucllac~ a~~ pllob~em~. even tho~e ot the mu~t acute ~oc~a~ 
~ntelle~t, and a~~ ca~e~, even tho~e ot the deepe~t human 
den~~t~, aile Ileduced to the vo~ume ot a t~~e ~h~ch wandell~ 
~~ow~~ b~ the path~ ot bUlleau~. ~eavin~ now and then a 
Ile~~due - a t~~~n9 calld. 50 ~~te ~~ beind Ileduced to ~cheme~, 
~t ~~ be~n~ ~queeied ~nto iUllid~c e~~ence dllop~ and tllan~tollmed 
~nto pll~nted tOllm~" (CAETANO 1950,19). 
This "administered poli';ics" (GRAEA;.1 1975,14) (NOTE 39) 
led to an "ajministered society" (RIEGELP.AUPT i979), invading 
all are~ - even repression was administrative and legally 
framed (cbapter six, section 1.3; chapter seven. section 1.5). 
4.8.2. The predominance of Law men in Public Ajministration 
Being the most important task of this "administered 
poli tics" the pre-decision of problems through categorizing 
situations and giving each category a solution through the 
making of legal norms it is natural that La'w' men became the 
predominant group in the regime .. In fact. their experti se is 
essential in a system where innovation is rule making and 
reform rule remaking. 
Indeed SCHMITTER tells ~3 that for years la'w'yers and 
judges consti tuted almost one third of the Assembly and 15% of 
the Corporative Chamber (SCHMITTER 1975.34). Well over half 
of the civil cabinet ministers during the period 1932-1968 
were graduated in Law; a similar proportion probably hold for 
semior civil servants (MARTINS 1971). As NUNES says 
"administration [was] commanded fundamentally by men with 
legal formation" (NUNES 1964). 
Indeed Law was the avenue for power. being Law the 
continental equivalent to the English Public School in this 
sense (NOTE 40). Far more la'w' graduates were produced than 
were used in judicial matters, but Law had a great potential 
of role substitution (MARTINS 1971). A standard joke among 
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portugueSE: Lawl icpntiat'C.'s is VE:ry reveal ing of thi s -"The Law 
course prepares for everything even to one 
(NOTE 41 ). 
become a lawyer" 
The consequence of this predominance of Law Men in 
Government and Public Administration was to reinforce the 
legalist-bureaucratic style. Indeed this style served also as 
pretext to consider Law men more prepared than other licentiates 
ones to government and management. It became a vicious circle 
- legalist style of decision-making is both cause and 
consequence of the predominance of Law men. If every problem 
is a legal problem (or must be transformed into a legal 
problem) Law men should monopolize decision -making. 
So even doctrinal documents became, in SCHMITTER's words, 
"ldeo~o~lca~-~e~al t~eatl4e4" (SCHMITTER 1975,26). Ideological 
principles are transformed into legal principles which 
facilitates the bureaucratization of doctrine. 
This tendency is very much supported by the predominance 
of a posi tivist philosophy in the Facul ties of Law (at Coimbra 
and at Li s!:>on ). As one professor of Law said, in 1932, in a 
publiC c<:;rs"!1ony, presenting a colleague as implici t model of 
Law professional - "for him, as jurist, there is no Law 
outside the norms which are assumed and ratified by the 
rulers" (in HESPANHA 1982 ) NOTE 42). 
The predominance of Law men in Administration made very 
difficul t the creation of a professional spiri t specific of 
Public Administration and even the creation of a School of 
Administration (NOTE 43). 
If·one adds the legalist tendency to the "catedratocracia" 
of the New State one can logically conclude that uni versi ty 
professors of Law were the most powerful group in Government 
and Administration. Indeed this was the case - most of the 
academics who where m2rnbers of Government were professors of Law. Both 
Salazar and Caetano were professors of Law. This role was 
even more visible in the educational system - out of the 
fourteen ministers of Education between 1932 and 1968 half 
were professors of Law (thirteen out of fourteen were 
university professors) - from 1936 to 1955 there was a 
constant rule of professors of Law over the Ministry of 
Education (NOTE 44). 
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4.8.3. The relationship bet~~en Politics and Administration 
The administrative framing of all problems pT'E:.'supp:·s~s 
a concept of Politics which identifies it, in large part, with 
Administration. This is inceed characteristic of authoritarian 
regimes (LINZ 1975,271 ), typical of bureaucratic thought 
(MANNHEIM 1952) and very current in latin-american Iberian 
world (WIARDA 1977,21 ). 
SALAZAR's speeches give several indicators that his 
poli tical thought supports similar views (NOTE 45 ). As seen 
aoove( chapt<::r trjr~, section 2,4.4), partisan poli tics. the poli tics cf th<:: 
others,was ir;h:>rently evil.Nf·\tJ State poli tics 'Was obviouSly not evil 
but played just a minor role in the regime's a~tivity when 
compared with administrative government activities. 
n~vve~nment i~ the ~upe~iv~ ~uidance vt nativnaL cvLLectivitv 
th~vu~h the detinitivn vt vbjective~ tv be ~eached and the 
dai~y deci~ion ot p~ob~em~ ot imp~ementation ot tho~e 
objective~. Po~itic~ i~ the ~et ot individua~ o~ co~~ectiv~ 
mean~ th~ou~h which pub~ic con~cience i4 led to a 4tate ot 
adhe~ence v~ me~e contv~mit~ in ~e~a~d tv tho~e objective4 and 
coope~ate~ with the autho~itie4 in thei~ imp~ementationn 
(SALAZAR IV,274 - see also SALAZAR V 304-311). Politicsnha~ 
a4 only u4etu~ ~oa~ to ~ive exp~e~4ion and po~itica~ va~ue to 
~ove~nment act~. Tv 9vve~n C ••• j· i~ the onLy t~u~y con~i~tent 
and ~e~iou~ ~o~en (SALAZAR IV, 487 - see also SALAZAR II, 72-
-74) • 
Thus for SALAZAR administration is the only worthy and 
honourable acti vi ty, poli tics is reduced to mere propaganda 
and can aim, in truly demobilizing fashion, towards mere 
conformity of citizens (NOTE461 
5. CONCLUSION - THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IS CONGRUENT WITH 
PASSIVITY AND DEMOBILISATION 
As we have just seen the strong state discourse 'Was 
implemented in Administrative State practice. The 
Administrative State is the most congruent 'With the passivity 
aim of the regime. The concentration of deci sion-making did 
not allOW for any participation of civil society in decision-
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-making, the administrative formulation of problems created 
an apolitical and dpparently value free style of decision-
-making and the poW'er of Public Administration did not alloW' 
guarantees for t fU:;€;- who W'€':'r'2 subject to i ts ~'J.~r.istration. IrJdE-~_..j the 
Administrative State W'as very effective in achieving passivity 
and demobilisation. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN EDUCATION 
-PRACTICE-
Ho~ ~ere the different discourses of the r~gime about the 
role of the state in education implemented in practice? 
According to C\ . .:r hypothesis, the authoritarian strong state 
discourse sho~ld have prevailed in practice un~sr the form of 
Admini s tra ti vt':; S ta te . 
We ~ill .=::-;alyse the role of the state edu::ational practice 
in three stagt':;s. 
First of all, we will gather evidence to prove that there 
~as no corporative implementation in education. Special 
attention ~ill be paid to University, since it is the most 
prominent and po~erful educational organization in the regime 
as it is, at the same time, a natural corporation. 
The next stage of our analysis will be decisive for the 
confirmation of our hypothesis. As it ~as referred above(chapter 
one, sections 2.1. 1 . b)" 3.2), it ",;as created, during the mcbilising period, a 
mobilising yo~:h organization ("~ortuguese Youtr,"). Does this 
mean tha t , at leas t in education, the mobilizing strong s ta te 
ciscourse led t:l a totali tarian educational practice? It is 
through the ar.alysis of what become of that organization that 
we will seek the answer to this question. 
The third and final stage of our analysis will examine 
if the authoritarian strong state had been implemented in 
education under the form of Administrative State. This will 
be done through the analysis of the posi tion of the State 
.in regard to private teaching (strong state) and through the 
analysis of the centralization of educational management 
(Administrative State) in the next chapter. 
This chapter will show both the real role of the State 
in education and will hopefully carry further evidence for the 
authoritarian nature of the regime, as manifested in education. 
319 
1. CORPORATISM WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED IN EDUCATION 
1.1. A partial and incomplete corporatism 
Before analyzing the case of corporatist implementation 
in education it is necessary to analyze the implementation of 
moral corporations in accordance with the theoretically 
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integral character of portuguese corporatism ( crlapter seven,sections 
2.4.1, 4.1.1 ) and thus to a!1swer to the question put in the 
beginning of the previous chapter (page 291) - were the 
various areas of society actually corporatized? 
The answer is that since 1966 all areas of society were 
formally corporatized. So Fortuguese corporatism could 
formally claim (only after 1966) to be formally an integral 
corporatism. 
But the reality is very different. In fact, Portuguese 
corporatism was a partial corporatism, almost restricted to 
the economic area. Several indicators point in that direction. 
First of all, the formal co:npletion of corporatism was 
retarded until 1966, which is the date of the creation of the 
moral and cultural corporations - the Corporation for Welfare, 
the Corporation for Science, Letters and Arts and the 
Corporation for Physical Education and Sports. So, even at the 
formal level, Portugal lived in partial incomplete corporatism 
for thirty three years (1933-1966); moral corporations were 
created almost in the end of Salazar's rule (NOTE 1). 
Secondly, the most important moral and cultural 
organizations were n~yer corporatized. As said above (chapter eight, 
section 1.2)neither the Church(NGrE 2) nor the Universi ty were ever 
corporatized. Corporatization of (liberal) professions watered 
down many of the control devices of corporative regulations 
(see WIARDA 1977, 139-140.245). 
Thirdly, the primary organizations of those moral 
corporatio:".s w~re not changed and their representati Yes did 
not really r~present them (LUCENA 1976a,161 ,197e~) -(NOTE 3). 
The Ccrporative Chamber did not represent adequately the 
moral interests. 
In sum, if one goes beyond formal aspects portuguese 
corpora ti sm was only an economic one - see LUCENA 1976a 161-
-162 , WIARDA 1977,329-330. 
1 .2. The non integration of the Uni versi ty in the corporative 
scheme 
The most :mportant moral corporation in the educational 
system woule be the University. But it was not corporatized. 
In spite of the work done during the period of ~~e corporatist 
revival abou: this corporatization (c:~ap~er sever",s-?,::tion 4.1.4) 
and in spite cf the fact that Caetar.o, a theoric::an of 
Uni versi ty as a corpora tion, was Rector of the Uni versi ty of 
Lisbon (1959-1962) the university remained outside the 
corporative system. 
There were sometimes timid defenses of university 
autonomy (see the episodes narrated in CAETANO's memoirs in 
CAETANO 1977,295-301,332-333) or atti tudes which demonstrated 
the conscience of universi ty privileges like the resignation 
of CAETANO as Rector of the Universi ty of Lisbon in 1962 due 
to the en tra!"":ce of the police in the Uni versi ty (chapter six, 
tl"on 2 5 ,....J -' .. - thl"S could mea1 on'" tr,~: c Universi<:_"; is a se: . . ~ . !: - - -!f' natural 
corporation; it did not mean that it was integrated in the 
implemented corporative scheme. 
Occasional references to university corporative autonomy 
were just to pay lip service to the regime's official doctrine 
but had no real meaning - see, for instance, GALVAO TELLES I S 
reference, when he was Minister of Education, to the autonomy 
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and self management of university students.;welfare service (GALVAO-
-TELLES 1967) - or were qualified with restrictions and 
limi ta tions {G;LVAo-TELLES 1963a}. 
The reality was, as it was said in chapter five (section 2.3.2), 
the gradual centralization of; uni versi ty management and the repression of ~ 
university students activities (chapter six, section 2.5). Any 
autonomy which was obtained for the uni versi ty came from the 
political activity ~ithin the university of its students 
which. si~ce 1962. transformed the University in an 
"autonomous arena of pol i tical debate". (cha~':,=,r six. section 2.5.3) 
WIAR)A refers as reasons for this non integration of the 
University in the corporative scheme conjuncture reasons. the 
technical difficulty of corporatizing a so complex institution. 
the v~latili ty of student body. the poli tical opposition of 
senior fa:ulty and students and sheer inertia (WIARDA 1977,124)' 
But d~eper reasons can be invoked to explain this 
situation. 
Why :'r.deed ~as a natural corporation wi th traditions of 
self govE;rr.ment and his;Jrical privileges. the "alma mater" 
of all corporatist theorlcians (almest all of them were 
university professors) not part of the implemented corporative 
scheme? 
Firs: of all. the University elite did not need this 
integratic:1 to obtain power. since through co-optation they 
could guarantee a "catedratocracia". This linked the eli te 
with the c~ly political reality - Government/Public 
Administration which was much more powerful than the 
corporati ve structure. Thus the opposition of senior faculty 
to corporatization of the university. 
On t~e other hand. corporatist implementation in the 
Uni versi ty could be dangerous for the authori tarian nature of th~ 
regime. s:'!1ce it enhanced autonomy and self-government which 
could be cangerous if given to younger members of staff. not 
yet co-opted. and to uni versi ty students. Indeed portuguese 
intellectuals did not convert "en masse" to the new regime 
(ROBINSON 1979.81) and the period of corporatist formal 
completion (economic corporations ~re created between 1957 and 
1959) coincided with ~he great social changes which had a 
counterpart in uni versi ty unres t {chapter six, section 2} 
Gradual centralization was clearly preferable from the point 
of view of the regime's authoritarianism. 
So when university student unrest began (1956.1961-62. 
1969 . onwards) and the public debate about the unwillingness 
of Universities for self-reformation took form (from 1968 
onwards - NOTE 4 ) corporatism was no doctrinaire reference at 
all. 
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1.3. The non corporative government of the educational system 
As said in chapter seven (section 4.1.2 )the touchstone of educational 
corporative management was the attribution of primary 
responsability for the education of children to families. 
In reali ty parents had no participation at all in school 
government at any level, not even in the village primary 
school. So it is clear that this main principle was ignored. 
The only corporative vestiges in educational government 
are the permission of individual "domestic teaching" (article 
43 of the Consti tution) and the settir.g up in 1933· of an 
organization called " The Work of the Mothers for National 
Education", a "collaborative agency" of the corporative 
structure (WIARDA 1977,117). 
The "domestic teaching" is the individual teaching given 
at home by parents or other relatives who live with the child. 
8'j its very nature it is a faculty which could be used by very 
few families. According to statements in the first "National 
Congress of Private Schools" in 1965, the major part of this 
teaching become almost clandestine (in GOMES 1981 ). 
In regard to "The Work of the Mothers for National 
Education" its objectives were to stimulate the education role 
of families, to give child ~ guidance to mothers, to 
deffend good customs and more spe~ificallY to promote pre-
-school education, to promote school social welfare, to help 
teachers in the moral and civic education of pupils and in 
their attendance and school progress, thus contributing for 
the nationalist education of portuguese youth (Decree n226893 
15-8-1936) . 
This organization was staffed on a voluntarily basis by 
mothers of the upper class generally linked with local and 
governmental eli tes. It was clearly aimed at the indoctrination 
of low class families in the good customs, good educative 
principles nationalist spiri t. It did not mean to promote 
the participation of families in school education decisions, but 
rather control morally and doctrinally ION class families and 
more "suspicious" teachers (SAMPAIO 1976,40). 
The deeds were rather less, in all dimensions, than the 
intentions; the organization never got any prominence (MONICA 
1978,228). It ut terly fai led to promote pre-school education. 
it failE2d in the educati0nal welfare dimension (in 1940 only 
0.4% of primary school population got school meals through the 
organization says MONICA, ibidem). 
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The creation, in 1966, of the Corporation for Science, 
Letters and the Arts. where educational interests were represented, 
did not modify the government of thE2 educational system. In fact 
this Corporation "never did really began to function, largely 
because of the opposition of the university community and of the 
sheer difficulty of organizing such an inherently individualistic 
sector" (WIARDA 1977,229) (NOTE 5). 
~4. The non meaningful indoctrination in the curriculum 
As it was above analysed in chapter three (section 3.3.2) 
poli tical education was r.ot meaningful, idE2ological education 
was completely irrelevant. So it is not surprising to discover 
'(WI).. -
that corporative indoctrination was p!aticall~ ~existent in 
compulsory education - we only found a text about the 
cooperation of classes in the s ole reading book for the third 
class, a text about the Corporative state in a book of 1937 
for the fourth class (NOTE 6). It was probably considered a 
too elaborate doctrine to be presented to young children. 
Corporative indoctrination was also completely 
unimportant in secondary education, but one can find here more 
positive statements of intentions. The reform of grammar 
school education of 1936 (Decree 27084,14-10-1936) states, in 
its preamble, the need to form a "corporative mentali ty" and 
in the article 33 the need for all teachers to give their 
teaching a "colonial and corporative direction". The Law 1941 
(11-4-1936) had previously declared that it would be 
compulsory in all schools of the post-primary level (including 
teacher training schools) courses of corporative organization. 
But in the reform of grarrr.lar school education of 1947 all this 
vanished into thin air. We were in the period of corporatism 
discredit (chapter eight , section 2.2.2);as to corP='ratism revival it had no 
effect on the curriculum. 
The only presence of corporative indoctrination in this 
curriculum which survived from the 1936 mobilizing reform 
was (since 1936 until 1974),a course cf "Political and 
Administrative organization of the Nation" where some 
corporatist indoctrination was done (NOTE 7). But the low 
status of this subject in the curriculum, mainly due to having 
only one hour per week and to the fact that no specialization 
was needed to teach the subject, almost cancelled any 
indoctrination effect (NOTE 8). 
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In regard to technical education.corporative indoctrination 
was forma~ly assumed as r.ecessary. the r~ason being tr;e need 
to control the future working class. But even here it was 
given only one course of ene hour per w~,=~~ in just one ::chc:: 
gra~ un..:;er the name of ":orporativE rorr..s.:ion". The sa":':-= 
effect of low status almost cancelled any indoctrinatic~ 
effect (BETTENCOURT 1983, 93-94). 
In regard to the Uni versi ty corporatism was only preser:: 
in the curriculum of Law courses - there was a course of 
Corporative Law. The appeal of Pires Cardoso for a compulsory 
semester course about corporatism for all universi ty courses 
(CARDOSO 1949,14) was not fOllowed. But, as Law licentiates were 
considered the natural corporative elite (CARDOSO 1949,14-15). 
and were also the political and administrative elite, 
corporatist formulation was includec in their training. 
Research centers for ccrporative studies were crea:ed :~ 
the University of Lisbon (in 1949) and in the University of 
Coimbra (in 1951) which were henceforth responsible for the 
major part of the doctrinaire studies about corporatism (see 
about their work WIARDA 1977. 194-197). 
1.5 Conclusion - corporatism was not implemented in education 
One can easily conclude from what was said that 
Corporatism was not implemented in education and that is not 
relevant for the understanding either of New State theory 
about education or of its practice. 
This irrelevancy is even emphasized by the fact that the 
creation of the corporation of education (Corporation for 
Science, Letters and the Arts) was done in 1966, in a period 
where the educational system was breaking away from the mould 
of the mobilising period in some aspects - the substi tution 
of primary sole textbooks was in preparation (the first new 
sole textbook was used in the school year of 1967-1968) 
(chapter three,section 3.2.3.c) ), compulsory schooling was 
expanded for six years in 1964, the preparatory school was 
created ln 1967 (chapter five, section 3.5). 
One can hypotheSise that corporatization did not perform 
in the educational system any of the real functions of 
corporatism already described (chapter eight, section 3.2) -
- the preventive and the defensive functions of corporatism 
were mainly necessary in the economic system whose agents were 
not directly controlled by the state, but it were not 
necessary in a system which was Gompletely centralized and 
whose agents were directly contrOlled. 
The failure of the corporative discourse in education 
means most probably the practical success of the strong state 
discourse. Did it prevail in the mobilising mould or in the 
demobilising authoritarian mould? As it was said in the 
beginning of this chapter, the answer to this question will 
be done analySing the history of the apparently mobilising 
youth movement - the "Mocidade Portuguesa". 
326 
2. THE FAILURE OF THE STRONG MOBILIZING STATE DISCOURSE IN 
EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE 
- WAS "MOCIDADE PORTUGUESA" A MOBILIZING MOVEMENT? 
As it wasjust said, we will carry evidence for this 
failure through the analysis of what became of the mobilizing 
youth organization of the regime. This does not mean that the 
analysis ~f statements about aims and of the school curriculum 
cannot pr~vide also relevant evidence for this failure, but 
rather that the main evidence should come from the analysis 
of the only educational organization which assumed more 
clearly, at least in the beginning, this mobilizing intenticn. 
2.1. Foundation of "Mocidade Portuguesa" (M.P.) as a 
mobilising movement - its main principles 
As seen above, "Portuguese Youth" - "Mocidade Portuguesa" 
(henceforth named as M. P.) - was founded in 1936, during the 
tI fascisti za tion from wi thout" period. Thi s period included a 
set of changes in the regime of mobili zing tone, as has been 
seen (chapter one, section 2.1.1,b), chapter three, section 2.2.1). 
It was unquestionally founded as a mobilising movement 
which fits with the fascistoid pattern of the period (see 
CARNEIRO - PACHECO 1936 a,1936c,1938a). According to the first 
regulation (Decree-Law nQ 27301, 4-12-1936 henceforth na:rled 
1 simply as the Regulation ,it "encompa'Me~- a.l.l youth, be.i..n9- .i..t .i..n ~ ~choo.l o~ not, and ha~ a~ a.i..m~ to ~t.i..mu.late the .i..nte~~a.l 
! deve.lopment ot it~ phy~.i..ca.l capac.i..ty, the to~mat.i..on ot 
; cha~acte~ and ~he devot.i..on to Fathe~.land, in a ~ent.i..ment ot 
I i o~de~, in ~he .lik.i..n9- ot d.i..~cip.l.i..ne and in the cu.lt ot mi.lita~y 
. duty".! The M.P. "wi.l.l p~omote the mo~a.l and civic, phy~ica.l 
and p~e-m.i...lita~y education ot it~ membe~~ [ ••• ] and w.i...l.l 
cu.lt.i..vate the ch~.i..~t.i..an edvca~.i..o~ t~adit.i..ona.l in the count~u". 
It was a movement organized around the trilogy 
"Fatherland, God and Authority". The nationalistic inculcation 
was transmitted mainly through pre-military training and 
physical development in order that "through a complete 
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hierarchy and a sr,ur!1 formative guidance, the youth of 
Portugal be a closed rank of nationalistic fai th" (CARNEIRO 
- PACHECO 1936a). Authori ty and hierarchy were a good way to 
imprint devotion to the Fatherland. Religious indoctrination 
was also present and the 1936 Regulation even said that "on 
no account (the ~.~.J w~ii adm~t ~n ~t~ ~ank~ an ~nd~v~duai 
w~thout /l.el~9~on" I . Authori ty transpires in all articles of 
the ~gulation and is embodied in the mili tary organization 
and training and in respect to hierarchy. 
This trilogy is implemented through an alliance of three 
very important insti tutions in the New State - the Army, the 
Church and the University. The Army is given some co~~and 
posts (see article 9 and 10 of the Regulation) and £eneral 
influence over the organization, the Church is pres~~t at all 
levels through religions assistant s (see ARRIAGA 1976,69 -70) 
and the direction of M.P. was given several times to 
University professors ("catedraticos" and Army men divided 
almost all the leadership of M. P. - see ARRIAGA 1976,49-59 
_ from 1940 to 1944 Caetano himself was the leader of M. P. ) . 
This insti tutional trilogy was present in various symbols -
the patrons were a warrior saint (Nuno Alvares Pereira) and 
the organizer of Discoveraies (Henry, the Navigator), the 
hierarchic units were called upon historical and nationalistic 
figures or tr!&'l'?S The trilogy was al so present in par ale sand 
other public activities of M.P. (Naffi 9). 
2.2. The coexistence in early times of a totalitarian 
discourse and an authoritarian discourse 
There are various totali tarian -like statements and a 
few regulations which indicate clearly the existence of a 
tot ali tarian intention in the early times of M. P. But there 
are 'also, at least, as many which contradict those indicators 
and point towards an authori tarian (and th us less mobilising) 
discourse. We will study the coexistence of those two 
discourses through the analysis of speeches of the mobilising 
minister who created M.P. (Carneiro - Pacheco), the 
instructions given during the mobilising period 
by the second National Commissary of the M.P. (1940-
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-1944) ,who was no less than Marcello Caetano (publ:shed in a 
book called. "The Mission of the Leaders - p.~fltcti()ns and 
Guidelines for 'Portuguese Youth' " - CAETANO 1952), the first 
Regulation of M. P., the Conclusions of tht First National 
Congress of M.?, in May 1939, (included in CAETANO 1952) and 
the "Precepts of the Good Affiliate Member"(also included in 
CAETANO 1 952 ). 
2.2.1. The totalitarian discourse 
Analysing those primary sources one can find several 
totalitarian-like statements 
t r a i n i n g an d s pi r ito f M . P . 
- the empha.si s on th~ mi I i tary 
( CARr~EI RO-PACHECO ·1 936a, 1 936c, 
Regulation articles 1,9,11); his extreme nationalis~ic fervour 
(CARNEIRO-PACEECO 1936a,1936c, CAETANO 1952,48-49); the desire 
to build a new mobilised youngman and thus to create a "new 
nationalist renaissance" (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936c); appeals to 
mobilisation of nation (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a); appeal to 
cult of physical fitness and virility (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a, 
Regulation article 1) and occasional references to the 
decadence of the race (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a); the cuI t of 
6bedience and of blind adhesion to the leader (CARNEIRO-
-PACHECO 1936c). 
There are other indicators of a totali tarian intention 
in statements which exal t the val ue of M. P. in the education 
of youth in regard to insti tutions like the family or other 
organizations like the school or the Church. The insufficiency 
of family in the education of new generation is sometimes 
acknowledged (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a, CAETANO 1952,36-37) and 
it is expected some resistence of families to the 
implementation of M. P. (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a); it is even 
occasionally said that "we are in such times that often 
parents need to be educated by their children" (CAETANO 1952, 
37 - see also SPJ../l:l..AA. in FERRO 1982,288,CARr-.'EIR~PACHECO 1938a)(NarE 10).The 
insufficiency of school is also referred (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 
1936a, CAETANO 1952,38-39). 
Appeals to cooperation wi th "Portuguese Legion" (Legi~o 
portuguesa) a mobilizing militia created in 1936 (see above 
page 14) (SALAZAR 11,297-298, III,162 CAETANO in 1940 - in ARRIAGA 
1976,54 - Regulation, article 9) and the occasional 
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intercha~ge with german nazi youth organization (CARNEIRO-
-PACHECO 1938a). 
But there organizational indicators which go beyond mere 
verbal sta temen t s - the military-like inte:rnal organi za tion 
of M.P., its symbols (uniform, roman salute: and other 
paraphern3Iia). the S in uniform's bel ts in a tentative cuI t 
of the leader all are indicators of a totalitarian intention. 
The ~rganizational role assigned to M.P. is also a 
powerful indicator - membership was compulsory, M.P. 
encompass:d all youth being it school youth or not (Regulation 
article 1); in 1942 it was given M.P. the coordination and 
control cf all youth movements (Decree-Law n2 31908, 9-3-1942), 
of all 5'::::)01 associations (1942), of all physical education 
and spor~ practiced by young ones until 21 y:ars of age 
(August i942 - see ARRIAGA 1976,28). Thef1.P. 'v;as also!;iven 
the super'lisic:1 of all extra classroom activi ties in schools 
in the 194"" refor.:", of grammar school education (Decree-Law n Q 
36508, 17-9-1947) and in the 1948 reform of technical education 
(Decree-La-w nQ 37029, 25-8-1948) and the supervision of the 
teaching cf Physical Education, Choral Singing and Women's 
Handworks (Decree-Law 36507, 17-9-1947, article 13). M. P. was 
also responsible for the school canteen (NOTE 11). 
These early times of M.P. were met with enthusiasm by 
the regime's press (see ARRIAGA "976, 79-94); the national 
broadcast:'r:g corporation even for some time began and ended 
its broadcastings with the M.P. anthem (ARRIAGA 1976,64). 
Those early times were propicious to interchanges with 
totali tarian youth organizations (see ARRIAGA 1976,37-47 and 
FERREIRA 1952), tentative cults of the leader (CARNEIRO-PACHE-
CO called Salazar tithe great educator of youth" - in ARRIAGA 
1976,39 - see also in CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1935b Salazar "as the 
great educator of our times")( NOTE 12). 
One can conclude that there was indeed mobilisation and 
a mobilising group supporting M. P. action. CARNEIRO-PACHECO 
is the overexcited and frenetic spokesman of this group. 
Undoubtely some wi thin the regime followed thi s mobilising 
style, but the main stream remained clearly quieter. According 
to CAETANO (CAETANO 1977,165) Salazar so diSliked CARNEIRO-
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-PACHECO t~at ~e ceased to attend him. As we will now see, 
both the speeches of CAETANO and, in a much greater scale, 
those of Salazar remained in the authoritarian framework. 
2.2.2. Th~ aut~0ritarian discourse" 
There are clear and explici t statements denying any 
totalitarian i~tention in M.P. - M.P. is a "movemen~ ot 
inte9~aI to~ma~ion, but doe~ no~ p~etend to be a movemen~ ot 
totalita~ian education. Jnte9~aI to~mation i~ that which 
develop~ in ~outh all vi~tualit.i.e~ towa~d~ the ~ood" (CAETANO 
1952,35 - :ee SALAZAR in FERRO 1982,156) (NOTE 13). 
-The :'asic sentiments of portuguese moral structure"(chapter 
tr.lI'ee, sectic!'", ~ .4.1 )..Jhich are the basis of t~e pa~ s i ve men tali ty 
inculcatio~, are present in CAETANO's instructions to M.P. 
(CAETANO 1952,45,146). Salazar puts it very clearly, in 1950 
"Jt i~ not unde~~tandable [ .•. ] that M.? be not the viva~ium 
ot an anticommuni~t elite, an~i-communi~t onl~ becau~e i~ i~ 
po~tu9ue~e, anti-communi~t onI~ becau~e it i~ ~pi~itual, 
anticommuni~t onl~ b~cau~e dette~d~ IAeednm of con~cience and 
ti9ht~ to~ human di9nit~" (SALAZAR IV,510-511) (NOTE 14). 
It is very obvious from CAETANO's instructions, from the 
conclusions of the First National Congress of M.P. and from 
the "Precepts of the Good Affiliate Member:' that the main aim 
of M.P. is moral education, rather than political ideological 
education - the main aim is the development of all virtualiti~ 
towards the Good, the integral formation.the teaching to 
become a man (CAETANO 1952, 7,34-35), the moral education of 
youth (CONCLUSIONS, number 5). 
The first National Commissary for the M.P. ( 1 936-1940 ) 
~as already saying that M.P. was not a political party nor had 
any immediate purposes of political fight (in ARRIAGA 1976,52) 
For CAETANO the poli tical aspect of M. P. is fundamentally the 
preparation of elites and to make of "each po~tu9ue4e a 
CQn~cient, di~ciplined and pe~~i~tent agent ot the polic~ 
which ~uit~ ~he Nation." "(CAETANO 1952,11 - see alSO· pag~ 29 ). 
Caetano reports that the so called "nationalist formation 
instructors", specially charged wi th nationalist indoctrination, 
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which exist~d i~ the b~ginning th~ organization, had been soon 
dropped b~caus~ the system did not work (CAETANO 1952,145). 
In th~ ;:,ro::·:':Ih.'rlC'f' of moral cduc-ati on one can feel the influence 
of Boy SCOl..i":: ST'?::'Y. i ?dtjnn - this is expl i ci t ly acknowledged by 
Caetano (CAET.t-.::J 1977,110-111 ) and referred by !'1AROUES (1976, 
186) and W1AR~A (1977,120,250). 
The ar.C!ly~:'s of both the "Conclusions of the First 
Na tional CC;!g!'~ s s" and the" Precepts" carry evidence for this. 
'Out of the ten precepts 80% are concerned with moral education; 
out of the twe~ty-nine general conclusions 38%(11) are 
concerned wit~ ~cral education, 14%(4) with pre-military 
training, 1L%(L) with physical education, 14%(4)_~ith 
nationalistic ::.~j political educaticn (21%(6) w~re categorized 
as various) \ ;:::S 15). 
In correspo~dance with the doctrinal trilogy (God, 
Fatherland, Fa~~ily) there was a trilogy of educational agents 
which the New State considered fundamental for the education 
of youth - Church, Army and Family. Those three agents should 
be present in school and in M. P., as had already been seen in 
the initial sec:ion of this part~ As Caetano says - M.P. 
formation is '" .... r..tef)/l.aJ.., but .i..ncampJ..ete /.oltmat..i..on. 7n (M.dell t.o 
compJ..et.e thi~ to~mation it i~ nat tov much t.he et./.vllt.~ ot 
r amiJ..v., 5 chovJ.. CJl.d Ch 1.1. It ch , in conJunct.ion wit.h OUIl~" (CAETA..~O 
1952,42) "The M.? i~ above the ~chovJ.., in t.he ~ame pJ..ane ot 
t.he ~ound tam.i..J..~ and ot the Chu~ch, a~ envillonment. ot 
chalLact.elL f-vlt.mation and pllepallat.ion tOIL J..ite" (CAETANO 1952,8). 
The role of the family as educator, in this context, is 
emphasized (see SALAZAR in 1938 - 111,89). All those statements 
reject any monopoly or superiority of M.P. as educational 
agent of youth. 
In consor.ance with this spirit one can quote several 
statements which qualify restrict or even contradict the more 
totali tarian -1ir:e statements quoted in the previous section. 
"The pre-military education is fundamentally a formative 
pedagogical problem, hence it should be done by processes 
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different from those of military instructicr." (COr::LUSIONS, 
number 19 - see also CAETANO 1952,30). "The p!-:·!sical education 
of youth should be aCCO'TD700ated to the possibili ties of those 
to be educated" (CONCLUSIONS. number 1 - see also CAETANO 1952 
30). The cult of obedience should only be exercised when it 
is useful and always respecting the personali tj' of young ones, 
and promoting their spirit of initiative and autonomous action 
(CONCLUSIOr~S, numbers 11,12,13,14). Authori ty should be based 
on prestige (CAETANO 1952.50). All those statements are much 
more moderate than those above quoted about the same subjects. 
The mest significant indicator of the !"".:!1 totali tarian 
essence of M.P. (or, at least, of its divided soul, in early 
times) is the role of the Catholic Church in !.~. P. As had been 
seen in chapter three "moral union" between the New S ta te and 
the Church is one of the most important evider.ce for the 
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authori tarian demobilising essence cf the regii':'E:- (c:haptE!" Th·u, section 
5.5) . nris. "moral union" existed in M.P.since the beginning 
(although it became much more clear after the mobilising time 
- see FERREIRA 1952). 
The Church had seen wi th suspicion the creation of M. P. 
(NOGUEIRA 1978,21), but several statements were clear and 
explicit in asserting the "moral u!1ion" at th:'s level. The 
Minister of Education comments that "God and Fatherland had 
been together since Portugal was born" (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 
1936a); Caetano reaffirms that "A~ we do not plZ.etend the 
educationa~ tota~italZ.iani~m, we do not on~~ lZ.e~pect, but a~~o 
want and ~lZ.e~, the exi~tence ot the wOlZ.k~ ot the ~outh llZ.om 
'Catho~ic Action"'('CAETANO 1952,41) (NOTE 16) and asserts that 
M.P. does not pretend to have a specific moral doctrine 
outside that of the Catholic Church (CAETANO 1952.40). Indeed 
M.P. wants to promote not only moral, but also religious 
feelings, attitudes and practices among its members 
(CONCLUSIONS numbers 6 and 7, CAETANO 1952,40) (NOTE 17). 
"Moral union"was also present at the organizational level 
_ there were "ecclesiastic assi stan t s" at all levels headed by 
a "Ne:::'onal Eccl~siast:',: Assistant". 
O~e can concl~1e that, eve~ in early times, the 
authori tarian discoursE: co-existed. at least wi th equivalent 
status, with the mobilising totalitarian-like one - the 
"basic sentiments of p0!"tuguese moral structure" were as 
present as the mobilised atti tudes, the respect of family was 
as present as the idea of educating the parents through the 
children, moral education was as present as political 
education, religious education was as present as nationalist 
education, the Church was as present as the Army, God was as 
as prE:sent as Fatherla~1. 
We have not enough e~idence to co~firn if one of the two 
discours-2s was clearly p:<::"Jailing at the time, but it seems clear 
that different groups i~s:.ce the regime su~ported different 
discourses. The mobilizi~~ group was naturally more ostentations 
and th~s attracted more attention, but it is interesting to call 
attention to the prefer<::~:e clearly given by Salazar and also by 
Caetano (although in this case with some concessions to the 
mobilizing group) to the authoritarian discourse. 
2.3. The abandonment of the totalitarian-like 
the decline of M.P. 
di scourse and 
Ttis title could ~~ interpreted as i~plying a cause -
effect relationship b~:~~en those two fac:s. That is, once tt-2 
mobilising period ende~ ~ith the world war, M.P. decline 
naturally followed by cessation of its "raison d t etre". This 
would mean that the tr~e nature of M.P. ~as that of a 
totalitarian youth organization. Against this reasoning 
stands the fact that M. P. remained until , 974. To accept this 
explanation would imply to accept that M.P. only lived 
according to its essen:ial purpose nine years (1936-1945) and 
was in decline the rema:~ing twenty nine years (1945-1974)! 
On the other hand, if the true nature of M.P. was 
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pursuing demobilisation and passi vi ty it could have developed 
naturallY, once the mobilising period ( ... hich would have SaTe'.rhat 
distorted its nature) ended. Indeed this was not 
apparently, at first ~la~ce , the case. 
The question is co~.;.lex and so the title does not pretend 
to contain any hidden -2z;:,lanatory message. It just affirms a=-. 
intention of explaining those two phenomena. In fact. we need 
an explanation not just for the creation of H.P .• but for its 
decline. We also need further explanations to account for its 
long survival in a declined condition. All the few studies which 
try to explain M. P. address the first question. very few the 
second question (ARRIAGA 1976. BETTENCOURT 1983) and 
apparently none the third question (only a brief reference can 
be found in MARTINS 1970). 
I~ t.s obvious that one cannot center the study of an 
organization which lasted thirty eight years (1936-1974) in 
the study of the first nine years. So this section will 
analyse the remaining years of M.P. 
This discussion is central for the confir~aiion of the 
main hype thesis of this work the crea~ion 
and persistance of a totalitarian ~like mc~ilising yo~th 
organization within the New State would be a very serious 
objection to our hypothesis that the regime sought passivi ty 
through non participation and demobilisation. 
2.3.1. Evidence of the decline of M.P. 
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The M.P. was never a great sucess (BE'ITENCOURT 1983.FONSECA 1983.70 
MONICA 1978,355, ROBINSON 1979,58-59), never penetrated 
meaningfully the Universi ty (MON'I,'EIRO 1975), it even became a 
subject of contempt or ironical comment (MARQUES 1976,1e6) 
"Though the Mocidade sounded both fierce and Fascist, in fact 
it never became either of these" (WIARDA 1977,120). It entered 
in decline after the Second World War (ARRIAGA 1976,13,58-59, 
105, BETTENCOURT 1983, MARQUES 1976,186) and became in time like 
a Boy Scout organization (WIARDA 1977,250). 
Evidence for this decline will come,first of all,from 
statements of the very leaders of M.P., in its Second Congress 
in 1956; then from content analysis of the three Regulations 
of M.P. '1936,1966,1971); the frontal attack on M.P. by 
FERREIRA, a member of parliament in 1952; still within the 
analysis of primary sources, 'one can find ,even in the ini tial 
period,some indicators of difficulties which could help to 
understand the later decline. 
BETTENCOURT's interviews of teachers is a useful 
secondary source to confirm the primary ~vid~uc~. 
In 1956 M.P. promoted its second (and last) congress. In 
this Seco!'d National Congress of M.P, which had "the effect 
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of a true auto?y" (ARRIAGA 1976.100) many statements o~ its leaders 
of M.P. represent clear evidence of an aclmo·wledged decline -
"Onl~ looked t40m ata4 doe~ toda~'~ M.? 4e~emble a ~outh 
o4~ani3at.{.on"i "la~t ~ea4~ have been a./..mo~t completeJ..~ [ .•. ] 
hi~hl~ det~imental", "the M.P. ha~ ~one ve4~ little in~ide ihe 
boJl.~" (all those statements and similar ones can be found in 
ARRIAGA 1 976,95-101 ). Thus thi s decline ""as ackno\Vledged by 
the organ:' za tion (see SALAZAR V, 471). 
The :: s t of doctrinal or civic con tent can. be indi ca ted 
by the ana:vsis of M.P. Pegulations. The prc~crtion of 
expressive and instrumental articles of reg~lation should v~ry 
across tiI7'.e - that is, it is natural ttat loss of coctrir.al 
and civic content should be translated in a!'"; increase in the 
proportior. of instrumental regulation and in the consequEr.t 
decrease :'r. expressive statements in Regulations. 
The r.:easure of analysis will be the "article of 
regulatior:". Within the expressive category are inCluded 
statements of aims and objective~ content of activities, 
references to symbols and rituals; instrumental articles 
include tte organizational struc~ure of ~.P. (central and 
local). articles referring the coordination structure. 
hierarchic relationship. competences of decision-making 
bodies, staffing and finances. 
The analysi s of the last Regulation presents a difficulty 
- at that ~i;te there ~re t'WO official youth organizations of the 
regime: M.P. and the "Secretariate for Youth" created in 
October 1971 (Decree-La\V 446/71, 25-10-1971). The analysis of 
this situation is beyond our temporal scope of analysis (\Vhich 
ends in 1968). Since \Ve are not analyzing specifically f-L P. 
as such, but the regime's official youth organi zations, the 
best solution seems to be to add the t\Vo Regulations of 1971 
together - in a note a specific analysis of each one will 
be done and a brief explanation of this situation will be 
presented. 
TABLE 9~ EXPRESSIVE INSTRUCTIONS IN OFFICIAL YOUTH 
ORGANIZATION(S) REGULATIONS 
CATEGORY 1936 1966 1971 
OF ARTICLES STATUTE STATUTE STAT'u.t:S 
EXPRESSIVE 16 19 15 
ARTICLES 64°/ 10 30"fo 
INSTRUMENTAL 9 44 41 
ARTICLES 36% 70"fo . 
'IUrAL 25 63 56 
100% 1 cx:rfo 
27% 
73% 
100% 
As it is clearly visible there is a gap between the first 
Regulation (Decree-Law 27301,4-12-1936) and the second one 
(Decree-Law 47311, 12-11-1966) - the number of regulations 
almost trebled, but the number of expressive regulations 
decreased enormously proportionately to the total. This can 
be seen as an indicator of bureaucratization and 1055 of 
doctrinal content (of course such indicator would be doubtful 
on its own , but here it supports other evidence). From 1966 
to the two Regulations of 1971 ("Secretariate for Youth" 
Regulation - Decree-Law 446/71, 25-10-1971, M.P. Regulation 
Decree-Law 486/71, 8-11-1971) there is no significant 
difference (NOTE 18). 
So this analysis can be seen as evidence of loss of doctrire and 
civic content of M.P. and thus of the decline of its mobilizing intention. 
In 1952 a member of the National Assembly made as clear 
as a frontal attack on ( boys) M.P. as the regime allowed 
_ see FERREIRA 1952. This attack c~ies evidence of the 
decline of M.P. in two ways - through the accusations of 
inefficiency to M.P. and through the fact that it was possible 
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to attack so strongly the official youth organizat:'Qn (NOTE 
19). 
But one can already find early signs of alarm in the 
primary sources of the ini tial period, which were tte object of' 
analysis in tr.e previous section. Caetano complained. in 1942, 
of the little s~pport given to M.P. (in ARRIAGA 1976.55 - see 
also CAETANO 1977.8).Caetano very premonitorily warns against 
the temptatio~ to promcte just fa~ade events (CAETANO '952,75-
-78) and criticizes the dull sessions (in a very vivid account 
he tells of those M. P. sessions where "in inactive ranks the 
small talk alternates with the yawn" (CAETANO 1952,100). 
This decline has even caricatural aspects like :~e 
emphat~ dsr;ial of M.P. leaders that the S in the un::~rm's 
belt ever stoo~ for Salazar (for the episode see ARR:ASA 1976, 
74-76) (NOTE 20). 
A secondary source confirms the decline evidenced by the 
referred facts. BETTENCOURT interviewed several teachers 
which were witnesses of M.P. work - they asserted that M.P. 
never performed the role it was assigned (BETTENCOURT 1983,94-
96) . 
2.3.2. The tentative renewal of M.P. - the reform of 1966 
The Secor.d National Congress of 1956 did not provoke any 
immediate char.ge M. P., in spi te of the demands of its leaders 
to abolish compulsority. 
Only in 1966, thirty years after the creation of M. P. ,did 
the Minister of Education,Galvao Telles ,decided to reform M.P. 
This reform was preceded by a long spech about the problems 
of youth (GALVAO-TELLES 1964c) in which he reasserted the 
"basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure" and 
recommended that M. P. abandoned all appearance of educational 
statism and military aspect - see also GALVAO-TELLES 1963e. 
This reform had as its most important features to give 
to school a much greater control over extra-classroom 
activities and to give M.P. the promotion of school social 
services ("ac~ao social escolar") (see ARRIAGA 1976,110-112). 
On the other hand, M.P. was to concern itself mainly with 
338 
school youth. almost abandonning the pretension of e~bracing 
all the youth. Compulsority of M.P. activiti~s attendance was 
reduced for the first six years. being dependent for the 
remaining years on the decision of the Rector of a grarrrnar school 
or the directc!' of a technical school (article 26 of the 1966 
Regulation). It gave to H.P. the monopoly of all school 
sport except or. higher education (article 28). 
Those ref~~rns. on the one hand. merely adjusted 
principles to Eacts (it is the case of reduction of 
compulsori ty a!,".j restriction of H. P. mainly to school youth); 
on the other ha'1d. those reforms by giving a more important 
role to school restricted the autor.omy of M. P. acti vi ty. But 
there is also a third important aspect in those reforms -
- there is cle:.!'"ly a goal displacement from civic e.!'1d moral 
education to ~;:.:rt and school welfare. This goal displacement 
seems similar :0 the goal displacement of corporatis:n towards 
welfare functic:1s ( chapter eight. section 2.2.4) and means 
acknowledgement of the abandonment of the early aims (NOTE 21) 
The refor~ did not impede the decline of M.P. The reform 
of 1971 was just the final blow in a "delayed corpse'l (NOTE 22) 
.. 
2.4. Explanation of the decline of M.P. 
It is evident :~at. in the initial period, the mobilising 
group behir.d t~e mobilising disc'ourse of M. P. could produce 
statements. ri:~als and regulations which reflected the 
mobilisation ir.:ention - compulsority is the most prominent 
aspect. But there was, since the beginning, resi stances to M. P., 
not just outside resistances but inside ones (ARRIAGA 1976,46-
-47). Those resistances explain partially difficulties in the 
implementation of a mobilizing M.P. Those resistances were 
acknowledged by the leaders of M. P. (ARRIAGA 1976,46-47,101-
-104) and had tl'e:ir~ main cause in the compulsory characteristic 
of M.P. membership (NOTE 23). There were resistance fran farrdlies. 
resi stance frem the Church (ARRIAGA 1976 t 13.101, FERREl RA 1952) 
(NOTE 24). As these resistances came from educational agents 
which generally supported the regime they reflect their vision 
about the regime they support. 
There was other type of resistance - the resistance of 
secondary and higher education teachers and university 
339 
students (IJOTE 25). 
But the r;.ain calJse of decl ine of M. P. was the end of the 
mobilising period and the consequent disapperance of the 
mobilising group within the regime - the same decline 
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happened wi th other mobil i si ng organizations 1 i ke the "Portuguese 
Legion" (see GUEPI<A 1984,108,116).This was brought about as more easily as 
the mobilisation style was, from the point of view of the 
mainstream of the regime, a strategical move - (chapter one,section 
2.1.1 ) (NOTE 2:,). Only policy change brought about by the 
Government can explain why M.P. had not had enough support 
to finance and staff a structure which could be adequate 
to accompli=h its comprehensive task (NOTE 27). 
So the authori tarian nature of the regirr:12 is undoubtely 
the main Expla!':3tior. for the decline of mobilising M.P. (see 
in similar ser:se BETTENCOURT 1983,99-101 ). 
So far the explanation seems reasonably linear and 
covers the creation and decline of M. P. - in brief, M. P. was 
created by pressure from the mobilising group as a (partial) 
mobilising organization, its decline being the direct 
consequence of the end of the mobilising period. Since its 
nature was essentially totalitarian it did not fit in the 
normal authoritarian characteristics of the regime. ~bat 
happened to M. F. was similar to what happened to its 
predecessor the "Ac<;ao Escolar Vanguarda" - chapter one,section 
2.1.1a); chapter five, section 1.2.2 • 
But this reasoning does not explain adequate~y th~ long 
survival of M.P. That is, the difficulty pointed 
above remains. So it seems that further analysis are 
needed to elucidate the true nature of M.P. 
2.5. Explanation of the survival of M.P. in a declllrirng 
condition - the true role and nature of M.P. 
In searching for reasons for the survival of M.P. the 
first which comes across is sheer inertia. In such a 
regime, as the New State, inertia indeed played a part in non 
change. But this explanation can be abandoned immediately 
because the Second National Congress of M.P. proposed changes 
in the charact~ristics and structure of M.P. 
Does the"t<:=naci ty wi th which [the regime} holds on to its 
key symbols and the resilience with which it revives dormant 
organizations after periods of international discredit" 
(MARTINS 1970) explain adequately the survival of M. P.? Thi s 
statement is ~:re a verification that an explanation. but 
linked wi th t:-.,= "mausoleum effect" can provide an explanation. 
The "maus-:.leum effect in that previous organizational 
forms identified wi th earlier historical experience continue 
to exist side ~y side with those characteristics of modern 
industrial orc-:rs" (GRAHAM 1974) is typical of the latin-
-american-iber:an world. As a consequence the political system 
of those count~ies resembles a "living museum" which reflects 
their whole history of political experience (GRAHAM 1974. 
WIARDA 1977.2Co ). In this sense passive M.P. poses as a "living 
museum" or as a "mausoleum" remembering the mobilising days. 
This characteristic is related to a process of change 
by superimposi~g social. ideological and political layers 
rather than by substi tution of the old by the new ones. That 
is, change is the adaptation of the newer wines to the older 
botles (SARAIVA and SILVA 1976,50. WIARDA 1977.25-26). Indeed 
the reform of youth movements was done by superimposi tion of 
another new or;anization ("Secretariate for Youth") - from 
1971 onwards ~·~.P. became exclusively a "living museum". 
·Eut has r·~.p. just been a "living museum" since the end 
of the war? Was its role just that of a mausoleum - to 
remember already qone times? Let us go back to the Congress 
of 1956 to search an answer. It was said there "Yn· t.he peaR. 
ot it.4 compu~4o~it.~ t.h~ee qua~t.e~4 ot po~t.u~ue4e ~out.h did not. 
exi4t. to~ M.P." (in ARRIAGA 1976,96). This means that M.P. 
never worked as a mass organization. Its leaders asked, in 
this Congress. for the end of compulsority. As one leader said 
"Gducat.iona~ ~evo~ut.ion4 we~e neve~ done act.in~ upon enO~m()u.4 
ma44e4, 4ince educat.ion i4 a pe~4ona~ wo~h. What. we need i4 
an e~it.e which U/O~h4 wit.h t.he ma44e4 and ~ive4 t.hem t.he 
Jt.edeemin~ tellment. C ... 1 Let. U4 t~ee t.he compe~~ed at.t.endant.4. 
Let. U4 4t.a~ t.ho4e who con4cient.~~ want. t.o 4t.a~~ (in ARRIAGA 
1976.96 - see similar demands from other leaders and groups 
341 
in ARRIAGA 1976.95-101) (NOTE 28). But this vOluntariness. 
which "was al~los t enough prerequi si te to transform M. P. in a 
true youth organization" (ibidem) was never allowed to M.P. 
The appeal of M. P. leaders seems reasonable and adequate 
to the authori tarian nature of the regime - was it not Salazar 
himself who pointed to the preparation of eli tes as the main 
educational task of the regime (chapter t:\lO. section 2.2). In 1566 
compulsority was restricted to the first six years. being from 
then on depencent on the decision of the head of schools. 
Indeed compulsori ty was restricted to the age range which was 
specifically as~ed. in 1956. to be excluded from membership of 
M. P. (see ARR:;'.GA 1976.100). Only in 1971 was this. appeal 
satisfied - !:-.at is. vOluntariness ",;as only granted when M.P. 
suffered the last blow. 
In sum. M.? was compelled to continue in a impasse situation 
_ it could not act as a mass organization by lack of means and 
will, and it was ::ot allowed to act as an elite organization. 
Indeed it was compelled to act as a failed or decayed mass 
organization. A question naturally arises - why was not M.P. 
allowed, as its leaders demanded and seemed adequate 
(according to the eli tist theory of government of the regime), 
to act as an elite organization of civic character? The answer 
to that question would provide u~ wi th an answer for the true 
nature of the ~egime. 
A first r.ypothesis could be found on the educational role 
of M.P. which ~ouldt in some way, impose compulsory attendance. 
According to BETTENCOURT'S in terviewees , M. P. was mainly seen. 
in secondary schools, as a resource center for obtaining 
material facilities not available normally in schools. 
paradoxically M.P. activities appe~as the only space in 
which students and teachers could discuss informally and 
pursue their own interests. Thus one can sometimes find 
teachers, politically situated in the opposition to the regime t 
in charge of some M.P. activities (BETTENCOURT 1983,94-95). 
One can conclude from here that M.P. performed an useful 
educational role through promotion of (non political) extra-
-classroom activities. But this role does not impose any 
compulsory attendance, since voluntary adhesion seems 
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essential for the- success of sportive, cuI tural and rE:creative 
activities. 00 the other hand, since resources for ttose 
activi ties in Portugal are always scarce compulsory attendance 
of those activities would be clearly not convenient. 
So one m'..;st conclude that it was not the edu=ational 
role of M.P. w~ich imposed compulsory attendance. 
One must search the explanation in other direction - in 
a political di~ection. If one recalls what been said about the 
organizational pre-emptying strategy of the New State. one can 
hypothesise U'.at M.P. occupied a certain organizational space 
which were to let free could be occuped by other youth 
movements - student I s associations, civic you th ~.ovements, 
progressist catholic movements, etc. This would be v~~y 
dangerous for the demobilizing purpose of the regime. From 
this point of view.it is clear that compulsority was essential 
for the sucess of this organizational occupation strategy. 
But one can go a little further in the exploration of 
this political (but not ideological) dimension of M.? One can 
hypothesise that there was another reason for not allowing 
M. P. to become a voluntary organization, which has all to do 
with the nature of the regime. If H.P. was allowed to work on 
a voluntary basis its civic character could be activated 
again. This was very probable because some of H. P. eli te w'ere 
ideologically fcllowers of the more 'mobilizing group of the 
mobilizing per:od of the regime. There was even a civic 
association of ex-members of the eli te of M. P. ("Liga dos An-
tigos Graduados da Mocidade Portuguesa" - "League of the Ex-
-Officers of Portuguese Youth") C NOTE 29). The transformation 
of M. P.:in a nationalist eli te organization could provoke again 
the political appearance of a new dynamic ideological pressure 
group inside the regime, which could evolve into a political 
tendency. 
This could be a far greater danger for the existing elite 
than the decay of M.P. The more immobilist the regime became, 
as it-waS the case in the 1950sCchapter one,section 3.4;chapter ~~,section 4.4; 
chapter six, section ~) the less it viCE willing to accept any SOlution wr.ich could 
upset the balance of power inside it. As it was said iii chapter b·o 
(section 4.3.), Salazar always avoided the crystallization of the 
regime I s internal groups in political tendencies, since they 
could corn~r t,i~, and thus diminish hi s range of ;'.anoeuvre wi thin 
the regime. 
Those t·."ro poli tical reasons seem to adequately explain 
why it was ~ss~ntial that M.P. remained legally compulsory. 
To SUffi up, the true educational role of ~.F. was to 
promote and coordinate extra-classroom activities and to 
promote moral education. The true political role of M.P. 
became, after the mobilising period, to pre-e~pt the 
organizatior.al space of youth associations in crder to avoid 
that it will ~~c·r;te occupied by iroternal or exterr.al- (to the 
regime) mo~:l:z:ng groups. 
Thus ~.P:srole is congruent with the auth=ritarian nature 
of the regi:ne. This means that the strong state discourse did 
not lead in ecucation to any totalitarian practice. 
(Before concluding this section it is necessary to note 
that the analysis of the function of M.P. is restricted to 
boys t-t,. P. Al though the ana+ysi s of girls M. P. would 
be as interes:i~g, on the educational point of view, it would 
not fi tour pt.;!'pose. As it was sai d ,the analysi s of M. P. in 
this thesis serves to confirm our demobilising hypothesis, 
through explaining that the ini tial mobilizing intention and 
totali tarian appearance of masculine H. P. was dropped after 
the mobilizing period. The analysis of feminine M.P. would be 
useless in this respect since, from the very beginning, it did 
assume clearly a demobilizing intention - see ARRIAGA 1976, 
115-127,141 -151. That is, its congruence wi th our hypothesis 
could not be in doubt). 
Until now ~ have concluded that corporatism was not 
implemented in education and also that there was not any 
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implemented strong totali tarian state discourse in education. 
It is due time to see which state discourse was effectively 
implemented. This means that we -.Nill analyse the 
implementation of the authoritarian strong state in 
educational practice. This will be done, in the last section, 
through the arlalysis of the posi tion of the state in regard 
to private tea~hing (strong state) and then, in the next 
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chapter, through the analysis of centralization of educational 
management (that is, of the implementation of the administrative 
state). 
3. THE STRONG STATE IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE 
OVER PRIVATE EDUCATION 
- THE CONTROL 
As it was said in the beginning of this chapt~r. the 
third stage of our analysis will examine if and hOI,,' th~ 
authoritarian strong state had been inplemented in education. 
This will be done in this section through the analysis of the 
position of the State in regard to private educatio~. 
3.1. New State theory about freedom of private education 
Congruently wi th the theoretical posi tion irA rE:gard t-:> 
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the role of fa:r.ily in education (chapter s':ver:,so:-:ti:·; .. 4.1.2) th-= ~;-?W :·t::::·:-
was favourable to privat-= education. This could be seer; as the 
substantiation of the family right to chose the educa::'D~ cf 
chi ldren (NOTE 30). 
The New State gave constitutional status to this 
principle. The 1933 Constitution says that the state should 
"taciLitate the pe~to~mance ot pa~ent'~ in~t~uction and 
education ot thei~ chiLd~en, coope~atin~ with them th~ou~h 
~tate ~chooL~, ~eto~mato~ie~ o~ th~ou~h tavou~in~ p~ivate 
in~titution~ with tho~e ~ame obj.ective~" (article 13,4). In 
the article 42 the Consti tution does not distinguish between 
official and private education "lducation and in~t~uction 
a~e compuL~o~1J. and conce~n tami1..y and ~tate and p~.i..vate 
~chooL,-j in coope~ation with it". The principle of freedom of 
private education is asserted in the article 44 "Jt.i..~ t~ee 
the e~tabLi~hment ot p~ivate ~chooL~ pa~aLLeL to ~tate one~, 
~ubj.ect to ~tate in~pection, wh.i..ch the ~tate can ,-jub~idi~e; 
the ~tate can ~ive otticiaL ~tatu~ to thei~ ce~titicate~ it 
thei~ cu~~icuLa and ~tatt quaLitlJ. a~e not inte~io~ to tho,-je 
ot ~tate ~chooL~". The Law 2033 (27-6-1949) renews the 
constitutional permission of private schools to have different 
curricula from those of official ones (NOTE 31). 
As often happens with New State, the ordinary legislation 
was charged wi th the task of restricting, contradicting and 
distorting the consti tutional general principles. It is the 
typical case of ordinary laws about repression (chapter six, seCtion 
1.1). It is also the present case of freedom of private 
education. As r1JuldGtJ'ES comments all this C(;~lJnon legislation 
was embedded in a "spiri t of theoretical fr~edom of teaching 
and real limitation to its exercise" (IDDRIGL'ES 1976). 
3.2. New State practice about freedom of private education 
- the control of the state over private education 
The controls over private teaching began in the setting 
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up of a pri vat'=: school - it was necessary re .obtain a charter ("alvara") 
granted by cer.tral administration and to have a specia,l inspection 
visit to the facilities ("vistoria") before U:€ effective 
opening of the school. 
Then tr.~ c0ntrols extended to the directcr (who r.'2e~ed 
a specific di;:loma) and to the teachers who ',,,;sre subject, as 
if they were civil servcr;ts, to the disciplir:2.r:1 pO~'er cf the 
state. 
The curriculum and the general pedagogical organization 
of private sc~ools was compulsorily the same as that of state 
schools (see recree-Law 36508, 17-9-1947, article 6; Decree-
-Law 37029, 25-8-1948, article 367; Decree nQ 48572, 9-9-1968 
article 25) - this clearly contradicts the constitutional law. 
In this line the teaching of religious education was imposed 
and M.P. membership compulsory. 
Another layer of centrol was the one of the certification 
of students. rntil 1957 all students of private schools ~'ere 
compelled to do their exa~ina~ions in state schcols with state 
teachers - only this way they could obtain official value 
certificates. From 1957 onwards the state would appoint in 
the official examination jury of private school students one 
private school teacher. 
There was also great difficulty in the transference of 
a student from private to state schools. 
Above all this,the state set up a central department 
specifically assigned to control and inspect private schools 
_ the "Private Teaching Inspection". 
The first statute of private teaching was produced in 
1931 (Decree 19244, 16-1-1931). New statutes fOllowed each 
more detailed than the previous one - 1932, 1933, 1934 and 
finally t 1949. This las t 5 ta tute (Decree nQ 37545, 8-9-1949 ) 
was the most important since it was onlYrevoked in 1980. It is 
part of the effort made in the stabllization p'::riod to c0dify 
and rationallze central administrative control over all 
education - the grammar school statute was published in 1947. 
the technical school one in 1948 and the pri va te education in 
1949. There is a continuity between all those successive 
statutes in the control of the state over private education. 
One can even say. with some irony. that the only discontinuity 
is the 1933 Constitution precepts. 
In sum, the administrative control of the state limi ted 
greatly the freedom of private education. But there were also 
financial cor.trols - the consti tutional perrr.ission of state 
subventions to private education was never use6 in the period 
studied in this thesis. The Minister GALVAO TEL~ES (1962-1968) 
considered this possibil i ty (see TELLES 1 966b. 421-422 • TELLES 
1966c.39-40), but never ~ut it into clear execution. 
Only in 1971, in VEIGA SIMAO's rule, was ir.itiated a 
policy of subventions to private schools (NO'IE 32).Beyond this non 
financial incentive, private schools were taxed. 
One can conclude that there was strong administrative 
and financial control by the State over private education. Did 
the same controls apply to the schools owned by New State's co-
-opted partner in the portuguese passive mentality inculcation 
- the Catholic Church? The next iection will a~swer to that. 
3.3. New State practice about freedom of private education -
the control of the state over Church owned private 
education 
Chapter five (Secti012.2. 7) gave clear. answer to the 
previous question - the moral union was not an obstcCleto the 
administrative submission. 
The Concordat between the HOly See and Portugal (1940) 
says in his article xx that nCatho~ic Chu~ch a44ociation4 and 
o~9ani~ation4 can t~ee~~ 4et up and 4Uppo~t p~ivate 4choo~4 
pa~a~~e.~ to tho4e ot the 4tate, be.in~ 4ubject to it4 
in4pection and to it4 4ubve.ntion and otticia~iJation in the 
4ame. te~m a4 othe~ p~ivate 4choo~4". 
In regard to religious seminaries, where catholic priests 
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were prepared, the Concordat d~crees that its internal 
organization a~d curriculum is not subject to state inspection 
- even so the Church should report to the Central 
Administration the textbooks ~hich were adopted for the non 
philosophical or theological subjects. 
Control over those schools was exerted ~ainly through 
the admin is trati ve control over the value of t!-leir certificates. 
In a first stage, until 1956, no official acceptance 
whatsoever was given to seminary certificate::.. This provoked 
some situations which were both ridiculous and vexatious. For 
instance, if a priest wanted a dri ving license (for which it 
was necessary to have primary education) it ~~s useless to 
proclaim he had twelve years of post -primary studies, since 
they counted for nothing in the official system - he was 
compelled to exhi bi t his primary school certificate. 
In 1956 a decree. was published in which some acceptance 
(equivalence )was given to religious seminary degrees (Decree-
-Law 40591, 4 -5-1956). This equivalence was n~t given in terms 
of certificate, but just in terms of access to examinations in 
state schools. Even so there was a discrepancy between the 
years of study required for access to examinations for 
religious seminaries and the other schools. Tate 9.2 shows this 
discrepancy. 
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TABLE 9.2-COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF STUDY YEARS REOUI~ED 
fOR ACCESS TO OFfICIAL EXAMINATIONS BETWEEN 
EELIGIOUS SEMINARIES AND RESULAR SCHOOLS 
NORMAL RELIGIOUS DISCRE 
DEGREE SCHOOLS SEMINARIES PANCY 
Primary education 4 years - -
-
1stCycle of 
Secondary Educaticn 6 years 8 years + 2 
2ndCycle of 
Secondary Education 9 years 11 years + 2 
rd 3 Cycle of 
Secondary Education 11 years 16 years + 5 
no 
Higher degree 15-16 years equivalence 
-
The table is clear in itself and shows that the higher 
the degree the tighter the control. 
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This control is the application of the strat~gy of 
cOJnpartmentalization of the New State in re:latic!1 to Catholic 
Church. As it was said in Chapter five, side by side with 
"moral union" there was the "economic and administrative 
separa tion". Religious seminaries should be "a~~.i ni s tra ti vely 
separa ted" in order that priests became clearly 
compartmentalized in the religious sphere - the:y should not 
compete wi th their educational qualificaticns in the normal 
market. 
One can ask the question - why did the Catholic Church accept 
this apparently inferiori ty si tuation. if :. t had a 
privileged status as partner of the regime? ";'.s to the degrees 
conferred by the seminaries. the Church su;portej the State 
policy because it allowed a r.arrow control 0: the Church's 
Hierarchy over its priets. They hardly could leave the Church 
or oppose its leader's decisions as they depended on 
the institution to keep their economic resources and their 
social status. Some evidence is available to support this 
explanation: a) al though the priests and ex-seminari s t s 'Who 
did not follow the priesthood made several attempts to 
obtain the recognition of their degrees, the Church's 
Hierarchy never gave official support to this demand; b) even 
after the first recognition of those degrees by the l1inistry 
of Education, admir.istrati ve dEvices were frequer:tly used to 
refuse to give the school certificates required for the 
priests to register in State Universities or to apply for a 
teaching job in private or state schools" (FORMOSINHO, FERNAN-
DES, PIRES, 1982). 
On the other hand, . this compartmentalization helped to 
increase the number of seminary graduates who opted for the 
priesthood. This needs ~ explanation - indeed seminaries 
were frequented, in the major part, not by clearly vocational 
candidates for ordination, but by able rural children in 
search of educational and social promotion. Seminaries were 
a very important instrument in the (little) social mobili ty of 
rural classes - Salazar is the most noteworthy example of 
this rural family strategy of social promotion (NOTE33). 
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According to COSTA(1974) only 20% of all enrolled 
in religious seminaries opted for priesthood. If religious 
seminary certificate had normal market value it is very 
probable the decrease of this proportion. Hence this is 
another reason for the peaceful acceptance by the Church I s 
Hierarchy of this compartmentalization (This had also the 
consequence of making more difficul t the social mobili ty of 
rural classes). 
The state only changed this compartmentalization 
strategy when it needed all the qualified workmansrnp it could 
get to answer to the need for increasing the tosaching staff 
caused by the policy of great expansion of schooling in the 
fifth period of our division (1968-1974). In 1972, seminary 
courses were given legal recognition for teaching in the 
preparatory school, that is, in the new 5th and 6 th year of 
compulsory schooling (NOTE 34). 
3.4. Characteristics of private education 
Due to the administrative and financial control and due 
to the lack of official support,. private education developed 
certain characteristics which conditioned its role and status. 
The first characteristics is its non competitive 
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character - private education was offered generally ei ther in the 
level of teaching where the state did not offer education 
(pre-school level) or in professional areas where the state 
had not yet any educational supply (language, secretariate, 
management courses, for instance) or, wi thin normal primary 
and secondary schooling, in geographical areas where no state 
education was available (large villages, non district capital 
towns). This strategy avoided either tight control of the state 
(in the first two cases) or direct competition with state 
schools (in the last case). 
In fact, to set up a private school, in thi s last case, 
was considered a risky business - either the private school 
was financially supported by a religious organization (NOTE 35) or it 
seemed necessary to play safely by chosing an area where no 
state competition existed. This is clearly linked with the 
second attributes characteristic of many private schools 
- their commercial character. Indeed, in non confessional schools, 
commercial concerns sometimes superimposed on educational 
quality concerns (GOMES 19B1). 
A thiid characteristicof private education is that it 
was, in the major part of the cases, supported by Catholic 
Church organizations. This religious character of many private 
schools is natural in a country where the Catholic Church is 
so influent. On the other hand, religious organization had, 
more than simple private individuals, the financial. power needed 
to set up a sc~~81. 
Both confessional c=.nd non confessional schools were 
generally frequented only by elites - thus its elitist 
character. In fact, those families who enrolled their children 
in primary or secondary private schools paid twice for the 
education of their children - through private school fees and 
through taxes. It is natural that, in a poor country, only 
high middle class or high class families could afford this. 
All those characteristics conditioned the role private 
education performed in portuguese educational system. 
3.5. The actual role of private education in portuguese 
educational system 
Due to these character:istics private education could not 
generally provide an ideological or pedagogical al ternative 
to state schooling or perform an innovatory role. 
Indeed the role of confessional schools in providing an 
ideological alternative was relatively unimportant since state 
schools also provided an education based on catholic christian 
values (article 43 of the Constitution) and offered also 
specific teaching of catholic religion and morals. For the nost 
part, families who chose religiously controlled schools for 
their children did not do it predominantly for religious 
reasons, but because they needed a boarding school due to lack 
of near by school s, or wan ted a social and morally con trolled 
education for their children, or wanted a more individualized 
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attention. 
Very few private schools were also asked for their 
pedagogical alternative offer. Due to administrative and 
pedagogical control of the state, it was very difficult to 
build a global pedagogical alternative which included both 
academic and mGral curricula. The only area where private 
schoo~could create clear pedagogical models was where the 
state was abser.t - pre-school education, new professional 
courses, religious seminary education, etc. But in those cases 
one cannot properly speak of al ternati ve since thi s requires 
the existence of a confrontation of modelS - in those cases 
no official mo~el was available. 
It was in those areas that private education performed 
an innovatory role; but the importance of this role was 
prejudiced by tte commercial character of many of these 
schools and lack of quali ty of teaching staff and some lack 
of concern wi tt educational quali ty (GOMES 1981 ). The absence 
of competition facilitated this result. 
The major part of private education performed just a 
supplemental role ,offering education similar to that offered 
by state schools in communi ties where no state education was 
available. 
Private sC:--Lools in towns where state education was also 
available performed generally remedial role, receiving 
students who die not perform adequately (in relation to their 
families expectations) in state schools or needed special 
attention. The official regulations even permitted that a 
student, who e~ted .. a failure in state schools, could 
transfer, during the school year, to a private school and 
present himself to examination in the normal conditions of 
private school students. The inverse was obviously not 
possible - in fact, transfers from private to state schools 
were difficult .. 
Some private schools (generally boarding schools) 
specialized in a disciplinary role and provided specific 
attention to '~djusted, disruptive or rebel students. 
From what was said one can predict the areas where 
pri vate education was. in quanti tati ve terms. more important 
- pre-school education. due to absence of state educational 
supply; grarrmar school education,due to the elitist and 
supplemental role of private schools. The next section will 
confirm this. 
3.6. The importance of private education 
TABLE 9.3-ENROLLED STUDENTS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
(percentage in relation to total 
student:: enrolled in private and state schools) 
PERIODS 2ndPeri I'd 'od 3 Perl. t~ , . 4 erl.OC 5thperiod 
LEVELS 
OF 1940-41 19)0-51 
SCHOOLING 
1960-61 1966-67 1973-74 
PRE - SCHOOL 
EDUCATION 100"fo 1 OO"fo 100% 1 OO"fo 91.2% 
PRIMARY 
EDUCATION 8. 5~" 5.0% 4.6% 5.3% 6.3% 
PREPARATORY 
EDUCATION 37% 8.7% 
GRAM-1AR SECONDARY 
EDUCATION 50.8% 54.6% 58.8% 57.3% 20.6% 
EDUCATION 5.ax 12.4% 5.8% 6.1% 1.2% 
TEACHER 
EDUCATION 13.5% 18.gofo 11.4% 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 9.2% 7.3% 5.3% 
(The Table was build upon statistical date from national 
educational statistics -'it was also consulted SAMPAIO 1973). 
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Pre-schoc: ~ducati0n was left. until 1973, o~l'l to 
private initia:~ve. The New State regime did not off~r 
educational se~vices in that area, since it assumed that, 
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until school a;,=, children should be educated and reared o('l~y by 
their parents {mainly by their mother~. This position was 
reinforced by tt.e inculcation of a tradi tional rr .. ~ntali ty in 
regard to wome~ - to perform well the roles of mother, 
howsewife and ~~ouse they should stay at home. As SALAZAR says 
"there never \l!2.'s a good housewife who did not have plenty of 
work to do" (SJ..:.. . :.ZAR I, 204 - see also SALAZAR to FERRO 1982, 
156-157). 
In reg arc :0 primary education the role of private 
schools ~as in all periods, unimportant. 
But the s:' :uation was completely different in crar:imar 
.... x'-_~ 
school educati~~. Indeed, ~ntil the fifth period, 
schools had mor-= students than state ones. The 
role of private schools was clear here, generally 
;:,rivate 
s-..:pplemental 
:n a non 
competitive fra~ework - private grammar school ed~cation was 
generaly offerE~ to communities where no state gra~~ar schools 
were available. As private schools were not supported by the 
state ,they had fees; thus only high middle class and high 
class families could afford private education for their 
children. On t~-= other hand, those families demanded generally 
the kind of ec·...:::ation which could give access to the uni versi ty . 
That is, 't!':ere '.,·as, on the side of the demand. economic and 
social reasons '",'hich explained the success of private grammar 
school educati:n (and its elitist character). 
The same reasons explain why private technical education 
was not demanded. On the other hand, its supply was very ltttle 
due to the fact that it did not attract those who could pay 
(high middle class and high class), and due to the fact that 
those who could be attracted by vocational and professional 
courses did not have economic capacity to pay the fees. 
Furthermore, tr.e setting up of a technical school 'Was more 
expensive than that of a grammar school, due to the machinery 
involved. All thi s is clearly reflected in the non importance 
of private technical education in all periods. 
Teacher education was also a state affair, except in 
relation to the preparation of pre-school teachers, 'Which 
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accounts for :~e percentages of private tea~her ~ducation (NOTE 36). 
In highe~ education the same applies. The y,=rcentages of 
private educa~:on are mainly due to religious s,=~inary 
education (at the higher level) - 54% (84% in 1960-61. 
66% in 1966-67, 20% in 1972-73). 
So the analy'si s of table 9.3 is congruen t wi th 'wha t had been 
said about th,= characteri stics and role of pr: 'late education 
in the New Sta:e educational system. From all 'Vo'hat had been 
said, one can take some conclusions about the status of 
private educa:ion, which is instrumental to cor.::rm the 
assertion of tfJe "strong state" discourse in ed:..:-:ation (NOTE 37), 
3.7. The status of private education 
What werE the consequences of all those f:~a~cial, 
academic and a::ministrative controls on the sta:;.;s of private 
education? Ar.~ what were the effects of the abc~e referred 
characteristics and role of private schools in t~is status? 
The firs: consequence came mainly from the ~essage 
transmi tted by state controls - private education was much 
more a toleratEd teaching than a fully accepted (and even less 
supported) kind of education. This is also evidenced by its 
non competi tive character and the predominance of its merely 
supplemental (~ather than altern~tive) role. 
The secc~j feature of private education sta:us is its 
second class :eaching status. Evidence for this status 
is overwhe1mir.g - the state controls, the non competitive 
character, the predominance of the supplemental, remedial and 
disciplinary :"c1es over the al ternative and innovatory roles. 
Beyond this one can quote some legal dispositions which 
reflect this - the easiness of transfer of almost failed 
students from state to private schools versus the great 
difficul ty of transfer of even good students from private to 
state schools; the ~esser requirements of private school 
teachers qualifications; the prohibition of the use of the 
name of "liceu" (grammar school), 'Which 'Was exclusive of state 
schools (Decree Law 36508, article 7), This last disposi tion 
is very enlightening about the minority status given to non 
state education - private education 'Was even semantically 
" compartmentalized". 
The stig:r.a of private education could not come from any 
intrinsic difference between the kind of education practiced 
in it and in s:ate schools, since state controls existed 
precisely to ~~iformize this. The lesser qualificatio~of 
private school teachers does not also seem enough to explain 
the stigma, si~ce all kinds of students (private and state 
ones) were corr,?elled to make examinations in state 
thus obtaining exactly the same kind of certificate. 
schools, 
That is, 
the eventual c:'fference in the means of teaching was covered 
by the equality of the ultimate control. This means that this 
was certainly ~;~re a consequence than a cause cf. the minori ty 
status. T~us ~~e stigma seems to concentrate on the extrinsic 
characteristic of o ... nerships - state or non state o'J,nerships. 
This leacs us to the question of the role of the state 
in Portuguese society, and in Portuguese educational system, 
during ~the t'e\.l St~-=e regime, mainly to the ques tion of the 
legi timacy of s:ate control over all social acti vi ties. The 
legitimacy of the state in the present question was built not 
only on the image of the state as the moral leader or the 
"national patron" (v,'IARDA 1977,105,150), or the "MJther-Providence" (APAr::AO 
1985,355), but a~so on careful destruction of the legitimacy of 
private educat:'~n. This was based,in its commercial character, 
in contrast with the noble character of official teaching (see 
FRANCO 1976); cr in its eli tist character, in contrast wi th 
the lOW cost of official schools; or in its religiously 
partisan character, in contrast with the non ecclesiastical 
ambiance of state schools (the emphasis was not put on the 
religious character, but rather on its ecclesiastical 
character whic~ awakes strong anti-clerical roots in the 
portuguese - NOTE 38). Thus private schools education was less 
noble, less social and less independent than state education 
_ thus it was less legitimate. Hence state controls were 
justified. 
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How was :~is ~~c0n~ class status congru~~: with t~~ 
elitist chara::er of ~ducaticn? The fact is that private 
schools perfc.:~.'?d, even f or the eli te, only a secondary role 
- a supplemen:::l, disciplinary or remedial role. That means 
that, apart t~~ disciplinary or remedial situations, they were 
not the norma: choice of the elite, when there was the 
possibility c: a choice. The "liceus nacionais" (national 
grammar schoc:z) enjoyed generally great prestige. 
More dif::'cul t to Explain is the peaceful acceptance of 
the Church of ~ second class status to a kind of teaching 
which was, in its ~~jor part, owned ~y religious crganizations. 
We have alrea,::,.' analyz-=-:J. ~he Ch'...:rch' s ~si tion in r~;~"'Cl to the 
status of rel:';ious s-::minaries education. Let 1.,;S analyse, in 
the next sect:.:n, the Cat hoI ic Church's posit i ~n in regard to 
regular priva:~ education. 
3.8. The Catholic Church's acceptance of the second class status 
of private education 
There are several reasons which can explain Church's 
acceptance of this second class status of private education. 
First of all, the Church accepted because this. was part 
of a status q~o which was much better than the previous 
situation - "::-:oral union with economic and administrative 
separation" was better than official persecution. 
Secondly, because state education was also guided by "the 
priciples of :;'~istian doctrir.e and morals, tra~itional in the 
country" (article 43 of the Constitution). Indeed the New 
State introduced massive doses of religion in compulsory 
education and guaranteed the teaching of Religion in secondary 
schools (see cha;::ers three,four and five) (NOTE 39). 
Thirdly, because the social control of the CathOlic Church 
Hierarchy over catholic laymen. and over society in general, 
was more than enough to guarantee that a christian catholic 
socialization prevailed in the educational system (NOTE 40). 
Fourthly, because Church and State were partners in the 
more comprehensive project of inculcating a passive mentality 
in portuguese people:" . 
So the Ch~rch's acceptance of an inferior status for many 
of its schools was seen as part of a global implicit and 
explici t deal in which its social and educational influence 
was not only respected, but also fostered. 
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But this deal r~lied on the maintenance of some implicit 
condi tions - on the maintenance of Church's social control 
over society, but al so on a consensual· catholic world and 
a consensual perspective, wi thin catholics, about the role of 
Church in portuguese society. Such consensus existed until the 
early 1950' s, but became gradually to fade since late 1950' s 
360 
and mainly during t~e 1960's and 1970's(see chapter five, sections 
2.2.5, 2.2.6, chC~':7r six, secticns 2.1.1, 2.4.2).The catholic "dissidences" 
~ which .... ·ere thereb:; peli tical dissid~nces )put at stake not only th~ 
"moral union", but the Church Hierarchy strategy of 
educational influence through social control. 
If thi s h::pothesi sis correct one can expect the aPP2c.rance of Church 
official positions in favour of private schools in the 
1960's and 1970's - indeed, once the adopted strategy was 
questioned, it was safe to try, at the same time,another 
strategy which implied a more clear and dignified role fer 
private schools. 
The evidence supports our hypothesis. In 1962, an 
Episcopacy Pastoral Note defends that was then due time to 
face the problem of private teaching with larger perspectives, 
as other countries did. The same message is conveyed by the 
1964 Episcopacy Pastoral Note. 
It is obviously not by a fortuitious coincidence that the 
first "National Congress of Private Teaching" was held in 1965 
It asserts private teaching rights and asks from the State 
financial support for private schools (see ACTAS 1965). For 
instance, LOL'P£IRO's communication (NOTE 41) claims for a free 
teaching based on family educating rights, economic equali ty 
and pedagogical freedom; at the same time, criticizes the 
strict co~~ercial approach in private education (LOUREIRO 
1 965 ) . 
From then on we have a more assertive position from 
Church Hierarchy (see,for instance, LEITE 1968 (NOTE 42) ). 
There wa~ ~nother powerful reason for this ass~rtion 
- private sch::ls suffered, in late 1960's and in the 1970's, 
the greatest t~reat not only to its status, but to its 
survival. Due :~ the predominan~e of the suppl~~ental role in 
relation to tt~ alternative (c~mpetitive) role, private 
schools were ~~rticularly vulnerable to any expansion of 
state's schoo:~ network. This would mean to set up state 
schools where ;reviously only private education was available 
- private sch:::.:.: s were not prepared for the ccrnpeti tion. The 
statistics of :!1e last fourteen years of the regime show this 
very clearly. 
TABLE ?A- ENROLLED STi.::SHTS IN PRIVATE SCHOetS 
~ LEVELS OF SCHOOLIN 
PRIMARY 
EDUCATION 
PREPARATORY 
EDUCATION 
GRAMMAR SECON:~~Y 
EDUCATION 
TECHNICAL 
SECONDARY 
EDUCATION 
(1960 - 1974) (in relation to total enrollments 
in private and state schools) 
1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1973 
1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1974 
4.6% 4.8% 5.3% 5.2% 5.9% 6.3% 
 V~ ~ /. 100% 34.5% '9.0% 8.7% 
58.8% 58. 4~~ 57.3% 55.2% 44.3% 20.6% 
5.6% 5.4% 5.9% 5.7% 5.8% 1.2% 
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This table was built based on the national statistics of 
education. Data about the school year 1973-1974 is presented with 
reservation sin<;e the 1975 and 1979 official compilation of 
stati sties differ in their resul ts aOOut' this period ( III) 
In r~f~r~nce to prE:paratory education 0!';e must cc,rn:nent 
that, from 1965 to 1971, there was an only private TV 
preparatory education (official TV education began in 1971-
-1972). From 1965 to 1968 TV private education was the only 
preparatory education available - in 1968-1969 the state 
direct preparatory education began . This explains why in 
1966-1967 pre;:;aratory education was guaranteed, in 100%, by 
private schools (private "Telescolas"). 
The table provides evidence which justifies the concern 
of Catholic Church, and private schools in general, about the 
future of private education after the expansion of compulsory 
schooling. 
3.9. Conclusion the tight control over private teaching is 
evidence of the prevalence of the strong state discourse 
in education 
The objective of thi 5 part of chapter nine \las to show how 
the strong state discourse prevailed in education in its 
authoritarian mould. 
The analysis done about the control, the characteristics, 
the role, the importance and the status of private education 
provided overwhelming evidence for this objective. This 
evidence is reinforced by the fact that no ideological issue 
was at stake - the tight control was sijrtilarly exerted over 
schools which were supported by the· t:el,t·: State partner, the 
Catholic Church. 
The strong state control was decisive for the 
unimportant role that, on the whole, private education 
performed in portuguese educational system - between 1960 and 
1972 private education represented between 11.4% and 14.2% of 
all enrolled students. The situation worsened in the fifth 
period in the area where private education was tradi tionally 
important - grammar school education. 
If private teaching was so tightly controlled how would 
state teaching be . controlled? The answer to this question will 
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be the obj~ct of the next chapter v,:hich analys'::s t~.e 
full implementation of the Administrative Stat~ in education . 
. . 
l • 
CHAPTER X 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN EDUCATION 
- THE ANALYSIS OF CENTRALIZATION IN SCHOOL EDUCATION 
The analysis of centralization of decision-making in the 
educati0t;-al system has as its main purpose to carry ~vidence 
for the confirmation of the use of educational cer.~ralization 
as a demobilizing strategy to achieve passivity. 
The analysis will be done at the seccnd,ary ~~;;cational 
level~ There are two main reasons for this choice - first all, 
centralization in primary education has already t~E-:-.. studied 
(MONICA 1978, second' part ,c~apter three); . se:ondly, . 
secondary education is the ideal area to analyzec~ntralization 
since in Portugal administrative control is much rrore preser.t there than . 
in primary education, as will be seen. 
1~ PRESENTATION OF THE METHODOLOGY USED 
. If' the hypothesis' that centralization was a strategy of 
demobilisation is correct, one can expect that centralization 
decreased during the mobilizing period. 7hat is, ~t.:ring that 
period ideological control should have:prevailed over 
administrative (bureaucratic) control. This demands ,that the 
analysis of centralization be done diachronically. 
,The research ,wa~, conducted through, content analysis of 
the Statutes of grammar school education, technical education 
and, since it was created, preparatory education. 
, The analysis falls mainly upon the education for 
elites - grammar school education, not only because it 
'reflec~more the careful control of the state, but also 
because it was published a statute for grammar school in each 
of the first three periods of New State regime (1932, 1936 and 
1947). The fourth period is represented through the analysi s 
of the statute for the preparatory education school (1968), 
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which was COr.",,"":'Ion both' to grammar and technical -school -future 
students. Tr.t:: research includes the last period of New State 
and presents, also the present situation.- This last inclusion 
attempts to show the relevance of the analysis for the 
understanding of the present situation,' and implies the 
exis tence of, structural, continui ties before. and _ after, the 
25 th April re~olution. 
The comparison of· regulations for grammar and technical 
schools will be done through the analysis-of the 1947- grammar 
school statu!~ and the 1948 technical school statute (both 
lasted until 1974 ). -, .. -,' _ . 
1.1. The educational decision-making content analysis 
, Two methods of content analysis were' used (NOTE 1). The 
! 
first was the analysis of decision-making in the several areas 
of school mar.'agement·· to . dete~min'e 'the'desiree -or' ce'n't'ral'izatiol1. 
Three major areas were considered - curriculu~ and evaluation. 
" , 
pedagogical management, government and administrative, 
management. Each major area was divided into smaller areas. 
In each of those smaller areas several sub-areas were 
considered - these sub-areas were' the, main uni t of analysis 
in a first stage. All those type of , areas can be seen in' 
Tables 10.1, 10.2 and ,10.3 .' 
1.1.1. The scale used 
The situation in respect to each sub~area (item of 
analysis) was categorized in an ordinal' scale; according to 
the degree of control of central administration over this 
concrete area of decision. Those categories are: 
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Graphic 
symbol MEANING 
XXXX Total control of Central Administration. 
No room for school discretionary judgement 
decision. 
XXX. Almost total control of Central Administration. 
Very little room for school discretionary decisior 
xx •• · Control of Central Administration 
Little room for school discretionary decision 
X ••• Guidelines of Central Administration. 
Some room for school discretionary decision 
•••• Freedom of school in decision-making 
- discretion of school 
1.1.2 Type of items analyzed - control items, structural ite~s, 
uniformity items 
The great majori ty of the items of analysis (sub-areas) 
reflect the degree of control of central administration over 
decision-making in schools; that is, they reflect the degree 
of discretionary decision-making.in schools. From that one can 
conclude the degree of the schools autonomy. This means that the 
categorization is done based on who decides mainly (Central 
Administration - the first four categories - or the school 
_ the last category) and, in the case of Central 
Administration decision, how tight are rules for 
implementation in school. We will call those items control 
itenS - 55. of the 70 sub-areas are of this type (79%). 
There are also structural items which are 9% of the 
total - (6). In some areas of decision-making.although . all 
decisions are pre-made by Central Administration, the 
structure they create can give more or less autonomy to the 
school, across the several periods of time. The categorization 
reflects this degree of autonomy. For instance, the situation 
in which students can be promoted without being subject to 
national exarnina tions 9i ves more autonomy to the school than 
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the inverse si tuation. Another example - if the decisicri to 
promote or fail a student is done by mere juxtaposition of 
individual decisions of the different subject teachers the 
school has less structural autonomy in this area than if it 
is given to a committee of teachers the power to override 
individual decisions and to produce a global judgement over 
students which ends by a promotion/failure decision. In both 
cases the Central Adm:inistration 'determines tightly the· rules •. 
but the choice for individual or group decision-making has 
influence in the autonomy of the school. The last solution 
gives more power to.include non subject k~owledge 
considerations (like ability, work qualities, .personal 
situation, etc) into the decision-making process. A third 
example is given by the teacher grouping structure. If tea-:hers 
are grouped on a monodisciplinary basis the degree of 
structural autonomy in class allocation to teachers is lesser 
than if .Central Administration determines (with no equal. room 
for school discretionary decision about teacher grouping) that 
teacher grouping is done·bidisciplinary or on the basis of 
great areas of knowledge. 
A third type of sub-area of analysis reflects the degree 
of uniformity and rigidity in educational decision-making .. ' 
Uniformi ty is a characteristic. intrinsic to centralization 
(CRUZIER 1964) - so in measuring how far the system is uniform 
for all schools, .all teachers and all students.one·is 
measuring how far . the system·· is centralized.· Only. 7% (5) of 
all items are of this type .. There are those items which 
reflect more uniformity - those referent to curricular routes, 
optional subjects, curricular uniformity in general-and two 
it~ which reflect the degree of rigidity - bureaucratisati~ 
of teachers appointment, field of recruitment .of·. headmasters. 
For instance, in this case the level of the ordinal scale is 
attributed as a function of the comprehensivness of the 
recrui tment field - this field can be only. teachers· of the 
school at stake, only teachers of the same level of teaching, 
any teacher or teachers and pedagogues. The assumption is that 
the greater the field of recrui tment the lesser the degree of 
rigidity of the system of appointment. 
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In sum, the seventy items can be. of three types - central 
control items (79%)~' structural autonomy ite1lS ( 9%) and 
uniformi ty/rigidi ty' items (7%) ~ There are 6% items (4) of 
mixed type. In Appendix there is the indication of the type 
of each of the seventy it~ of analysis. 
1.1 .3 Type of items general items, complex i tens 
Some' items refer a _g;;..e_n_e_r_al _ ..:.i.j..;;u..;;d,.Jil.g....;;,e.;.;.;m....;;,e.;.;;n....;;,t about great areas 
- about curricular rigidity. curricular uniformity. teacher 
. . . 
curricular freedom, autonomy in the evaluation system, 
bureaucratizatlon of teachers appointment, financial 
management, secretaryshlp management. Those are ~he seven 
i tens which reflect general judgements about central ization 
in great areas. They al'e presented in Tables 101.10.2 and 10.3 in 
a different type of lettering. 
For most part of the it~ the categorization ln one 
level of the scale is done based on a linear judgement. But 
sometimes it lS necessary to use more than one indicator to 
characterize adequately the i tern in analysis. Those are the 
complex items. For instance, the degree of autonomy of the 
. school in the class allocation to teachers depend on varlOUS 
factors - the number of 'subjects 'teachers can (are legally 
allowed to) teach, legal teaching l0ad, the existence of other 
rigid cri terla for class allocation and the need of approval 
(or some more discrete control) of central administration. 
In the case of those complex items , based on several 
indicators, each indicator is given a score of 0-0.5-1, 
according to the degree of centralization. it reveals; the 
final categorization is given on the' basi s. of the average of 
the partial scores. This average is transformed in a level of 
, , 
the ordinal scale in accordance wi th the following cri terion 
'0.0 to 0.19 - •••• ; 0.20 to 0.39 - x ••• ; 0.40 to 0.59 - xx •• ; 
0.60 to 0.79 - xxx.; 0.80 to 1 - xxxx. If the indicator used 
is a categorized item the same conversion scale applies. 
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1.1.4 The result of th~ ~ducational decision - making'context 
analysis - Tables 01, 02 and 03 
The 'r~sult' of-this first'~~ihod of ~ontent analysis 
. '.' . ~. . ' ..... - "".~.~." . 
(educatl.onal"dec{si6n - making a~alysis), which involved 483 
. --' .. ,. . 
categorizations, is represented in the following pages In ' 
, ", . ,'.,,"" ' .. "- , ' '" .,! .. , 
three tables - Tables 01, 02 and 03.' , .; . 
is: , 
'The list of the documents ,used for this content'~naly~is_ 
I 
, . 
. .. 
,..:. 1932 - ,Statute of, Grammar' School: Education,,' 
-.Decree n2 20741,-11-1-1932.-
.. ~. 
~'1936 '-' Reform of GraJTunar School Educ'atiorl ~ 
'Decree-Law ~nQ 27084. '14-10-"'9'36 
- 1947 - Reform of G!"ammar School,Educatlon'and 
Statute of Grammar School' Education ' 
Decree-Law nQ 36507 and Decree nQ 36508 both 
of 17-9-1947. 
- 1948 -' statut'e 'ofTech~ical Education 
Decree n2 37029. 25-8-1948 
1968 Statute of Preparatory Education 
Decree nQ 48572. 9~9-1968~~' :~ 
1970-1974 - Various legislation~ 
,:... 1985 - L'AL 1985/1936 "Circular de apoioa~: lanc;amento 
.. 
.. " " do ano lecti vo", 'Direc~ao Geral do Enslno Se-, 
cundario. 
. .' 
Decree-Law n2 769-A/76,'23-10-1976 
Portarian 2 677/77,4-11-1977 
Portaria' n2 970/80,'12-11~1980 
other legislation. 
t . .' 
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-:-;'.BLE 10.1-SEHTRALIZATION OF SCHOOL 
DECISION-MAKING IN 370 
PREPARATORY AND SECONDAPY SCHOOLS 
ARE~ 8F ~l<ffi~" . i-'E 1 st· 2nd 3ro 3rd 4th c: th DECI..,I ~~-j K. RJ [dODS: .) :IQ~/,f 
. -. - --_. -
_ . 
1947 1948 1968 
1970 
1974 :98" 
GENERAL STRUC1"~F£ . XXX)( XXXX y.xxx XXXX ,y.xy 
OB ECTIVES XXX){ XXXX 
~lTB TEeTS LIST XXX)( XXX){ XXXX XXXX 
XXX, XXXX XX •• •••• 
XXX)( XXX. XXXX XXXX 
XXX){ XXX){ XXX)( XXXX ~~ ~~CHING TIME DISTRIBUTION XXX)( xY.xx XXXX XXXY :::>H 
ai TEACHING TIME L-:UT XXX){ XXX)( XXXX XXX. c;;! CURRICULUM EXEl-?TIONS XXXX' XX){){ XX •• XXX. 0::: 
B~ CHOICE OF OFFE?ED COURSES ){){XX r:tJO' 
Curricular ~gicitv XXX. x ... XX .. XX •• )0:" XXX, .fXXJ: 
Curricular uni~crrnity XXXX XXXX xxx. xx·:. >y •• XX •• (00 
.. 
;J: METHODS OF TEACP.ING XX •• ~t RATE OF IMPLEt-~~:rATION K Teacher curricular freedom 
PROKYTION SYSID-t XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX 
P~ON WITHOtrr EXAMINATION XXX)( XXX)( XXX)( XXX. 
z 
WHO PROMJIES XXX, XXX. xxx. xxx. 0 ~H 
. EVALUATION TECH~'IOUES XX" XX .. XXX, X." XX •• .. .. ~~ EVALUATION SCA!.E: XXX)( XXXX XXXX XXX){ XXX>: XXXX 
V) 0... 
FAILURE BY .ABS::'!rrEEISM XX •• )(XXX XXX. XXX. XXXX XXXX 
. NATIONAL EXAMINATION SYSTrn XX .. X", "XXXX 
TYPE OF EXA.t..fiNATION )(XXX XXX)( XXXX 
EXAMINATION CONI'ENI' XXX){ ){XXX "XXXX 
en PROMJI'ION SYS1t:M IN EXAMINAT. XXX)( XXX){ O· WHO MAKES EXAMS. TESTS XX" X ... H ~ WHO MARKS EXAMS TESTS XX .. X," 
~ WHO APPOrnTS EXf.MINERS X ••• X ... 
tsJ DATES OF WRITIEN EXAMINAT. XXXX XXX)( 
DATES OF ORAL EXAMINAT. X ... X," 
Autonomy in evaluation system XXXI XXX. xx:o XXX, 
TABLE 10.2cr:JlPJ..LIZATI(t1 or SCHOOL DeCISION - r~"r.r:.: 1'. r:-~EPAPP.TORY 
NJO SECONDARY SCHQOLS 
- I"En2'G)GICAL OIGJ~I 'lMIa-~ 
~ 1 st \2 nd 3 rd 3rd 4th 5th G1932 Gl93G Gl947 T1948 PIG Pl9G8 11970/7~ 
SamL OPACITY"" XXX){ xxxx xxx. xxx. xxx. XXXI 
CA'I'CHEMEt'-'T AFrA XXX)( XXX){ xx .. xx .. xx .. xx .. 
trnACHING O~~I~.Tla1 xxx. xxx. XXX){ xx .. xx .. XXX){ 
~ ~~. s GIOJPING X ... X ... xx .. x ... xxx. xxx. ~lGIDJ) XXX){ X ... xx .. xx .. XXX){ XXXI t'l H 
~ crASS AI..J.CX:A..""Irn TO TEACHEPS XXX. .... x ... .... xx .. x ... SI'UDENI'I s GroJPDIG X ... . ... xxx. xu. x ... xx •• 
~ crASS SIZE XX .. xxu xx .. xx .. XXX, ,xxx. 
~ p.;..sS SPCNSOR XXX)( XX .. XXX){ xxxx XXX){ XXX){ mEDIAL TEAClIDIG XXX){ XXX){ xxx. XXX){ xx .. XXII 
SClDL YEAR XXX){ XXX){ XXX){ XXX){ xxxx XXX){ 
~L TIMETABIE x .. , x ... xxx. xx .. xx .. xx .. 
I 
MIDDLE mw.nn:r STROCI'UFE XXX){ XXX){ XXX){ xxx. xxx. XXX){ 
IRJr.E OF SC!DJL a:u"UTI'EES .... .... xx .. xxx. x ... x ... 
~ OF OOf-U'l'IEE MEETINGS XX" xxu XX .. . ... xu. x ... 
NUMBER OF MIron.: W\NAGERS XXX){ XXX){ XXX){ xx .. x ... xxx. 
~ APPOINrMENr CF MIDDIE MANAGEFS XXX. xxu xx .. xx .. x ... xx .. ~ 0C1LE OF MIDDLE r-WlAmPS xx .. .... XI .. XXX. X," x ... 
....... 
~..cHER CERI'IFICATICN XXX){ }(XXX XXX){ xxxx XXX){ XXX){ 
ICERI' • TENURED T. APFOINI'MIln' xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx XXX){ 
~ p:ro-. tm TrntJRED T. APPOTh"n1ENl xxxx 
}(XXX xxxx xxxx xxxx XXX){ 
INCN CERl'IFrn T. APPOINI'MENl' X ... X ... XXX){ xx .. x ... x ... 
~Jm:~n.r J( :1< . .J.".1ZATIrn OF T. APPOmI' • XXX. xxx. XXX){ XXXI xxx. xxx. 
~C1'E TEACHEPS CAN TEACH .... X ... xx .. .. .. XXX){ xxx. 
Il'EACHER EVAUlATICN X ... X," XXX){ XXX){ xxx. xxx. 
~ roI.UEN1' OF STtJI)mI'S XXX}{ xxxx XXX){ XXX}{ XXX}{ XXX){ 
I 
tpro::ESS OF STUIENI'S ABSEOCES xxxx X'" XXX){ XXX}{ .... XX" 
In. IDtISSICN XX •• xxxx XXXI xxx. xxxx XXX){ 
~1'UlJ1:1'l.l.·;:' ~ PlNISHMENI' X ... X ... X'" x ... x ... x ... 
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N)W 
1985 
XXX. 
XX .. 
XXX){ 
XXX. 
X>OQ{ 
xxx. 
xx .. 
xx .. 
XXX){ 
XXX. 
XXX){ 
XXXI 
XXX){ 
xxx. 
XX" 
xxx. 
x ... 
XXXI 
xxxx 
XXX){ 
xxxx 
}{XXX 
XXX){ 
}{XXX 
}{XXX 
XXX){ 
xxxx 
xxxx 
XX" 
. 
TABLE 10.3 CEl1I'PJ\LIZATICN OF SQ1CX)L O[CI:::aO;J - l'jAK.I;~[, IN PREPARATORY 
AND SECDTJOARY SCHOOLS 
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~IT A"ill ArMINISI'RATTVE r~~'T , , -
~ 1 st 2nd 3rd 3rd 4th 5th NO-l G1932 Gl936 Gl.947 T1948 P1968 piG .1985 1970/7~ 
QJVm~![Nr STROC'I'tJRE xxxx )OOQ{ >:xxx )000{ )000{ XXX){ XXX){ 
OIOleE OF HI:AD XXX){ >:xxx )OOQ{ xxxx XXX){ XXX){ .... 
I 
mOleE OF DEPt1I'IES XXX){ )QOO{ XXX){ XX •• XX" XXX, .... 
FIDD OF RECRLTI'I'D1I' .... . ... XX" X'" .... .... XXX){ 
rolE OF HE'MlS X'" XU. xxxx XXX){ XXX){ XXX){ xxxx 
roLE OF IEPtJI'IES X," XU. XXX){ XXX, xxxx XXX){ XXX){ 
NtMIER OF HEAD/DEPt1I'IES XXX){ )QOO{ )OOQ{ XXX){ XXX){ XXX){ XXX){ 
~ FINANCIAL r-1tI~ma'T X)O{. XXX, xxxx XXX){ ){XXX XXX){ ){XXX 
~ SECRmARYSHIP r-t;~ XX" XX" xxxx XXX}{ xxxx xxxx xxxx 
. . 
. . 
.. 
. ' 
.. , 
.. 
.. . ' . 
.. ..... . . 
. . ) 
, . 
, . 
" .' 
'. 
.> • 
.. 
1.2. The expressive versus instrumental rules content analysis 
The seco!".d method of cont':nt analysis used ir. ~his chapter is 
mainly ba~ed on the type of control that rul,:s prescribe. Ttis 
control can be an ideological. expressive c~~trol or an 
administratlve. bureaucratic. instrumental c-:.:-.trol. It is tte 
same distinction'already used to categorize c,=mobilization 
strategies :n chapter three and M.P. (PortugJese Y~~th) rules in chapt,=r 
nine (see c~~pter three, section 1., chapter nine, s~tion 2.3.1 )(NOTE 2). 
,It :s necessary to give to this distlr.ction an 
operatio~al character.' Exnressive'rules'are those which 
reflect :~e expressive or=er.which convey ic~ological contrGl 
in educa:::nal decision-making. So'expre55iv~ rules are 
operatic!".~::'ly defined as those related to :=.:ms, objecti'l'=s. 
to the b=2:= organizatior.al structure. to c~rriculum. 
evaluati~~. socialization. Instrumental rules are' 
operatio~a:ly defined as generally those related with 
administra:ive management or the non expressive aspects of 
pedagogic:=.: management. 
Beyc!,".j this main categorization, rules are divided ir.to 
pedagogical rules and administrative rules. Pedagogical rules 
are those related to pedagogy, that is, related to the~content 
of what·:'s being taught and the method of how is being taught 
and also ~~l:=.ted to the coordination of teaching; pedagogical 
rules al s: i r.cl ude . rules referent to teachers and studer: t s . 
Thus peda;:;i.:al rules ca!"i be operationally defined as these 
referent ::J curriculum (formulation and irr:plementation), to 
evaluatio:-. (student prorr.otlon and examination), pedagogical 
organiza:i:n of the school and middle management. student I s 
punishmer.:. teacher education. 
Administrative rules are those refering to the 
administ!"a:ive management of school and those related to the 
structure of the system and to government. Thus administrative 
rules ca~ ~e operationally defined as including the main 
structure cf the educational system, school government. 
secretaryship management, financial management, school social 
service, ~=n teaching staff management, non pedagogical 
teaching staff management (appointment, salary, absences to 
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work, etc.), student enrollment and fees, transi tional rules 
(that,is ~ules which, regulate the transition from the old 
situation to the new situation). 
The crossing of these two variables creates four group 
of rules. There are in f act pedagogical expressive rules and 
pedagoglcal instrumental rules, administrative expressive 
rules and administrative instrumental rules. As example of 
pedagogical instrumental rules one can point to the administrative 
regulaticr. of examinatio~s and evaluatio~ (for instdnce, 
closing ~ate for examination enrollment, appointment of 
examiners, seting a date for examinations a~d the like), 
administ!':;.tive regulation of student teac:-;:ng process. This 
means th:;.: wi thin rules a~out evaluation ai.:=: examinations or 
teacher ~=~cation some w~~e categorized as ~xpressive and 
others as instrumental. 'As examples of administrative 
expressi-:.;? rules one can point those refering to the main 
structure cf the educatior.al system and to school government. 
This analysis was only done in complete and global 
regulaticns (Statutes) and this excludes the present situation 
and the fifth period. As the analysis has as its main 
. , ' 
objective to analyse,historical evolution it excludes the.1948 
Statute, since the third period is already represented by the 
1947 Sta:"..::e. 
The !'"esul ts of this analysis are presen<::ed in Table 10.4 · 
TABLE 10.4-TYPE SF RULES IN MAJOR AREAS OF 
SCH::1 V~NAGEMENT 
CATE-
GORIES CF 
ANALYSIS 
PERIODS 
PEDAGO~ICAL 
w 
> 
H C/) 
U) W 
-, s t 
AVERAGE 
C/) ~ ~--------------+-----~~----~------~----~r-----~ w
~ ~ 
0... 
X 
W 
...l 
~ 
E-o 
Z W C/) 
;'.D!'.I N I S7RATIVE 
l'J..!';AGD~ENT 
FEDAGOGICAL . 
MA~AGEr.!ENT 
~ ~ I---------------~~----~----~t_----~~----~------~ ::> ...l
0::: ::> 
E-o ~ 
C/) 
Z 
H 
AD~INISTRATIVE 
TOTAL 
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2. GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS - THE 
EVIDENCE OF CENTRALIZATION 
In order to permi t easy comparisons (in the tables refering 
to the first content analysis) of differences of levels of 
centralization, among great areas and areas and among periods, 
the data must be presented in a way that mak~clear the 
differences. This demands that the level of centralization should 
be transformed into a slngle score. Hence the non presentation 
of percer.tages of each type of item per periods or per areas. 
Ther"2 are two possible ways to do this. The first is to 
convert ~ach level of the crdinal scale into a score - 1 for 
•••• , 2 : cr x",, 3 for xx", 4 for xxx. and 5 for xxx x .. Thus 
1 is the lesser level of cEntralization and 5 the higher. This 
method is very convenient and it.will be used.:But one 
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importan: precaution must be made - in doing that one is 
transfor:::ing an ordinal scale into an interval"'scale; In this one 
the difference between 1 and 2 is the same that the difference 
between 4 and 5, since the scale.'has equal. intervals. But. ,the 
same does not apply in an ordinal scale - that is, one cannot 
assure that between x," and xx •• there is the same increase of : 
centralization that between xx •• and xxx,; thi~ point 'i~ "ev~n 
more relevant due to the heterogeneity of the situations 
, . 
categorized. Hence the use of another way of presenting the data 
which does r.ot have this objection - the percentage of central 
control itens (xxxx,xxx', xx •• ) present in anyperio~ or area. 
This sys:em is entirely: legi timate, but does not, take into 
account the differential categorization of the lesser i tens' (x," and •••• ). The following-tables (Tables 10.5,10.6) will use' '-' 
both types of single scores . 
.. 
. . 
TABLE 10. 5 - GE!:ERAL EV8LtITION OF CEtrrRALIZATION 
PERIODS 
/illEAS 
CURRICULUM M1) 
EVALUATION 
PEDAGOOICAL 
MANAGrnENT 
GOVERNMENT AND 
A!::MINISTRATIVE 
~.ANAGENENT 
PERIOD 
AVERAGE 
% OF OJNTROL 
I'IENS 
1st 2r,C 3r C. 3rd 4ttJ 
G G G T P 
1932 1936 1947 1948 1968 
: 
4.1 4.0 4.3 3.9 3.9 
3.7 3.3 4.0 3.6 3.4 
. 
3.6 3.6 4.9 4.6 4.6 
3.8 3.6 4.4 4.0 4.0 
79.7% 69.6% 91.3% 82.9% 79.4% 
G - Grammar School .. Legislation ....... 
T - Technical School Legislation 
P - Preparatory School Legislation 
c:;th No,,! ~ 
PIG PIS 
1970-74 1985 
3.6 3.2 
3.7 4.3 
4.7 4.5 
4.0 4.0 
78.3% 78.3% 
S - Comprehensive Secondary School Legislation 
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APL':'. 
AVE?;'.-
GE 
3.9 
3.7 
4.":' 
·4.C 
79.9 % 
. 
TABLE 10.6- EVOLUTIOr\ OF .CENTRALIZATION 
IN CURRICULUM AND EVALUATION 
1st 2nd 3rd 3rd 
~ .. 
FERI2DS ; 4 _., 
AREAS G G G T P 
1932 1936 .1947 1948 1968 
CURRICULUM 
FORMULATION 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.1 
CURRICULUM 
IMPLEMENTATION 3 3 4.3 4 2.8 
STUDENT 
PROMOTIO:; 4.2 4.5 4.5 4 4.5 
EXAMINATIOr\S 3.7 3.4 4.1 3.4 3.9 
: 
PERIOD 
AVERAGE 3.9 3.9 4.3 3.9 4.0 
% OF CX>tm\DL 90.3% 80.6% 90.3%: 84.4% 86.7% 
ITEMS 
G - Grammar School Legislation 
T - Technical School Legislation 
P - Preparatory School Legislation 
5th 
PIG 
1970-74 
4 
2.5 
3.7 
3.8 
3.7 
74.2% 
S - Comprehensive Secondary School Legislation 
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,. r-. , 
• ~ _' {t AP.£A 
AVE-
PIS RAGE 
1985 
: 4.6 4A 
1 .8 3.1 
3.3 4.1 
2.1 . 3.5 
3.0 3.8 
61.3% 81.2% 
TABLE 10.7- EVOLUTION OF CENTRALIZATION IN THE 
PEDAGO~ICAL MANAGEMENT· 
1st 2na 
... ..., 3rd 4tn c;th K 
": -.... NOW 
-
-' 
AREAS G G' ~ T P PIG' PiS Ij 
1932 1936 1~7 1948 1968 1970-74 1985 
PEDAG03ICAL 
ORGANIZATION 3.9 3.2 1 :< 3.3. 3.7 3.8 4.1 -""'w 
-
MIDDLE 
MANAGEMENT 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.2 2.3 3.0 3.7 
TEACHERS - . 
PEDAGOGICAL 
MANAGEMENT 3.4 3.6 ' - . 4.0 4.3 . 4.1 5.0 '-. .' 
STUDENTS 
r-'lANAGEMENT 3.8 3.5 . ,. 4.0 ·3.3 3.8 4.5 ..... I.J 
PERIOD AVERAGE 
3.7 3.3 .!.O 3.6 3.4 3.7 4.3 
% OF COm'ROL 
I'IENS 72.4 % 58.6 % 89.7 % 79.3% . 70 % 79.3 % 96.6% 
G - Grammar Sch~:l Legislation 
T - Technical School Legislation 
P - Preparatory School Legislation 
S - Comprehensive Secondary School Legislation 
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AREA 
AVERA-
GE 
3.7 
.. 
3.2 
4.2 
3.8 
3.7 
78% 
. , ' 
, . 
TABLE 10.8- EVOLUTION OF CENTRALIZATION IN 
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT 
~ 1 st 2nd 3~ 3m 4th, .. G .G G T P . AREAS . 1932 ' 1936 1947, 1948 1968 . -
. 
, 
mVERNMENT 3.6 3.6 4.7. 4.1 4.1 
ALMINISTRATIVE .. 
MANAGEMENI' 3.5 3.5 5 5 5 
'. PERIOD . , 
AVERAGE 3.6 3.6 4.9 '4.6 4.6 
% OF COm'ROL 
I'IENS 66.7% 66.7% 1 ()J"110 88.9% 88.9"10 
. 
G - Grammar School Legislation 
T - Technical School Legislation .. 
P - Preparatory School Legislation 
5th ~ r::",; . 
pIG PIS 
h 970-74 19~5 .' 
.. 
4.3 3.9 
5 .. 5 
4.7 4. : 
88.9"10 . 77.8% 
S - Comprehensive Secondary School Legislation 
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. '. 
ARE.t.. 
AVERA-
m 
4.0 
4.6 
4.4 
82.6 
2.2. The centralization is confirmed 
Global analysis of tables 10.5. 10.6. 10.7 and 10.8 show that 
from 1932 until today there 'is a high degree of 
centralization in secondary education managem~nt. The'average 
level of' centralization is located around the category ;'Almost 
total control of Central Administration" (level 4 of the 
scale); 80% of the items reflect major contrG~ of Central 
ajministration. 
This centralization remains stable. which is indicated 
by a low standard deviation - 0.22 for the first type cf score and 5.98 for 
the ~rcen!age score (based on Period' Average data of Table 10.5)· 
Centralizatiun range goes' from a minlmU'l1 of 3.6. in 1936. ·to a maximum 
of 4.4 in ~ 947. ' 
Another indicator of the high degree cf centralization 
is the very detailed Ii st of sub-areas (items ~f analysis) . 
. . . 
which include matters like optional subjects. teaching time 
distribution (that is, if it is allocated four hours. per week 
to a subject it is also determined how they are to be spent 
_ 1+1+1+1 or 1+2+1, etc.), dates of written and oral 
examinations, school capaci ty, class allocation to teachers, 
class size. student's absences remission, and others - this 
detail reflects the degree of control of Central 
Administration. 
One ~ust take into account that the tabl~s presented have 
a strong bias in favour of pedagogical manage~ent. because it 
sui ts better the demonstration of the demobilising character 
of centralization in relation to teachers. but the same, or 
probably more, detail is present in the rules concerning 
administrative management. 
Another indicator of the high degree of centralization 
comes from the qualitative analysis of rules - they go 
sometimes to ridiculous details. For instance. the Statute of 
1947 determines the colour of the ink which must be used to mark 
examination tests (article 515); it determines that the 
Government can decree a national uniform model for student's 
copy-book (article 358). 
Curriculum formulation is the most centralized sub-area 
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in all periods, ~hich is natural since it determines what 
should be taught. It is done in the tradi tion of centralized 
curricu~ which is so well caricatured in the 
famous anecdote of the 19th century french minister of 
education which "could pride himself on being able to announce, 
just by consulting his watch, which page of Virgil all school 
, , ; , 
boys of the Empire were annotating at,that exact moment" 
(CROZIER 1964, 239). 
A uniform curriculum determines, to a great extent, a 
uniform pedagogy (F~RMOSUmO, ~ 985a) and i,t is congruent wi th a 
tight control of its implementation through a system of 
national examinations. 
Cent:'alizatio!1 applies evenly to all aspects of school 
life. It does no: fall predominantly to adminis:rative matters 
-. indeed, as seen in Table 10.9, an average· of 55% of the rules 
refer to pedagogical management and an average of 45% of the 
rules refer to administrative management. 
So one can easly conclude. that centralization of 
educational management is confirmed. 
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TABLE 10.9 - PEDAGOGICAL MANAGEMENT AND ADHINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT RULES - in percentages 
PERIODS 1st 2nd 3rd . th 4 
AREA OF G G G P AVERAGE 
RULES 1932 1936 1947 1948 
PEDAGOGICAL 
MANAGEMENT 60.2% 58.2% 57.6% . 46% 54.8% 
RULES 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT 39.8% 41 .8% 42.4% 54% 45.2% 
RULES 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% . 
.-
N = 246 55 606 367 1274 
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2.3. The prevalence of instrumental control 
The confirmation of the reality of centralization in 
. ' , 
educational management demands that we analyze the relative 
position of instrumental rul~s and expressive rules in the 
statutes analyzed. The predominance of bureaucratic control 
over ideological control should be indicated by the prevalence 
of instrumental rules over expressive on~s. Table 10.10 would 
confirm this or ~ot. 
TABLE 10.10 - INSTRUMENTAL AND EXPRESSIVE RULES 
- in p~rcentages. 
TYPE F:::\!CDS 1
st 2nd 3rd 4th 
G G ' ,... P OF 
-.j 
RULES, 1932 ' 1936 1947 1968 
EXPRESSIVE 
RULES 45.1 % 69.1 % 32.5% 38.1% 
INSTRUMENTAL .. 
" 
RULES 54.9% 30.9% 67.5% 61.9% 
TOTAL' 100% 100% 100% 100% 
-
N = 246 55 606 367 
-' , 
, " 
TYPE OF 
RULES 
AVERAGE/ 
/TOTAL 
38.1 % 
61.9% 
100% 
1274 
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Indeed Table 10.10 gaves another important indicator of the 
centralization - on average. 62% of the rules are instrumental 
ones. against 38% of expressive rules. In all periods but one 
(the second period), instrumental rules prevail over 
expressive ones.It is in the 1947 Statute that inst~ntal rules 
are in greater percentage. 
As it is natural, the percentage of expr~ssive and 
instrumental rules is not the same in pedag:.gical management 
and in administrative management, as can be d~duced from Table 
10.4 . In' pedagogical management expressive rules prevail (57% 
on average); inadministratiye management· ins~ntal rules 
prevail. ~ 85% on average). As can :'e seen, even in 
pedagogical matters the. percentage of instr·.;~ental rules is 
very high (43%). Ad:ninistrative Instrument.3J. Rules :'s the only sub-area 
whose increase is steady - see Table 10.4 \30%.29%,37%,48%). 
The prevalence of instrumental rules in general reflects 
the predomin~nce of bureaucratic control and thus confirms the 
seting up of a centralized system of educational management. 
3. THE PREVALENCE OF IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONTROL:IN THE MOBILISING PERIOD ANOTHER CONFIRMATION OF 
THE HYPOTHESIS .' 
As Pt was said in the beginning of this' (;hapter ~ if the 
. . 
hypothesis that centralization was a strategy of demobilization 
is correct, one can expect that it decreased in the period 
where the opposite aim - mobilization - was pursued. This 
would be firstly cshown by a decrease in administrative 
(bureaucratic) control in that period, which would be 
indicated by a decrease in the percentage of instrumental 
rules in the Statute of 1936, and a consequent increase in the 
percentage of expressive rules. Indeed ideological control 
(indicated by expressive rules) is the congruent one with 
mobilizing purposes. 
Ideological control is based on political control of 
accessand promotion, doctrinaire control of teacher education, 
control of the curriculum and appointment of educational 
managers on the basis of POlitical confidence (NOTE 3). 
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Bureaucratic control is based on detailed regulation of 
all aspects of school life (both pedagogical and 
administrative management) and on compliant acceptance of 
those regulations.This co~pliance is guaranteed by the obedience 
expected of all civil servants,by hierarchic control, by 
school inspection, and mainly by the inculcation of a 
conformist and passive mentality in teachers. 
The analysis of Table 10.10 confirms our hypothesis very 
clearly. The second period shows a clear increase in 
expressive rules (from 45% to 69%) which is followed by a 
sharp decrease in the third period (from 69% to 33%). 
Naturally.the opposite happens with the percentage of 
instrumental rules. It is noteworthy to recall that the 
mobilising period is the cnly one in which the ~egulation 
analyzed had more expressive than instrumental rules. It is 
also interesting to observe. in Table 10.4 that expressive 
rules abo~t pedagogical management occupy 56% of all the rules 
in 1936 Statute (the highest value recorded); there is only 
one rule of instrumental character in that area of school 
management. 
Table 10.11 represents graphically the evolution of 
ideological control (indicated by percentage of expressive 
rules) acro~s the four per~o~sobs~rved. It is evident the 
peak of ideological con trol in the mobil i sing period. So the 
hypothesis is again confirmed (NOTE 4). 
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, , 
TABLE 10.11 - GRAPHI': ?EPRESENTATION OF THE EVOLUTION 
OF IDE~:8GICAL CONTROL 
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But there still anoth~r '.oJay of confirming' our hypothesis 
- if cent~alization wai a strategy of demobilization its 
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lowest peint should have be~nin that period where there 
prevailed the opposit~ strategy - a stra!egyof mobilization. 
Let us leok again at Table1~5 to confirm or not this statement. 
Inde~d tr.e global centraliz~tion score of the' second period 
(1936) is the lowest of all the seven periods analyzed. 
4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN EDUCATION . 
," 
4.1. 1947 and 1948 Statutes - The apo~is of the 
," 
Administrative State in educational management 
~ .' 
The statutes of 1947 ar.d 1948 represent the apotheosis 
of the A~~inistrative State in educational management and the 
clear prevalence of bureauc~atic (and conformist) control of 
education" over ideological" (mobilising) control: 
(Differences of centralization level between 1947 and 1948 
, ' 
Statutes are due to the greater curricular complexity of," 
technical education (due:to a great variety of courses) and 
not to different philc"sophies o'f 'educaticnai government). 
There" are' several ,inc:catol"s "to" confirm" that 1947 and 
1948 statuies represe~t ~ 1a~dmark. 
First of all; fro~ 1947'onwards'instrumental rules 
clearly prevail over express: ve ,rules - only the 1947 and 1968 
statutes are not below avera~e percentage cf instrumental 
rules (see Table 10.10). From' 1 936 to 1947 there was an increase 
. . 
of 218% in the percentage of instrumental rules (392 rules in 
absolute numbers; 274 rules in relation to 1932 statute). This 
increase is steady in instr~"!Iental rules about administrative 
management - 29% in 1936, 37% in 1947, 49% in 1968 (see 
Table 10.4). 
A very typical ~le which indicates the difference 
between 1936 and 1947 statutes is the norms about textbooks. 
..i 
In the 1936 statute it is deterr:1ined (article 32) that there will be a 
national sole textbook in History, Philosophy and Moral and 
Civil Education, that is, in the more ideological subjects. 
In the 1947 statute (article 39C) all subjects. :!",cluding the 
least ide::.logical ones. liy.'2 Mathematics or Drawing, should 
have natic::al sole textbooks - the bureaucratic principle 
of unifor~ity was imposed (~~TE 6). 
Anotr.~r indicator of th'2 apotheosis of the 
Administrative State is provided by the analysis of the 
relative p~sition of the three major areas of educational 
rnanage:nent in relation to the centralization level. Table 10.12 
shows this relative posi tion based on data from Table 10.5 • 
TAE:E 10.12 - RELATIVE: POSITION I!! REL":.7ION TO 
CENTRAL:ZATION LEVE~ OF 7HE THREE 
GREAT AREAS OF EDUCATIO~h: 
MANAGE~E:~;T 
RELATIVE 1 st 2nd 3!"':l . 3rd 4t :-. 5th 
G G • 0 G T F PIG ORDER 1932 1936 1~7 1948 1963 ~ 970-1974 
1s CE CE GA!-! 00f GAM GAM 
' .... nj 
e:. FM 'GAM 0 CE' °CE CE FM 
"'x GAM FM W. FM PM CE .) 
• 0 
CE Curriculum and Eva!uation Area 
o PM _ pedagogical Manage~ent Area 
. 
GAM - Government and A~~inistrative Management Area 
NON 
PIS 
1985 
GAM 
FM 
CE 
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From 1947 statute o~~ards, Government and Administrative 
Management became the m~st centrally controlled area, inst~ad 
of Curriculum and Evaluation, which was the most controlled 
area in 1932 and 1936 r;g~lations. 
The control of Gov~rnment and Administrative Managem~nt 
had been hence situated between 4.5 and 4.9 point of the 1 to 
5 scale. 
Indeed the tighter control of curriculum is more 
congruent with ideological control; the tighter control of 
government and administrative management is more congruent 
with bureaucratic control (NOTE 7). 
4.2. The evolution of the Administrative State in the 
educational management 
It is somewhat striking in the analysis of Table 10.5 the 
constancy of centralization. Analyzing the global records of 
centralization (period average) one, sees. from 1947 onwards -
- 4.0, 4.0, 4.0 and 4.0 (in percentages 83%, 79%, 78% and 78% ). 
Standard deviation in this period is 0, in relation to the 
ordinal score, and 1.9 in relation to the percentage score. 
The Minister of Education from 1962 to 1968 (GALVAO 
TELES) even tried to elaborate one of those."ideological -
- legal treatises" thatSCHM~TTER speaks (SCHMITTER 1975a. 26) 
_ a. "Statute of National. Education" (see GALVAO TELES 1966c. 
1969) (NOTE 8), 
. '. : " ' 
He spent years in preparing this great diploma which 
,would represent the translation into juridic no~ms of all the 
educational philosophy and all the pedagogy; that is, it would 
, . - . 
represent the more elaborate aChievement of the Administrative 
State in Education. In spite of the commitment of the Minister 
to the project, he was dismissed before he finished the work 
(NOTE 9). 
, 
The prevalence of Law men in educational management, 
which is completely congruent with the Administrative State 
. . 
(chapter eight, section 4.8.2), went on - as an indicator fran 1947 
to 1974 three of the six ministers were licensed in Law 
(NOTE 10). 
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The Administrative State was. less visible in primary 
education. First of all, the efficacity of strictly 
bureaucratic control in a situation where teache~s worked 
, . 
s~~~r~tely~ in scattered ~~its 6f teach~ng (the,-great majority 
of schools had only teacher) was obviously limi ted.' But there 
was probably another reason - as primary schooling was the 
only compulsory one, it is -natural' that 'ideological control 
was there more careful. One has already seen in chapter three 
that the reading sole textbooks determined in the mobilising 
period lasted until the fifth period (exclusive), which is . 
probably consequence of the same ideological concer'n. 
Control on primary education had to be teacher control, 
due to the isolated conditions of work~This control 
began in the control of prima~y teachers education (see MONICA 
, . 
1978, 210-218), went on to control on access to tenure and 
promotion (MONICA 1978,207) and was completed by control of 
teacher's practice though'inspection.,Thecreation of 
"regentes escolares" (chapter five, s~tion 3.4.1) also facilitated 
ideological control (NOTE 11 ). -, 
But there are still many mechanisms of the Administrative 
., . 
State in primary education. MONICA,comments, "{lIhen one 
con~ide~~ the expiLcit aim~ ot to~mai indoct~ination at 
p~ima~~ ~chooi ~eache~~ du~in~ 5a~ala~i~m, it~ etticacit~ 
~eem~ ve~y. ta~ tll..om a ~ucce-1-1. C ... 1 ,in.~t,ead ot clZ,ea:!in~ new, 
in~titution~, the ll..e9ime u~ed a ditte~ent poiic~ at teache~ 
~ec~uitment and to~m-1 ot admini,At~ative ~ep~e~-1ion a,imed at 
compeliin~ teachell..~ to contoll..mi~m and apath~" (MONICA 1978, 
218 ). Promotion after tenure was based on seniori ty (MONICA 
" -
1978,207), school inspection was remote. In fact, MONICA tells 
us'that'school visits'by inspectors were rare and hasty; as 
, . 
there was only one inspector for 356 schools the 
probability of an inspection visit was a remote one, 
ideological influence over teachers through inspectors did not 
exist (MONICA 1978,163-169). So centralization was, also very 
present (MONICA 1978, 164-165). MONICA concludes that the 
JOOst efficient control over teachers was social' control by 
the parents of their pupils and of local community (MONICA 
1978, 166-169). This means that, through this other way, 
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ideological-control was r~ally more important in primary 
education than in secondary education." 
4.3. The evolution of the Administrative State in educational 
management - analysis of the evolution of the number of 
rules 
One of the main features of the Administrative State in 
education is the management by rules which are produced mainly 
by the Government and Central' Administration. The number of 
rules existent in each period is an important indicator of the 
evolution of the Administrative State in educational 
management. To derronstrate the opportunity of the analysis of this thesis 
. . 
we extended the present analysis to the present period. even at the cost of 
increasing the difficul ty in data gathering t due to the scattered 
aspect of the present eG~cat1onal leglslation. 
4.3.1. Methodology of the analysis 
Indeed the attainment of this information for all areas of 
educational manacr~ment t in relation to the present period, 
proved to be an i~possible task. So it was confined to 
selecting only some areas of secondary education 
educational management. The criterion~. for this choice was the 
availabili ty of compilations. of present educational rules. in 
certain areas. In accord an':€' with such cri terion three areas 
were chosen - Pedagogical Organization, Teacher Management and 
School Government. 
The sources used for each area were .the following: 
Pedagogical Organization Area - it was based on the official 
compilation made in 1985 by the Ministry of Education' through 
the central department for secondary schools~ "LAL 1~85 - 1986 
_ Circular de apoio ao Lan~amento do Ano' Lecti volt wi th . hi s 
"Anexo de Legi sla~~o" t Direc~~o Geral' do Ensino Secundario t 
1985 (27-6-1985). 
Teacher Management Area - the source used for the 
counting of rules in force in this'area, in the present period 
was a compilation in three' volumes made by the Ministry of 
Education in 1981: "Gestao ern Educa9aO " -- Pessoal Docente" t 
Boletim Informativo do Ministerio da Educa9~0 e Ciencia~ Li5-
boa, nQs.7,8,9, Janeiro/Fevereiro 1981. 
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School Government t.r·t;:a - the sourCE: used was a privatE: 
compilation of legislati~~ ac6ut this area. 
The source used for the fifth period is a compilation 
of laws made in 1973 by the Hinistry of. Education - "Ensir.o 
Secundario Tecnico - Legisla~ao Compilada e Anotada", 
Ministerio da Educa~ao ~acio~al. Secretaria de Estado da Ins-
tru~ao e Cultura, Direc~ao-GE:ral do Ensino Secundario. 
September 1973. 
The compilation reproduced the 1948 rules of the Statute 
of· Technical Education and added,. when necessar~ the new· rules 
. refering to each subject. As most part of the new rules were 
common to grammar and technical education 1 we used the,· data 
about technical educaticr. to estimate the number of rules· in 
force in grammar educaticn - the symbol: indicates (in Table 
10.13) that the data for gra::::~ar school is a estimate. 
Before the presentation of the collected data it is . 
convenient to clarify certain points. 
First of all, the data refers' only to secondary schools 
management. This includes, in the third period I the 5th to the 
11 th year of schooling, in the fifth period it includes the 
7th to the 11th, and now includes the 7th to 12th year 
schooling. 
Secondly, the data from the third and fifth periods 
includes rules relative to gra:nmar and to technical schools, 
in the present period the data is referred to the comprehensive 
secondary school. 
The counting unit is the minimum normative unit. This 
cri terion overcomes difficul ties which arise from differences 
in legislative technique between periods and between 
Government or Parliamrnent legislation and administrative laws. 
Each subdivision ("ponto" or "alinea" or IIparagrafoll) counts 
as an unit, but preambles to rules and ti tIes do not count as 
units. (Since there did not exist those probl~ , we used, ln 
Tables 10.4,10.9,10.10,10.11, the criterion of counting as one rule 
only the "artigo" - article). 
The subjects included in each Area are always the 
across periods, independently of differences of 
categorization in different compilations. The cri terion 
was that reflected in the sub-areas which constitute each 
in Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 • 
same 
used 
area 
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In the present time the counts are not exhaustive, since 
the sources used are also not exhaustive of all the existing 
rules in each Area. This is indicated in Tables 10.13 and 
10.14 by the symbol> . 
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In the Teacher Management Area, in the present period, 
we included both the rules refering to the teaching profession 
and the rules refering to the' teacher as civil servant (but 
it excluded those rules present in the compilation which 
referred to civic laws 'like' electoral '·laws). But as" it was --. 
not possible to ,obtain comparable data for the, other' periods 
this data is not included in the general calculations. 
The Area of School Government includes, in all periods, 
the middle "management rules, that" is; 'rules abc)ut'structure 
of school middle management, role of school co~ittees,number 
of committee me~tings, appointment of middle managers 
(class 'sponsors; 'heads of subject groups)~·etc. 
4.3.2. Presentation of the results of the analysis 
Let us present-now the results of this analysis in Tables 
i 0 . 1 3 and 10. 1 4. 
-TABLE 10.13 - NUMBER OF RULES IN SELECTED AREAS 
OF EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT 
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PERIODS 3rd PERIOD 5th PERIOD PRESENT PERIOD , 
, 
1947 - 1948 1973 1981 - 1985 AREAS 
~ ... . . .- ....... - ..... . .. 
'G T G T 
PEDAGOGICAL 108 -115 >1583 : 
362 ! 
, 
ORGANIZATION 385 : 
,- , ... . ' 223 . ~ .. " 
, 
'G T- G T i , >[21 0!1 (1) i 
TEACHER 261 356 > 2034 
894 :t __ 1220 ' i 
- MANAGEMENT • ~" < .,. ," ., .. .. ~ . - - "_ .. ' ...... -. 
617 [4135J(2) >2034 
G T G T 
SCHOOL 91 142 24S! 379 )1162 
GOVERNMENT 233 
TOTAL 1073 3483 + )4779 -
(1) Number of rules referring to teacher as civil servant. 
(2) Total number of rules referring to teacher management. 
As there are' no comparable numbers in the previous periods 
this total is not included in the general calculations. 
G - Rules refering _ to grammar schools. 
T - Rules refering to technical schools. 
TABLE 10.14 - PERCENTAGE OF Il~CREASE IN NUMBER OF RULES IN 
EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT ACROSS'PERIODS 
~ 5t~ PERIOD NOW 1947-1948 .1973 . 1981-1985 ,. 
PEDAGOGICAL . 
ORGANIZATION 100% ·335% + )710% 
-
I 
TEACHER , 
MANAGEMENT .100% 343% + >330% -
. 
·SCHoeL ., 
GOVERIJMENT 100% ' 267% + > 499% -
, TOTAL 100% 325% + > 445%. 
-
.The Table shOw's the oveNhelmingly clear . increase . in 
educational legi slation from 1947-1948 to our days. This 
increase was already very visible in the Veiga Sim~o's period 
(1970-1974). But it is also very great the increase from 1973, 
al though it is not so evident in the table, as the increase 
from 1947-1948 to 1973. 
One must consider three points in relation to the present 
number of rules which explain this lesser visibility. Firstly, 
the counting is not exhaustive because the sources used 
'Were also not exhaustive. Secondly, although the major part 
of the rules of 1947 and 1948 Statutes are not in force now, the 
Statutes themselves are not revoked and some of their niles are 
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still in force, but th~y ~ere not counted for the present 
period since 'i t is diffi~ul t to know which rules are in force 
and which rules are implici tly revoked (NarE 12).A third point which 
help to explain the lower visibili ty of the increase from 1973 
to nowadays is the fact that present legislation about 
comprehensive secondary schoel is much more ~conomical (in 
terms of number of rule:s) tha!: different legislation for 
grammar schools and techr.ical schools, :whic,h had to repeat in 
the respective statutes ~any rules which applied to both ,types 
of schools. All this means that the difference between the 
present period and the fifth period in number of rules is more 
meaningful than the tabl~s suggests. 
Assuming that the posrcentage of increase. in number of 
rules between 1947-194e a:'1:i r.:',:adays holds constant for each area 
one can calculate the n:.;::;ber :>f rules in force in educational 
management of secondary schools around 17500. Itis a very" 
crude calculation (NOTE ~j, but it serves to enhance the 
character of the present state of the Administrative state in 
educational management. 
4.3.3.' Interpretation of the results - 'the hypothesis ',,, 
of the influence of the advent of mass schooling 
on the increase of legislation 
i 
Why does the number of rules increase" so greatly 
across periods? How can this evolution be explained? One 
can hypothesise that the grc,*'ing complexity of educational 
management prov~ked this proliferation of rules. But what 
would be the cause of this growing cO!l1plexi ty? 'One can 
hipotheslse' that the advent of mass' schooling '- with its 
changes in the academic and social climate' of schools, 
the need to, recruit more teachers and more managers, to 
build bigger schools and to crowd the' existing ones - was 
the main fector responsible for this canplexitY. 
In 1964 the regime decreed the extension of compulsory 
schooling for six years, ~hich began to be implemented 
. ' 
in 1968-1969. This means that the effect on secondary 
schools (then from 7th to 11th year of schooling'), began 
, .: ~ . . 
in 1970-1971: The new preparatory schools (5th and' 6th 
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year) became mass schools by r.ature, but the great 
increase in demand in secondary schools - due to the 
compulsority. decreed - progressively transformed secondary 
schools in mass schools. 
Indeed in 1973-1974 74;% more students were enrollE-d in 
preparatory and secondary ed:..;':ation than in 1940-1941, 639% 
more than in 1950-1951, 264% r:".ore than in 1960-1961 and 177% 
more than six years before (1966-1967). (The calculations were 
based on the official statistics). The mass school was already 
implemented in the fifth peri~d (1970-1974). 
A first indicator of :he effect of mass schooling 
on legislation was the public~~ion,in 1968, of a new 
Statute for the 5th and 6tt year of schooling, that is, 
for preparatory education. c:...it we will analyse here the 
effect of thi s policy change only on secondary education 
management. 
If the hypothesis above formulated is wrong one could 
expect an even production of adequate rules for secondary 
education management during ~he years which last from the 
publication of the Statutes :0 the publication of the 1973 
Compilation (1948-1973). If t!':is production is much greater 
after the first impact of the added compulsority in 
secondary education (which coincides with the fifth period 
1970-1974) the hypothesis can be considered confirmed. 
The cri terion of adequacy of rules (to the 1973 situation) 
is indicated by the fact of still being in force. 
In order to test our hypothesis we sampled two of 
the three analysed areas of Technical Schools Management 
(due to the fact that the nost part of the new rules are 
common to grammar and technical school s the choice of type 
of school is not relevant in this case). The new rules, 
added to the 1947 and 1948 Statutes, were categorized in 
two groups - those produced between 1948 and 1969 and those 
produced between 1970 and October 1973 (although dated 
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fran September 1973 the Compilation still includes legislation 
of October 1973). 
Table 10.15 shows the resul ts of this analysis. 
TABLE 10. 15-THE EFFECT OF THE ADVENT OF MAS S 
SCHOOLING ON THE INCREASE OF 
SECONDARY. EDUCATION LEGISLATION 
~ PERIOOS 1948 1970 
1969 1973 
AREAS ~ 3rd_4 th Period 5th Period 
PEDAGOGICAL 185 85 270 
ORGANIZATION 
69% 31% 
SCHOOL 81 143 237 
GOVERNHENT 34% 60% 
266 228 - 507 
TOTAL 
52% 45% 
.. 
Number of years 22 3.8 
-
TOTAL 
100% 
100% 
100% 
,~ .. 
The analysis of the Table ,cl~arlY confirms the·hypothesis. 
Indeed in the 3.8 years . the. fifth period produced 45% 
of all new rules of the analYsed areas in force in 1973 
(against 52% in the ~ning 21 years'- the 3% missing 
r~present 13 units of School 'Government rules which could not 
be dated, because they are mere elucidation of rules). 
Of all the total rul~ units in f.orce 'in' sec~ndary 
education in 1973 (thus including. those of, the. 1948 Statute) 
30%' were produced just in the. 3.8 years. in \rIhich·. the 
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effect of extended compulsory schooling began to affect 
secondary schools. This indicates that changes had to be· done 
in secondary schools (due to its growing mass school , 
characteristic) which demanded the production of abundant new 
legislation. So the hypothesis is confirmed .. 
As the mass schooling process was intensified. after the 
change of political regime in April 1974 - in .1980-1981 there 
were 139% more students enrolled in state preparatory and 
secondary schools than in 1973-1974 and 159% more just 
referring secondary schools - one can expect another increase 
in legislation in relation to the 1973 Compilation. Table 10.13 
shows that thi s increase indeed happened, which can be seen 
as another way of confirming the hypothesis. 
4.3.4. The hypothesis of the progressive inadequacy of the 
central bureaucratic paradigm of educational decision-
-making 
The ever growing increase in legislation can be also seen 
as indicator of the possible progressive inadequacy of the 
central bureaucratic paradigm of educational decision-making. 
Indeed, according to the above made eStimate, there 
should be around 17500 rule units for the management of 
s~condary schools. It seems'not easy for an educational' 
adminis tra tor (not specifically prepared < for the job, as it 
is the case in Portugal) to manage adequately a so great 
amount of rules. But the great amount of legislation produces 
several other consequences which can be ~auses of inadequacy. 
Firstly, the increase in law making increases also the 
possibility of contraditions among laws •. Secondly, it 
increases also the doubts about the interpretatio? of produced 
rules. Thirdly, since most part of the revokation of rules is 
made only implicity (that is, by mere publication of new 
different rules) it iS,in many cases. difficult to know if some 
less recent rules are still in force or not - that is, the 
system generates an ambigui ty about the status of many rules. 
All those problems can only be solved. within the central 
bureau.cratic paradigm. through the publication of new 
clarifiying legislation, which reinforces the inadequate 
pattern. All those consequences are aggravated by the general 
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loose and unconnected character of the n~~ legislation. 
, If those are considered indicators cf inadequacy of the 
.1 ., <," • • • ." • ' ' 
. central bure~uc!atic paradigm one can ask - why does mass 
schooling provoke this progressive inadequacy? 
In agrammar school the reali ty of a school for an el i te 
provoked a socially and academically homogeneous climate which 
supported the bureaucratic assumption of rules made for the 
"average student" in a "average school" (see FORMOSINHO 1984b) 
This' basic assumptiOn of the central bureaucratic pedagogic 
decision-making became inadequate in the context of a mass 
~chool iF6RMOSINHO 1985b). As it is know~, central bureaucratic 
decisio~-making 'is based on pre-decisio~ ~f all possible 
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si tuation:; through pre-made rules. This as S:..lmes the possibil i ty of 
. , 
easy 'anticipation of all 'ques tions and d~:7.ands careful categorization 
of si tuationS (MERI'ON 1940) in order to give to each one an 
adequate solution ~ that is, it demands :~at decrees prefigure 
the facts', in LUCENA' swords (LUCENA 19762, 22). Mass 
schooling creates a complex and very diverse situation in 
reg~rd t~ c~mpre~~~sivness of curricula, proliferation of 
optional subjects, variety of buildings, different teacher 
certification procedures, social and academic heterogeneity 
of students, etc. - all this makes anticipation JlU..Ich more subject 
to error, categorization much moz:-e difficult and, naturally, 
central rules less adequate to solve concrete situations. That 
is, central decision-making becomes bot~ more difficul t and 
less adequate. 
So the. progressive inadequacy resul ts from the contrast 
between social and educational evolution (change) and the 
constancy of centralization as system of educational 
management (non change). 
r' 
4.4. Conclusion - the strong state took in education the form 
of administrative state 
From all these analyses one can c~~clude·that the 
Administrative State mould prevail~d i~ educational management 
Its apotheosis was represented by the ~947 and 1948 Statutes.-
Due to the coming of mass schOc..2.:'!'lg the Administrative 
State mould was reinforced which is :':-.dicated by successive 
increases in legislation, as had been a~alysed. This evolution 
did not bring more adequacy to educati:~3l management. On the 
ccntrary. progressi ve inadequacy ~sul:ed from the' contrast 
. 
between educational change and cG!'".s":ar.::: (non change) in the 
system of educational management. (Thi~ analysis has put aside 
the question of the possible intri~sic :~adequ3cy of the 
central bureaucratic paradigm for peda;:·gical decision-making 
for this see FORMOSINHO 1984b). 
One can conclude establishing pos::ively~that in 
education the strong - state took the :orm - of', Administrative 
State. 
, I 
" ' 
, ' 
.' : 
, , 
But centralization is not only a q'.lestion of adequacy of 
, -, 
methods of decision-making nor only a question of the extent 
" " t " , 
and the type of controlo~er what 'g?es on in shools. It 
involves also personal control over teachers. This aspect'will 
be analyzed in the fOllowing'section. 
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5. CENTRALIZATION AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHER'S CONTROL 
There were several kinds of control over teachers-
-expressive controls, 
controls. Although the 
repressive 
last ones 
controls, 
are the 
administrative 
congruent ones 
with the Administrative State, a brief reference to other 
controls is necessary to understand the context of use 
of administrative controls. 
5.1. Expressive control of secondary school teachers 
One had already spoken of primary school teacher 
role in New State school' mentality inculcation functions 
(chapter three, section 2.6.1.), of the congruent primary 
school teacher expressive' controls (this chapter, section 
4.2.) and of the evolution of its teacher education (chapter 
five, section 3.3.2.). So in this section it will be 
referred 
teachers. 
the expressive control of secondary school 
It is obvious that centralized management of 
education could only be efficacious if it was designed 
a system to ensure that teachers and educational managers 
in secondary schools complied with central commands. 
Expressive controls were essential in the creation of this 
attitude. 
A 'first strategy to ensure this attitude was the 
control of teacher education. Teacher education of secondary 
school teachers was done, since 1930, in 'three separate 
stages (see FORMOSINHO 1985d)- first the academic 
preparation in Universities (as seen above - chapter five, 
section 3.4.3. this meant a social selection); then, 
a year of pedagogical theory; then a two year~ po~t-g~aduate 
training period (only one year, after'1969) in'a secondary 
school ( "estagio" ). This "estagio" (student teaching) was 
never done irnrnediatly after the academic course the 
licensed was appointed as provisional teacher' for some 
years before he could be admitted to the "estag io", since 
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places for teaching practice were limited.' Those two post-
graduate training years were not paid. Thus the system 
ensured academic and economic selection in access to 
professional certification. 
The training period was done mainly based on model 
pedagogy, in which the trainee was mainly required to 
reproduce the type of teaching he have seen his master 
teacher been doing (FREITAS 1983, 24-26, PINTO et al. 1974). 
This ensured pedagogic compliance; school socialization 
taught administrative compliance. 
Empiric models of teacher education, that is, 
models based only on non theorized experience and on 
learning through socialization in what exists, are shown 
to be culturaly conservative (FORMOSINHO 1984a, 1985c). 
The just described model ,had many feature of an empiric 
model (FORMOSINHO 1985d) and was thus congruent with the 
inculcation of the desired professional conformism in 
teachers (NOTE 14). 
5.2. Repressive control of secondary school teachers 
SALAZAR said "It would be ridiculous if the State 
C ••• J acknowledged the right 'of educational functionaries 
(which are not chosen by the families) to teach pri~ciples 
opposed to those of the State" (SALAZAR 1936). 
Thus teachers were subject to the same political 
controls of the common civil servant (teachers were also 
civil servants) there 'was potencial control of their 
voting patterns (chapter two, section 5.3.2., chapter five, 
section 1.1.1.), teachers could be dismissed if they engaged 
in oppositionist acti vi ties (see chapter five,' section 
2.3.1. and chapter six, section 1.). 
The headteacher ( "rei tor" or "director" ) was 
appointed by the Minister of Education on the basis of 
political confidence. (This does not exclude that 
competence criteria were used, but they were not the first 
criterion). Thus the headteacher was ,a potential' agent 
of political control in schools. 
5.3. Administrative control of secondary school teachers 
There was direct control of access to employment, 
to certification and to tenure (see chapter five, section 
1.1.1.). This direct control had clear repressive components 
- the admissions were generally preceded by an information 
of the secret police - and also expressive components since 
the admission imposed that teachers swear fidelity to the 
established order (" I declare upon my honor that I accept 
the social order established by the Political Constitution 
of 1933 and that I actively repudiate communism and all 
subversive ideas."). 
The main strategy to ensure teacher control was 
the implementation of teachers duty to obey. as the Statute 
of 1948 says (article 317, 0), the teacher should "abstain 
from showing in front of pupils or subordinate officials 
any disagreement about the organization of services or 
about superior's orders". (The formulation is not so strict 
as that found in the Statute of the Weather Service (Decree 
n Q 37l09, 19-10-1948) - lithe civil servant attitude should 
be such as to give the impression that he agrees entirely 
wi th given orders, without showing or even hinting, that 
the points of view of the chief do not meet his approval"). 
This strategy is instrumental for the success 
of the implementation 
inculcation. Without 
of New State aims of mentality 
teacher obedience the strategy of 
implementation of those aims through national central 
curriculum formulation could be useless. 
The central departments prepared the national 
syllabus which the Minister approved. The Minister chose, 
since 1947, sole textbooks which were valid for all schools 
in the country. But this was not enough - the teachers 
were forbidden of dictating notes or changing the order 
of the teaching of different subjects in the syllabus or 
not teaching certain subjects. It was also strictly 
forbidden the use of auxiliary textbooks or epitomes (see, 
for instance, the articles 170, 414, 415, 416 of the Statute 
of 1947) (NOTE 15). Curricular control was then culminated 
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with national examinations. 
All this conformist purpose was helped by the 
growing teaching load given to secondary school teachers 
- from 18 hours per week in 1932, it was increased to 20 
hours per week in 1936 and finally to 22 hours per week 
in 1947 (22% more than fifteen years before), which is 
still the normal· teaching load nowadays. The more hours 
the teacher spent in classroom work the more it was probable 
he restricted his work to preparing classes and giving 
classes - it is the bureaucratic disfunction analyzed by 
GOULDNER 1954 - the exact knowledge of the minimum patterns 
of work which are still acceptable tends to level the work, 
within the organization, at this minimum point. 
The success of centralization in achieving 
passivity of teachers was probably helped by the 
feminization of teaching occupation at secondary school 
level. The several roles of the professional women in a 
traditional society (mother, 
professional) often inhibits a great 
by lack of available time. Besides 
spouse, housewife, 
degree of commitment 
that the traditional 
education of women in submission to men (see chapter five, 
section 3.6.) also worked in that direction. 
In 1940-41 there were only 34% female teachers 
in grammar school education; in 1966-67 its percentage 
was 61%. In reference to technical education the percentage 
of women teachers was 21% in 1940-41 and 48% in 1966-67. 
The same effect of femininization is described 
by STOER (1985) in regard to primary school teachers STOER 
explains the sudden change of the role of primary school 
teacher from ideologue of Republican. ideas to the "souls 
moulder" of the New State to the femininization of the 
occupation. (STOER 1985, .63-64). In 1940-41 there were 
already 76% of women in primary school teaching in 1967-
68 there were 88%. The New State actively favoured this 
trend in regard to primary school teachers, reserving, 
since 1942, two thirds of the places in the reopened Teacher 
Education Colleges (see above chapter five, section 3.3.2.) 
to women. 
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5.4. Conclusion teacher control as an indispensable 
instrument for the efficacity of centralization. 
Teacher control through expressive, administrative 
and repressive strategies is a touchstone for the efficacity 
of centralization. The system can only work commanded from 
the top if the legitimacy of the. domination is not 
questioned and if the central bureaucrats are certain of 
the unquestioned implementation of central rules in schools. 
6. CONCLUSION - CENTRALIZATION AS A DEMOBILIZING STRATEGY 
TO ACHIEVE PASSIVITY 
The relationship between the Administrative State 
and the aims of depoliticization, conformism and 
demobilization had been often referred in this work (see 
chapter five, section 1.1.2., chapter seven, introduction 
and section 5., chapter eight, sections 4.5., 4.7. and 
5. ) • 
Indeed centralization is congruent with the 
education for passivity, it is ,congruent with the pursuiness 
of mentality uniformity, it is congruent with the 
habitualness in political and daily life which Salazar 
proclaimed as ideal (see chapter two, section 1.3.) , it 
is congruent with the emphasis on hierarchy ( H I do not 
believe in equality but in hierarchy" - SALAZAR, VI, 41). 
Centralization is the main tool to build and 
sustain the Administrative State, not only by effectively 
removing decision-making from local agents (teachers, 
educational managers), but through the creation in. them 
of an attitude of non legitimacy to decide. 
Centralization is based on that theory of human 
behaviour which McGregor calls "theory X" - the average 
man is indolent, works as little as it is allowed to, he 
is not ambitious, he is not willing to take decisions, 
hates responsabilities, prefers to be ruled than to rule 
(McGREGOR 1958). It is not necessary to refer the similitude 
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of "theory X" with Salazar's new man ideal 
two, section 1.3.). But centralization as 
decision making creates in persons the very 
(see chapter 
process of 
attitude of 
unwillingness to decide this inculcated attitude can 
then be used as legitimacy basis for the continuation of 
centralization. It is thus clear the demobilising mechanism 
of centralization. 
It can be hypothecized that it is the persistence 
of this attitude which may explain the failure of the so 
called "democratic management" of schools implemented after 
April 1974 (the government of schools by elected teachers, 
helped by elected students and by elected members of the 
non teaching staff) see FERNANDES 1985 and FORMOSINHO 
1986. 
It can also· be hypothecized that the persistence 
of this attitude is. a great obstacle to the creation of 
a professional attitude in teachers and it is also an 
obstacle to the process of regional educational management. 
Indeed "centralization is not only a 
disproportionate process of power sharing, but also a 
cultural process of' non participation, situationism and 
passivity" (FORMOSINHO 1986). 
So one can conclude that the ambiguity of New 
State theory referent to the role of the State (in general 
and in education) was solved since 1947-1948 in favour 
of the implementation of an Administrative State and this 
is congruent with New State passivity oriented strategies. 
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Each chapter had a general introduction which 
explained its relevance for this thesis and ended with 
a conclusion which indicated the way in which it contributed 
tO,the confirmation of the main hypothesis. 
In this last chapter we will try to put together 
and make sense of all those chapter conclusion~. 
1 •. EDUCATING FOR PASSIVITY 
As it was said (in chapter two), Salazar's new 
man was the passive man inculcated with rural values. The 
Nation itself was essentially the rural people and the 
eli te which identified itself with rural people's values 
(see chapters three, four and seven). 
man 
The New State pursued the building of this "new" 
(based on the image of 1;.he "old" rural man), through 
the setting up of mechanisms of non participation in public 
life and through the implementation of expressive 
strategies. 
Naturally the same purposes, were pursued through 
the educational system (as it has been analysed in chapters 
three and four). The adequately educated young person· of 
the new generation should be a conformed person, believing 
in his leaders and admiring the Nation's heroes and in 
the capacity of his leaders ,to defend the "pluricontinental 
and multiracial Portugal": if possibly, he should be a 
religious person. The adequately educated: young person 
should be a family man/woman and should exhaust. his/her 
ambitions in family problems and private strategies, he 
should not need political information (better if he 
repudiated politics all together). 
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2. THE "MILD BUT CONSTANT PRESSURE" 
APOLITICISM AND PRIVATENESS 
FROM RURALISM TO 
One can argue that if Salazar was truly convinced 
of the natural passivity of the Portuguese people no 
demobilising strategies were needed. The answer to this 
apparent paradox was given in chapter two - the rural man, 
who is already naturally passive, is the image to which 
the more mobilised urban man should conform. So the urban 
man was the main target of the expressive demobilising 
strategies. Even the educated status group (the "doutores") 
should learn to conform. 
This ruralist expressive strategy was implemented 
mainly through education there were many texts of the 
reading sole textbooks of the New State praising life in 
'the countryside and asserting the supremacy of rural values, 
as it was seen in chapter four. 
But this expressive ruralism was supplemented 
by an organizational strategy of compartmentalizing rural 
people in the countryside - if rural people were naturally 
demobilisE7d then it follows logically that to keep them 
there is instrumental to achieve demobilization. This 
compartmentalization was done through not facilitating 
the emigration of rural people into towns and through the 
low degree of industrialization. Again one has expressive 
and organizational strategies walking in conjunction with 
a global expressive strategy of demobilization. 
The non existence of participation in public life, 
which we observed in the chapter two, was a natural 
consequence of this global strategy. 
The main objective of the "mild but constant 
pressure" was to obtain "the order guaranteed by the 
obedience of the souls" (SALAZAR in GEORGEL 1985, 123). 
The main basis of the "mild but constant pressure" 
was the "basic sentiments of portuguese moral structure", 
not any elaborate ideology (which is 
authoritarian regime). On the contrary, 
typical of 
the basis 
an 
of 
effective repression was not mere non conformance to this 
moral structure, but active political opposition to the 
regime. 
This constant pressure led to an apolitical pattern 
of life which had as consequence the promotion in each 
citizen of only private strategies. It is what SALAZAR 
recommends -to "live habitually". This is part of an 
implicit agreement between the regime and the citizens, 
between the State and civil society - neither the State 
would interfere in areas of citizen's private life (choice 
of profession, leisure, sports, entertainment, etc.) nor 
the citizens would interfere in public life. Public life 
was the monopoly of the State. 
Thus to outstep private strategies was in itself 
a political act, even if the objectives were not directly 
political - for instance, to publicly press for the building 
of a· school, of a hospital or of a road. The choice of 
certain means - meetings, petitions, working. committees, 
etc. was considered dangerous by the regime. For this reason 
meetings among primary school teachers were forbidden; 
for this same reason family (which the New State considered 
the main educational agent) was not provided with any 
official means to influence school education - this would 
mean to outstep private strategies. Not even at local level 
small communal strategies were allowed(see chapter eight •. 
One of the pillars of the "basic sentiments of 
portuguese moral structure" was respect for the family. 
This is obviously part of the traditional values, but its 
enhancement is not as innocent as it would appear, at first 
• 
glance the more engaged you are with extended family 
affairs, the less time and effort you have for public 
affairs. Indeed BRADFORD attributes to the absorption 
with family affairs the no public spirit of Portuguese 
(BRADFORD 1973, 142). 
3. GENERALIZED PRESSURE AND SELECTIVE REPRESSION 
The generalized "mild but constant pressure" was 
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supplemented by a strategy of selective repression, as 
it had been seen in chapter six. 
Changes in the 1960's provoked clearly a shift 
from the generalized pressure to selective repression due 
to the increasing mobilization of certain sectors 
intellectuals, students, progressist catholics, trade 
unions. It became clear that the "intelligentsia" had 
refused to convert "en masse" to the regime (ROBINSON 1979, 
81). The intellectuals became even to be culturally 
dominated by leftist values. 
The answer of the regime was to increase selective 
repression. But as it had been said in the ·conclusion of 
chapter six all must be seen as ~art of a global integrated 
expressive strategy to achieve passivity. 
4. SOCIALIZING FOR SITUATIONISM 
All types of strategies - expressive, repressive, 
administrative and organizational 
portuguese for situationism, that 
what is, because it was set up like 
try to socialize 
is, for conformity with 
that. 
From the three main currents of thought, ROBINSON 
finds throughout portuguese history sebastianism 
(portuguese messianism), regenerationism and situationism 
(ROBINSON 1979) - the New State built its strategy mainly 
on situationism. 
To aim in life only for private or extended family 
goals and, consequently, to pursue only private strategies 
was the best road to situationism. Centralization was 
instrumental in compelling the more active towards that 
road through emptying local means of any decision-making. 
To live habitually an apolitical life should be the ideal 
for the common portuguese man. 
5. ORGANIZING FOR DEMOBILIZATION 
Society is not only composed of individuals, but 
of social groups and organizations, as the New State leaders 
very well knew (see chapter seven). There was then the 
need to formulate strategies to avoid mobilization of social 
organizations. 
Corporatism served well this purpose through 
integration of the National into the State. In this way 
the distinction between State and Civil Society became 
blurred. The State controlled and suffocated (LUCENA) civil 
society. 
Beyond corporative organization there were set 
up several organizations to control civil society. The 
non participation in public life was not enough for the 
demobilizing purposes of the regime. It was necessar'y to 
fill the vacuum which this non participation could provoke. 
As SCHMITTER says the regime had an horror of the vacuum 
(SCHMITTER 1975a, 23) and thus created several organizations 
to fill this void through pre-emptying the potential 
mobilising spaces. It is the case of the National Union, 
it is the case of corporative organization, it is also 
the case of Portuguese Youth. 
It is what MARLER (1979) calls the "organization 
without mobilization". 
6. ADAPTATION OF THE NEW STATE STRATEGIES TO PORTUGUESE 
PEOPLE TRAITS 
As analysed in chapter two, the Salazar theory 
of government by elites was based on a diagnosis of 
portuguese people traits. 
The regime incorporated the conservative 
characteristics of the portuguese society and capitalized 
on the historical dependence of portuguese society in regard 
to the state (BARRETO 1984, VALENTE 1983). 
Even Salazar's leadership was more paternalist 
than charismatic, 
ideology, more 
sebastianism. 
more appealing 
appealing to 
to tradition than to 
situationism than to 
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The strong state took the form of the 
Administrative State which represents a rationalization 
of the traditional dependence of society in regard to the 
State. 
7. WAS THE PASSIVITY INCULCATION EFFECTIVE? 
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The more assertive aspects of the New State 
mentali ty inculcation did not seem to be as effectively 
transmi tted as the clearly passivity oriented ones see 
SALAZAR's complaints, in 1958, in SALAZAR V, "471, 521-526. ' 
He asks "why does today's youth feel that it has its soul 
empty? It is not enough Fatherland (love and cUlt] to fill 
a soul? There should be something wrong with education". 
MONICA also reports little success in primary school 
teachers mentality inculcation (see chapter ten). 
However the inculcation of a conformed behaviour 
seemed very successful. Indeed the New State outstepped 
the life of most authoritarian regimes, it ruled for 48 
consecutive years, it did not create a strong opposition, 
it could maintain, at least until the 1960's, a deep and 
generalized level of demobilization in the population. 
Portuguese civil society accepted state domination. So 
on the whole passivity was effectively obtained and 
conformism in behaviour was very successfuly achieved. 
As shown throughout this thesis, the education system played 
a vital part in this process. 
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NOTES OF INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
NOTE 1 
This attitude was indicated by non willingness to 
distinguish between non qualified and qualified teachers 
at the level of pedagogical authority to chose methods 
of teaching, textbooks, methods of' evaluation and to be 
responsible for the pass-fail decision for each pupil. 
This attitude is probably congruent with the individualism 
exhibited, but it is not congruent neither with 
professional values nor with democratic accountability. 
NOTE 2 
"Democratic management" of schools can have several 
meanings from a minimal to a maximal meaning: 
a) It can mean "democratic government" with 
participation of parents and local community 
representatives in the government of school, that is, 
it can imply decentralisation: 
b) It can mean just management of school by an elected 
teaching body chosen between competing teams of candidates 
with different educational options and pedagogical 
government programs, what: would mean "deconcentration" 
or partial "functional decentralisation" (see about these 
concepts applied to education FORM05INHO 1983 b, 1986): 
c) "Democratic management" could only very difficultly 
mean just election of a teacher body to fulfil the same 
(restricted) roles and have the same (limited) powers 
of non elected heads. But this was the meaning which 
prevailed, which can be seen as 'partially still consequence 
of the education for passivity. 
See about "democratic management'" FERNANDES 1985, 
LIMA 1985, STOER 1986. 
NOTE 3 
This is not the case of a contradiction between verbal 
discourse and practice which is 'normal within certain 
limi ts - see BURRI5S 1980 -, but a contradiction between 
atti tudes which were more congruent with the educational 
changes produced after April 1974. 
NOTE 4 
The assumption behind this reasoning - that· person 
socialization as child influence, adult' behaviour' --.is 
clearly confirmed by psychological research. 
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NOTES OF INTRODUCTION 
NOTE 5 
The passivism inculcated by the New State seems more 
adequate to explain teachers practices (reported by 
interviewed teachers and observed by the researcher) than 
ideological revolutionary attitudes, socialist ideology 
or the political philosophy of " democratic management" 
of schools. Those latter explanations account very 
adequately to interviewed teachers verbal statements, 
but not to their reported practices. Some questions 
would be unanswered by this latter explanations but seem 
more understandable if one accepts the essential 
administrati ve continuity (and congruent partial at ti tude 
continui ty) between New State educational management and 
democratic educational management after 1974. One can 
produce some examples of those questions - why were not 
transferred to school democraticly elected teachers bodies 
more competences than had the previous head? Why was not 
the new system of school educational management used to 
create school based innovations? Why was leadership in 
schools reduced to laissez-faire leadership? Why was 
leadership of elected bodies reduced to bureaucratic 
management? Why was given (by school and central 
administration) to "democratic management" the minimal 
meaning the concept could contain (see note 2 of this 
Introduction)? Why is there now such demobilisation in 
regard to "democratic management", as it is indicated 
by the fact that around half of the teacher comrni ttees 
are appointed by the central ministry instead of elected 
by the teachers? (see GEP 1986). 
NOTE 6 
During sometime after the overthrow of the New State 
it was taboo to show any area of continuity between the 
authoritarian and the democratic regime. Once the 
revolutionary enthusiasm decreased and political 
mobilization diminished , it is more possible to analyse 
the problem of continuities. 
So one can see in GRACIa 1985a, 1985b an 
acknowledgement of policy continuity in regard to the 
unification of post-primary education which one does not 
find in previous papers about the same subject - see GRACIa 
1976, 1978, 1980, 1984. 
See about this continuity STOER 1986. 
NOTE 7 
In book references the date and the number of the 
page are indicated. In article references only the date 
is given. In regard to references from official legislation 
it is indicated the number of the decree, the date of 
its publication and generally the legal article from where 
the reference was taken. 
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NOTE 8 
This "Comission for a Bla~r. Book about the Fascist 
Regime" was created in April : ')77 to publish documents 
which could show by themselves :-IOW the regime worked and 
governed - see the Introduction ~o COMISSAO ••• 1979. 
NOTE 9 
This· opinion of Augusto JOAQUIM is quoted in BELO 
1986. JOAQUIM added that port~9uese left ignored those 
questions and would pay a price for this ignorance. 
NOTE 10 
The confirmation of the irn~lcmentation cf the elitist 
non participatory theory of government was also done 
through the analysis of the mechanisms of non participation 
in public life and the role of the President of Republique, 
of the National Assembly and of the sole party. 
NOTE 11 
It was also done a not so detailed analysis of the 
curriculum of secondary school. 
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NOTE 1 
CABRAL 1982 says that to call the regime as "limited 
pluralism" or "paternal dictatorship" is to justify the 
New State, to minimize its repressive aspects. On the 
contrary, to qualify it as fascism is to emphasize those 
same features. Thus it is an option which could have 
to do with the political intentions of the authors. 
About the influence of political options on the 
qualification of the New State see implicit references 
in LUCENA 1979a, PAYNE 1979a. WIARDA complains that fascism 
"has become a label of disapproval rather than a precise 
terms of analyses" (WIARDA 1977,4). 
NOTE 2 
A recent novel about life in a portuguese small town 
during the World War conveys the idea that Portugal could 
not even be a Fascism, with capital F, but it could only 
be a little fascism. New State nationalism was called 
"little and dull". See-Alvaro GUERRA, "Cafe Republica", 
Edi90es 0 Jornal, Lisboa, 1982, page 169. 
NOTE 3 
The fact that there is more agreement in the 
description of the New State than on its qualification 
can only mean - that there is more consensus about what 
was the New State than about what fascism is. 
NOTE 4 
See for this kind of definition for instance 
1982. In the end Mussolini's Italy ends up probably 
the least characteristic fascism according to 
definition. 
GINER 
being 
this 
One can distinguish between the ,Political Science 
definitions of regimes more concerned:with formal political 
structures and explicit objecti ves '. and Sociological 
definitions more concerned with the' class content- of 
regimes, (see WIARDA 1977, 346-347 as an example of this 
confrontation). .: .. 
It seems that- many ambiguities in this area come 
from non clarification of what. kind . of ·definition is 
intended - the perspective followed in this work borrows 
more, in this respect, from Political Science. 
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NOTE 5 
In the First Conference on Modern Portugal 
(International Conference Group on Modern Portugal) held 
in the University of New Hampshire (U.S.A.), October 1973 
(see GRAHAM and MAKLER 1979), the most heated discussions 
took place in the session on" portuguese corporatism. But 
this had more to do with the reality of academic political 
science than with the reality of Portugal. 
NOTE 6 
If one accepts that fascism is by nature totalitarian, 
then the categorization of New State as non totalitarian 
implicitly rejects the fascist label. 
NOTE 7 
CAETANO, the other very important leader of the 
regime, makes a distinction between "essential freedoms" 
(or "civil freedoms") - the right to build a family, to 
chose an occupation, freedom of movement, religious freedom 
and right to private property - and "instrumental freedoms" 
- freedom of reunion, of association, of speech, of having 
elections, etc. The first ones could . never be limited 
by the State; but the· latter could be limited in order 
to promote the first ones. "All that the liberalism had 
of truly good and human will be preserved by us" (CAETANO 
1950) ~ 
NOTE 8 
For this rejection of characterizing the New State 
as a totalitarian regime see, for instance - GRAHAM 1975, 
19, LUCENA 1976a, 120, MARQUES 1976,181, MARTINS 1969, 
MONICA 1978, 102, 355, PAYNE 1976, 1979," SHMITTER 1975a, 
40, SETON-WATSON 1972, 248. 
See about the different interpretations about the 
New State LUCENA 1984. 
NOTE 9 
The episode of portuguese National Syndicalists 
(Blue Shirts) which promote fascist ideals, fascist symbols 
and rituals can be seen as evidence of the rejection of 
totalitarianism by the New State, since the mainstream 
of the regime opposed them (see section 2.l.1.a». 
See about this episode GON~ALVES 1981, LUCENA 1979a, 
MEDINA 1979, NOGUEIRA 1977b," 162-169, "278, ROBINSON 1979, 
52, SARAIVA and SILVA 1976, SCHMITTER 1979, WIARDA 1977, 
180-181. 
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NOTE 10 
One must realize that the New State was a regime 
which lasted from 1926-1933 till 1974. One cannot judge 
the regime analysing only its fascistoid period (1933-
1945). The continuity of the regime probably makes us 
less aware of the changes it suffered in the so long span 
of time. 
NOTE 11 
Salazar preferred to deal with a sleeping country 
(LUCENA 1976a,' 66-67). Congruently' with his theory of 
eli tes (see chapter two, section 2) he did not seek any 
active popular support in mass demonstrations or simi lar 
manifestations. 
NOTE 12 
NOGUEIRA tells that the Catholic Church made 
reservations about the setting up of Portuguese Youth 
with fear that it could lead to divinization of worldly 
ideals and consequent deviation of spiritual ones - see 
NOGUEIRA 1977b, 93-97, 1978, 21. 
NOTE 13 
The characterization of .the regime as authoritarian 
does not intend any type of rehabilitation of the regime, 
(as CABRAL hints see NOTE 1), but just a· better 
description of its essence. This characterization does 
not ignore the important presence of repression, but it 
just says that its essence was not there. It was - rather 
in the demobilization strategies that its core· should 
be sought. 
NOTE 14 
LINZ (1975) makes a typology of authoritarian regimes. 
He proposes several sub-types - Portugal is categorized 
in the "organic statism sub-type". 
NOTE 15 
Salazar himself pointed as· his aim' for Portugal to 
"live habitually". See about Salazar's leadership style 
FERRO 1982, 190-192,' 283-284; 302-305.' 
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NOTE 16 
CRUZ 1982b points up very important differences 
between the New State ideology and the "integralismo 
lusi tano" movement and concludes that its ideology never 
turned into being the official ideology of the regime 
or even its most important doctrinary contribution. (The 
movement's ideology was ambivalent as ChRDOSO 1982 shows). 
The attitude of the movement main leaders was of 
opposi tion to the New State - the NeON State used " the 
corporations as an instrument of domination of the State 
over the Nation" one of them said (quoted in CRUZ 19820). 
They also disagreed with the building of the Police Sta~e. 
But several followers of the moveme:-.~ were co-opted by 
the rising regime. According to MARTI~S (1970) there were 
several types of integralists and they gave accordingly 
different answers to the New State from cooperation to 
almost opposition. 
A group came from the movemen~ tried to form a 
political movement paralel to the Salazar supporters 
-they were the National Syndicalism movement - see Note 9. 
NOTE 17 
To co-opt the youth following the National-Syndicalism 
it was promoted the creation of an official youth movement 
(AC9ao Escolar Vanguarda), in. 1934. ':'0 capture recrui ~ 5 
in the same field of National-Syndicalists this official 
youth movement adopted a violent verbal style (agai~s~ 
"bourgeois of easy life", "old-fashioned people", "routine 
spirit" and "demo-liberal capitalism") and promc~ed 
demonstrations and rallies. Salazar was presented as 
someone who, beyond his calm profile, was a true 
revolutionary. But, once the need to mobilize youth has 
passed, the movement entered into rapid decline. As PINTO 
and RIBEIRO (1982) say, Salazar was not inclined to support 
them beyond the need of a mere tactical expedient. 
NOTE 18 
As American Minister, in Lisbon at the time, said 
in a dispatch to his government (in August 1936) that 
the portuguese governement had, since the beginning of 
the Spanish Civil War, regarded the rebels success "as 
a matter of life and death" (in MARTINS 1970). So the 
regime gave several facilities to the rebels and even 
promoted a volunteers corps (the "Viriatos"). who fought 
with Franco's forces. 
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NOTE 19 
According to MARTINS (1970) the "Legi~o Portuguesa" 
was the most spontaneous creation of the regime since 
it corresponded to certain pressures from below. But the 
"Legiao Portuguesa" was led by Army officers, which was 
a means of control. As MARQUES says "it quick ly faded 
away and ceased to be taken seriously, as generally happens 
in Portugal after awhile" (MARQUES 1976,186). 
NOTE 20 
SCHMITTER 1979 points out 
period has no equivalent in the 
the core of the regime. 
NOTE 21 
that this mobilization 
recrui tment pattern to 
Both MARTINS 1970 and MARQUES 1976 (176) give more 
importance to the integra1ist movement as ideological 
source of the New State. But CRUZ, in more recent studies 
(1980, 1982a and b) point to christian democratic thoughts 
as its main doctrinaire source. This seems to explain 
better the political behaviour of the regime (see chapters 
two, three, five and six), its repudiation of the fascist 
mobilizational core, its longevity and even its evolution. 
It is also more congruent with the composition of the 
elite - LEWIS 1979, SCHMITTER 1979. 
NOTE 22 
SALAZAR supported some eclectic solutions (SALAZAR 
IV, 433, V, 494) and accepted limited ideological variety 
within the regime (SALAZAR VI, 242, 356). He said more 
than once that the New State did not have a pre-ready 
doctrine, but a doctrine which was being formulated while 
practical solutions were being implemented - "We are going 
to make propaganda of an already made doctrine and of 
a doctrine still to be made" (SALAZAR I, 281 - see also 
SALAZAR III, preface). 
About this conflict between individual and organic 
representation, he said that the Corporative Chamber was 
more representative of Nation than the Parliament (SALAZAR 
IV, 435), but he also said that national interest could 
not be the combination of corporative interests see 
chapter seven and eight. 
NOTE 23 
See about the different groups within the regime 
MARQUES 1976, MARTINS 1970, ROBINSON 1979, SCHMITTER 1979, 
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WIARDA 1977. See also the biography of Salazar by Franco 
NOGUEIRA and CAETANO's memoirs (1977). A very interesting 
document about political group in the early times' of' the 
regime is GON~ALVES 1981 - it refers to military groups 
and national syndicalists. . 
About the monarchic group CAETANO's memoirs are very 
interesting. CRUZ (1982a and b, 1985) refers to the 
integra1ist group and CRUZ 1980 to the Catholic group. 
WIARDA 1977 is the best source for the group of corporatist 
theoreticians. 
NOTE 24 
A notable of the regime (Albino dos Reis) said "we 
do not recognize parties outside National Union C'the sole 
partyJ. Within it we do not allow groups". 
But CAETANO had other opinion, he deffended openly 
a restricted pluralism wi thin the regime, - see for an 
episode CAETANO 1977, 306. 
NOTE 25 
LEEDS (1983) proposes a formative period (1932-1936), 
an intensive period (1936-1947), a "low pressure" period 
(1947-1958) and a decadence period (1958-1968). 
NOTE 26 
This campaign is an' exception in educational policy 
after 1945, since it used mobilizational methods in a 
non mobilizational period. 
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CHAPTER 2 
NOTE 1 
SALAZAR disliked parties in general, but admitted that 
some countries like England, could work well on a party 
system. He considered that Portugal could never be like 
that, due to the characteristics of portuguese people. 
NOTE 2 
"Saudade" is a specific portuguese word with no exact 
equivalent in other languages. The best approach is to 
miss someone or something, to be nostalgic or longing. 
"Nostalgic and longing" was the translation used for 
"saudoso". 
NOTE 3 
This is the reason why portuguese are so easy prey 
of pessimism - see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 296. 
NOTE 4 
Accepting that may not be easy to modify' portuguese 
people (SALAZAR 1933, in FERRO 1982, 126), Salazar says 
that if he cannot get to 100' he would try to' reach 80 
(ibidem, 170). 
NOTE 5 
Thus the constant reference to our "mild customs" 
(brandos costumes). 
NOTE 6 
One of the best sources for this type of pessimist 
self-image of portuguese is a portuguese historian and 
writer of the 19th century - OLIVEIRA MARTINS. See for 
recent comments on this subject CARDOSO 1986. 
NOTE 7 
Those sentences about the virtues of the obedience 
were compulsorily included in primary school reading 
textbooks alongside with others of the same style - see 
chapter three, section 3.2.3.a). 
NOTE 8 
This is clearly· linked with the "aurea: mediocritas· 
as ideal way of life deffended by Renaissance poets - see 
SALAZAR 1933, in FERRO 1982, 283. 
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NOTE 9 
Another example of the same paradox Salazar 
. criticizes portuguese individualism and built a political 
regime based on the compartmentalization of social 
relationships, that is, on the same individualism.' 
As MARTINS (1985) comments, he reduces the person 
to its private dimension, "he sets apart, analyses, 
differentiates and carries his atomizing process to the 
believers singularness". 
NOTE 10 
For the regime "people" means the rural· people and 
"masses" the urban population. 
NOTE 11 
See GALVAO-TELLES 1964b. 
NOTE 12 
Was there a regime beyond Salazar ideas and 
personality? Was there a "New State", with a clear 
political structure or there was just "Salazarism"? Those 
questions, although in rethoric fashion, were at the core 
of CAETANO's speech of 1951, in Coimbra (see in CAETANO 
1959, 167-185). 
WIARDA asks the same question see WIARDA 1977, 
282, 309, 397, note 17. 
It will be clear in the end of the thesis that there 
was indeed a political regime beyond Salazar's autocracy. 
NOTE 13 
CAETANO in his memoirs tells several episodes in 
which one can feel that he resents Salazar's autocratic 
style - see CAETANO 1977,59-60,102,162-166,293,340-
346, 452. 
NOTE 14 
See CAETANO 1977, 163, 181, 185-8, 457. 
See CRUZ 1982c, GRAHAM 1975,14, MARQUES 1976,202-
203, SCHMITTER 1975b, WIARDA 1977, 103, 108. 
NOTE IS 
See CAETANO 1977, 371, 378. 
NOTE 16 
As CAETANO says - all the collaborators of Salazar 
who had personality had sometimes conflicts with him 
(CAETANO 1977, 102). 
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NOTE 17 
CAETANO refers often this fragmentary pattern in 
public administration (CAETANO 1966, 1977, 153,161-166, 
181). GRAHAM (1975, 60) says that Salazar used this 
fragmentary pattern to increase his power. 
NOTE 18 
See how the President of Repub1ique Craveiro Lopes 
(1951-1958) was chosen, in CAETANO 1977, 377-380. 
NOTE 19 
CRUZ 1982c comments that Salazar's leadership was 
more paternal than charismatic. 
NOTE 20 
See CRUZ 1982c. 
NOTE 21 
See an example of this, in the re-election of 
President Carmona, in CAETANO 1977, 320-321. 
NOTE 22 
It is the case of Carmona (1928-1951) (see CAETANO 
1977, 307-308, 319), the partial case of Craveiro Lopes 
(1951-1958) (see CAETANO 1977, 379). The most notorious 
case was Americo Thomaz who was President from 1958 to 
1974. 
NOTE 23 
THOMAZ became a 1au9hin9 stock 
because of his apparent stupidity 
of THOMAZ' s speeches in NEVES 1974 
80, 2-11-1977. 
NOTE 24 
of intellectuals, 
see' some examples 
and in "op~ao",· .. nQ 
See about this change CRUZ. 1982c, LUCENA 1976a, 159-
-160, ROBINSON 1979, 73-75. 
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NOTE 25 
See "0 Livro de Leitura da Terceira Classen, Livraria 
Editora Figueirinhas, Porto, 1958, 4th edition, pages 
174-175. 
NOTE 26 
The member of Parliament was Jose Hermano SARAIVA, 
later minister of education (1968-1970). 
NOTE 27 
ROSAS (1985, 48-49) reports that 41% of the members 
of the Parliament, in the first Parliament of the New 
State (1934), were state employees. 
NOTE 28 
See about this BLUME 1975, CRUZ 1982c, LUCENA 1976a, 
150. 
NOTE 29 
See about this restriction CAETANO 1972a, 601, SALAZAR 
I, 83, 436, VI, 38 - see also LUCENA 1976a, 150. 
NOTE 30 
See about this CAETANO 1972a, 595, SALAZAR I, 326 
- see also CRUZ 1982c. 
NOTE 31 
The dissident member of Parliament was Mota Amaral, 
now head of the government of Azores. 
NOTE 32 
Recent documents published by the COMISSAO DO LIVRO 
NEGRO SOBRE 0 FASCISMO may throw some light on this matter-
- the National Assembly may have not been so obedient 
as it appeared (see COMISSAO ••• 1986, introduction). 
NOTE 33 
SALAZAR tells to Ant6nio FERRO the reasons why women 
should not normally vote - SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 156-
-160. 
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NOTE 34 
Republican tradition was not one man, one vote, but 
it was based rather on a restrict· definition of the 
electorate - see CABRAL 1982, PAYNE 1979a, ROBINSON 1979, 
36, 67. 
Ironically Portugal was the european country which 
held more elections between 1933 and 1970 SCHMITTER 
1977. 
NOTE 35 
See COMISSAO ••. 1979, 10, 35, 48, 53-55,.59. 
NOTE 36 
See COMISSAO .•• 1979, 61-68. 
NOTE 37 
One can recall so important ministers as Adriano 
Moreira (Overseas Minister), or Veiga Sim~o (Minister 
of Education) who were not members of National Union -
- see CAETANO 1977, 304. 
NOTE 38 
Afonso QUEIRO was professor of Administrative 
as CAETANO, but in the Uni versi ty of Coimbra, and 
a partisan of the New State. 
NOTE 39 
Law 
was 
The notable was the member of Parliament Albino dos 
Reis. 
NOTE 40 
CAETANO appears generally more dynamic and open than 
Salazar, probably because he was younger, he was not the 
leader and he had to compete with Salazar. But there seemed 
to exist also some ideological differences - CAETANO was 
republican and Salazar was, apparently, monarchic: CAETANO 
seemed to be more sincerely corporatist and less prone 
to use repressive strategies than Salazar. 
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NOTE 41 
The monarchic group was the major exception in this 
context, probably due to Salazar's apparently monarchic 
convictions and probably also due to the great difficulty 
in restoring the monarchy in the concrete case of Portugal-
- see CAETANO 1977, 536. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NOTE I 
See other complaints in the same direction in SALAZAR 
IV, 272, 276. 
NOTE 2 
Poli tical propaganda is one of the important means 
of making politics. Salazar defined Politics as "the whole 
set of . individual and collective means by which public 
conscience is brought to a state of adhesion or of mf31re 
conformi ty with [national] objectives and is brought to 
coopera tion with the Power in its achievement" (SALAZAR 
IV, 274). 
NOTE 3 
Salazar does not apply this 
analysing Opposition reaction to 
- see SALAZAR VI, 252-253. 
NOTE 4 
political motto when 
political repression 
Poli tical propaganda was also designed to increase 
the legitimacy of the control of the state ·over civil 
society by making clear to the latter that the state 
devolute the power, which it. took from it, in material 
goods and visible achievements - see JOAQUIM 1979 •. 
NOTE 5 
ROBINSON considers that "Students of modern political 
history searching for what is peculiar to the Portuguese 
poli tical culture would probably decide that three 
interrelated "isms" [ ••• ] have a tendency to recur: 
Sebastianism, regenerationism and si tuationism" (ROBINSON 
1979, 32). _ 
Si tuationism is the art of survival in an unstable 
situation, the adhesion to whichever is in power just 
because it is in power. Political propaganda appeals to 
si tuationism (indoctrination is. more congruent with the 
two other "isms").· 
NOTE 6 
Salazar distinguishes clearly Politics and Government 
see SALAZAR IV, 274, V, 306-309. 
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NOTE 7 
The comic actor was Raul Solnado. 
NOTE 8 
The ideological fight against communism did not imply 
mobilization since it was considered abnormal' for a 
portuguese formed in the "basic sentiments of portuguese 
moral struture" to become a communist. Such exceptional 
cases were treated through repressive strategies. 
This does not mean that occasionally Salazar did 
not appeal to political indoctrination to fight communism 
see SALAZAR IV, 475, 510-511. But, in fact, this last 
comment of Salazar acknowledges that the main strategy 
to fight communism had been repression and not 
mobilization. 
NOTE 9 
This motto of Salazar as the " great educator' of 
our time" is often repeated by CARNEIRO-PACHECO in his 
speeches - see CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1940. 
NOTE 10 
In this mobilization style CARNEIRO-PACHECO says 
in regard to girls education "There is a modern education 
which we take for good, even indispensable, aimed at 
forming women ready to face life, with healthy body and 
soul, with common sense and achievement capacities, with 
strong character, ready to serve C .•. l God, Fatherland 
and Family!" (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1939). 
NOTE 11 
The concept "hidden curriculum" used initially by 
JACKSON (1968) had been used in so many ways . that, can 
be seen as a "porridge word" in DE BONO terminology (quoted 
in MEIGHAN 1981, 53) - due to this lack of precision the 
concept has been stirred around to stimulate further ideas. 
It had been used to cover the universal 
characteristics of schools in all countries (like 
compulsority, management by teachers, credentials 
production) (CAMPOS 1980, 63), it has been regarded as 
refering to the ghosts that haunt the classroom (MEIGHAN 
1981, 56), to cover all that is learned in school without 
having been (intentionally) taught (FORMOSINHO 1983a, 
1985e). 
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NOTE 12 
The narrowest definition of curriculum is considering 
it as a list of subjects and the largest is considering 
it as all that is learned in school (being or not being 
intentionally taught). Within this framework one can 
formulate different definitions of curriculum. 
The main text presents also the main definitions 
one can formulate between those two extreme definitions. 
NOTE 13 
BERELSON defines i tern as the "whole 'natural' unit 
employed by the producers of symbol material". It may 
be a book, a magazine article, a speech, a letter, an 
editorial or any other self-contained expression (BERELSON 
1952, 141). 
NOTE 14 
In regard to the main text the context unit is the 
book. 
NOTE 15 
As seen above, this was political propaganda, but 
not political education of masses. 
NOTE 16 
CARNEIRO-PACHECO saw Choral Singing as a means to 
promote nationalism, not in the sense of musical education. 
NOTE 17 
Due to the scarcity of references one has put in 
the same broad category political education and political 
propaganda stricto sensu (as defined in this chapter, 
section 2). 
NOTE 18 
In the 4th and 5th periods political propaganda (lato 
sensu) almost disappeared. 
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NOTE 19 
This is a list of all the primary sources for the 
analyses of secondary education curriculum. 
1932 Grammar School Curriculum 
- Decree 20741, 11-1-1932 
1936 Grammar School Curriculum 
- Law 1941, 11-4-1936 
- Decree-law 27084, 14-10-1936 
1947 Grammar School Curriculum 
- Decree-Law 36507, 17-9-1947 
- Decree 36508, 17-9-1947 
1948 Technical School Curriculum 
- Decree-law 37028, 25-8-1948 
- Decree 37029, 25-8-1948 
1968 Preparatory School Curriculum 
-Decree 48572, 9-9-1968 
1972 Experimental Curriculum of the new 3rd year 
of the Preparatory School 
-"programas", Minist6rio da Educa9ao Naciona1, 1972 
NOTE 20 
The subject "Traba1hos Manuais" (literally "Manual 
Works", that is, Crafts) was categorized differently in 
the various periods according to the primary sources 
indications - it was included in the moral component in 
the first cycle of 1932 reform, in the artistic curriculum 
in the 1936 and 1968 curricula, in the technical curriculum 
in the second cycle of 1932 reform, in 1947 reform. 
NOTE 21 
The total work load of grammar school curricula does 
not include "Lavores Femininos" (Embroidery), which was 
only part of the girls curriculum. This means that, in 
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a strict point of view, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 are 
accurate for boys curriculum. Due to the low work 
of Embroidery the difference is not relevant. 
only 
load 
NOTE 22 
The instructional components of the grammar school 
curricula are much more stable across periods than the 
physical and artistic component and the moral component. 
In fact, standard deviation of percentage numbers of the 
academic component are (respectively for the first and 
second cycles) 2.9 and 6.8, and of the technical component 
are just 1.3 and 5.3, against 7.8 and 9.1 for the physical 
and artistic component, and 9.e and 13.5 for the moral 
component. 
The stability of the instructional components reflects 
the traditional academic dimension of grammar schools. 
The instability of the moral components - it is the one 
wi th higher standard deviations shows that it is the 
, component most prone to change due to political variations. 
, NOTE 23 
If Portuguese and History of Portugal had been 
included just in the academic component the peak of the 
moral component will still be in the second period, as 
can be seen in the revised percentages (across periods) 
of the moral component of grammar school curricula of 
first and second cycles -8%, 26%, 24%, 7% for the first 
cycle, 0%, 26%, 21%, 3% for the second cycle. 
In 19.rr- i t was allocated more time to "Portuguese 
Youth" (two afternoons) than in 1936, in spite of the 
more mobilizing character of 1936 Reform. In 1936 
"Portuguese Youth", having just been founded, had no 
possibility of encompassing immediatly great number of 
activities: in 1947 "Portuguese Youth" had already eleven 
years of existence and was already established in the 
schools, so it could perform more activities. 
NOTE 24 
The same trend to increase the importance of the 
moral component in the secon? ~eriod happens in the third 
cycle. One can ?nly use as ~nd~cators, due to the greater 
complexity of th~s cycle structure, the list of compulsory 
subjects. 
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1st 2nd 3rd 5th 
SUBJECT LI ST OF SUBJECTS 1932 1936 ! 1947 1972 
, 
CATEGORIES Reform Reform! Reform j i 
I 
I I NON MORAL GEOGRAPHY I 
- - -I 
SUBJECTS PHYSICAL EDUCATION X I I I I I I 
I 
, 
PARTIALLY ·PORTUGUESE 
-
I ; 
- -I 
MORAL SUBJECTS -PHYLOSOPHY X 
-
, 
I I 
! 
• GERMAN X ! 
- -
! 
-
I . 
; 
; 
t 
i i i MORAL SUBJECTS -POLITICAL AND ADMINIST. I I I I ORGANIZATION OF THE NATION 
-
i X I I 
-
I I I 
-RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EOU· 
, 
, 
, 
, 
CATION 
- I - I -
-CHORAL SINGING 
-
I 
- -
The categorization of subjects_in.the three categories 
was' not done by their _ intrinsic abstractquali ties, but 
by their concrete role in each period. In fact, in 1932 
German was, a partial moral subject and in 1936 Choral 
Singing was only viewed through' its moral nationalist 
potential. 
NOTE 25 
In,the third cycle there was since 1947,a compulsory 
subject which was partially of nationalistic inculcation 
"Political and Administrative Organization of the Nation" 
, it envisaged also' a vague corporative indoctrination 
and a clear propaganda (in stricto sensu) of the regime. 
But it had a low status mainly due to the fact that 
only one hour per week was allocated for such comprehensive 
and ambitious aims see BETTENCOURT 1983, NUNES 1981, 
147-148. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NOTE 1 
For a socio-psychoanalytical analysis of portuguese 
nationalism, see JOAQUIM 1979. See also a recent analysis 
of portuguese nationalism in ARAGAO 1985, 48-52, 263-273. 
NOTE 2 
This representation of the Nation by the State (better 
studied in chapter seven, section 2.2.3.) compelled all 
State activities to involve the Nation interest. So all 
official correspondence was ended "For the_ good of the 
Nation". 
This same pattern applies to the military coup d'etat 
of 1926 which initiated the'regime - it was done by the 
Nation, since the Army is the symbol of the Nation and 
interpreted well the feelings' of the Nation (see MONICA 
1978, 88). As a matter of fact, this is the usual 
justification for the political initiative of the 
portuguese Armed Forces (SERRA and MATOS 1982 - see also 
CARRILHO 1985). 
NOTE 3 
The Minister was the Deffence Minister SANTOS COSTA 
-quoted in the newspaper "Republica", 14-5-1974. 
One can quote a similar situation in 1974, before 
the April "coup d'etat". A' "nationalist" newspaper was 
saying even in the eve of the regime's fall -"Who governs 
educational curricula: the national interest or the 
interest of the anti-national conspiracy? The Portuguese 
State or the forces of the anti-portuguese subversion? 
A member of Government who swore fidelity to the 
Constitution and to ,the Fatherland IVeiga Simao, then 
Minister of Education I or the infiltrated agents of the 
ennemy?" (in the newspaper "tpoca" 8-3-1974). All this 
violent accusation was to condemn the methodological 
instructions of the experimental curriculum for the new 
third year of preparatory education (seventh year of 
schooling) which did not emphasize the heroes's methodology 
in the teaching of History. 
NOTE 4 
Only two years after the set up of the new regime, 
it was decreed that it was necessary to initiate and 
intensify the study of portuguese colonies in all schools, 
because it is," indispensable to· create: in our people a 
colonial opinion" (Decree 15088, 23-2-1928). 
Six years later, in 1934, the first congress of the 
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sole party the National Union concluded also that 
"all education should be impregnated of colonial spirit" 
(in SAMPAIO 1976, 36). In the same year, there was also 
a congress specifically addressed to the teaching about 
colonies and it was recommended that all curricular 
subjects should be integrated in the "accomplishment· of 
that robust education which built the Empire" (in SAMPAIO 
1976, 37). 
In Coimbra, it was built a' children's living museum 
named "Portugal dos Pequenitos" (Portugal of the Little 
Ones) which tried to imprint the imperial dimension of 
Portugal in children. 
NOTE 5 
MARTINS (1970) comments that the empire became a 
generally accepted symbol to achieve status: pro-imperial 
ideology involved two types of considerations - the weak 
argument that Portugal, albeit small and poor, could be 
great with the empire, and the strong argument that 
Portugal could no longer subsist as an independent state 
without its colonies. 
In Geography textbooks for secondary education the 
map of the empire was superimposed over the map of Europe 
to illustrate the idea that Portugal with the colonies 
was greater than Europe. 
NOTE 6 
Once the Prime-Minister ·Marcello Caetano had a slip 
of . the tongue and said "The whole Portugal from Minho 
to Algarve" I the southern region of Portugal I • The far 
right interpreted it in a freudian way and criticized 
him. 
NOTE 7 
When Salazar said in the preface to his interviews 
wi th Ant6nio Ferro that "Our heroic past hangs too much 
on our present" and that in our attachment to past 
conceptions of this heroic past, we run the risk of 
appearing with empty' arms to a new world that does 'not 
understand us (SALAZAR 1933) '. he did not pretend to stand 
against the past dimension of nationalism,' but just to 
state that to stop only on that dimension was useless 
(see SALAZAR I, 74). What was necessary was to use those 
nationalist feelings to' rebuild the Nation.: In' Salazar's 
words , in the same preface, it was necessary to use the 
formidable qualities of the people and to neutralize some 
of its main defects to build a new mentality through which 
portugal could rise again. 
NOTES OF CHAPTER 4 439 
NOTE 8 
The tendency for cultural isolationism comes from 
the beginning of the regime. CAETANO founded in 1926 a 
review which claimed itself to be "anti-modern, 
anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-bourgeois and anti-
Bolshevik [ ••• ] counter-revolutionary and reactionary: 
Catholic, Apostolic and Roman, monarchic, intolerant and 
intransigent" (in ROBINSON 1979, 40) •. 
Salazar also proclaimed 'the New State as 
anti-parliamentarian, anti-democratic and anti-liberal 
and said that the New State opposed all the great heresies 
of today and all forms of internationalism - communism, 
socialism, syndicalism. 
These quotations show tendency to oppose foreign 
ideas and to cherish cultural isolationism among New State 
leaders. 
NOTE 9 
For this conception of History the following sources 
can be consulted CALDEIRA 1983, CARDOSO 1982, MONICA 
1978, RADICH 1979, SAMPAIO 1976. 
NOTE 10 
According to this analysis the period of the 1383-
1385 crisis was more important than that of Restoration. 
MONICA says that the Restoration wasi' with Discoveries 
and Foundation, one of ,th~ most important historical 
periods (MONICA 1978, 302). The prevalence in all periods 
of the analysis of references to the 1383 crisis over 
references to Restoration may have to do with the easier 
identification of individual heroes in that 1383 period. 
NOTE 11 
A 'content analyses of the type of heroes referred 
shows 'that military heroes' (including in this category 
the navigators) prevailed over non military heroes (queens, 
poets, intellectuals), which is consistent with New State 
conceptions of History - from the 74 texts using heroes 
as strategy to teach history, 58' refer military: heroes 
and 42% non military heroes. This percentage shows tendency 
to decrease across periods - 67%, 61%, 53% are the numbers 
referent to military heroes. 
The relatively high percentage of non military heroes 
may be explained by the non aggressive' nor mobilizing 
dimension of nationalistic inculcation. 
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NOTE 12 
The use of references to monuments to teach History 
was relatively important in the second and third periods 
- 1.8% in regard to the total sample and 16% in regard 
to the History of Portugal texts. 
This is part of a strategy of social education of 
people through monuments, since they are visible and 
permanent reminders of History, which can serve a more 
concrete pedagogy and a reinforcement of national 
personality (SALAZAR III," 402-403). On the other hand, 
as the New State was engaged in an ambitious program of 
historical monuments rebuilding the reference to some 
rebuilt monuments could contribute to the legi timisation 
of the New State. 
NOTE 13 
Salazar was presented as the "Saviour of the 
Fatherland" in a propaganda postcard. Salazar was called 
"Redeemer of Portugal" in a demonstration in the late 
1930's or early 1940's - see CORTE SAO 1982, 89-91. 
NOTE 14 
Salazar was sometimes presented as having married 
the nation. He said of himself that "One can extend his 
family to all the Nation" (in FERRO 1982, 305). For many 
rural persons Salazar had a religious status almost similar 
to that of a catholic saint. 
NOTE 15 
The mother is a woman who lives for her children 
and makes all sacrifices for them. As a mother says in 
a poem "Where there will be heather and gorses/ Stones 
which tear the skin/ I will" put my body over them/ You 
will cross over it" (3rd, 1958, 164). 
All those sacrifices will be compensated since only 
children can give us the true joy - "Only children and 
the fatigues they gave us are our richness. It is for 
them and through them that we are happy" (3rd, 1958, 43 
- see also ibidem, 9). 
The role of the children is very well prescribed 
- they must be eternally grateful to their parents. It 
is impressed in them a sense of non redeemable debt towards 
their parents -"Children should remember the sacrifices 
that parents made to bring them dressed and clean""" (3rd~ 
1958, 56). "Children, you will not pay/ Not even seeing 
you crawling/ A kiss from your parents" (from a non sampled 
textbook of the fourth class, in MONICA 1978, 295). " 
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NOTE 16 
As MONICA comments obedience was a universal value 
which should be inculcated also so strongly in the elite 
as in the masses (MONICA 1978, 286). 
NOTE 17 
Quoted in MONICA 1978, 102. 
NOTE 18 
See WIARDA 1977, 49-51, 287-290, 351. 
NOTE 19 
The textbook is "Comp@ndio de Fi10sofia" by Bonif4cio 
Ribeiro and Jose da Silva - quoted in PINTO, BORGES, MATOS 
1974, 182. 
NOTE 20 
This living for the family included a great emphasis 
on family meals. This had as consequence that there was 
no willingness to build canteens in schools. As a Decree-
-Law said in 1952 "The canteen should only substitute 
family meals when commanding social or economic reasons 
impose it": the canteen· should never "inspire a 
collecti vist life style, so contrary to our social 
traditions and christian principles" (Decree-Law 38968, 
27-10-1952). 
A secondary school teacher told the researcher that 
he was looked as pro-communist, in the 1960's, just because 
he proposed, in a conference, the creation of big school 
centers where children would spend all school day and 
would have their meals. 
NOTE 21 
In terms of the total sample, due to the fact that 
family inculcation follows a decreasing trend (7% 6% 
4% see Table 3.6.), the same pattern applies both 
to conformist oriented references (2.7% 2.5% 1.1%) 
and to love oriented references (3.7% 2.9% 2.0%). 
Conformist oriented strategies show a lesser decrease 
from the first to the second period than love oriented 
ones, but their decrease is sharper in the fourth period. 
This shows that those references are more linked with 
New State menta Ii ty inculcation strategies than the love 
oriented ones. 
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NOTE 22 
In the newspaper "A VOz·, 23-2-1928, quoted in 
MONICA 1978, 140. 
NOTE 23 
TAMAGNINI, in 1936, wrote ·The nationalist policy 
must necessarily make return to the land all those men 
that the liberal illusion of an easy social promotion 
intends to 'unroot' from their -natural occupation" 
(TAMAGNINI 1936, 12). 
SALAZAR, in 1935, asks "It is often asked that 
the Government commands the people - to learn to read. But 
to read what? I ••• I I rely on -the depopulation of towns 
in favour of the countryside" (in SAMPAIO 1976,47). 
See about ruralism in New State MONICA 1978, 66, 
102-105, 138-144. 
NOTE 24 
Most of the references come from the third class 
textbook of the second and third periods (which lasted 
almost until the end of the fifth period) - indeed this 
textbook can be seen as the paradigm of New State mentality 
inculcation in all aspects. 
NOTE 25 
A text where integration of messages is taken 
to the extreme is presented in the second class textbook 
of 1958 (2nd, 1958, 53-54). 
A village boy going to school, observes, the way 
long, in the rural dawn, several rural scenes (rural 
inculcation). Then, he met an illiterate farmer who 
expressed his wish to learn to read. The boy recommended 
him the adult courses in the village corporative 
organisation "Casas do Povo" Iliterally People's Housel 
(literacy inculcation and corporative propaganda). Then, 
the text comments that everything that the boy saw can 
be divided in three categories - animal, vegetal and mineral 
(science message). The text ends remindig that Man is above 
all the other natural Beings, because he possesses an 
immortal soul (religious message). 
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NOTE 26 
Calculations for this information were based on 
the year of publication of. the .. several textbooks. Those 
who were in the second class in 1944-1945 were the first 
ones to be subject in the first and second class to this 
passivity indoctrination. Those who were in the third class, 
in 1951-1952 were subject to· the full passivity strategy •. 
The last year in which the 1958 first class textbook was 
in force was 1966-1967, since in 1967-1968 it was in force 
the new first class textbook.· 
This means that those born in 1936 (now - 1986 
50 years old) were the first to. be subject to the 
conformist oriented first and second class textbooks; those· 
born in 1942 (now 44 years old) were the first to be 
inculcated the full message contained in the first, second 
and third classes reading textbooks; those born in 1960 
(now 26 years old) were the last cohort to be inculcated 
this full message. 
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CHAPTER 5 
NOTE 1 
The role of centralization in the promotion of 
passivity in: the New State regime is congruent with the 
conformist attitudes generally promoted by centralizing 
strategies. But exceptionally, in revolutionary periods, 
centralization can be used to expand new ideas more quickly 
than other systems -.' see about this ARCHER 1979, CROZIER 
1964, 1970, 1977 •.. 
An illustration 
use that pro-communists 
portugal . (1974-1975) of 
control the country. 
NOTE 2 
of . the last situations is the 
made in the post-revolutionary 
the centralization to rapidly 
Many civil servants of the republican regime were 
co-opted by the New State - see SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 
118, CRUZ 1982c, MARTINS 1970. See chapter eight, sections 
4.1. and 4.3 .• 
Some republican politicians were also' co-opted 
- see MARTINS 1970, SCHMITTER 1979. 
NOTE 3 
. See about this SALAZAR in FERRO' 1982, 81~84, CRUZ 
1982c, WIARDA 1977, 122-123, 297, 305. 
NOTE 4 
There was an implicit agreement between the New 
. State regime and the Army -. the. State would not interfere 
wi th the Army and the Army would' not interfere· with the 
government of the country. -
NOTE 5 
Some important references for the study of the 
relationship between the State and the Church in' the New 
State regime. are - ANTUNES 1982, BRUNEAU 1976, CERQUEIRA 
1973, CRUZ 1978,' 1980; FERNANDES .1982, GEORGEL -1985,187-
-223, ROBINSON 1977, 1979, WIARDA 1977, 123-124, 299-300. 
When the Pope' John Paul II visited Portugal, in 
1982, several weeklies included important dossiers about 
the subject - see "Expresso", 8-5-1982 and "0 Jornal", 
7-5-1982 and 13-5-1982. 
Salazar himself was an important catholic leader 
before 1926 - see SALAZAR 1922, 1924. 
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NOTE 6 
Some of these measures were' - the expulsion of 
religious orders; closing down of religious houses 'and 
colleges; prohibition of the teaching of religion in all 
schools; nationalization of Church property; strict control 
over cult manifestations: prohibition of the use of 
ecclesiastical habits; supression of Catholic holidays; 
introduction of divorce for everyone; extinction of the 
School of Theology: etc •• 
For this see 'MARQUES 1976, 130-134 and FORMOSINHO 
et alial982. 
NOTE 7 
"To aspire to study the historical evolution 
of the Portuguese people by first removing, its religious 
life and" the mission of the regular and secular clergy, 
would be tantamount to trying to understand the circulatory 
system without the blood-vessels" says Fortunato de Almeida, 
a portuguese historian of the Church-(in ROBINSON 1977). 
NOTE 8 
Although the New State claimed to follow the social 
doctrine of the Church~ 'when created the corporative 
structure, the Catholic Church, was never submitted to 
the corporative organization - see W.IAROA 1977, 123-124, 
196, 299-300, 330. 
NOTE 9 
See "portugal's Clerical Fascism" in "Weekly 
People", January 27, 1962, page 304. See also'CAETANO 1977, 
413-415. , 
NOTE 10 
This cooperation between the, New State regime 
and the Catholic Church was clearly visible in elections 
time,' even in difficult situations - 'see THOMAZ 1983, 240-
-241. WIARDA says that the Church was part. of the state 
system (WIAROA 1977, 299-300). 
NOTE 11 
In ROBINSON 1979, 64. 
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NOTE 12 
From the characterization of european civilization 
as western and christian it was' perfectly, logical that 
the Church supported a regime which claimed itself more 
pro-western and more christian than the Opposition. 
NOTE 13 
This role of the Church as agency of social control 
was more clear, and also more efficient, in the rural world. 
NOTE 14 
In consonance with those ideas - to give to God 
what is of God and to give to Caesar what is of Caesar-
the Concordat did not give back to the Church the property 
confiscated during the Republican regime (except churches 
and seminaries) and did not abolish divorce (although 
divorce was restricted to the non religious marriages). 
But the Concordat' guaranteed the basic interests 
of the Catholic Church - it recognised the Church as an 
artificial person, it gave the Church freedom to communicate 
openly with the Pope, without any governmental mediation, 
and gave the Church the right to'set up its own schools. • 
There were 'conflicts between Salazar and the Holy 
See during the negotiations for the Concordat - see NOGUEIRA 
1978, 262, 1980, 457-459. 
NOTE 15 
MARQUES explains that the fact that no 
anti-Catholic propaganda or writings were generally 
permitted was due not to state intolerance," but because 
of the political advantages ,. of '" religious homogeneity and 
of continuation of tradition (MARQUES '1976, 194). 
NOTE 16 
-----_. ", 
The state veto worked the following way the 
Holy See had to ,inform government which'priest it preferred 
for bishop:- the portuguese Government had thirty days to 
raise objections "of general political character". 
NOTE 17 
This means that political differences within civil 
society had some parallel in difference within the Catholic 
Church .. 
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NOTE 18 
Due to this mobilization 
portugal was called the nation of 
song), football and Fatima (seen 
of "alienation"). 
role of Fatima pilgrimage, 
three F's - fado (national 
as the three main sources 
The strong 
message made it ideal 
anti-communist tone 
for political use. 
of the Fatima 
/ , 
/ 
NOTE 19 
The most visible episode of this dissidence was 
the incident of "Capela do Rato" (Rato Chapel) in which 
a group of catholics had a religious meeting, in 1972, 
to protest against colonial war - see about the "catholic 
dissidents" FREIRE 1976, GEORGEL 1985, 202-218, REGO and 
GOMES 1973. 
NOTE 20 . 
A high bureaucrat (the General Director for Primary 
Education) said in 1937 "The destiny of the child belongs 
to the moral; and the moral either is religious or it is 
nothing" • 
The . official ministerial magazine "Escola 
portuguesa n (Portuguese School) dedicated in 1940 . a 
sucession of articles to the theme of the christianization 
of primary school. 
NOTE 21 
The Minister Galv~o Telles said in the sixties: 
"I think that education must never lose and should rather 
put growing stress on the spiritualist nature it derives 
from the shining Christian tradition" (GALVAO TELLES 1966, 
42). So, the importance of a religious ambiance of 
education prevailed over the whole period of the New State. 
NOTE 22 
See Decree-Laws n. 26611 (19-5-1936), 27301 (4-
-12-1936), 47311 (12-11-1966) - for instance articles 7, 
8 and 12 - 486/71 (8-11-1971) - article 8. See below chapter 
nine, section 2. 
NOTE 23 
See Despacho 2/72 from the Secretary of State 
for Youth and Sport (5-l2-l972). 
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NOTE 24 
In po~tugal, due to its religious homogeneity, 
to speak of religious education is to speak of catholic 
teaching. So, to make religious education compulsory it 
was to compel all to listen in state schools to the teaching 
of the portuguese Catholic Church. This would be a very 
delicate policy susceptible of reviving some form of the 
religious question which absorbed Portugal during the first 
three decades of the century. , 
NOTE 25 
The personal experience of the author, as pupil 
in a boys grammar school from 1957 to 1964, confirms 
entirely the low status of Religious Moral Education. 
The teachers were appointed by the Ministry of 
Education from lists drawn up by the ecclesiastical 
authori ties. Most of the teachers, in boys schools, were 
priests. Neither the Church nor the' State ever created 
a course to train those teachers (the syllabus was 
formulated by the Church). 
This lack of. pedagogical training had negative 
effects in a type of teacher who had no other forms of 
power (use of failure or threat of failure to control 
students, influence in the general pass-fail decision and 
other ',types of power then used by the other teachers). 
So many Religious and Moral Education teachers were 
ridiculed by the ,classroom, ,others chose to follow the 
via of political indoctrination with a .religious "basis 
- very few teachers, in'my impressionistic judgement, were 
able to put forward some·· working scheme, for serious 
discussion of moral issues. (It is possible that this 
judgement is inadequate for girls schools). 
NOTE 26 
One important illustration of.:repression over 
university professors occurred in the University of Lisbon, 
in 1947 -see CAETANO 1977, 295-305. 
NOTE 27 
See FORMOSINHO et alia, 1982. 
NOTE 28, 
As MAKLER (1979) says "The typical career path 
to a modern .corporation in Portugal started with an 
assistant professorship at a ,university, particularly under 
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the tutelage of a well-known "catedratico", movement into 
an undersecretarial (deputy minister) position, and then 
either from there to a top industrial post or continuation 
in the government, moving into a ministerial position, 
and then into industry". 
NOTE 29 
This "catedratocracia" was also based 
importance given to the role of intellectuals in 
making - see CAETANO 19S0~ 6-11. 
in the 
policy-
NOTE 30 
See the studies of SCHMITTER 1979 and MAKLER 1979 
about this. 
NOTE 31 
The Minister of Education who was not university 
professor was Jose Hermano Saraiva (1968-1970) -. he . was 
secondary school teacher. 
NOTE 32 , . 
See MONICA's comment 
has about the "naturalness" of 
1978, ·39, 74-76, 87, 133). See 
5 , about the inculcation of the 
NOTE 33 
State 
(MONICA 
section 
about the idea New 
social differences 
also chapter four, 
sense of hierarchy. 
The reading textbook· was' "Livro de Leitura - 4~ 
classe", Joaquim Gaspar, Livraria Rodrigues, Lisboa, 1968 
(1) -see above chapter three, section 3.2.3.c). 
NOTE 34 
One of the reasons. for the non preparation of 
good elites is, according to SALAZAR and CAETANO, the 
bookish character of instruction - see SALAZAR 1933, I, 
274-275, III, 393 and CAETANO 1941, 32, 1959, 306-307. 
In spite of all this condemnation of the bookish 
method of the teaching this was the model followed. This 
may be explained by the fact that in the beginning of the 
regime to· form new elites· it was necessary to fight 
conformism~ but the same conformism was . convenient in· a 
normally working regime. 
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NO'l'E 35 
Freitas do AMARAL, the conservative candidate 
to the Presidency, of Republique, in 1986, said in a book 
supporting his campaign, . that in education, Salazar acted 
as he hadcenturies·ahead of him to formulate and implement 
educational policies (AMARAL 1985, 174). 
NOTE 36 
Arguments in favour of this solution - the creation 
of "postos esco1ares" - were mainly of economic character 
- SALAZAR in FERRO 1982, 135-137. 
NOTE 37 . 
CAETANO says.' that this compartmentalization of 
primary education between schools and teaching posts 
("postos escolares") was not intended. The real spirit 
of Salazar's initiative was to provide education for 
1i teracy through a person inserted in his community and 
not by a low qualified monitor who could be, as it often 
happened, from other community (see CAETANO 1977, 407). 
But if the implementation was really preverting 
New State . educational logic,' it would be always possible 
to change the process of implementation. It was·not changed 
for decades •.• 
NOTE 38 
TAMAGNINI proposed, in 1936, a triple track, by 
adding what he called the "escola media de cultura geral" 
(intermediate education school for general' culture) • ' This 
new kind of school should exist side by side with grammar 
schools and technical schools. It was aimed at those 
children of middle class who were not able to enter grammar 
school. This means that TAMAGNINI, in fact, proposed a 
double selection -a social selection and an ability 
selection. Grammar schools were for the able students 
of the middle and high classes, intermediate' schools' for 
the non able of. those classes (see TAMAGNINI 1936, 14-20, 
24). His proposal was not adopted, maybe because it created 
a too complex structure. 
NOTE 39 
"Feminine' formation" courses were'very popular 
because, they gave, access to Teacher Education Colleges. 
Commercial courses were very - popular ,because . they were 
those which" had greatest status due to giving access to 
white collar jobs. 
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In 1966-1967 the enrollment percentages in the technical 
courses were: 
- commercial courses 51% 
- -feminine formation- 17% 
- locksmith 8% 
- electrician 8% 
others 16% 
100% 
NOTE 40 
The increase of industrialisation also provoked 
the need to improve the literacy rate· of the adult 
population. . Thus the launching of a Campaign for Adult 
Education (see chapter one, . section 3.3.) in· a mobilizing 
style (see chapter one, note 26). 
. . See about the launching of the Campaign the speech 
of Pires de Lima, then Minister of Education (PIRES-de-
-LIMA 1953). See also CAETANO 1977, 407. 
NOTE 41 
Entrance examination to grammar schools were set 
up i:1 1935 (TAMAGNINI 1936, 6),· because pupils would· come 
to grammar schools without knowing to read,to write (MONICA 
1978, 335-336). The first: examination year had a failure 
rate of 34% (TAMAGNINI 1936, 7). 
NOTE 42 
The 
of Education 
this policy. 
·NOTE 43 
almost total underdevelopment of 
in Portugal would not. permit to 
Sciences 
implement 
In grammar school exemption from fees payment 
was given to 10% of the'· pupils; in technical schools 
exemption was given to 25% of the pupils. 
NOTE 44 
VEIGA SIMAO, the Minister of Education of the 
fifth period (1970-1974), fused the two departments-
Technical Education Department and Grammar School Department 
- into a single Secondary Education Department. He proposed 
and got approval for the comprehensive reformulation of 
the secondary education. So· this strategy of 
compartmentalization ended in the fifth period. 
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NOTE 45 
See also CAETANO 1959,.308-309. 
NOTE 46 
There was - higher . non university education - it 
was mainly the case of religious education (to prepare 
for priesthood) and artistic education. 
NOTE 47 
This inextricable connection . between higher 
educational credentials and social status still gives raise 
to dramatic problems in Portugal - one can have an indicator 
of this in the difficulty of launching a network of 
polytechnic higher education schools in Portugal. The 
populations dislike polytechnic and fight (generally with 
success - see the case of Vila Real, Covilha, Algarve) 
for a Uni versi ty in places where the government planned 
a polytechnic school. 
NOTE 48 
LEITE-PINTO was seen as an irreverent person and 
sometimes did not stop at criticizing privately Salazar 
himself. See a glimpse of his irony in his subtle critic 
of GALVAO-TELLES (one of his successors as Minister of 
Education) reforms in LEITE-PINTO 1966b. 
NOTE 49 
There was between LEITE-PINTO 
GALVAO-TELLES (1962-1968) the' brief rule, 
Education, of Lopes de Almeida (1961-1962). 
NOTE 50 
(1955-1961) and 
as Minister of 
portugal is probably the only country in Europe 
(and certainly one of the very few in the world) where 
compulsory schooling can be accomplished through television 
broadcasted courses with local support. The system is still 
working. 
NOTE 51 
Congruently GALVAO-TELLES says about school 
welfare services that the State must not concern itself 
with doing everything in this field (not even the most 
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part of the material actions), but should just to promote 
and to motivate without harming the healthy private 
initiatives (GALVAO TELLES 1966b). 
NOTE 52 
See about this EM!OIO 1981. 
NOTE 53 
The stay on rate- depended on the failure rate 
in the second, third and fourth classes. Failure rates 
in primary school education were always higher - see MONICA 
1978, 333-334. 
NOTE 54 
In the fifth period secondary education included 
also preparatory education. 
NOTE 55 
In HIGGINS and WINTON 1942. 
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CHAPTER 6 
NOTE 1 
See about this LUCENA 1976a, 133-134. 
NOTE 2 
This means that the opinion of the. common urban 
man is always inferior. to the opinion of . the. healthier 
rural people, since only this rural people truly represents 
portuguese spirit. See about this, chapter two, note 10, 
chapter seven, section 2.2.1 •• 
NOTE 3 
Another consequence was the adoption of a highly 
criptic style of writing by the' "intelligentsia" see 
MARQUES 1976, 187. 
NOTE 4 
See chapter two, note 1. 
NOTE 5 
This question was posed· by CAZAL-RIBEIRO· (1973), 
an extreme wing member of Parliament. 
NOTE 6 
probably the inverse statement is truer - .. the 
need to increase power compelled the secret police to become 
visible and thus its omnipresence. 
NOTE 7 
This phenomenon could only happen due to the strict 
compartmentalization of social relationships and lack of 
information in society, due to censorship. 
NOTE 8 
.. 
See for this LUCENA 1976a, .112 and BLUME ·1977 ~ 
352. 
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NOTE 9 
See MARTINS 1971, ROBINSON 1979, 136. See also 
ESTAOO NOVO, 1987. 
NOTE 10 
See about social changes in the 1960' s ALARCAO 
1964, FREITAS 1973, JESOtNO 1982, MARTINS 1971, NETO 196~ 
NUNES'1964, SAYERS 1968. 
NOTE 11 
One of the most repressive policy decisions, since 
it goes strongly against individual rights, was that of 
1956 which introduced the so-called "security measures" 
which enabled the Ministry, of Justice, under proposal of 
the police, to keep indefinitly under arrest (by three-year 
renewals of the term of sentence) all those who were 
believed to be dangerous to "society" - MARQOES 1976, 188-
189. 
NOTE 12 
See about repression of catholic militants FREIRE 
1976, GEORGEL 1985, 202-218, MARTINS 1970. See an article 
in the weekly "0 Jornal" in 7-5-1982, pages 21-24. 
NOTE 13 
Many compare secret police activities and role 
wi th that of Inquisition in Modern Times - see BRADFORD 
1973, 87, MARQUES 1976, 188, WIARDA 1974 •. 
NOTE 14 
See CAETANO 1969, 103. 
NOTE 15 
One must call attention to the fact that the 
ini tial incident which later developed into the military 
"coup d'etat" of 25th April, 1974 began by a conflict of 
status between. professional soldiers, formed' in the 
traditional Army school, and the militiamen-see GRAHAM 
1979, JESU1NO 1982. 
NOTE 16 
changed, 
since it 
war and 
country. 
NOTE 17 
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The recruitment of "cadres" for the Army was . not 
probably because it would alarm civil society, 
was 'a clear indicator of the continuation of the 
of its potential to disrupt normal life in the 
See about this ALVES-PINTO 1983, 30-34. 
This 
the Catholic 
strategy. 
means that the State 
Church the general 
imposed strongly to 
compartmentalization 
NOTE 18 
See about secondary student non participation 
in that period LIMA 1985, 62-74. 
NOTE 19 
There was a conflict between 
traditional academic costume ("capa e 
use of the "Mocidade Portuguesa" uniform. 
NOTE 20 
the use of 
ba tina" ) and 
the 
the 
See ANDRADE and BARROS 1957, CRUZEIRO 1979, LOPES 
1982 for the description of University of Coimbra 
traditional praxis. 
NOTE 21 
The decree-law was published without previous 
consultation to student's associations. 
CAETANO (1977, 481-482) says that Salazar foresaw 
the student unrest and so did not want the publication 
of the decree-law, but Caetano and the Minister of Education 
pressed for the publication. 
NOTE 22 
In Coimbra there was (and still is) only one 
Student Union for all the University. In the other 
universities there was a student union for each Faculty 
of Studies. 
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NOTE 23 
See the full text of this letter in RODRIGUES, 
MARQUES and MARQUES 1969(?), 213, and reference in 
RODRIGUES 1982. 
NOTE 24 
See about student resistance COMISSAO ••• 1983. 
NOTE 25 
Wi thout reference to student mobilization it is 
not understandable the mobilization within the Armed Forces, 
between and after the 25th April 1974, the appearence of 
various parties of the extreme (revolutionary) left just 
before and after that date, the general mobilization in 
1974 and 1975. 
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CHAPTER 7 
NOTE 1 
Both "State" and "Nation" appear in Salazar's 
writings always written with capital letters. 
NOTE 2 
Salazar considered, in 1947, that the rebuilding 
of Europe after the devastation of Second World War, 
demanded a strong State (SALAZAR IV, 267-273). 
NOTE 3 
See ASSAC 1964 about this. 
NOTE 4 
See about these periods MARQUES 1976. 
NOTE 5 
The new elite, which is the vanguard of the Nation, 
has to adopt the values of people, that is, the rural values, 
to be truly representative of the Nation. 
NOTE 6 
The idea of the originality of portuguese political 
structure (the "portuguese political experience" ) is 
grounded on the idea of "uniqueness" of portuguese essence. 
Hence the statements that portuguese colonization was unique 
(see LUCENA 1977a, MARTINS 1970). 
So 'as RATO said "Portugal goes under Salazar 
indicating to the Western world good constitutional paths" 
(RATO 1958, 88). This originality has influenced the type 
of corporatism the New State adopted (WIARDA 1977, 82-83, 
334). 
It is possible that this obsession with the 
originality of portuguese experience and the uniqueness 
of portuguese colonization' was a tentative to overpass 
the well-known national inferiority- complex in Portugal 
(see WIARDA 1975, 57-58, 1977, 334-335 - see also BRADFORD 
1973, 148, ROBINSON 1979, 24.). 
The motto of the originality of the regime returned 
in the revolutionary period (1974-1975) under the name 
of "original via for the socialism". This was probably 
fruit of the same dialectic between inferiority complex 
- superiority complex - see a critique of the pretentious 
of an "original via for the socialism" in PEREIRA 1976, 
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181-191 - see also WIARDA 1975, 57-58). 
NOTE 7 
Salazar's motto "Proudly alonel" reflects the 
portuguese political isolationism of the post-war period. 
This isolationism was justified by the fact that Portugal 
alone, among western European nations, supported with 
courage and firmness the christian western civilisation. 
According to Salazar, only_ Portugal fought what Salazar 
called "the winds of History", only Portugal -remained 
impermeable to the "great heresies of today". This political 
isolationism was based on nationalism, since- this had 
implicit the rejection of the currents of thought from 
which Europe did not want to run away (see chapter four, 
note 8). It led to an obsession of Portugal being right 
against the modern thought prevailing in Europe. 
This political isolationism is congruent with 
the cultural isolationism which feeds the idea of the 
originality of portuguese political structure (see NOTE 
6 of this chapter). 
Both political and cultural isolationism, through 
the deprivation of information about foreign institutions 
and ideas, facilitate the inculcation of passivity and 
conformism. 
NOTE 8 
Again Salazar built political - conceptions based 
on the characteristics of portuguese people - see chapter 
two, section 1. 
NOTE 9 
See Salazar's development of this idea in. SALAZAR 
III,-234-237. 
NOTE 10 
This theoretical system of social 
organization based on corporative principles 
in accordance with the social doctrine of 
Church - see chapter one, - section 2.1.2., 
section 2.2.2., and note 8. 
NOTE 11 
In ASSAC 1964. 
and political 
was perfectly 
the Catholic 
chapter -five, 
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NOTE 12 . ~. 
See about this CAMPINOS 1975, 25-27. 
NOTE 13 
In a traditionalist conception of culture this 
is not identified with literacy. Thus the statement that 
many 'literates were not more cult that 'many illiterates. 
But the point of the discussion should. not, ,be" this 
confrontation, but rather if it was convenient to provide 
all persons with the ability to read and write. 
NOTE 14 
A consequence of this umbilical relationship 
between State and Nation was to transform' automatically 
political opponents to the existing organization of the 
State into ennemies of the Nation, - thus the concept of 
the Anti-Nation (see chapter four, section 1.2.', c). 
NOTE 15 
There are many designations for" those "structural 
elements" ( Constitution of 1933,' article' 5) ',- "Component 
organisms" (SALAZAR I, 87), "living forces", "manifestations 
of collective life" (SALAZAR I, 92) , "basic social 
organizations" (SALAZAR IV, 259). 
NOTE 16 
As LUCENA (1979) says "Corporatism does not ignore 
the fact that classes struggles. What it refuses to accept 
is class struggle in the Marxist sense. It refuses to regard 
the struggle as implacable I as providing the foundation 
for societies and 'the motor of history', or as demanding 
a revolutionary classless outcome". 
NOTE 17 
See' Salazar I s development of this, idea in SALAZAR: 
V, 495-497. 
NOTE 18 
, The' true corporatism was deffended often in 
CAETANO's and sometimes in SALAZAR's writings - corporatism 
should be an 'integral corporatism (SALAZAR 'I, 345)" it 
NOTES OF CHAPTER 7 461 
should be pure and not subordinate (CAETANO 1941, 24-25, 
55, 61, 124-125, 1972a, 330) , it should be a corporatism 
of association (CAETANO 1950, 22, SALAZAR IV, 433). 
NOTE 19 
As CAETANO says ·Corporatism is not a doctrine 
made with pieces from other systems: with an idea from 
this one, and another from that one, liberalism is right 
here, but communists are right· there ••• Corporatism has 
its doctrine perfectly defined "( CAETANO 1941, 18). 
This idea is very much emphasized - see SALAZAR I,· 345, 
III, 130-131, 358-361, IV, 369, 491, CAETANO 1941, preface, 
13-22, 36-45, CAETANO 1950, 20-21, MARTINEZ 1967. 
This "constitutional rule of the new order", 
"framing principle of national community", "active 
conscience of our solidarity" (SALAZAR III,. 131) demands 
not only new structures, but also a new mentality 
"Corporatism .is not a mere organic formula, C ••• ] it 
represents a new moral and mental attitude in regard to 
economic and social problems C ••• 1 (CAETANO 1941, 75 see 
also ibidem 80 and CAETANO 1950, 26, CARDOSO 1949, 9). 
NOTE 20 
"The corporative principle implies the'co1aboration 
of free activities, that is, activities "promoted'by private 
initiative and developed under its responsability, although 
within the discipline of common' good" (CAETANO 1950, 11-
-our emphasis).· CAETANO ressearts in this speech of 1950, 
in a very vigorous tone, the need to mantain this principle. 
In consonance with this· orientation' portuguese 
corporatism should be a corporatism of association (SALAZAR 
IV, 433, CAETANO 1941, 24, 1950, 22). As CAETANO says the 
State is not the main actor in a corporative system (CAETANO 
1941,24). 
NOTE 21 
Corporatism· . means "integration of all . nation 
societies C ••. J in the political constitution of the State" 
(CAETANO 1941, 55 see also SALAZAR I, 87 and about 
corporatist suffrage CAETANO 1972a). 
This political system based on the organic Nation 
is considerated superior to the liberal democratic system· 
of political· representation and·· when fully 'established 
will restore political freedom (CAETANO 1941, 124-125) . 
. Corporations will be, such as the State,· sources 
of common law (CAETANO 1941, 24-25, CAETANO 1970a, 80, 
1972a, 330, MARTINEZ 1967). 
In a radical statement, in 1938, CAETANO even 
wanted to corporatize politics creating the "national 
corporation of politic" which was the sole party (CAETANO 
1938) - see NOTE 25 of this chapter. 
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NOTE 22 
Thirty three years later MARTINEZ was also saying 
that corporatism has the potential to fight totalitarian 
trends of modern states (MARTINEZ 1967). ·We will keep 
everything truly good and human liberalism had· (CAETANO 
1941, 124 - see also CAETANO 1950, 21-24). 
How was this done? As each of us is' naturally 
incorporated into several groups (family, local "community, 
church, economic corporations, etc.) this ·social pluralism" 
would impede total absortion of the individual by one of 
them. Thus the autonomy of all these groups, given by a 
true corporatism of association, is guarantee of a 
separation of powers which is more efficient to preserve 
freedom than liberalism (CAETANO 1941, 49-51). Thus the 
"pulverization of authority· that CARDOSO speaks (CARDOSO 
1949, 11). 
So only civic freedom was preserved now, but, 
in the future, even political freedom would be restored 
by a "sincere organic suffrage" (CAETANO 1941,· 125) - see 
chapter one, NOTE 7, and chapter six, section· 1.1. for 
the distinction between civic and. political freedoms in 
CAETANO's thought. 
NOTE 23 
One may make a comparison between the conflict 
between Strong State versus Corporative State (as two 
solutions which gave very different role to civil society) 
and the present conf lict in Portugal between Centralized 
State/ Decentralized Regional State. See about this LUCENA 
1978b, 1979b, 1979c. , 
Nowadays, the . question of· the . role' of the ' State' 
in society is a very important political issue in Portugal. 
Hence the pressures for a revision of the 1976 Constitution • 
. . . . ., 
NOTE 24 
The ,"PIanos de Fomento· were regularly produced 
-I Plano (1953-1958), II (1959-1964), complementary (1965-
-1967), III (1968-1973). . 
See about those plans. SALAZAR V, 91-126, CAETANO 
1959, 224-225, 1977, 402-409, 504-518. 
NOTE 25 
But CAETANO's idea of reinforcement: of the role 
of the sole party, ·the corporation of politics" (CAETANO 
1938) . - see NOTE 21 - may not be very congruent with the 
reinforcement he pretends of the role of Corporations., 
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NOTE 26 
As CAETANO acknowledges "We are between two 
fires -that of the socialist spirit and that of the liberal 
spirit". He adds that neither of them will thank the New 
State for the defense of what it thinks useful in each 
one of those spirits. (CAETANO 1956 in ZORRO 1969, 66). 
NOTE 27 
See CAETANO 1950, 5-11, about this gap between 
theory and practice. 
NOTE 28 
CAETANO acknowledges that in regard to the role 
of the State it should be avoided two different tendencies 
the centrifugal tendency and the centripetal tendency 
(CAETANO 1950, 25). See also about this CAETANO 1941, 49-
-56, CARDOSO 1949, passim. 
See as important secondary ."sources about . this 
subject of the theoretical cover given to contradictions 
of portuguese corporatism LUCENA 1976a, 112, 173-176, WIARDA 
1977, 83-S4, 105. 
NOTE 29 . , 
WIARDA and SCHMITTER, probably two of the three 
most- important researchers of portllguese corporatism (the 
third is LUCENA) , have different perspectives about 
corporatism itself. 
According to WIARDA (1973, 1974, 1977, 1979) 
portugal is part of Latin-American Iberian tradition. Part 
of the response of this Iberic Latin world to "the great 
twentieth-century issues of capitalism, industrialization, 
alienation and mass society" is the corporative model 
(WIARDA 1977, preface - see also WIARDA 1974), what is 
logical since natural corporatism has a long tradition 
in those countries. So the portuguese corporative experiment 
was not a "sudden apparition but· represented a logical, 
sequential, twentieth-century extension and elaboration 
of an older, deeper, 'natural' corporatist tradition" 
(WIARDA 1977,S). "The corporative tradition implies a value 
system. based upon widespread acceptance of hierarchy, 
elitism, organicism and authority" (WIARDA 1979). 
SCHMITTER dismisses the cultural explanation as 
having little to do with political. culture •. He does not 
find "very productive to consider corporatism to: be an 
exclusive or distinctive product of a particular culture" 
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(SCMITTER 1974 - see also SCHMITTER 1975b). 
From those two different approaches it results 
that WIARDA is much more empathic in regard to New State 
corporatism than SCHMITTER. 
NOTE 30 
See about the ambiguity of -integralismo lusitano-
CARDOSO 1982. 
NOTE 31 
CAETANO seems, to, diverge slightly from SALAZAR 
on corporatism themes, being generally CAETANO more emphatic 
on the defense of truly corporatist principles. 
It is not clear if it is a genuine ideological 
emphasis or just a discrepancy due to the different 
situation in which he was - he was not the top leader and 
posed several times as a concurrent regime's ideologue 
alongside Salazar. 
For CAETANO it seems sometimes that corporations 
themselves could as well adjust individual interest to 
corporative interest as corporative interest to national 
interest (CAETANO 1941, 25) and thus he reacts strongly 
against state interventionism in corporations (CAETANO 
1941, 1950, passim.) 
But even in CAETANO's speech there are also pro-
-interventionism texts (CAETANO 1941, 56, just as example) 
- see NOTE 25. 
NOTE 32 
See LUCENA 1976a, 161-162, WIARDA 1977, 85. 
NOTE 33 
See about the social role of mothers CAETANO 1967 
in ZORRO 1969, 59-60. 
NOTE 34 
The conference of CAETANO on the University is 
one important source for the analysis of the subject of 
corporatisation of Universities see CAETANO 1942. See 
also CAETANO 1949, 1952, CARDOSO 1952. 
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NOTE 3S 
It is clear that corporatisation of the University 
had much to do both with socialization and human relations 
within the University. 
NOTE 36 
The state should be the "pedagogue which teaches 
the whole Nation" (CAETANO 1941, 133), but Corporations 
should have an educational role (WIARDA 1977, 85) , 
socializing their members in corporative values, providing 
activities for leisure times, promoting a pleasant climate 
in the work. For this last objective it was created FNAT 
(Funda~~o Nacional para a Alegria no Trabalho), that is, 
"National Foundation for Joy in the Work". 
NOTE 1 
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CHAPTER 8 
The Corporative hierarchy was the following: 
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- primary organizations - Sindicatos (Trade Unions) 
and Gremios (Employer's Associations) 
- intermediate organizations Federations of 
primary organizations of the same branch activity 
- Corporations - they were the apex of the system, 
implemented only since 1957. 
In a political level the Corporative Chamber 
re~:esented the corporative interests next to the 
sovereignity bodies - National Assembly and Government. 
NOTE 2 
The member of Parliament. referred in .the main 
tex,,: is Jose Hermano Saraiva, later Minister.' of. Education 
(1966-1970), in a speech in June .1959 - quoted from CRUZ 
19S2c. 
NOTE 3 
One can relate this mistrust in the -capacity of 
Cc:~orations to incorporate segmentary interests into a 
ge~e:al framework with the belief that portuguese are 
i!".=.~~:idualis,: by nature and do' not like to cooperate or 
wo:~in groups (chapter two, section 1). But:there iS'also 
a " s:>ecifically political reason - it. seems· that Salazar 
ne,er intended to give political power to the Corporations, 
since this would upset the structure of the authoritarian 
re:ime (see \>;IARDA 1977, 149, 329). This means that there 
was never an ·organic democracy· (WIARDA 1977,175,.183).' 
In this Chamber representative of national interest 
(National Assembly) "men representative of great national 
activities C ••• J only reluctantly decide to take a" stand 
on questions of a general order for which they did not 
prepare themselves specially" (SALAZAR IV, 428). So good 
part of the members of parliament were civil servants 
- around 50% in 1949 (according to, SALAZAR indication in 
the same speech). Thus the general interest was probably 
administratively 'defined - it prevailed not just state 
like interests, but, in most cases, interests of the state 
administrative apparatus." 
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NOTE 5 
In 1959 the situation was somewhat modified -the 
President of Republic ceased to be directly elected and 
it was elected by an electoral college. This college was 
composed by all the members of National Assembly and 
Corporative Chamber, local government mayors and overseas 
provinces representatives. This college upgraded the 
Corporative Chamber for it gave it, for the first time, 
a "general political role" (LUCENA 1976a, 160). . 
But the reason behind the change was not in the 
least corporative, or even ideological, but just the 
opportunist motive of keeping power structures above 
electoral campaigns to prevent what SALAZAR called a 
"constitutional 'coup d'etat'" (SALAZAR v, 494). This almost 
happened in 1958 with the enthusiasm created by the campaign 
of the oppositionist general Humberto, Delgado, later to 
be murdered by the secret police. ' 
NOTE 6 
The debate about corporatism was one of the few 
ideological debates allowed (WIARDA 1977, 194), but it 
interested only a small part of elite. 
NOTE 7 
The needs' of the war were unanimously' chosen as 
the scapegoat for the kind of corporatism it had been 
implemented until then (CAETANO 1950, 14-18, 1966, SALAZAR 
IV, 433, 453-454). 
But the trends towards state corporatism came 
from before the War (CAETANO 1941, 80-82, LUCENA 1979b). 
After the War "the administration (did not] show itself 
very disposed to renounce so easily the' preponderance it 
had acquired" (CAETANO 1966). 
There were several occasions to reverse the trend 
towards state corporatism - the end of War in 1945, the 
period of internal. critique (1945-1950), the creation of 
the first Corporations (1957), the change of leader (1968). 
NOTE 8 
CAETANO (1950) says that -in practice corporative 
ideal have- been altered and transformed and if such 
modifications were allowed to go on one' would be in 
"presence of a 'counterfeit covered by false labels". 
portugal was a. corporative state in intention, but - not 
in fact. After, 17 years of corporatism -not one single 
Corporation had been created. It was the Second World War 
that compelled the' state to establish a "centralized 
control" of the economy. "The free cooperation, of 
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acti vi ties gave place to the discipline imposed under the 
threat of grave sanctions R • He pointed two great deviations 
from the doctrinaire principles - the excess of regulation 
and the excess of bureaucracy. The State dominated while 
corporative christian principles. were supposed to protect 
individuals from total submission to the state. So it was 
time to create the Corporations, but not· for them to· be 
transformed into ministerial departments (Direc~Oes-Gerais). 
As . to . the proposed (by Salazar) creation of a Ministry 
of Corporations he thought that it was a mistake. Since 
all activities should be corporatized all ministries should 
be corporation ministries insofar as they should have 
corporative spirit and work. in close contact with the 
Corporations. A Ministry of Corporations in a corporative 
regime would be like a Ministry of Freedom in a liberal 
regime. 
But . Salazar. created the Ministry of Corporations 
and this is an answer to the effect of Caetano's action 
to reverse the situation from a total state corporatism 
to a freer one. This lecture and other theoretical stands 
were useful to produce a coporative revival and an interest 
in corporative ideals and institutions. 
NOTE 9 
The reaction ·of National Assembly to the creation 
of . Corporations was not enthusiastic.' It was expressed 
uncertainty to what the creation of the corporations meant 
and what the implications of this step would· be (WIARDA 
1977, 201). This means that, within the New State, there 
were various members of the elite which· did not like 
corporatism •. 
NOTE 10 
The position of CAETANO was against the creation 
of a Ministry of Corporations (see NOTE 8 of this chapter). 
This creation was done against the little group of 
corporatist theoreticians who defended a freer (from the 
state) corporatism. But, at the end, Salazar's will 
prevailed. 
NOTE 11 
- . . ; 
The "parecer" (written advice) of PIRES CARDOSO, 
one of the important corporatist theoreticians was in favour 
of an horizontal scheme for corporative organization. This 
meant that CARDOSO wanted all the participants in the entire 
productive cycle of a single industry grouped together 
in a single corporation. If one was speaking of. the wine 
industry this would mean' that the growers,. day. laborers, 
harvesters, landowners, shoppers, boatsmen, processors, 
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import-exporters, bar owners and so on would be integrated 
-horizontally" into a single corporation. So there will 
be a Corporation for each major industry. This scheme would 
facilitate a system of' economic self regulation" a 
corporatism of association. . 
This system was approved in the Corporative 
Chamber, but it was rejected in National Assembly and the 
vertical scheme adopted instead. This vertical scheme groups 
corporative organisms according to the major -arms of 
production" agriculture, transport, commerce, fishing, 
industry etc. This system created less Corporations and 
bigger Corporations and facilitated state control. This 
time both Salazar and Caetano (then Minister of the 
Presidency, close to Salazar) favoured the vertical scheme 
and it the adopted one by the National Assembly. Once more 
those who favoured a corporatism of association lost. 
For all this see WIARDA 1977, 201-202. 
NOTE. 12, 
The . "Organizations of Economic· Coordination" were 
considered pre-corporative organizations aimed at 
guaranteing coordination while the Corporations were ,not 
created. So the creation of the latter. should naturally 
imply the extinction of the, former. So Corporative Chamber 
proposed :along with the creation of Corporations the 
suppression of, the Organizations of Economic' Coordination. 
But, the National Assembly diverged once more ,( see NO~ES 
9 and 11 of this chapter)and the ·Organizations;of Economic 
Coordination" stayed, side by side with the newly created 
Corporations. It was once more, the clear, defeat of any 
ideal of self-direction -·see LUCENA 1979c. 
In 1958 the Minister of Economy· (Correia de 
Oliveira) definitively transformed the "Organizations of 
Economic:Coordination" in permanent agencies of governmental 
economic control - see LUCENA 1979c. 
NOTE 13 
. '. ", . 
On paper controls over employers were still more 
strict than those over workers, but the application' was 
biased in favour of the employers (SCHMITTER 1975, 21).' 
NOTE 14 
For the social composition of' Corporative Chamber 
see SCHMITTER '1975a, 31-37. Civil servants and University 
professors were the occupational groups more present there. _ 
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NOTE 15 
The behaviour of the Portuguese Communist Party 
in 1974-1975 seems to indicate that they believed' also 
that it would be· easy to transform state corporatism in 
state socialism. 
NOTE 16 
Those similitudes between portuguese. state and 
eastern socialist states are acknowledged sometimes by 
the leaders - CAETANO finds striking resemblances between 
corporative administration and Jugoslav self-management 
(CAETANO 197 a a, 370). . 
NOTE 17 
For the explanation of· the evolution towards'state 
corporatism one line of explanation· is the.' study of the 
traditional role of the state in Portugal and deduce from 
the centralizing historical continuity the - inevitable 
failure of a corporatism of association in Portugal. Another 
line of explanation comes from - the study'·' of the· specific 
political reasons related with· the political structure 
and the nature of New State regime. 
Those two types of explanations do not cancel 
each .,ther out, so they should both be used. In this thesis 
there will ,be some reference to the first type of 
explarlation in chapter eleven (Conclusions). This 'line of 
explanation is not more developed because~it would clearly 
step out of the main objectives' and . hypotheses of this 
thesis. 'But it'is not ignored. 
What interests us most for the understanding of 
New State essential logic and thus for this thesis 
hypothesis - is to develop the second line of explanation. 
NOTE 18 
The Corporative Chamber did not perform any role 
of representation of corporative interests. 
Some authors say the Chamber was a "political 
eunuch" (BLUME 1975) 'or had: "pure cerimonial functions" 
(FIGUEIREDO 1976, 71), but, others saw. it as important 
(PORTAS and· GAGO 1980). and politically influential 
( SCHMITTER 1975, 3 0) • The reality is that although not 
a powerful body it had some influence. But where .the Chamber 
was influent it was. not corporative. and where - it was 
corporati ve it. was not inf luent. That is," its. inf luence 
did not come from the corporative representation. 
The Chamber was important because its most 
important members were appointed by the Government and 
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many were high bureaucrats (GRAHAM 1975, 32-33). Indeed 
the Government controlled the Corporative Chamber •. ROBINSON 
(1979, 49) even calls it an "amalgam of committees of 
governmentappointed specialists". Only one third of its-
members were appointed by the Corporations - and this only 
after 1957, since until then there were no Corporations.: . 
The Government transformed it in a good 
bureaucratic consultation body, filling it with high civil, 
servants and ex-ministers. One half of· the -members, - in" 
the first Chamber session, were either ex-ministers, high. 
civil servants, university rectors, civil - governors or 
middle government employees (SCHMITTER 1975, 34). 
Since the most important legislative body was 
the Government (and not the National Assembly)' it was the 
Government which benefited most of the Chamber I s opinion. 
But it would give its "parecer" -(written advice) only 'in' 
those matters which the Government would send to the' 
parliament, which were the very minor part. But in those 
matters the Government sometimes· could only ignore' its -
"parecer" at a considerable risk of embarassment (WIARDA' 
1977, 222). The Chamber had developed its technical side'· 
and this evolution culminated with the creation ofa 
permanent section which would work all the year round (The 
National Assembly only worked three months per year). -
CAETANO wanted that the Corporative Chamber had ,-
a more technical - role (CAETANO' 1977, . - 405) (CAETANO 
complaints of the -fact that sometimes National Assembly 
did not give enough importance to Corporative Chamber 
"pareceres" - CAETANO 1977, 348-350, 405-406). 
Besides this moderately important t:echnical role 
the Chamber had a political one it was a "body of 
political sensibility of the regime" (LUCENA 1976a, 163). 
As such, its debates could be more plural than in National 
Assembly. Another political role of the' Chamber was to 
be a collection of notables -(WIARDA··1977,· 233), a "sort 
of National Honor Society" (SCHMITTER 1975a,31). 
Summing up, although moderately importa'nt as 
technical body, the Corporative Chamber' did not really 
perform any representative role in regard to corporative 
interests. 
NOTE 19 
CARDOSO (1949) touches this delicate' point in 
a footnote ••• CAETANO hints, in his 1950 Conference, that 
one could be in Mpresence of a counterfeit covered by false 
labels", that is , one could have the "socialism without 
doctrine" under the label of corporatism (see CAETANO 1950). 
Indeed - the -state cannot be at the same time' the. 
strong national father and the promotor of the autonomy 
of the children. -
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NOTE 20 
Taking all what said into 
if Corporatism is not completely 
analysis of how the regime worked 
of the role of the state. 
account one can ask 
irrelevant for ·the 
and for' the analysis 
Since power was not neither in Corporations nor 
in the Corporative Chamber (see NOTE 18), since corporative 
practice diverged clearly from corporative principles 
(implementing a state subordinate corporatism instead 
of a pure corporatism of association), since corporative 
implementation was far less comprehensive than corporative 
principles (since the 1960's corporative services occupied 
just one floor of the twenty six floors of the still so-
called Ministry of Corporations-WIARDA 1977, 330-331, 
341), since Corporatism ended up being one feature more 
of the regime, among many others, instead of its driving 
force (WIARDA 1977, 330-331), in sum, since Corporatism 
it is not an independent variable (WIARDA 1977, 332), 
one can ask if the analysis of corporatism .is not 
completely irrelevant since it does not· explain us how 
the system works. ..
Such a temptation is strong, but as SCHMITTER 
says ·Corporatist institutions may not have been designed, 
much less used, to accomplish such manifest goals ( ••• J, 
but this does not mean that they did not obey conscious 
(if unconfessed) purposes and perform important (if latent) 
functions· (SCHMITTER 1975, 58). 
NOTE 21 
This was the first time it was created a department 
specifically for administrative reform. From 1967 on there 
were several changes in the type of organization to cope 
with administrative·· reform, mainly after 1974, . but the 
administrative reform is still to be done. . 
NOTE 22 
In the first Congress of National Union, held 
in 1934, it was recommended that in the subjects related 
wi th Public Administration the congressmen should abstain 
of personal criticisms (in Parreira et alia, 1982). 
NOTE 23 
The stability of Government favoured the stability 
of Public Administration. Salazar changed 50% or more 
of his cabinet members all at once only five times from 
1932 to 1968. Periodic changes of ministers generally 
affected no more than a third of cabinet members (MARQUES 
1976, 202-203). .' 
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NOTE 24 
Public Administration is still growing nowadays 
- see BARRETO 1984 (see a newpaper article about this 
subject by Alfredo de Sousa in RExpresso", 26-10-85). 
NOTE 2S 
See about the separation between Administration 
(Government activity) and Politics SALAZAR I, 61-63, II, 
71-7 4 , I I I , 3 8 9 - 3 9 4 , IV , 27 4 , 3 5 7 , 4 8 6 - 4 8 7, V , 3 0 6 - 3 0 9 , 
VI, 38 - see chapter three, section 2.4.4 •• 
NOTE 26 
In the beginning co-opted members were younger 
than afterwards. CAETANO was chosen by Salazar to work 
with him with 23 years (CAETANO 1977, 25). The average 
age of the first Salazar's cabinet was 43,7 years 
(SCHMITTER 1979). In the following periods seniority took 
its rights. 
NOTE 27 
According to CAETANO (1966) there was a gradual 
increase in the administrativt~ character of ministers 
and decrease in its political character - see also GRAHAM 
1975, 18-19. 
NOTE 28 
This fusion of political and administrative 
carreers led ministers to be administrative heads, as 
it was just said. But the inverse also happened - some 
bureaucrats took in charge the political decisions. See 
an illustration of this last case in CAETANO 1977, 188. 
NOTE 29 
See chapter six. 
NOTE 30 
Concentration of powers is traditional in Latin-
-American Iberic world (GRAHAM 1974) and in Portugal 
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(WIARDA 1977, 84). CRUZ 1982c says that Salazar does not 
reject separation of powers, but makes an hierarchy among 
them. 
NOTE 31 
In 1945 a constitutional change puts the Government 
as the normal legislative body not only de facto, but 
also de jure, 
NOTE. 32 
One can speak - New State as - a regime of 
presidentialism of the Prime-Minister. 
NOTE 33 
So- far was-carried this -Wdictatorship of the 
executive" that Salazar acknowledged, in 1965, that never 
succeeded in convincing sucessive Governments in--accepting 
the need of political support for their activity (SALAZAR 
VI, 376). 
Another consequence of this predominance of 
Government over other sovereigni ty bodies - was the 
identification, of opposition to· the Government· -to 
opposition to the regime (BLUME 1975).-
- For peasants,' power was something called, "the 
Government" (RIEGELHAUPT 1979). 
NOTE 34 
See about this subject - BLUME 1975, GINER 1982, 
GRAHAM 1975, 63 (note 5), MARQUES 1976, 203, NUNES 1964, 
272, PORTAS and GAGO 1980, ROBINSON 1979, 52-53, VALENTE 
1983, 356, WIARDA 1977, passim. 
NOTE 35 
There is a great fallacy in CAETANO's argument 
- . the lack of material resources and partially of human 
resources is a conseguence of centralization and unbalanced 
distribution of revenues between - central -;- and local 
government and only afterwards can be considered. a cause 
of this lack of resources. . . 
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NOTE 36 
The administrative divison Province did not have 
any important role in administration CAETANO 1970a, 
285-287, 345-347. 
NOTE 37 
"The ideological basis and the form of government 
insti tutionalized by the Estado Novo led to a system in 
which 'the separation between "Administration" - and 
"Politics" was very evident at, the local level.' If we 
consider "politics" to refer to decisions on public matters 
and "administration" as referring to the execution of 
previously decided upon policy, then we find that at the 
parish level most of what appears "political" is, in fact, 
"administrative". ( ••• J 
Unlike most anthropological descriptions of "local-
level politics" , the local" level in the - nonparty, 
authoritarian, corporate state was characterized by minimal 
and trivial politics, a far cry from the reported dynamic 
nature of political behavior in other small communi ties. 
( ... ] 
There was no need ever to mobilize a voter either 
for or' against, or to make, however insincere, a promise 
to a community that a road would be built or a school 
opened. The only way to get anything accomplished was 
by having a contact or paying a bribe. It became extremely 
difficult to realize any public goals; instead, ,- the 
achievement of private ends was' pursued" (RIEGELHAUPT 
1979a). 
NOTE 38 
It is obvious' that - this, situation did' not' only 
enhance administrative centralization-of decision - making, 
but actively promoted political centralization giving 
almost all the power to Lisbon politicians. 
NOTE 39 
As GRAHAM comments the CAETANO'S definition of 
Public Administration as the "body of decisions and 
operations through which the State and other public 
entities seek to assure the satisfaction of collective 
needs [ •.. ]. This acti vi ty is to a large extent executed 
through administrative services" (CAETANO 1970a) points 
clearly to the preeminence of the concept of administered 
politics rather, than' of corporatism as the dominant 
philosophy of the regime (GRAHAM 1975, 18). i 
.' r 
, 
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NOTE 40 
DAHRENDORF quoted in MARTINS 1971, 71. 
NOTE 41 
Law course prepared and still prepares the major 
part of portuguese politicians. From the fourteen leaders 
that the five major portuguese parties had from 1974 to 
1987 ten were law licenciates (other two are economists). 
The same trend, seems to go on, although now economists 
began to appear as source of recruitment for politicians. 
Indeed the' two' major portuguese parties (1987) have at 
their head an economist. 
NOTE 42 
HESPANHA (1982) tells of two cases of university 
professors who were compulsorily retired for having 
criticized the regulation of marriage in the "Concordata" 
of 1940 between portugal and the Holy See (no civil divorce 
for catholic marriages). 
NOTE 43 
CAETANO (1966) says that the ndoutorismo". in 
portugal - "every body,.. wants to get a license in: order 
to be . able . to' be socially addressed as II senhor doutor n 
inhibits the creation, in Portugal, of professional 
schools of Public Administration. 
NOTE 44 
All Ministers of Education but ,one were University 
professors - see chapter five, 2.3.3 •• 
NOTE 45 
For references in this thesis to the same subject 
see chapter three, section '; 2 • 4 • 4 ., chapter' three, notes 
2 and 6, chapter eight, section 4.2., chapter' eight, ,note 
25. 
NOTE 46 
For Salazar, politics· does need competence, but 
administration does - SALAZAR III, 274, ;VI, 38 •. 
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NOTE 1 
As it had been hinted in previous chapters (chapter 
seven, section 4.1.4., chapter eight, section 2.1.), there 
was never great theoretical thought about moral 
corporations - see FERREIRA 1951. 
NOTE 2 
It is ironic that the Catholic Church which is 
a natural corporation and was the doctrinaire support, 
through catholic social· doctrine, of this solution was 
never· corporatised. But the realities of power imposed 
over doctrine - a Church parallel to the State does· not 
accept to be subject to the corporative scheme. See above 
chapter five, note 8, chapter eight, section 1.2 •• 
NOTE 3 
As LUCENA says, the representatives of the moral 
interests were often appointed, not elected - LUCENA 1978b. 
NOTE 4 
See as important· sources about these debates about 
university reform - AN~LISE SOCIAL, n Q 20-21 i vol •. VI, 
1968, DIAS 1971, GUERRA 1970, NUNES. 1970, NUNES no date, 
LEITE-PINTO 1968a, LEITE-PINT01968b, RALHA 1968, SANTOS 
and SAMPAIO 1963. 
NOTE 5 
The university benefited, in' terms of power and 
status much more with "catedratocracia" than with 
subordination to the.corporative organization •. 
NOTE 6 . 
. . ~ . . 
. Neither. BIVAR' (1975)' nor MONICA (1978) . in their 
analyses of mentality inculcated in primary. school·. refer 
any significant corporative indoctrination. 
NOTE 7 
. , 
In the 
Administrative 
most used 
Organization 
textbook 
of . the 
of "Political and 
Nation" (AFONSO no date) 
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around 34% of the pages were about corporatism. This would 
be important if the' low status of the' subject did not 
cancel the indoctrination effect. 
NOTE 8 
A similar situation of low status happened to 
"Religious and Moral Education" - ·see 'chapter three; 
section 4.6. and chapter five, section 2.2.7 •• 
NOTE 9 
Several important members of the regime elite 
were connected,·· in some time' of their carreers, 'with 
"Mocidade Portuguesa" - Marcello CAETANO was leader of 
M. P. between 1940 and 1944. LEITE-PINTO, . later mini s ter 
of Education (1955-1961), was relator of First Congress 
of M.P. in 1939. Jose Hermano SARAIVA, Minister of 
Education between 1968 and 1970, was general secretary 
of the Second Congress of M.P., in 1956_. 
NOTE 10 
See about the insufficiency of family in the 
education of the new generation the following excerpts: 
CARNEIRO-PACHECO said in a speech: "But the State 
cannot ignore that the family, even when morally and civily 
good, does not have' the necessary conditions to carry 
on adequately its educative mission". So the school should 
cooperate with the family: but the school is also not 
enough for this educative mission and thus M.P. was 
created. The Minister ends up adressing specially the 
parents "from whom one could expect the first objections" 
- "the hour is not for objections, but for, action r ... J . 
The honour to be portuguese C ... J is earned by a continuous 
act of love for Portugal, which parents must teach·. to 
their children" (CARNEIRO-PACHECO 1936a). 
CAETANO, in his instructions written between 1940-
1944, when he was the leader of M.P., said "M.P. is above 
the school, in the same level of the t honest family and 
the Church": "Unfortunately one can not always follow 
the orientation of the family r ... J [sinceJ the portuguese 
family is often touched by evils which diminish or cancel 
its' educative' capacity C ••• J .'·We: are in such times that 
often parents need to. be educated by their children. ~ ." 
in CAETANO 1952, 8, and 36-37. . " . 
NOTE 11 
There are still other indicators of a totalitarian 
discourse at that time the Militia of M.P. (ARRIAGA 
1976, 22-24, 66-67), the threats of extinction of 
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organizations which opposed M. P. 
the militant cry of M.P. young 
Who lives?" "Portuga11 Portuga11 
who leads us?" "Salazar! Salazar! 
1976, 29, -47), 
"Portuguese, 
"Portuguese, 
(ARRIAGA 
members 
Portuga11", 
Salazarl" 
NOTE 12 
See chapter three, sections 2.6.1., 2.6.2. I about 
this period. 
NOTE 13 
In 1956 LEITE-PINTO is formal - .. It is wronq the 
one who seeks to find a totalitarian source in~the 
organization (M.P.J" in ARRIAGA 1976, 109. See also CAETANO 
1977, 109-113. 
NOTE 14 
Salazar had said an identical message to the-youth 
organization predecessor of M.P. - the "AC9~o Escolar 
Vanguarda" in SALAZAR I, 305-314. -
NOTE 15 
The categorization was done as follows 
PRECEPTS 
-Moral Education - 1, 2, 4, 5, 7,_ 8, 9, 10 
-Various - 3, '_ 6 
CONCLUSION 
-Moral. Education 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 24 
-Political and 
Nationalist Education - 17, 22, 23, 25 
-Pre-military training - 18, 19, 20 " 21 
-Physical Education - 1, 2, 3, 4 
-Various - 15, 16, 26, 27, 28, 29 . 
-
8 - 80% 
2 - 20% 
100% 
11' - 38% 
4 
-
14% 
4 
-
14% 
4 
- 14% 
6 
-
21% 
101% 
The numbers, refer 
or of the-Conclusion •. 
to . the number of ~ the Precept 
, ,' ............. ' .... '" 
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NOTE 16 
Catholic Action was an international catholic 
movement to facilitate and to lead the participation of 
laymen in activities of cooperation with the Catholic 
Church. In Portugal, Catholic Action was set- up in 1933, 
being- Cardinal Cerejeira the most important - promotor of 
its establishment. 
NOTE 17 
It was -not only the Catholic Church -w!'lich - looked 
wi th _ suspicion the creation of M. P. (see FERREIRA 1952, 
NOGUEIRA 1978, 21), but also the Army, since pre-military 
training was thought to be a task for the Army (CARRILHO 
1985, 317) - see also PARREIRA et alia 1982, 226. 
NOTE 18 
Differently from the reform of 1966 which tried 
to give a useful purpose to M.P., the reform of 1971 
represents in fact its almost extinction. 
The most clear indication of this purpose is the 
transference of all its patrimony to the new organization 
"Secretariate for Youth"~ 
The political situation of the Minister Veiga 
Sim~o, considered a liberal and looked with great suspicion 
by the mainstream of the regime, did not allow a formal 
liquidation. The new M. P. Regulation is just a verbal 
fa9ade to cover its practical disappearence. . 
The comparison - between the Regulation of M.P. 
(1971) and the Regulation of the "Secretariate for Youth" 
(1971) is done in Table 9.l-A. 
Table 9.l-A 
COMPARISON BETWEEN the "M.P." and 
"SECRETARIATE FOR YOUTH" REGULATIONS (197l) 
CA n:J.:~:(( Secretariate M.P. OF' A.-:::: CLES for Youth Regulation 
E:XPR::3S 1\ 'E 5 10 
ARTICLES 
16% 42% 
I NSTRUME:~TAL 27 14 
ART!CLES 
84% 58% 
1UI'AL 32 24 
100% 100% 
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It is clear that for the moribund'M.P. was reserved 
nationalist inculcation (without means to do it). 
NOTE 19 ' 
The attack of FERREIRA appears to be, by its style, 
a attack made in defense of Catholic Church in general 
or Catholic Boy~Scouts in particular. 
NOTE 20 
For this episode see ARRIAGA 1976, 74-76. 
NOTE 21 
There was some reaction to the 1966 Reform - see 
GALVAO-TELLES 1966c, 33-34. 
NOTE 22 
Due to this decay there were generally no violent 
reactions. against M.P. militants after the 25 th April 
·coup d'etat". 
NOTE 23 
As it was commented in the Second Congress of 
M.P., in 1956, not even the Army could act with efficiency 
upon masses of half'a million persons - in ARRIAGA 1976, 
97. 
NOTE 24 
All those resistince~ were to BOYSM. P., not 
to Girls M.P •. 
NOTE 25 
See about the: r~sistan~~ of teach~~s to M~P. 
BETTENCOURT 1983, 102-104. " 
See' about the. resistance of University '~students 
to M.P. chapter six, section 2.5.1 •. 
NOTE 26 
what 
"Mocidade Portuguesa" would 
regards mobilization purposes, 
have suffered, in 
the same withdrawal 
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of support that its predecessor ·Ac9~o Escolar Vanguarda" 
had suffered, once the tactical need which created it 
disappeared -(see chapter one, section 2.l.l.a) and chapter 
five, section 1.2.2.). 
But as M.P. survived and "AC9!o Escolar Vanguarda" 
did not survive this cannot be ~een as the whole 
explanation. 
NOTE 27 
It is probable ·that-those groups within the regime 
which resisted. to the creation of M.P. felt more free 
after -the end· of the .War, and consequently of the 
mobilization necessity, to express their resistances. 
The speech of FERREIRA (1952) in National Assembly (this 
chapter, section 2.3.1.' may indicate this. 
NOTE 28 
Other statements in the same ,sense are 
"Compulsority is contra-:nat~ram (s,ic,)".: nOne of. the g~eat 
mistakes of M.P. L ••• J 1S lots amblotloon, in the beginnl.ng, 
to encompasse all boys between· ages. X and Z .C ••• ~" .. " a 
nightmare which still hangs over. ( ••• J the organl.zatl.on • 
"Voluntary attendance is almost. the necessar,Y. pere~uisite 
to transform M.P. in a ~rue· youth organl.zatio? See 
ARRIAGA 1976, 95-101. 
NOTE 29 
. .. .......... 
. -
The·"League of the Ex-Officers· of Portuguese Youth" 
was a very important organization for ~the access into 
posts of political conf idence and for the general access 
to the regime elite. 
NOTE 30 
See acknowledgement of family educating rights 
-: in SALAZAR I,··341,·CAETANOl946 in ZORRO 1969,·61.· 
NOTE 31 
There is a great diffe~· ce in the way the 
portuguese regime and the contemporary spanish Franco's 
regime dealt with the question of private education. A 
comparative study will probably. throw some more. light 
in to this question. 
NOTE 32 
The implementation of· mass schooling was certainly 
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the important factor in this change of policy - see chapter 
one, section 3.5 .. 
NOTE 33 
Seminaries were important instruments in the little 
social mobility of rural classes. The ablest from it could 
become priests and this, in itself, was a social 
promotion, with great impact in the rural world - or could 
have access to other careers, after having given up the 
project of becornming priests. 
NOTE 34 
In 1972, by a dispatch (despacho of 15-2-1972 
published in BOLETIM OFICIAL do Ministerio da Educa9!o 
Nacional, nQ 1, October 1972, 189) priests could be TV 
school (Telescola) monitors. In the same year, by decision 
. of 2-12-1972 (ibidem nQ 2, December 1972, 135)' priests 
could be admitted to the process of certification as 
preparatory school teach~rs, provided they passed three 
ad hoc subject examinations in the University. The 
certif ication given was to preparatory school where the 
need of qualified teachers was greater. 
NOTE 35 
There were (and still are) several religious 
congregations specifically' dedicated to education 
Jesuits, Marists (Society of Mary), Salesians, "Doroteias", 
etc .. 
NOTE 36 
In the 1930 s the private primary teacher education 
schools were closed because the existing ones were 
considered competitive in regard to the state ones, and 
not complementary (that is, they were set up more 
111 important towns I side by side with state schools, instead 
of being set up in the rural interior) (MONICA 1978, 214-
-215). 
NOTE 37 
For a list of all private schools see "Guia do 
Ensino Particular", 1964 and MACHADO 1966. 
NOTE 38 
See for the relationship between portuguese 
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religiosity and portuguese anti-clericalism RIEGELHAUPT 
1982. 
NOTE 39 
It is worth to recall that all those policy 
measures should be confronted with previous republican 
policies. 
NOTE 40 
This same argument explains why Catholic Church 
did not press for compulsory Religious Education for all. 
: " 
NOTE 41 . 
Jo!o Evangelista LOUREIRO was later on, in the 
1970's and 1980's, one of the most influential leaders 
of educational thought in portugal. 
NOTE 41 
This . assertive position' . of, Catholic : Church' 
Hierarchy in regard to the: status of private education 
went on, in a stronger tone, after the 25th April 1974 
- see NOVA TERRA 1976, PLANCHARD 1978. 
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See about content analysis what had been said 
in chapter three, section 3.2.2 •• 
NOTE 2 
, . 
Besides expressive·. rules and· 
there are also rules about control 
prescribe repressive strategies. There 
to them in section 5.2 of this chapter 
six. 
NOTE 3' 
instrumental rules, 
of ·teachers which 
will be reference 
- see also chapter 
The information of secret police was a prerequisite 
for acess to the teaching occupation (as for all civil 
service) - this was one of the i~portant operational means 
of ideological control. 
NOTE 4 
The Law 1941, 11-4-1936, is a paradigm of a almost 
purely expressive legal document. Ten of its fourteen 
"bases" (guidelines) are of purely expressive nature and 
four have mixed character. This law changed the name of 
the Ministry (from Ministry of Public Instruction to 
Ministry of National Education), determined how teachers 
should be (poli tically) selected, , set up "Mocidade 
portuguesa", created the sole textbooks, determined the 
patriotic purpose of Choral Singing in,. schools. and 
determined that all schools should' hang on . the wall. a 
crucifix, created corporative indoctrination courses and 
detc~mined the general revision of syllabus. 
NOTA 5 
The c~ntr~iization score of·the ~nd·~eriod (1936) 
in the lowest both in terms of'period average (3.6 against 
a average of 4.0 and the nearest lower: 3.8) and in terms 
of . percentage of. control rules (69.6% against a average 
of 79.9%.andthe nearest lower 78.3%). 
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NOTE 6 
It was a double uniformity since the sole texbooks 
were uniformly applied in all the country and the sole 
textbook measure was uniformly applied to all subjects, 
since the most to the least ideological ones. 
NOTE 7 
From 1970 onwards curriculum control' went into 
third place. The implementation of mass schooling increased 
the complexity of school pedagogical organization and 
government, and this may explain that more attention was 
paid to those areas. In a central bureaucratic system,' 
to pay more attention to sQme area" means to increase the 
central control over it. 
NOTE 8 
GALVAO-TELLES tried to put into legal principles 
and rules all ,the educational areas from the organization 
of the system to pedagogical questions. The approach used 
resented of 'the' legal format which was imposed on 
educational matters. It was a trial to rationalize 
education into the legal-administrative mould. ~, 
NOTE 9 
GALVAO-TELLES published the "Estatuto da' Educa9~o 
Nacional", in 1969 (after he was substituted as Minister). 
The "Estatuto daEduca9~o" Nacional": was "never 
transformed into law. 
NOTE 10 
The 
(GEP-Gabinete 
of Education 
some conflict 
NOTE 11 
creation of the Planning Department 
de 'Estudos e Planeamento) in the Ministry 
created, in VEIGA SIMAO's rule (1970-1974) 
between technocratic and bureaucratic power. 
The State even controlled the female primary school 
teacher marriages, imposing, in 1936, the following 
limitation to individual rights - the female teacher should 
ask permisson to the Minister of Education to get married ( ! ) • 
The rationale was to impose that teachers should--
marry'a men of her economic status. See about this CORTESAO 
1982, 86, 230. 
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NOTE 12 
For instance, the rules about teacher duties from 
1947 and 1948 are still in force. 
NOTE 13 
The basis of the calculation is the following: 
a)In the analysed areas the counting unit (minimum 
norma ti ve uni t) average per Law Article is 2,96: 
b)The statutes of technical and grammar school 
together have 1 173 law articles; 
c) The average increase from 1973 to nowadays was 
445% (4.45): 
d)Assuming that this rate of increase is common 
to all educational management areas one has 
1 173 Law Articles X 2,96 units per Article = 
3 472 units 
3 472 units X 4.45 (rate of increase)=15 451 units 
e)To those units one could add several other type 
of rules which were not encompassed in the 1947 
and 1948 Statutes. But in order to produce a 
conservative estimate one only adds the ones 
related to the teacher as civil servant - 2 101: 
f)15 451 + 2 101 = 17 552 
That is the rationale 
conservative calculation. 
of" this crude and 
NOTE 14 
See DIAS 1984. 
NOTE 15 
The substitution of oral examinations by written 
examinations in grammar schools in 1936 (see CARVALHO 
1986, 776-777) may have contributted to enhance the control 
over teachers. 
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ORGANIZATION OF REFERENCES 
References are organized in five sections. The 
first two sections regard references about the New State 
poli tical regime. The following two sections regard 
references about the New State educational policy. When 
some source is important for both types of sections, it 
is referred in the political regime section. 
Both "political regime" and "educational policy" 
sections distinguish between the primary sources and the 
secondary sources used. This is congruent with the 
importance given in the thesis to the use of primary sources 
(Introduction, section 5.3.) •. 
, . 
It is not included in references the legislation 
used since this is indicated for each subject. There is 
also no list of the textbooks· used in the analysis, since 
, . - . .,.. ~ . 
this was already given in chapter three. 
The last section ("Other References") regard 
references of a .. general nature which do not specifically 
regard to the New' State. This' section does not intend to 
be seen as a bibliography of all important sources which 
could help to understand political regimes or educational 
systems, not even of all sources that influenced the author, 
but just refers the directly quoted ones. 
I hope this References format can help future 
researchers of the New State regime. 
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